NATURE OF POLITICAL THEORY

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

RETHINKING POLITICAL THEORY: BEYOND CONVENTIONAL BOUNDARIES AND FOUNDATIONAL DEBATES

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ABSTRACT:

This study critically examines the conventional approach to teaching political theory, which often marginalizes the discipline as a mere prelude to substantive normative analyses. It challenges the prevailing view that theory is primarily an "applied philosophy" and argues for a more nuanced understanding that delves into the nature of political theory itself. The study addresses common objections to alternative approaches, emphasizing the inherent fascination and relevance of political theory. It explores the intertwined relationship between theory, politics, and history, highlighting the historical contingency of human reason.

The study contends that political theory serves the crucial function of posing challenging questions and advocates for a more comprehensive self-critical reflection within the discipline. This study underscores the intrinsic connection between the substantive nature of political theory and its practical application. It challenges the notion of a singular, abstract topic called political theory, advocating for a more nuanced understanding that considers various perspectives.

The analysis of foundationalism, with its rich, immanent, and logical aspects, provides a framework for exploring different approaches to political theory throughout the 20th century. The study critiques the dichotomy between theory and the real world, emphasizing the need for a more extensive and critical reflection on the arguments, values, and conceptions in contemporary political and moral philosophy.

KEYWORDS:

History, Politics, Philosophy, Political.

INTRODUCTION

The discipline itself as a practice, which is the main matter of this book, is often mentioned in passing in the first chapter of most political theory textbooks. It's usually seen as unproblematic and something to get out of the way right away. The substantive normative analysis and promotion of a notion or set of political ideas, such as rights, justice, equality, and democracy, then often occupy the primary body of the standard texts. In this sense, theory is often seen as a kind of applied philosophy that is focused on specific substantive conceptual, normative, and evaluative forms of analysis, among other types of analysis. In this perspective, most texts that introduce political theory are more like introductions to a certain understanding of political theory than they are to political theory itself.

The following kind of comments are often made in response to any suggestion that theory be covered in a different way: apart from the possibility that it is inherently boring, nobody really wants to spend time thinking about theory. The idea says that theory is inherently a "active" or "engaged" discipline. It is thus possible to lose a lot of time studying comparative political theory approaches. The key to theory is to really "do it," not to observe it from a distance and ask yourself, "What am I doing?" when you pursue it? In this interpretation, the mission of

theory may therefore be defined as the application of strict, rigorous, and limited value analysis forms to political challenges with the goal of producing meaningful policy recommendations and institutional design forms.

The preceding statements are somewhat true, but there are a few quick counterarguments. First, theory itself has the potential to be inherently fascinating since it interacts unexpectedly with more in-depth assessments. A deeper look into twentieth-century thought really demonstrates how diverse its methods and interpretations of politics are. An alternative way to put this is that a substantive topic for political theory might be the "nature of theory." The nature of the subject matter, the actual appearance of the political landscape, and public policy may all be significantly impacted by one's theoretical approach. A theory will determine the proper subject, area, and research methodology. As a result, it is impossible to separate the theory from its purpose. In fact, political theory is the political object according to certain philosophers. This latter viewpoint is undoubtedly controversial, but it is still a workable and intellectually sound hypothesis. Hence, it is simply counterproductive dogmatism to continue reconstructing political theory as if the separation between theory and the real or practical world of politics was cemented in stone [1], [2].

A further reaction pertains to the "political" and "historical" aspects of theory. Politics research is inextricably linked to human values and interests. Political theory is not the subject of an apolitical, disinterested interest. Such immediate concerns are not abandoned or sidestepped in political theory; rather, they are simply raised to a higher theoretical degree of complexity and abstraction. Moreover, it is possible to see human reason as historically contingent. Reason does not stand scanning the political and historical world from a "god's eye view." It is usually connected to some auxiliary traditions or ideals. This historical viewpoint does not suggest that we succumb to relativism or even that we lose our ability to remain objective. It does, however, imply that we become more conscious of our historical context and finitude, and as a result, our concept of knowing becomes much more limited or fallibilist.

Last but not least, all political theories serve the same purpose, which is to constantly provide difficult and thought-provoking questions for political theorists to consider. The discipline needs systematic self-critical reflection to stay strong. My main criticism is that this critical reflection has to be considerably more exhaustive and extensive, addressing not just the "process of theorizing" itself but also the actual arguments, values, and conceptions found in contemporary political and moral philosophy. Once again, the nature of theory and the theorist's position are as mysterious as the actual political issues, and they interact and influence one other. This is a really substantial problem with theory itself, not a question of "meta-theory."

In conclusion, there is a strong correlation between the discipline's underlying substantive nature and the way it has been practiced. Furthermore, the notion that there is just "one" abstract topic or technique called political theory and that there is another item the thing that theory explains or accounts for should be carefully considered. This notion is often promoted within conceptually-oriented analytical political theory. It is an epistemological stance to divide theory and its object in this way: the theory as a neutral procedure and the object as the substantive issue to be taken into consideration. It isn't a factual item. It is, in reality, a controversial philosophical perspective on theory. Furthermore, from a historical standpoint, the conceptualist position presented above is constrained with respect to the actual practices of theory throughout the twentieth century. Political theory students may get the entirely unfounded notion from doing theory in this manner alone that a very specific, if dominant, philosophical technique is the sole or the only way to conduct theory. Nonetheless, a number of theorists continue to argue that the only strong defense of the discipline's applicability is some kind of rigorous conceptualist approach that is tangentially related to public policy. Any

other approach to theory might thus be dismissed as erroneous or as intellectual self-indulgence. Such opponents contend that political theory must prove its worth by offering specific, substantive recommendations for establishing institutions and formulating public policies. But there are other ways to make a living, thus it should be open for debate as to whether "utility itself" or "the utility of theory for public policy" should serve as the primary or only indicator of the worth of labor. Stated differently, this work is a call for a deeper critical examination of the essence of political thought in general [3], [4].

Bases

In an attempt to give twentieth-century political thought some structure, a formal topic must be chosen in order to make the story coherent. The notion of a foundation is the very simple intellectual issue that is being examined here. The definition of "foundation" is quite wide. It is understood to suggest a category of claims or assertions that are categorically preferred above others. This class of assertions is considered basic because it implies that its holders cannot resist deferring or referring back to it. Put otherwise, a variety of other claims necessarily assume this class of propositions. To the extent that this category of claims is essential, it might be deemed almost inevitable or almost unavoidable in any theoretical framework. A variety of additional assertions may be explained and taken into account by using systematic deductions and inferences that are made possible by foundational statements. Thus, foundational statements have a broad applicability. They guarantee the general "coherence" of many other claims. A theory is this cohesive collection of related claims. There are strong similarities between the phrases "metaphysics," "first principles," and "absolute presuppositions" and how I use the word "foundation."

The Western tradition has placed a great deal of emphasis on foundations, especially metaphysical foundations. Instead of delving into a comprehensive explanation of the inception of metaphysical or foundationalist analysis, three applications of foundationalism in political theory throughout the 20th century are highlighted. There may be a lot of overlap among these "ideal types" since this is just a suggested list. In the first application, the foundation is implied to be rich, substantial, or comprehensive; in the second, it is thinned down, transparent, or bleached; and in the third, the logic of presuppositions is more deeply examined. These notions of foundation are broad, immanent, and logical, as I have named them.

A complete, transcendental, perfectionist theory requiring some kind of objective moral judgment norm is implied by the richer basis. This notion best captures, in terms of twentieth-century political theory, the influence of philosophical idealism on political theory in Britain, Europe, and North America. "Comprehensive" suggests that a foundational idea may be recognized by its all-encompassing power—its capacity to explain. Therefore, the explanation's scope is what matters most. In this context, "foundational" is almost a synonym for traditional conceptions of metaphysics. Hegel's absolute idealism, Leibniz's monadology, and Spinoza's monism are a few examples of the attempts to analyze reality as a whole. The perfectionist component adds a "value" to the whole perspective. Here's when the basis transforms into almost religious doctrines. As a result, metaphysical foundations—which explain God, freedom, and immortality—can be seen as the ultimate and ideal form of human knowledge. This kind of metaphysical foundation provides the initiate the very essence of reality, which allows for the attainment of some degree of perfection in knowledge and practice, in addition to discussing the truth that lies beneath appearances. To put it another way, there are degrees of reality and truth, and a certain kind of virtue and character is needed to go up the scale of forms and degrees of truth. Thus, the acquisition of philosophical underpinnings advances at the same rate as human virtue and character development.

And last, this thorough comprehension of foundations also has a transcending component. The belief that underlying metaphysical resources are beyond the empirical, factual, or experienced domain entirely, specifically in some type of luminous transcendent reality, is the sense of transcendence that most vehemently opposes anti-metaphysical literature. Finding some rich suprasensible or transcendental foundations is consequently the only thing that matters. We can thus explain why the world is the way it is by using the transcendent non-empirical basis. The Augustinian God, the neo-Platonic demiurge, the divine artisan of Plato's Timaeus, the unmoving mover of Aristotle, or the Hegelian Geist are examples of divine craftsmen. This is a god's eye perspective, sub specie aeternitatis, looking in on human activity from the edge of the globe, seeing from a transcendental nowhere. Rather of explaining the "that" of the universe, it describes "how" the world is. It is important to remember, nevertheless, that the idea of foundation need not include any religious principles; in fact, it may be entirely secularized [5], [6].

The immanent idea is foundationalism in its second meaning. The fundamental concept is that without resorting to any comprehensive rich metaphysical statements, one might have access to a universal base. The main argument is that there are certain ideas that are completely self-justifying. Stated differently, the notion itself has the means for its own global validation and existence. Rebuilding and demonstrating these profound internal or immanent justifications is the job at hand. Therefore, the argument may, theoretically, pull itself up by its own bootlaces. Thus, a noble line of reasoning emerges that assiduously shies away from using the vocabulary of metaphysics or foundationalism—indeed, it often asserts that it is anti-metaphysical. The different versions of twentieth-century neo-Kantian constructivism are where this theory is most widespread. The implicit aspects of reason, action, speech, and communication are the focus of more contemporary versions of the immanent argument.

DISCUSSION

Genuine philosophical thinking, according to Jürgen Habermas, "originates in reflection on the reason embodied in cognition, speech, and action." Reconstructing the universal conditions that underlie all rational communicative behavior has been Habermas' focus. Fundamentally, Habermas is attempting to construct a universalistic basis from that which is inherent in human discourse and reason. It no longer makes the claim to be the last arbitrator, therefore this is not a fundamental framework in the sense of a "first philosophy." Therefore, it is unable to designate the different roles of the sciences as a single arbiter. Interacting with the other scientific and human disciplines, philosophy is increasingly fallibilist. Nonetheless, there is a kind of engagement that is fundamental to all communicative activity and is focused on understanding. This is maintained apart by Habermas from what he refers to as "social strategic action" and "nonsocial instrumental action." This basic interactive discourse consists of the kind of argumentation and clarification where we put off taking immediate action and where players, to use Habermas' term, try to salvage the legitimacy of contested statements. In essence, Habermas seeks to save the universalistic prerequisites for comprehension. Therefore, we may discern an overarching but obstinate claim to reason that is latent in the diversity of communication modalities and that suggests the potential for mutually reinforcing argumentative liberation. Stated differently, our communication activities have an underlying, universal, and inherent telos that is oriented toward mutual comprehension. It goes beyond any communication that is systematically distorted. As such, it has the ability to shape our collective political behaviors.

In a somewhat different but equally meaningful endeavor, Alan Gewirth proposes an ethical system as a set of descriptive and prescriptive statements that are arranged hierarchically and logically reliant upon one another. This endeavor remains focused on the issue of fundamental

immanence. According to Gewirth, "whether a substantial moral principle can be justified is the most important and difficult problem of philosophical ethics." The effort to rationally deduce normative rules from what is inherent in the idea of human behavior is what makes Gewirth's justification innovative. Therefore, the central claim of the argument is that "every agent is logically committed to the acceptance of certain evaluative and deontic judgments and ultimately of a supreme moral principle" just by virtue of acting. This is known as "The Principle of Generic Consistency," which calls on him to honor the prerequisites for action set out by his receivers. Gewirth argues that "adherence to the morality that is grounded in this principle is necessary for the very possibility of rational interpersonal action," which serves as evidence for the thesis. Its necessary location is the context of action, therefore every agent must embrace the principle on penalty of self-contradiction, giving it a strict logical justification that is also realistic. As a result, every actor is bound by a certain normative content when they behave in the world. Gewirth distinguishes two categorical characteristics of action: voluntariness and purpose. Opting for force is not an action. There is an implicit value judgment since the actor must believe that his aim is good in order to act upon it, even in the most basic sense. Consequently, "one cannot abstain from action unless doing so voluntarily or purposefully." Consequently, an activity has to be voluntary as well as purposeful in order to qualify as such. Seeking to achieve a goal or objective that serves as a justification for behaving is known as action with a purpose. Therefore, "the agent is obligated to accept certain normative judgments on pain of self-contradiction" when they take free action to achieve their goals. This means that Purposive Action's "very possibility is dependent on its having a certain normative structure," according to Gewirth. And the ultimate moral principle is rationally deduced from the judgments that are required to constitute this framework. Gewirth's plan ultimately finds intrinsic universal underlying reasons for moral rules that are embedded in all human behavior.

Neither Gewirth nor Habermas would characterize their claims as explicitly foundationalist or metaphysical. In fact, such an appraisal would most likely worry them. But from what I've read, this is only because they emphasize basic metaphysics in the more traditional sense. Though it is an impermanent basis, Neo-Kantian forms of constructivism are nonetheless widely fundamental. Politics and morals are still included on a fundamental basis. Neo-Kantians thus hold that one cannot contradict reason unless reason is completely and irrevocably presupposed. Naturally, neo-Kantians would prefer not to be referred to as "foundational" or "metaphysical." However, those who possess reason still submit to the inherent principles of thought, speech, and deed. The conclusions drawn from these bases are thought to be unavoidable. These fundamental underpinnings also make it possible to draw methodical conclusions and inferences that explain and account for a wide variety of other statements. However, in comparison to its complete relative, it remains a more restrained, tainted, and bleached foundation [7], [8].

The logical application of foundationalism is its third meaning. A formal framework is necessary for rational argumentation, and certain classes of claims are necessary for that structure to function. Thus, basic assumptions underlie all logical reasoning and argumentation. Therefore, logical foundationalism simply suggests that foundational analysis is the study and comparison of these "starting points," as every human cognition originates somewhere. Thus, the distinguishing feature of this foundationalism idea is logical primacy in the sequence of assumptions. Collingwood defined metaphysics as the historical science of absolute presuppositions. This is one interpretation of his theory. According to Collingwood, all of our statements even the little ones are responses to inquiries, and all inquiries are predicated on a presupposition. Answers to specific questions and additional presumptions in relation to other questions are included in relative presuppositions. Such relative hypotheses are testable or verifiable. On the other hand, absolute presuppositions are always made before any connected

inquiry and cannot be verified. Being totally presupposed, absolute presuppositions can never be true or untrue. Certain presumptions are 'to all questions to which it is connected as a presupposition, never as a solution'. In other words, they are basic or foundational. Therefore, foundational assertions or propositions communicate what is unquestionably assumed in every debate. Thus, the study of absolute presuppositions is metaphysics. This may be characterized as a logical interpretation of metaphysics, without getting into the intricate details of Collingwood's ideas, which is that in order to assert anything significant, one must first establish certain presumptions.

Therefore, the third sense implies that we need to rationally start our thoughts with a basis. In this way, the study of political theory entails being aware of the foundations upon which all political theory is based. It so shows where our thought process starts. It is nevertheless possible for critics to claim that analyzing any such basis is time-consuming and too abstract. But because all of the natural sciences are significantly more distant and abstract than metaphysics, it is absurd, as C. S. Peirce pointed out, to claim that studying philosophical underpinnings is too abstract. On the other hand, it is absurd to claim that the subjects of basic metaphysics are unobservable or difficult to study. In the sciences, most items are difficult or impossible to examine firsthand.

For example, supply and demand curves, gravitational forces, and energy cannot really be observed. The observation and analysis of fundamental claims that constitute metaphysics, according to Peirce, is likewise based on observation. He notes that "the only reason this is not universally recognized is that it rests upon kinds of phenomena that every man's experience is so saturated with that he usually pays no particular attention to them." Fundamental ideas so become an integral part of our daily lives. According to Peirce, "the data of metaphysics are not less open to observation than the data, say, of the very highly developed science of astronomy, but immeasurably more so." Therefore, the study of "general features of reality and real objects" is what metaphysics is.2. As such, it ought to be a fundamental component of political philosophy.

To sum up, this book explores foundation in a variety of ways. The several conversations are anchored as components of a cohesive whole by the usage of the word "foundationalism." A more thorough and transcendent understanding of foundationalism forms the basis for much of the political thought that was expressed in the early 20th century. This latter conception of foundation also provides the entirely unfavorable context for a large portion of the mid-1900s critique of philosophical foundationalism and even the denial of political theory as a profession. The revival of a large portion of normative theory in the latter decades of the twentieth century is supported by diverse interpretations of the immanent concept of foundationalism. The many efforts to identify alternate justifiable basic grounds for political theory within realms like nationalism, communitarianism, and the like are impacted by both the comprehensive and immanent types of foundationalism. The criticisms that emerged in the latter two decades of the twentieth century—postmodern, anti-, and post-foundationalist, as well as post-conventional—are negatively framed by the issue of foundationalism in general. In the final analysis, I see foundationalism as far larger than merely early classical and normative political theory applications, as shown by my utilization of the third meaning of logical foundationalism. Whether intentional or inadvertent, metaphysical foundationalism permeates almost all political theories, especially those that are empiricist-focused and span the century.

It is important to provide a concise explanation of the compound phrase "political theory" along with a few of its synonyms. Political philosophy and political theory are not strictly distinguished by me. They are often regarded as interchangeable terms. Is this a valid situation? This is not only a theory and philosophy topic, however; other fields are also involved. So, is

political theory synonymous with political ideology or political thought? Though many political theorists find this objectionable, political ideology and political thinking are really often seen as more direct cognates. For example, would philosophers or political theorists accept to be called political ideologists? Is there a significant distinction here? Philosophical anthropology and moral philosophy are two examples of additional secondary cognates with which political theory has complex relationships. In reality, it is debatable whether the work of the Rawlsian school of theorists prevented moral philosophy from being intimately linked with political philosophy. Given that the concepts above seem to be synonyms, should we be concerned? Other than the idea of ideology, other people may not be concerned at all. Some may choose to isolate philosophy from other subjects or to categorically reject the whole topic as being just too difficult to understand. Once again, political ideology, political philosophy, and political thinking might all be seen as being too action-oriented, too wide, and as such, they should all be kept separate. Nevertheless, there is nevertheless a constant overlap and symbiosis of these concepts in the European political lexicon, despite these divergent opinions [9], [10].

Even the compound word "political theory" is very new, at least in the sense that we now use it. It is a nineteenth- and twentieth-century creation. The term "theory" was often associated with derogation in the nineteenth century, when it was thought to be synonymous with "mere speculation" or "untested facts." Some of the senses listed in the OED reflect this. In spite of this, the term "theory" has been associated with "reflective thought" in general and philosophy in particular from its first appearance in European vocabulary. It is evident that theory follows the shifting boundaries of philosophical traditions. The ancient Greeks had a distinctive connection between theory and observation. A thea was a sight, and a theoros was the person who saw it. Theoria was the viewing of a show. Thus, theory was envisioned as acting as a bridge between the observer and the event. It explained the occurrence or custom. Theory and event were inextricably linked. In a way, knowledge itself was the unmediated experience. Furthermore, the idea that philosophy was a contemplative "seeing" or "observing" linked theory to philosophy and knowledge from the very beginning.

For instance, theoria in Plato suggested seeing a show. Theoria in Aristotle assumed a more instantly identifiable form of sophia-aligned intellectual observation and reflection. The companion or lover of knowledge had the capacity to see or perceive with the mind's eye. Thus, theoria effectively evolved into the act of knowing. Although theoria seemed distant, it nonetheless mediated between the observer and the reality. It was also considered as the finest 'walk of life'. However, the more recent notion of theory, especially since the emergence of modern natural science, is considered as something we construct and apply. It helps us, for example, to put experience facts together, hypothesis and then instrumentally change the environment. Greek classical theory, however, does not have such a dilemma with the reality which theory observes or represents. In Aristotle, theory was tightly tied with occurrences in the world. In more current use, nevertheless, theory is viewed to be disconnected from the world, and, notably since the introduction of Cartesianism, is prone to self-doubt over its own standing and its claims to knowledge. Theory consequently requires confirmation and verification.

The relationship of theory with the forms of philosophical traditions has meant that theory has been of necessity related to the present day, to the changing fortunes and character of philosophical thinking. Whether the ideas of philosophy are Aristotelianism, Platonism, Cartesianism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, phenomenology, Marxism, pragmatism, poststructuralism, or analytic philosophy, all might attract, unselfconsciously, the name 'theory'. Thus, political theory, whatever skeptics or critics may say, traces the fractured landscape of philosophical thinking. In this sense, there is a clear and evident overlap in the

employment of both theory and philosophy. Yet the situation is not exactly as clear-cut as one would anticipate. Whereas all philosophy requires theory, not every political theory necessarily involves philosophy. This is borne out in the overall pattern of political thought. If, for example, one studies the work of theorists such as Bodin, Machiavelli, or Burke, then this conclusion is more evident. None seem to write in what would be termed a philosophical way, but their views are certainly both political and theoretical. Even in their own words, it would be unusual to describe, say, Burke and Machiavelli, simpliciter, as political philosophers. In addition, most political theorizing throughout the twentieth century, would not be categorized normally as philosophy—this would notably be the case with empirical or institutional political theory, and much of what lies under the label of political ideology. One further challenge is that the understanding of what philosophy is also continues to evolve. Philosophy itself is not a solid or constant discipline. Consequently, political theory is not clearly distinguishable from political philosophy in all circumstances. At most, one could conclude that political philosophy is a con- testable species within an even broader and even more contestable genus of political theory. In summary, the term 'theory' is not a straightforward concept.5 It has a continuing multifaceted relation with philosophy—however, on occasion it can also be considered to be broader than the term 'philosophy'.

Finally, how does theory relate to the term politics? My own supposition is that politics is not an independent 'thing' which we theorize about. This judgement is more the pathology of one modern conception of theory.

The self-consciousness of politics is not written into the nature of the world; it is rather the outcome of a com- plex series of reflective critical vocabularies, which have become intertwined with and constitutive of practices. In this sense, politics is a rich 'world of experience', which already embodies the solidified forms of past conceptual artifice. Thus, when thinking about politics, we do not come to an unmediated natural entity or social object, which needs external explanation. Conversely, politics is itself a richly-textured artefact of reflective languages. The modernist separation of the 'fact-orientation' of politics from 'abstracted' theory is itself tied in this case to the growth of forms of philosophical materialism, naturalism, empiricism, and positivism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and its consequent seepage into common sense. The 'factual-orientation' view of politics is thus the product of certain comparatively recent historical developments in the understanding of political theory and philosophy.

CONCLUSION

This study has delved into the often-overlooked realm of political theory as a practice, challenging the traditional relegation of theory to a secondary role in political science textbooks. It argues for a more nuanced and engaged understanding of theory, rejecting the notion that it is inherently boring or detached from practical concerns.

The critique extends to the conventional separation between theory and the political and historical aspects, advocating for a more conscious awareness of the historical context and the interplay between theory and practice. The study further explores three types of foundationalism prevalent in 20th-century political thought, highlighting their implications for political theory. Whether the approach involves rich, comprehensive foundations, immanent self-justifying ideas, or a logical examination of presuppositions, the study contends that foundationalism, in its various forms, is an integral part of political theory. Finally, the study challenges the perception of political theory as a static and isolated discipline by highlighting its dynamic relationship with philosophy, political ideology, and political thought. It questions the distinctions between these terms, asserting that political theory encompasses a broad

spectrum of intellectual endeavors. The study concludes with a call for a deeper critical examination of the essence of political thought, emphasizing the need for ongoing self-reflection to ensure the discipline's continued relevance in addressing contemporary political challenges.

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CHAPTER 2

EVOLUTION AND CONTROVERSIES
IN CLASSICAL NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY

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ABSTRACT:

This study provides an in-depth exploration of classical normative political theory, focusing on its evolution and interpretations in the twentieth century. The analysis distinguishes between earlier and later forms of normative theory, emphasizing distinctions in thickness and universality. The historical roots of classical normative political theory, traced back to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are briefly discussed. The study delves into the regulative themes, traditions, and commonalities found in classical normative political theory, offering insights into its role in shaping political structures, institutions, and values. Additionally, the work examines how political theory classifications have evolved, touching upon historical, contextual, and cosmic perspectives. The latter part of the study scrutinizes the perception of classical normative political theory in the 20th century, acknowledging its resurgence in the 1970s as "the return of grand theory." The roles of prominent figures in sustaining this tradition are highlighted. Furthermore, the study reflects on the institutionalization of political theory and its transformation into a distinct academic field, exploring the relationship between political theory and real-world politics.

KEYWORDS:

Academic, History, Institution, Politics, Political.

INTRODUCTION

This talk of classical normative theory will just be a cursory introduction. Later concepts of normative theory in the twentieth century, especially those from the 1970s, were conceptually derived from the notion of classical normative political theory. The majority of the book's discussion is centered on this latter issue. However, I shall make further distinctions between thicker and thinner normative forms, as well as between self-consciously Universalist and more conventionalist varieties of normative theory, when I examine forms of normative theory from the late 20th century. Many of these differences have their roots in how the earlier iterations of classical normative theory were seen in the middle to late 20th century. Furthermore, nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought may be somewhat credited with the development of classical normative political theory, at least in the traditional sense. This last aspect will be briefly discussed at the conclusion of this section and will be extensively examined in the sections on institutional and historical political theory. Firstly, then, a functional divide is originally made between the late twentieth-century versions of classical normative political theory and its earlier forms. This section's emphasis will be on the former. Nonetheless, it is crucial to understand that proponents of normative political theory sometimes see their field as the pinnacle of political science.

On this point, however, there will be some reservations. I will first provide a succinct, very formal overview of certain common regulative themes and traditions found in classical normative political theory, as well as a breakdown of how numerous theories from the 20th century interpreted this legacy. Second, there will be some reservations about the extent to which we can effectively use this more antiquated conceptual framework.

Regarding the first point, many in the academic politics profession of the late 19th and early 20th centuries typically openly and explicitly acknowledge that there are a number of enduring or universal issues that date back to ancient Greek civilization and can be grouped under the heading of normative political theory. Thus, political philosophy seems to be the study of the Polis both literally and etymologically. As a result, a traditional canon of thinkers that spans from Plato to the present is seen to be a component of a shared, long-lasting normative project that centers on the Polis. Thus, some people see political philosophy as an ageless or universal endeavour. Formally speaking, it occurs when reflection achieves a certain degree of methodical complexity and self-reflection. It emphasizes on the goals, relationships, and coherence of social or communal life, often with the intention of dictating how we should live in the future. These systemic reactions are often produced by contingent political circumstances, but they are also seen to have effects and ramifications that extend well beyond those conditions. As a result, political theory explains the state of affairs, suggests goals for politics, and suggests means of achieving those goals.

The introduction of classical normative political theory is characterized by many recurring themes from a strictly regulative perspective [1], [2]. The main issues are those pertaining to our current social state, how it came about, and what exactly we need to value in this circumstance. As a result, there is widespread interest in the nature and function of public institutions, especially as they relate to the state, its representatives, or governing bodies, as well as in public laws and core values, which have a significant impact on the lives of all residents living inside community boundaries. People strongly believe that political or community life is more important than any other kind of human existence from an ontological, moral, and practical standpoint. In summary, non-political endeavors are seen as being facilitated, safeguarded, regulated, and fostered within a sufficient political domain. However, political existence is often regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the achievement of a "good life" a life in which an individual may achieve prosperity and well-being. Consequently, the methodical search for the optimum structures and methods to attain this good life and flourishing is a key component of classical normative political theory. Consequently, this understanding of the good explains how strong assumptions about human nature might be generated or fulfilled in political systems, as well as how to summon and use these assumptions.

As such, the selection of a certain political form of existence and an understanding of human nature often co-exists. The nature of people and what we may or might not anticipate from them are the overarching themes of the work. Political institutions' character and structure will therefore be greatly influenced by our understanding of human potential. In order to prevent factionalism, division, and civil upheaval, there is also often a widespread desire for some kind of agreement or the common good, as well as a shared fear of any difference, dissonance, or conflict within civic life. To sum up, the classical normative approach represents the idea that political activity may or does include shared goals, purposes, or benefits. These may be maximally thick cultural goods or minimally thin conditional rule-bound commodities. This last argument is directly tied to ideas about the usefulness of maintaining shared values, order, and security in politics, as well as the critical analysis of the causes that lead to both order and disorder.

It is acknowledged that the aforementioned concepts are rather broad and ambiguous. Even a simple examination of political thinking history would lead one to conclude that classical beliefs do differ greatly from one another on the aforementioned subjects. In reality, normative political theory commentators have often made further distinctions between different "traditions" of theory in an effort to categorize and explain the variation. However, there are other classification schemes for the more traditional varieties of classical political theory.

Nothing has been definitively classified. However, a classification is more of an analytical tool, a method of approaching the content. These customs were essentially "invented" after the event. In this manner, history is ever present.

There is a tendency for the historical classification of theory to change depending on the political theory interpretation. Political thought historians often choose very sophisticated contextual classifications that concentrate on more extensive or substantial periodization. Classical Greek, early, middle, and late medieval, early modern, modern, and so on are covered in these. After that, each step often serves as a micro-focus for subsequent, in-depth classifications. These are now considered the "stock-in-trade" of the several political philosophy histories. The many languages of political theory, including natural law, classical or civic republicanism, classical political economics, and the science of politics, may also be simplified from this more complicated framework. Compared to political idea historians, those who are more interested in twentieth-century advancements in moral and political philosophy prefer far simpler, less contextually-sensitive classifications.

As a result, terms like deontology and consequentialism are used to describe a wide variety of topics. Leo Strauss and others have offered more spectacular cosmic classifications of normative political philosophy. The subject of Strauss's writing was cultural crises. For instance, he saw three successive "waves of modernity" that resulted in the development of a sharp division between contemporary and classical political thought. Therefore, according to Strauss, Machiavelli who is recognized as the father of modern political philosophy started the first wave.

It is believed that Machiavelli essentially placed politics before morals and religion. The second wave, linked to Rousseau, looks to historical norms that are dependent for moral standards. According to Strauss, the latter phase established the conceptual foundation for subsequent German historicism and idealism. Nietzsche and Heidegger took a significant lead in starting the third wave. It added the idea of nihilism and rejected the process' logic while retaining the historicism and insights of Rousseau and German Idealism. According to Strauss, Heidegger represents the most extreme manifestation of the third wave's self-conscious modernity. Thus, Strauss was adamant that a line had to be drawn between classical and modern political philosophy.3 In a similar vein, Dante Germino identified three cosmic phases or traditions in political theory: messianic humanism, anthropocentric humanism, and theocentric humanism. This is another archetypal history of political thought. W and this have some rough similarities as well. H. Greenleaf's unique classification of political philosophy traditions according to rationalism, empiricism, and order [3], [4].

A more in-depth examination of each of the aforementioned classification styles—from the more commonplace contextualist historical perspective to the cosmically dramatic—might be warranted. There is no indication that they should be interpreted as anything other than "ideal types," however, since the classification used here concentrates on a few broad intellectual tendencies that are interpreted as extremely generic indicating signposts. The first category is concerned with nature and order.

The fundamental idea is that all human will, intellect, and judgment are governed by a complicated, predetermined, unchanging, and typically divine order. All legitimacy, power, responsibility, and obligation are based on these structures and regulations. This global pre-structured nature also includes law and justice. Theory's job is to find that order, explain it, and demonstrate how it affects the world—that is, how the world's legal and political institutions may be adjusted and modified to reflect this innate teleology or underlying purpose. This lineage is linked to the general philosophic trends of medieval Christianity, Platonism, and

Aristotelianism. It also has a close resemblance to the ancient doctrine of natural law. In this sense, ethics refers to preexisting, universally applicable acceptable principles. The modern take on this heritage may be seen more subtly in cosmopolitanism and some human rights theories, generally without overt teleology or metaphysics.

Empiricist tradition is the second. The question of human volition and artifice is raised by this. This is the tradition that systematically develops from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, despite its origins in ancient Greek ideas. Reason and faith are not the same thing. Reason is more concerned with the concepts of free choice, autonomy, and artifice.

It focuses on how important it is for people to have interests, preferences, needs, and desires. Moreover, it is inclined to be skeptical of broad knowledge assertions and places greater emphasis on gathering actual evidence, facts, and information about human behavior in order to verify or test generalizations. Advancements in human understanding will eventually lead to improvements. According to this interpretation, politics is a product of effective technological implementation or global governance.

Although Machiavelli is often cited as another important figure, Thomas Hobbes is one of the most prominent representatives of this school from the seventeenth century. According to this school, ethics is based on human impulses and wants. As a result, moral principles are susceptible to changing human desires, emotions, and the circumstances around them.

Furthermore, it raises the possibility of moral and political behavior becoming more dubious, unpredictable, and specific due to this possible susceptibility and unpredictability. Simply said, morality may be reduced to expediency and caution. Arguments from contractarians thrive in this context.

Political order, sovereignty, and state reason all become crucial. Given the variety of personal interests, order must be ensured. Additionally, it becomes important to consider how different people might coordinate their preferences and needs. One way is by coercion or force. Nonetheless, in the 20th century, ideologies like liberalism have typically supported welfare, education, self-regulating markets, and the promotion of consent, contract, and public reasoning as more respectable means of resolving conflicts.

DISCUSSION

Historical rationale is the third tradition. The argument that every human existence is contingent upon the historical and social context is the main focus of this. This is essential to the historical and sociological viewpoints in many respects as well. Thus, all people are seen as being children of their own time. They are unable to avoid their fate. Because of this, human nature is contingent, malleable, and devoid of a fixed essence. There are no universal interests among humans. Ethics are contingent on an individual's social context. Rich and decisive moral standards are possible, but often at the expense of any universality. This broad view seems to be the origin of many contemporary conventionalists, communitarians, multiculturalists, and nationalists. In this tradition, however, a lot relies on whether historical contingency is linked to a teleology of liberation or something like. An underlying teleology in authors like Burke, Hegel, or Marx may explain historical developments in terms of a series of events having a larger purpose. But if the teleology is abstracted away, history loses any meaning and becomes more of a matter of random chance. For the most part, this is the viewpoint of postmodern authors. According to Foucault, for instance, genealogy is an analytical method that does not include teleology and makes use of compelling narratives of historical mutation and social reduction.

The three traditions mentioned above are essentially modern artifacts. Some political theorists combine elements of many of these traditions. As a means of orienting knowledge, they should be seen as suggestive cartographical references that will be revisited throughout the mapping of political theory. They don't point to an earlier reality.

Now, let's turn briefly to how classical normative political theory was seen in the 20th century. It is widely assumed that there has been a lengthy, ongoing, and coherent political discourse that dates back to the Greeks. The general category of normative theory is thought to include all theories whose main emphasis has been on establishing norms, prescribing behaviors, and endorsing certain lifestyles and institutional frameworks. As a result, the whole of the traditional understanding of political theory is covered by normative theory as a broad category. Some people lost touch with this custom throughout the first half of the 20th century, but it was revived in the 1970s. Thus, it represents what some contemporary observers have dubbed "the return of grand the- ory." The notion of "return" is significant since other influential strands of twentieth-century political philosophy have either rejected or devalued it. In Part Two, these "other" industries will be covered in more depth. However, in the latter two decades of the 20th century, these other areas of political theory also lost some of their significance. Indeed, in retrospect, such narratives have come to be seen as just odd in some situations—for instance, the argument about the demise of political theory. Therefore, by the end of the twentieth century, normative theory seems to have made a complete comeback in this more inclusive reading. In the latter three decades of the 20th century, a significant amount of political theory's normative work has purposefully positioned itself in this conventional setting [5], [6].

It is also accurate to state that a large number of prominent figures in early to mid-1900s political theory, including Friedrich Hayek, Yves Simon, Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, Hannah Arendt, Michael Oakeshott, and many others, felt they were a part of this continuous grand normative tradition. This was an instance of a robust and ongoing tradition rather than one that had been broken. Furthermore, the academic institutionalization of the standard history of political thought textbooks occurred throughout the early to mid-1900s. Once again, this supported the idea of an uninterrupted normative tradition inside oneself. How could anybody possible question the continuation of this ancient custom when several academic works attest to its existence? This self-perception of an ongoing normative legacy has persisted unabatedly in late twentieth-century philosophy.

Aside from the aforementioned mainstream theorists, it's paradoxical that during the 1940s through the 1970s, the majority of popular political theory textbooks adopted a little more circumspect or even conservative stance toward normative theory. This hesitation stems from the points raised above, such as the fact that direct normativism was temporarily devalued by Anglophone conceptualist analytic theory, which was the more prevalent viewpoint. Therefore, it was evident that conceptual understanding, thorough investigation, and objective judgment were more important than normative or prescriptive recommendations. The illusive notion of "conceptual evaluation," which is often a slang term for a more deceitful normativism, is the closest thing one can get to normativism. According to popular wisdom, under the analytical conceptualist perspective, a political idea undergoes "evaluation" after "rigorous analysis" (the adjective "rigor" conferring a covert symbolic imprimatur), and then, somehow, one's interpretation of the concept emerges as the preferred reading.

These textbooks may take a variety of forms, from minimally restricted analytic conservatism to a more conciliatory evaluative stance. The overall theme is an assessment coupled with a thorough conceptual examination, while sometimes just one component is highlighted. For example, political theorist Andrew Hacker believed that improving conceptual clarity and comprehension was the primary objective of political theory. Political theory was defined as

"systematic thinking about the purposes of government" by John Plamenatz in a more well-known definition from 1960. In a well-known work from the 1970s and 1980s, David Raphael defined political theory as "the critical evaluation of beliefs and the clarification of concepts." Alan Gewirth defined political theory as "the moral evaluation of power." Even after this time, the same general themes continue to recur. Therefore, when David Miller defines political theory as "systematic reflection on the nature and purposes of government," he is emulating Plamenatz exactly. As "the project of evaluating the different social structures that political activity enables us to contemplate as alternatives," political theory was defined by Philip Pettit. This is a normative endeavor, according to him, with the goal of "evaluating rather than explaining." Though they nevertheless come from a more detached conceptualist and evaluative perspective, Will Kymlicka or Jean Hampton's introductions are also more directly focused on strict normativism.

The numerous "traditions" that underpin the traditional normative perspective are not well acknowledged by the majority of the aforementioned philosophers. Political thinking historians are typically seen as the experts on complex traditions. Because of this, the conventional wisdom on what many consider to be the classical normative political theory tradition is peculiarly narrow and biased. For many, "presentism" is the main idea of political philosophy. Dealing with the present and its many political issues is more important than daydreaming about the past. This means that only certain aspects of modern normative theory such as the empiricist tradition seem to be aware of or interested in the intricate origins of many of their own concepts. The historical tradition, which holds that virtues cannot be universal but are instead a manifestation of their particular time and place moral, political, philosophical, and religious beliefs all reflecting a contingent sense of place as well as this historical history seem to be lost on them.

In many respects, Thomas Kuhn's works on paradigms in natural science which, upon publication, proliferated in the vocabularies of the social sciences and humanities appear to represent one of the more recent and well-known faces of this historical contingency and mutability argument. Still, this did not stop a number of capable political theorists from putting out universalistic ideas far into the twentieth century and seeming unfazed by the intricate and exhaustively studied arguments of the historical reason tradition. Again, however, the significance of these historical arguments has obviously worried a lot of other people in the 20th century. Indeed, some of the profound unease that characterized political thought at the end of the twentieth century, especially with regard to concerns like international justice, universal human rights, and the survival of nationalism, was concentrated on historicist argumentation. The arguments put out by authors like Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michael Oakeshott, Benedetto Croce, Wilhelm Dilthey, and many more are undoubtedly still far from being properly evaluated.

It is also necessary to raise another argument that casts doubt on the foundations of traditional classical normative political theory. This is an argument that will come up again. The normative argument's main thrust is the assertion that a tradition of thinking that dates back to the ancient Greeks can be traced to the twentieth century. We should not lose sight of the fact that all history is still current history, even in light of my short review of the three traditions of thought. Additionally, the concept of a "continuous practice" connecting normative political philosophy from the past to the present is under dispute. It is worthwhile to examine if political theory has a distinct history while pondering the current and future conditions of political philosophy [5], [7].

These days, it is somewhat usual to hear the phrase "political theory" and to work as a political theorist. They didn't, however, become widely used until the middle of the 20th century in

certain professional academic contexts. It is now very easy for us to identify ourselves as "political philosophers" or "political theorists" and be understood. It is also a prevalent assumption that these animals have existed from the time of the Greeks till the present. Based on the surface, it seems reasonable to assume this. However, if we take a minute to reflect, we could wonder whether thinkers like Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Montesquieu, Machiavelli, Burke, Adam Smith, Hume, Kant, Herder, Hegel, or T. H. Green ever considered themselves to be uniquely political theorists. Did they delineate, or clearly distinguish, the domains of political theory from moral philosophy, political economics, history, psychology, and metaphysics? Did they both comprehend politics in the same way? The quick response to the previous queries is unquestionably no. Political theorists, or even principally political philosophers, were not how Hume, Burke, Kant, Hegel, J. S. Mill, or T. H. Green saw themselves. Instead, they were philosophers, and as part of their theoretical work, they discussed a topic that we may not even be familiar with: politics. Political economics, psychology, and morality were frequently though not always closely related to politics. Thus, political philosophy or political theory was not seen as a completely separate or exclusive field that could be distinguished in the way that we do today.

The twentieth century gave rise, in large part, to the exclusive notion of political theory as a distinct field with a canon of eminent scholars and well-defined curriculum. In the middle to late nineteenth century, the concept of the canon of "great theorists" was first proposed, and it further evolved in the twentieth century. It wasn't until the middle of the 20th century that political theory started to get more scholarly traction, and it wasn't until the 1970s that it started to appear in independent journals and gain greater institutional acceptance. The idea of a coherent, articulate endeavor that was momentarily lost or killed and then discovered or revived is thus unconvincing. More like a present-day imposition. In the 1970s, political philosophy emerged as a distinct academic field and profession, making it an extremely rare endeavor.

At the late 19th and early 20th centuries, political studies at universities became more academic and professional, which contributed to the subject's overall process of steady consolidation. Political theory's "action orientation" was often dismissed in academic settings. Thus, there has always been concern about how political studies and real politics relate to one another. As a result, there is a distinction between the political theory of the twentieth century, which is an entirely university-based academic profession, and the collection of issues that were loosely grouped under the heading political philosophy or political theory in the ancient, pre-modern, and early modern eras. Presently, political theorists mostly discuss with other political theorists. Few consider addressing themselves to a readership outside of this context, except in very uncommon or remorseful circumstances. Before it was institutionalized and professionalized, what could be unapologetically referred to as political theory often spoke to more urgent senses of political urgency if not the general public directly. This is by no means an absolute distinction, but it is evident that contemporary political theory is more driven by the inherent pressures of an institutionalized profession in the modern, fiercely competitive, university profession measured by research output, than by any sense of external political urgency. These days, political theory's internal, artifact-related issues are often its biggest concerns. Languages with extreme specializations change the world. Assuming that the real world is really an issue of sufficient theory is actually how we often soothe this possible discomfort. Through theory, we engage in politics as a practice. What's happening in the summaries of books and scholarly journals is politics. Sometimes theorists see themselves as political advisors or philosopher monarchs, although this is generally delusion [8], [9].

To summarize, the current state of political theory is mostly driven by the academic discipline's strong institutional, career, and professional interests, rather than any feeling of social or

political malaise or crisis. Additionally, there is another significant aspect at play. Because it still radiates the questionable patina of political participation, political theory continues to pique curiosity and create excitement. Allowing politics to take on the shape of a masque may nevertheless make political theory fascinating. The distancing of political theory from actual politics has also been strangely approved by many who find this masquerade or shadow-boxing repugnant, which only serves to enhance the discipline's luster for adherents of other schools of thought. This is a contention typically made by followers of Michel Foucault, Leo Strauss, and Michael Oakeshott. Politics is generally impacted by accident.

For the interest of the audience, political theory does, nonetheless, sometimes allow itself to be dragged kicking and screaming into the political sphere by political ideology. Political theory and political ideology still have a very unclear and unstable relationship, nevertheless. Here, there is a Mannheimian point. Originally, political theory had a comparable status as ideology, according to Mannheim. Thus, political thought was sometimes somewhat unlike political preaching. Social science, political theory, and political action were not very different in the eyes of Saint Simon, Fourier, Proudhon, de Tocqueville, Bentham, Comte, or Fichte. Concepts were seen to possess power and influence in the world. It is possible for a revolutionary concept to completely transform society. But social science and political theory were gradually being included into the expanding colleges by the end of the nineteenth century. The transformation of political theory inside a sanitized academic disciplinary frame occurred in a similar way to how Mannheim saw ideology gradually transition from an active revolutionary activity into a new academic discipline the sociology of knowledge. Political theory became depoliticized as ideology became, in a way, deideologized. It is hardly unexpected that some have predicted the demise of political philosophy, given that others have predicted the demise of ideology. However, this is certainly not the conventional interpretation of political philosophy's demise.

The claim that a sociology of professions or disciplines has no bearing on the subject matter of such disciplines might be made in opposition to the aforementioned reasons. A sociology of science has no bearing on the significance of scientific discoveries or the substance of science itself. Furthermore, one may trivialize the whole theory debate if they give the sociological thesis too much weight. It may even be argued that it undermines or destroys itself in a reflexive manner. These observations have some validity. Nevertheless, we need to have at least a passing familiarity with a "social dynamic" when discussing how a field has developed, educates its adherents, and sets publishing and teaching standards. Denying it is only narrow-minded or naive. It is not something that should be avoided or overemphasized. Political theory is an academic subject and specialized profession that emerged primarily in the twentieth century; this is not a social conjecture, but a matter of historical fact. It seems sense that it would want to write itself a history [10], [11]. It has gravity and intellectual weight because of this, but we should always examine assertions of this kind critically. We should exercise caution when academic political theory clings to its inherent academic authority and prospers on the merits of its institutions.

CONCLUSION

This study elucidates the intricate journey of classical normative political theory from its historical roots to its contemporary manifestations. It underlines the ongoing tension between thick and thin normative forms and universalist and conventionalist approaches. The analysis of political theory classifications sheds light on diverse perspectives, from historical contextualism to cosmic paradigms. The study emphasizes the significance of understanding the evolution of classical normative political theory, especially its resurgence in the late twentieth century. The transformation of political theory into a professional academic discipline is discussed, raising questions about its distinct identity and the implications of its

institutionalization. Overall, this study contributes to a nuanced understanding of normative political theory, its historical context, and its role in shaping political thought in the modern era.

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CHAPTER 3

EVOLUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE-CENTRIC INSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

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ABSTRACT:

This study explores the historical development and changing prominence of the institutional approach in political theory, particularly focusing on the German concept of Staatslehre. It traces the roots of Staatslehre to philosophers like Hegel and Fichte and examines its impact on political studies in Europe, Britain, and North America. The study delves into the intricate relationships between political theory, legislation, and historical studies, emphasizing the essential role of studying constitutions in understanding the state. The emergence of political science as a distinct field is discussed, with a particular emphasis on the influence of Staatslehre on early American political scientists. The study also highlights the diverse interpretations and challenges associated with defining the terms "state" and "institutions" in political discourse. It concludes by examining the decline of the state emphasis in the 20th century and the subsequent shifts toward more empirical, positivist, and behavioral approaches, while acknowledging the continued relevance of the state concept in certain contemporary normative political theories.

KEYWORDS:

Institutionalism, Historical Analysis, Political Theory, Practice.

INTRODUCTION

In its most straightforward form, the institutional approach recognizes political theory's role as defining the meaning and operations of the state, that is, the state's philosophical concept and constitutional legal practice. The German terminology Staatslehre is the one that best captures this. Philosophers like G are the source of this concept. In its most literal meaning, Staatslehre indicates that in order to understand politics, one must first study the state, which entails studying both the normative values that the state embodies and its many empirical and constitutional forms. By default, historical, legal, and philosophical problems are included in this kind of research. The state notion and the legal concept of the constitution were intimately related in various American and continental European settings. As a result, the study of constitutions was completely accepted within the broader field of state studies in the German tradition of Staatslehre. Studying the constitution was thus considered essential to the concept of the state.

French, German, and Italian political studies have really been strongly related to legal and historical studies long into the twentieth century. Therefore, to put it simply, Staatslehre was the first serious form in which political theory was applied as a sophisticated academic endeavour in Europe, Britain, and North America. But it's important to use extreme caution when drawing too stark a distinction between political theory, legislation, and historical studies. Parallel to this, it would have been incorrect, before to 1900, to draw separate lines separating the extremely independent fields of politics, sociology, philosophy, law, and history. There were differences, although they weren't really noticeable. The history and nature of the moral sciences, the evolution of history, the historical and comparative study of law and institutions,

and the history of philosophy were all influences on Staatslehre in numerous ways. Thus, it was a perfect "linking concept." At this moment, political theory was conceptually associated with many different viewpoints, which we would normally keep apart [1], [2].

Given this, it should come as no surprise that this field of study contains significant historical, legal, and philosophical components. Such synoptic or comprehensive studies benefit greatly from the state as an organizing or framework-making notion. The first academic studies of the state were really written by philosophers, legal and constitutional theorists, and historians starting in the middle of the nineteenth century and continuing far into the twentieth. Many of the pioneering sociologists of the early 20th century, including L. The state has been the subject of writings by T. Hobhouse, Max Weber, Leon Duguit, Émile Durkheim, R. M. MacIver, and Ferdinand Tönnies, among many others, continuing this extensive history.

However, a significant issue with the state emphasis is the open nature of the term's "state" and "institutions." Therefore, at the very least, from a legal perspective, the state may be seen as a special kind of public authority that is notably different from other manifestations of political power. On the other hand, this public authority might refer to the real or functional sovereign body or bodies; the legal or constitutional framework of regulations; the ruler's legal identity; or institutions. It may also refer to the government itself, a component of the government, such as the legislative, executive, or judicial branches, or a combination of these. It may also suggest the public will or the collective will of all people. The phrase "entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, from the family to the trade, and from the trade to the Church and University" may alternatively refer to something even more inclusive. This is not the end of the list. A survey of the state's history reveals an incredibly diverse array of ideologies and practices, each with a distinct interpretation. These state theories often represent extensive, intricate, and intersecting traditions of analysis.

Where does this emphasis on the state and institutionalism come from? Psychology, economics, anthropology, sociology, and political science were simply nonexistent as separate academic fields at colleges and universities in the early to mid-1800s. They were not studied or taught as separate disciplines, even though they were acknowledged as traditions of thought to some extent. The 1860s and 1870s were when they started to take on an institutional shape. Economics was the first academic discipline in the US to establish a professional association in 1885. Psychology followed in 1892 and sociology in 1905. In North America, political science established the American Political Science, a separate professional organization. In the United States, political studies evolved gradually in the 1870s and 1880s until being firmly entrenched in the early 1900s. Early nineteenth-century German and French academic traditions were the primary sources of intellectual support for early American political scientists, since the state notion had already solidified in these countries. However, discipline did not start to emerge in Britain until the early to mid-20th century. Approximately from 1870 to 1920, the "state perspective" dominated society. This does not mean that the state notion vanished; rather, it just lost its hegemonic status within the field. But as James Farr notes, "political scientists cast their work on government, parties, and policies in terms of the state" in North America long into the New Deal period.

According to some observers, political scientists' concerns in relation to the state date back to the enlightenment discussions of the eighteenth century over republicanism and the constitution. However, German expatriate Francis Lieber was the first professor to really bring political studies to institutions in North America. His first political lectures were entirely based on the ideas of Staatslehre. In 1857, Lieber was given a chair in political science and history at Columbia University. Under the leadership of John Burgess, another ardent supporter of Staatslehre, Columbia University established the independent School of Political Science in

1880. Later, many of the influential political scientists and teachers in the United States between 1880 and the early 1900s pursued postgraduate studies in German universities and expanded their interests in the historical evolution of institutions as a component of a comprehensive science of humanity. Actually, almost every influential figure in American political science until the 1920s, including John Burgess, W. A. Dunning, and W. W. Willoughby, Woodrow Wilson, Charles Merriam, and T. D. Woolsey adhered to the basic elements of the Staatslehre method. It is essential to understand, therefore, that adhering to the state in political discourse does not entail any fundamental theoretical substance. Both conceptually and factually, the idea of the state was flexible [3], [4].

The situation was a little different in Britain. Some academics even considered Britain as a state to be a "aberrant case." German philosophy began to heavily influence numerous philosophers, theologians, historians, and historians of political and legal systems starting in the 1870s.

It was nonetheless met with varying opinions, however. several, like the British Idealists, who dominated the British philosophical scene from 1870 to 1920, were accepting of the German concepts even if they had strong objections to several philosophical points. In addition, legal and institutional historians like F. German legal and historical studies also piqued the curiosity of W. Maitland, William Stubbs, and Henry Maine. Others include A. Sidgwick, James Bryce, and Henry Sidgwick. V. Dicey were more uncomfortable and skeptical, even if there was generally agreement on the significance of the "state" and the value of the "historical comparative method" for researching it.

It was also acknowledged that continental Europe and British intellectual heritage differed, especially the state tradition. Because of the common law tradition, the structure of Parliamentary government, the way subordinate agencies were subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and the quirks of the unwritten constitution, legal and political theorists as well as historians were less inclined to speak so self-consciously of the British state. Strange, enigmatic names like "crown" were often used. From Burke forward, the canon of Whig historians helped shape this more elusive view. It was thought that the British experience was distinct, if not unique. Long into the twentieth century, political studies in Britain were dotted with this notion. But throughout this time, important Staatslehre works—like Bluntschli's Theory of the State— were still translated into English and clearly found a willing readership.

There are factors that are both internal and external. The larger social, political, and historical backdrop of political research is mentioned in the external justifications. Initially, there was a mutual complementarity between the expansion of states and nationalism throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and the focus on the state notion in political science. Thus, to put it historically, Germany wasn't unified as a state until 1871, and Italy wasn't until 1861. Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States itself was looking for a stable sense of identity and cohesion, particularly in the wake of the massive upheaval caused by the American Civil War in the 1860s. State-building increased, nationalism enthusiastically formed and expanded, often via the development of public education systems, and state constitutions widely created and implemented were the main features of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Calls for sovereignty and self-determination, which became more prevalent during the twentieth century, particularly during the post-1945 era of decolonization, also represented the language of the nation state. It is thus not coincidental that the study of politics emerged at the majority of contemporary states' universities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the idea of the state serving as the main subject of the early political studies. In actuality, the state continues to be the primary scholarly emphasis in contemporary international relations.

DISCUSSION

Political studies, as they emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, have also been characterized by certain academics as being particularly tied to the nature of their respective nation state traditions. This would undoubtedly apply to Germany, France, and Britain. As early as 1858, Lieber in America made this connection clear in his defense of the need of political science in North American colleges. "We stand in need of a national university, the highest apparatus of the highest modern civilization," he said to his American audience. Not only do we need it to seem clear and dignified among our sister countries, but we also need it for other distinct reasons. Later twentieth-century observers on North American political studies likewise made the same observation. Consequently, Theodore Lowi said that "American political science is itself a political phenomenon and, as such, is a product of the American state" in his 1991 Presidential speech to the American Political Science Association. Every regime seeks to generate a political science consistent with itself, Lowi went on. As such, political science does not exist in a single form; rather, it is contingent upon the tradition it investigates. According to Lowi, the "consonance" between political science and the state is thus a topic deserving of investigation.

The imperatives of education were intimately linked to the "state focus." Focusing on the state meant learning about its institutional past, but more significantly for some academics, it meant being instilled with a sense of patriotism. This was fundamentally expressed in the concept of citizen education, sometimes known as civic education, and the many esoteric rites and celebrations associated with citizenship, which remained a recurring subject in many states throughout the 20th century. In addition, there was a strong perception of the need for trained personnel to fulfill the expanding requirements of the specialized public services and bureaucracies within states, given the tremendous growth of the state sector in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Citizenship education was one way to promote both civic awareness and consensual civic virtue.

Furthermore, a large number of individuals who began teaching and promoting political studies at universities in their early years were often dedicated to the concept of state-based change. Many in the politics field considered it desirable to educate and instruct new hires for state bureaucracy, do specialized research for governments, and be able to gently influence the direction of governmental thought via institutional design. According to John Gunnell, "the practical concerns of political education and political reform were never disjoined from the search for a science of politics." Thus, the goal of establishing politics at universities was to enable the field to "command the attention of government" via scientific knowledge and civic education (Bryman, 1997). Theodore Lowi saw the American Political Science Association's founding in 1903 as just a component of the "progressive reform movement" in American politics, and he did so in this context in 1993.

This useful reform approach originated, in many respects, from the first contacts between German and French universities and thinkers from North America and certain parts of Britain. In these later nations, there was a notion of a tight and fruitful relationship between the state and intellectual elites.

The Grand École tradition in France and the original École Libre des Sciences Politiques de France, which focused on political science, are examples of this.10 The London School of Economics and Political Science was founded in the early 1900s in Britain, partly due to the efforts of Fabian Sidney Webb, who was one of the founders. The school's initial goals were to train future public servants and administrators, provide highly skilled specialized social scientific research, and integrate social science into governmental thought. The British and

American reformers overlooked the small but significant distinctions between state traditions in continental Europe and the United States. There was often a deep-seated, underlying alienation between academia and intellectuals and the state, especially in Britain and America [5], [6].

This "state focus," however, was also motivated by a variety of internal factors that are intimately related to the study of politics itself. These, too, might be further classified according to the state concept's creative potential and the strategic requirements for discipline consolidation. The state concept offered the academic field of politics a ready-made, highly significant curriculum and subject matter in terms of strategic needs. A discipline will attempt to adopt a subject matter and study techniques that are sui generis if it hopes to achieve its own unique standing with its own curriculum. What topic may be considered exclusively political? Formal-legal political structure is, of course, the one topic that political scientists can really claim as their own, one that does not need learning the analytical methods of other disciplines.

Put differently, in the context of the faculty contest, politics even though it was often a haven for historically-minded philosophers and theoretically-minded historians or lawyers could not arrive at the academic bargaining table empty-handed or dependent on the lexicon of law, history, sociology, or philosophy. Politics, too, had to bid for a seat at the table by posing as the sovereign of a small but technically advanced and entirely independent territory, since economics had become progressively more technical, law validated a powerful public profession, history had become more specialized, and philosophy had become more technically focused on logic and epistemology. Of course, "the state" was the sovereign region that politics claimed to be able to comprehend and that delineated the distinct and crucial field of political research. This gave the academic community its primary justification. When considering the state concept's creative potential in regard to traditional normative political theory which was covered in the preceding section it was very significant.

It is also essential to comprehending the context of the historical political theory part that follows. In essence, the state took on the role of the central figure in the narrative sequence that supported traditional normative political theory. Many intellectuals' classical training, which continued far into the early twentieth century, also contributed to this. For these authors, translating the Greek phrase Polis into "city-state" or simply "state" was rather simple. Thus, a great deal of literature about the "Greek state" or "Roman state" was published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Roman law's suprema potestatis gave rise to the contemporary idea of sovereignty, which was thought to define the Roman "state." According to Aristotle, political science was consequently regarded as the "science of the state." The establishment of a cohesive logical sequence or narrative from the ancient Greeks to the present was made possible by the integration of classical normative political theory into state language. Essentially, the notion of the state might be used to interpret the whole history of political philosophy.

Thus, the issues facing the state were also the issues facing politics. Because they were all centered on the state, the issues of the Greek, Roman, medieval, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries became well-known issues. Over the historical and contemporary political spheres, the state constructed a supervenient narrative. Thus, the state provided a unifying issue for classical normative political theory. The science of the state "summed up" political science as a whole. "Systematic knowledge" was identical with the word "science." Therefore, the endeavor to both explain, on a comparative level, the factual specifics of forms of state, and further to show how the good life may be obtained, could be considered the science of the state. Thus, interest in both the real comparative historical detail of institutional arrangements—through which humans have attempted to organize their social existence—as well as normative

and ethical theories regarding the "best institutional arrangement" gave rise to the preoccupation with the state's institution. Political studies combined normative goals with descriptive and comparative historical information since they were state-focused. At first, it was thought that the normative ideals were just as important as the actual elements [7], [8]. In conclusion, the state emphasis served as a creative intellectual framework for modern study in addition to enabling the sequence of classical theory to be united and combining comparative historical detail with normative ideal.

It is accurate to argue that, starting in the 1920s, the state notion as a framework for understanding politics and political philosophy significantly declined. We'll look at this argument once more in the section on empirical political theory that follows. But it would be incorrect to merely associate the growth of more scientific, positivist, or behavioral approaches with the demise of the state and the historical comparative method. Undoubtedly, there was a noticeable trend towards a more positivistic goal in the social sciences in several nations, North America being a prime example. There was a significant increase in interest in political science's empirical methodologies. Even until the 1940s, however, the concept of the state persisted in American political science. If anything, a greater significant shift occurred in the 1950s. Furthermore, the state motif in Britain and Europe never saw the same downfall as it did in North America. Up to the end of the twentieth century, most of British political studies still relied heavily on descriptions of state structures interwoven with theoretical and ethical concepts. Furthermore, a number of noteworthy occasions and intellectual movements aligned with the state theme's partial fall. There was a partial move away from the state and an increasing interest in various types of political and ethical diversity in both Europe and North America. Philosophical idealism also saw a sharp fall in influence in Britain and Europe, in part due to its indirect association with the atrocious events of the First and later Second World Wars, along with the "theory of the state." It is important to remember that in the 1920s, the main schools of sophisticated state theory and Staatslehre were viewed with suspicion due to their close ties to German philosophy. Ironically, a huge number of German academic émigrés who had fled the Nazi "total state" joined American academia and created their own distinct brand of state scepticism, which is why this intellectual distrust of state theory persisted in America until the 1950s.

It would still be far from accurate, as argued, that the "state idea" just vanished in the 1920s. But things did become a whole lot more difficult. Two main trends emerged from the institutional or state emphasis, which are discernible inadvertently in the many nineteenth-century narratives of the state. According to the traditional interpretation of normative theory, the state's "ought" and "is" are inextricably linked. The descriptive required the normative. But in the decades that followed the 1920s, there was a growing second trend that distanced the empirical from the normative. Even in the nineteenth century, there was an inherent inclination for the comparative technique and historical reasoning to be somewhat self-sufficient. This was previously included in the Staatslehre framework. Within Staatslehre, the study of public law and the characterization of institutions were also distinct subfields. As a result, significant aspects of the subject were already tacitly understood to be empirical and descriptive research methods. Furthermore, from the early 1900s, fields like political economics and sociology have placed a greater emphasis on positivistic or empiricist methods of research. This unavoidably had an effect on political science research. The gap between the "is" and the "ought" of the state to grow as a result. Moreover, a wave of research conducted in the early 1900s, linked to authors like Graham Wallas, George Sorel, and Gustav le Bon, among many others, started to challenge the notion of the state or its people' normative rationality. An empirical approach like social psychology might provide more political understanding in this situation.12

Thus, we see an inconspicuous mitosis inside the institutional Staatslehre. On the one hand, the state's "ought" component faded. By the 1920s, the normative approach to the state, or the "philosophical theories of the state," had been badly out of favor, and it stayed that way until the 1980s. Philosophical trends of the same mid-century era, which will be covered in Part Two, also contributed to this downfall. However, the advent of empiricism in the social sciences and philosophy was a major factor in this collapse. Within political science, there was a belief that empirical research might provide a more suitable framework for discussing anything significant about the state. From this perspective, the most that classical political theory could provide was the hazy prospect of a few verifiable theories. It must be acknowledged that in contrast to Europe, normative political theory—as represented by the state idea—was more readily accepted in the United States.

The "empirical" aspect of state theory greatly grew and diversified into a variety of empirically-oriented studies as a result of the normative component's withering, with little to no awareness of its roots. Comparative politics, comparative constitutional studies, political sociology, political anthropology, and, starting in the 1920s, the emerging field of international relations were all grounded on this empirical dimension (1997).

It also formed the foundational lineage of public policy studies and public administration. For instance, the "historical comparative method" of Staatslehre had evolved into comparative politics by the 1950s and 60s. There were still elements of the earlier, semi-dormant classical normative political philosophy. Therefore, even in the 1970s, the majority of credible books on comparative politics felt compelled to provide sincere and courteous acknowledgments to their esteemed predecessors in the field, like Aristotle or Montesquieu. However, in more recent times, comparative politics has also had difficulties in political studies. This is likely due to the fact that it harbors the latent state theory virus. This discomfort with comparative politics is also partially explained by the ongoing cognitive shift of many political scientists away from institutions and toward behavior or informal politics. Therefore, a lot of people would argue that interest in comparative politics and even institutionalism has died beyond hope. The belief that institutional-based research is essentially unhelpful for comprehending politics is the basis for this later conclusion. Much deeper insights into political processes may be gained from informal political behavior, such as that found in political parties, policy networks, and policy communities.

The latter verdict, however, is still a little premature since "the new institutionalism" of the 1980s partially, if unintentionally, resurrected many of the ideas of the earlier Staatslehre and therefore institutional research. Furthermore, with a strong focus on "institutional design," some normative theory attempted to resurrect the empirical and institutional aspects in the 1990s. The main distinction between the "new institutionalism" and the more "traditional institutionalism" is that the latter was mainly inspired by criticism of empirical political science, especially neo-pluralism. The drive to seem "empirically rigorous" and a lengthy history of positivism are also evident in the new institutionalism. The fundamental idea behind the new institutionalism is that political science should now be "state-centered" rather than "society-centered." Thus, some authors have discussed "bringing the state back into political science," a notion they believe was abandoned by pluralism and neo-pluralism. Officials and procedures are seen as rather independent of the inclinations and pursuits of society. Thus, a macropolitical examination of the state is necessary. The primary distinction is in how political life is organized. According to political scientists like March and Olson, this amounts to a "paradigm shift" in the field of political science. It should come as no surprise that the "informalist" and "neo-pluralist" opponents of this viewpoint have proposed, among other things, that the state always works in the benefit of society and that this new paradigm has

become too state-centric. Thus, we see the later critics' time-honored reassertion of the importance of informal empirical investigations, which is essentially a reenactment of past discussions from the 1920s and 1950s [9], [10].

Political theory, in the context of institutional theory, is the methodical examination of the state notion. Undoubtedly, this is the most significant and original kind of political theory to emerge in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This is perhaps the most significant topic if we are talking about the first efforts to establish teaching and scholarship at universities. This theory integrates historical, legal, philosophical, and empirical elements in addition to being state-centric. By the 1920s and 1930s, this idea had mostly faded, albeit as previously said, state theory gave rise to new fields within political science, including comparative politics, public administration, and policy studies. Despite criticism of institutionalism in the early and middle decades of the 20th century, the state notion has been somewhat revived in the "new institutionalism," although often smeared with a little empirical oil. Furthermore, in the concept of "institutional design," state theory has somewhat recovered its popularity in the 1990s within certain contemporary normative political theories.

CONCLUSION

This study illuminates the pivotal role played by the institutional approach, particularly Staatslehre, in shaping the trajectory of political theory from the 19th to the 20th century. It underscores the complex interplay between historical, legal, and philosophical dimensions within the study of the state. The examination of the state's evolution and its conceptual challenges provides valuable insights into the intellectual foundations of political science. While the state emphasis faced a decline in the mid-20th century, its enduring legacy is evident in the continued relevance of institutional perspectives in the field. The study encourages a nuanced understanding of the dynamic relationship between normative political theory, empirical research, and the evolving nature of states and institutions.

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CHAPTER 4

EXPLORING THE INTERPLAY OF HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT:

This study delves into the intricate relationship between political theory and history, emphasizing the inherent historical nature of political theories. The examination encompasses the evolution of political theory from ancient Greeks to contemporary thinkers and contends that an understanding of this historical continuum is crucial for informed participation in critical discourse. The complexity arises from the contentious nature of both the concepts of "history" and "politics." The study explores the emergence of historical disciplines, the intersection of certain political theories with the past, and the evolving perspectives on the categorical division between theory and history. It delves into the motivations behind the popularity of historical approaches, both internal to political theory itself and driven by external contextual factors. The narrative also traces the historical development of political theory education and the changing conceptions of terminology in the field. Lastly, the study examines two waves of debate in the 20th century, led by thinkers like Eric Voegelin, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, J. G. A. Pocock, and Quentin Skinner, shedding light on their contrasting views on the relationship between philosophy and history.

KEYWORDS:

History, Politics, Political Theory, Philosophy.

INTRODUCTION

Historical political theory is the main topic of this third part. This method's main thesis is that studying political theory is inherently historical. On the surface, theory is understood as a series of connected theoretical advancements. Hence, theory may be defined as a prolonged discussion or debate on the key issues in politics. As a result, in order to be informed and aware, one must be aware of the canon of thinkers, which spans from the ancient Greeks to the present, and be ready to participate in the continuous critical discourse. Even though many generations of students have heard about the history of political theory, this specific notion of theory is one of the most intricate concepts within the whole basic scenario described in Part One.

It is easy to identify the causes of this complexity: first, the idea of "history" is just as contentious as the idea of politics. We often take disciplines and intellectual specialties for granted, yet this may sometimes cause us to miss certain crucial details about the origins of these concepts. The emergence of disciplines and sub-disciplines might provide the impression of excessively cohesive, independent bodies of thought when none really exist, despite the fact that they produce more manageable amounts of information. It is difficult to pinpoint history's beginnings outside of academic settings, as is the case with most academic fields. "Activities emerge naively, like games that children invent themselves," as Michael Oakeshott observed. First, each emerges as a path of attention followed without any expectation of its eventual outcome, rather than in reaction to a planned accomplishment. How could our artless forebear have understood what it means to be a historian, an accountant, or an astronomer? In its widest meaning, history is concerned with our perceptions of the past; however, the past may be conceptualized in a variety of ways. This history may also be interpreted or retrieved in a

variety of ways, all of which fall within the broad category of historiography. Additionally, history is written in a variety of fields, such as social history, science, philosophy, economics, religion, and war. Throughout actuality, the concept of history has seen extremes of mitosis throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, just like most other sciences [1], [2].

Secondly, certain political theories are inherently focused on the past. Stated differently, history is a component of their substantive structure. The two most notable instances of this are Marx and Hegel. Theoretically, history is also a necessary academic "method" of study or human comprehension. The issue is that there is a lot of complex and unclear overlap between these two dimensions. As a result, the technique may, for instance, grow to be accepted as the standard in academic study and even political philosophy, as shown, for instance, in Marxist history. It is also possible to see a historical analysis of theory as a means of identifying "great universal normative themes" pertaining to human behavior. On the other hand, some theorists who are historically oriented would contend that political concept history serves no normative purpose at all. merely as normative theory is merely normative theory, history is just history. This assumes a categorical division between theory and history, which is also reflected in the works of several analytical and normative theorists from the 20th century. As a matter of truth, a large number of analytical philosophers, especially followers of American philosopher W. O. Quine would consider the division between philosophy and history to be wholly categorical. A variety of interests have led to the popularity of political theory history as the primary approach to theory development. These may be broadly separated into two categories: first, those that are part of the practice of political theory itself, and second, those that make up the external environment in which political theory is practiced.

Regarding the internal motivations, let me say this: first, the two theoretical ideas that were previously mentioned are strongly tied to the history of political philosophy. First and foremost, readers have primarily learned the concepts of classical normative political theory through the history of political theory.17 Second, as was mentioned in the institutional political theory section before, the state idea can also be understood as the central figure in the narrative sequence that forms the basis of classical normative political theory. The sequence is really established by the assimilation of classical normative political theory into a vocabulary that is considered "statist." The idea of the state may thus be used to interpret the whole of political theory's history. In conclusion, the perceptions of classical and institutional political theory are mutually dependent on the history of political theory. Political terminology is connected to a second internal rationale. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a number of theorists often utilized terminology like political theory, political science, and the history of political thought interchangeably.

Political theory history was thus defined as the "history of the science of politics" by legal historian Frederick Pollock in his 1890 work Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics. Up until the 1930s, the majority of critics in Britain and even the United States held this viewpoint. Ernest Barker also addressed this terminological issue in his 1929 inauguration speech at Cambridge for one of the first chairs in politics. Political theory, which Barker defined as "a method or form of inquiry, concerned with the moral phenomena of human behavior in political studies," was simply identical to political science in Barker's view and could be studied historically. "Nothing in our field of investigation is capable of being rightly understood save as it is illustrated by the process of its development," Herbert Laski said in his first speech at the London School of Economics. To put it another way, a real politics is essentially a philosophy of history (1978). Thus, in Laski's opinion, "the past is never dead because it can be recreated at any time." John Gunnell has also observed that "nearly everyone agreed that the role of political theory was to develop the concepts and principles of a scientific

political science and the history of political theory was a central part of this project" in reference to academics studying American politics at the time. Politics' inherently historical nature therefore became the acknowledged norm for a brief period of time. The essential issue is that the political language of the early twentieth century did not really include the boundary between political theory and history, which proved crucial to subsequent self-conceptions of political theory in the century [3], [4].

The more distinct division between political science and the history of political thought was not established until the late 1920s, and even then, not in a very clear way, until the 1950s. It's also important to emphasize that this division from normative political theory occurred together with the division between political science and the history of political theory. By the 1950s, normative political philosophy was dismissed by political science as only being equivalent with the historical aspect. Again, this was a later phenomenon: the internal divisions between normative and analytical political philosophy and the history of political thought. The primacy of the early analytic conceptualist movement in Anglophone philosophy, which had a characteristically ahistorical ontology, is largely responsible for the rather half-hearted beginning of this later phenomenon. The misnamed "return to grand normative theory" was really a de novo rather than a "return" at all. There were undoubtedly remnants of a previous kind of theoretical work, but the intellectual climate and historical context of this particular political theory left an enduring impression.

DISCUSSION

One significant philosophical trend of the early 20th century, which is evident in the underlying influence of both idealism and hermeneutics, provides a third internal explanation for the relationship between theory and history. Early in the 20th century, authors like Dilthey, Collingwood, and Croce made significant literary contributions. These thinkers saw history as the evolution of ideas. One very broad idea, namely, that the history of thought was vitally significant, was shared by both Idealist and Hermeneutic frameworks, despite differences in how history was specifically seen. Some philosophers, like Hegel, saw the history of philosophy as a speculative teleological growth of concepts centered upon concepts like freedom. History was a teleology of reason. Others dismissed the speculative dimension, including Collingwood. But although history remained the history of thinking, it was recognized as a distinct mode of knowing with its own set of conditions and viewpoint. Political theory's past was thus seen as essential, either as the teleology of reason or as a separate form of thinking. Thus, the function of history in the human and social sciences received an implicit philosophical endorsement from idealists and hermeneuticists.

It is important to consider the external contextual factors that contributed to the formation of academic history as well as the history of political philosophy. It became further developed in the nineteenth century as a discipline unto itself. From the 1860s and even long into the 1930s, the discipline of history was unified by the belief that national civic education and the development of personal moral character were its primary concerns. Universities in North America and Europe went through a similar procedure. Consequently, there is a more than coincidental relationship between the establishment of nation states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the growth of universities and the creation of historical, literary, legal, and political curricula. National historians wrote history for national purposes. Neither contemporary discussion nor social critique was the main emphasis of history. They steered clear of modern history. The meanings of literature and events were "frozen with national ends." The main focus of student training was on developing healthy morals and civic virtues. Many of these graduates found employment in Britain in the diplomatic corps, general civil service, India and Colonial Services in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Employers were

looking for graduates who had a strong sense of civic duty and patriotism. Universities as a result "successfully transformed a licensing system for a national elite into a set of values encoded in the concept of "liberal education"."

The people who created the history curriculum were also the ones that supported political theory history. Stated differently, political theory histories are shaped by the historical record. Consequently, from the beginning and even long into the twentieth century, the history of political philosophy had a distinct purpose. This position has been extolled, denounced, buried, and then often elevated again. To put it loosely, it would teach pupils about the continuous legacy of "great" individual thinkers, who are recognized by their "classic texts." To keep the whole project together, the term tradition is used, sometimes in conjunction with a progressive teleology. The great classic texts stand out for their originality, systematic coherence, intellectual and moral influence, and the way in which they addressed the great perennial problems of political existence. They also serve four purposes: first, to teach students about national ideals and culture; second, to educate them about the state's development; and third, to instruct them on the big questions and universal moral virtues. It is sometimes overlooked that the academic industry as a whole has a very brief genealogy [5], [6].

The first book that made firm assertions about this strategy was A History of Political Literature from the Earliest Times, a two-volume work by Robert Blakey. Without a doubt, literary and philosophical history served as background models for this strategy. As a matter of fact, Blakey saw the history of political philosophy as a subset of literature in general. The history of political theory began to stutterly appear in British university curricula in the 1870s, usually under the auspices of history, jurisprudence, or the moral sciences. This tendency was typically sparked by historians with a focus on comparative studies, like Seeley, Pollock, Maitland, and Acton. But it was not until the twentieth century that it really took off in Britain.25 The concept was first pursued with more self-awareness in North America, where political science departments had a more independent and self-aware life as early as the 1880s. Beginning at this time, the number of political philosophy histories was published in both Britain and America to cater to the expanding demand for courses. According to a scholarly observation on the proliferation of these writings between 1880 and 1940, "the demand for undergraduate textbooks" seems to have contributed to the creation of what is now considered the standard objective canon of literature. However, most were still created in history departments in Britain far into the 1950s.

Among these early works, G was the most well-known at the beginning of the 20th century. H. Sabine's History of Political Theory was extensively republished till the end of the 20th century after it was first published in North America in 1937. Its release date has significance. In the face of 1930s totalitarianism in both Germany and Russia, Sabine's dedication to the moral value of understanding the evolution of the Western democratic heritage represents the historical perspective's deep-seated ethical and civic education goal. In twentieth-century histories of political thinking, the same concept has persisted as an undercurrent notwithstanding the short methodological fulminations of the 1970s and 1980s. Ironically, the individuals who dominated the technique issue have historically fulfilled comparable normative roles in rather different contexts.

It is crucial to remember that the argument also has a connection to broader conversations about the history of philosophy before delving into an explanation of the "two waves" of debate about the development of political theory in the 20th century. As previously shown, a lot of philosophers from the twentieth century have often drawn a strict line separating philosophy from history. According to the latter viewpoint, the philosophers of the past are examined in relation to how well they meet the standards of modern philosophy. It is customary to assume

that because modern philosophy is the most rigid, all prior systems must be evaluated in light of these constraints. Up until now, the analytical school of philosophy has mostly held this stance. These philosophers are prepared to respond negatively to the issue of whether philosophy and history are closely connected. Philosophy is not history; history is history. Nonetheless, there are alternative robust philosophical traditions, namely the Idealist and hermeneutic viewpoints, which intersect with the chronicles of political thought. Thus, a wide range of perspectives on the relationship between philosophy and history are offered by Dilthey, Collingwood, Oakeshott, and Croce. "The right way of investigating mind is by the methods of history," as Collingwood said. While Part Two will address the overall nature of the analytical reaction to political theory, the current discussion will not go into this more expansive issue.

Now let's talk about the two waves. The first was created by thinkers like Eric Voegelin, Hannah Arendt, and Leo Strauss. Unusually decontextualized, their thoughts continued to reverberate until the end of the twentieth century. The deterioration of political theory and politics was the subject these thinkers were concerned about. Their reflections were often framed by the mainstream empirical political science's rejection of political theory as well as their very personal responses to German politics and philosophy in the decades before World War II (1993). In the 1920s, Arendt and Strauss studied under Martin Heidegger in Germany and were troubled by his association with National Socialism. These thinkers also had a great respect for ancient Greek philosophy. This made Strauss and Arendt see the moral and critical significance of the great political philosophy tradition. But this idea of tradition was often based on a division between contemporary and classical political philosophy as well as a concern about how new liberalism, political science, and political philosophy might affect the old traditions. This transition from antiquity to the modern era was seen as a catastrophe [7], [8].

One recurring theme in Strauss's essays in particular was the idea of a Western crisis. In actuality, the issue facing the West is the crisis of political philosophy. The dilemma facing the West is that it has lost sight of its own core ideals and is unsure of where it is headed. Because modern philosophy naively accepts the relativizing assumptions of modern historicism and scientific science, it exacerbates this issue. But according to Strauss, for a society to be "healthy," universal ideals are necessary. Therefore, universal moral standards were the core theme of ancient political philosophy. It was centered on the pursuit of the ideal life and the objective discovery of the good, two things that positivism and historicism rejected. However, these traditional moral remedies won't provide any modern formulas. For Strauss, the only people who can solve our issues are ourselves. Nonetheless, a thoughtful examination of contemporary issues might begin with classical theory. "Reading Plato and Shakespeare helps men live more truly and fully," as Allan Bloom, a pupil of Strauss, put it. because at that point they are forgetting their accidental lives and engaging in fundamental being. Thus, the goal of political philosophy is to "build a society superior in truth and justice, on the foundation laid by classical political philosophy." It aims for a core understanding that is ahistorical in nature.

Political philosophy, in Strauss's opinion, is not directly the history of political philosophy. In Strauss, the development of political philosophy is interpreted in two ways. The first corrupt variant is called "historicism," and it maintains that political philosophy and history are inextricably linked. When historicism and contemporary political science work together, they subvert and transform real political philosophy into dogma. Political philosophy has therefore been superseded by political philosophy history in both study and instruction, according to Strauss, who claims that this is the clearest example of how political philosophy has devolved into ideology. This replacement may be justified as a well-intentioned effort to keep a wonderful tradition alive, or at the very least postpone its demise. According to Strauss, the

great heritage of political philosophy would eventually turn into a collection of silly footnotes from antiquated books when historicism takes center stage in the field's history. A supplement to traditional political philosophy is the unadulterated, second edition of the history of political philosophy. A political philosophy cannot be entirely dependent on the past. According to Strauss, an idea might represent a reality that transcends historical context even if it is tied to certain conditions. How else could one reasonably refer to these many political circumstances as "political situations"? All political situations "contain elements which are essential to all political situations." Therefore, understanding political philosophers as they understood themselves in terms of their original aims is the primary purpose of the uncorrupted history of political philosophy. "We must set aside our questions and try to find out about what were their questions," says Bloom. Above all, we must carefully and methodically read texts "that and not much else." Second, we have to assume that their beliefs could be valid and that there is a history of authors with comparable goals, independent of historical contingencies. Philosophy has, at its heights, mostly been a conversation between the greats, regardless of how far apart in time they are, as Bloom observes. Therefore, literature should ethically affect their audience, according to Straussians. It is recommended to read them in direct address mode. A reading like these fights against the "impoverishment of the world of experience."

In conclusion, contemporary philosophy, historicism, and natural science created a crisis of relativism and nihilism during the first wave of political thought history. As a source of potentially ahistorical universal and fundamental truths about the "human condition," genuine history is a moral endeavor devoted to the text and restoring its original intentions. This might serve as a basis for resolving the feeling of crisis.

The 1950s saw the rise of this first wave, which petered out in the 1960s. Aside from the believers, not many people could really take Strauss' idea of an apocalyptic crisis seriously, but some of his followers persisted in using its main ideas until the end of the 20th century.

The second wave began to emerge in the 1970s and gradually faded in the 1990s, but it continued to have strong institutional ties until this day. If anything, the second wave was dedicated to historicism, which Strauss despised.

It is often referred to as the "new history" or "revisionist history." J. and Quentin Skinner were its principal proponents. G. A. Pocock, accompanied by a sizable contingent of camp adherents. Of the two, Skinner has most likely had a more constant influence. R was the background influence. Idealism, hermeneutics, and linguistic philosophy are all woven together in the works of G. Collingwood, Wilhelm Dilthey, J. L. Austin, H. P. Grice, and John Searle. Although the Kuhnian idea of paradigms faded in later years, Oakeshott and Kuhn had a significant influence on Pocock's case as well. There were differences between Pocock and Skinner's methodological principles as well. The fundamental emphasis of the second wave, however, was on a categorical rejection of the political theory tradition's "purported" past up to the 1970s. The new historical literature dismissed authors like John Plamenatz, C. B. Macpherson, and George Sabine, who provided popular works on the history of political philosophy up until the 1970s, on the grounds that they were both theoretically incorrect and out of date. The Namierite notion that all political theory was inherently flawed was likewise rejected. The significance of political philosophy to contemporary historians was never quite apparent.

Regarding Skinner, there are many major issues that may be broken down into two categories: affirmative assessments of what ought to be done and negative assessments of what had gone wrong in the past. The first emphasizes the need to reclaim the author's objectives, whereas the second criticizes enduring issues. Positively, the aim is to comprehend texts' meanings as they

were understood at the time they were written. On the down side, an effort is made to eliminate superfluous goals by defining the field of the history of thought more narrowly. In other words, a political theory historian cannot provide an argument for something that the actors themselves were unable to comprehend or say. It is believed that thinking and speaking are socially specific processes. As a result, language norms, customs, and paradigms are essentially what make up reality.

Recovering authorial intentions is the first step in taking a positive view. What an author was doing or intended to accomplish while creating a book is hence the question. The interpreter must comprehend the author's message within the context of the work as well as the audience to whom it was intended. Additionally, this necessitates understanding the specific language norms that are suggested in that situation. "We need first of all to grasp the nature and range of things that could recognizably have been done by using that particular concept," writes Skinner, "in order to understand what any given writer may have been doing in using some particular concept or argument." It is believed that writing and speaking are both contextual linguistic activities. In line with the research of J. L. Austin, Skinner contends that understanding speech acts requires an understanding of both the locutionary meaning of the speaker and what Austin referred to as the illocutionary meaning of the speech act [9], [10].

It is important to note that Pocock's approach does not heavily rely on intentions. Instead, he believes that it is necessary to put together the intricate discourses or languages that writings are expressed in. In Pocock's perspective, texts and actions are more flexible than in Skinner's. There are many different ways to interpret texts. As a result, Pocock remarks that the text may be a "actor in an infinite series of linguistic processes." Thus, historians are required to determine the many languages that an author used. Every language game and conversation has its own unique vocabulary and idioms. The historian is essentially an archaeologist, as Pocock observes, "uncovering the presence of various language contents in which discourse has from time to time been conducted." Not simply the author's objectives, but also the writer's discourses are what matter most. Pocock qualifies this statement by saying, "We say only that it is a promising context with which to begin; we do not say that the language context is the only context, which gives the speech act meaning and history, though we shall infallibly be accused of having said that." Placing his own project in the middle of Saussure's langue and parole (1987: 20–29). According to Pocock, discourse exists before speakers and texts and is not consciously created. Pocock illustrates discourses by using certain elements of texts. In this regard, he resembles Oakeshott more in that he views philosophy as distinct from authentic history. Pocock does, in fact, seem to see himself more as a historian these days, though few historians would likely agree with this assessment of themselves.

CONCLUSION

This study navigates the complex terrain of historical political theory, demonstrating the inseparable link between political theory and its historical context. The examination of internal and external motivations, the evolving language of political theory, and the waves of debate in the 20th century underscore the dynamic nature of this relationship. Whether exploring the foundational ideas of classical normative political theory or dissecting the shifts in terminology, the study highlights the integral role of history in shaping political thought. The contrasting perspectives of thinkers in the two waves provide a nuanced understanding of the tensions between ahistorical universalism and historical contextualization. Ultimately, this exploration encourages a continuous engagement with the historical dimensions of political theory, recognizing the richness and complexity inherent in the interplay between theory and its historical backdrop.

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CHAPTER 5

REVALUATING POLITICAL THOUGHT HISTORIES: UNRAVELING THE SECOND WAVE'S EMPHASIS ON AUTHORIAL INTENTIONS AND CONTEXTUALISM

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ABSTRACT:

This study critically examines the second wave of approaches to studying the history of political philosophy in the twentieth century, contrasting them with the first wave and identifying key issues and critiques. The second wave places a strong emphasis on the relationship between political ideology, political activity, and the impact of changing conventions on interpretations of texts. It critiques first-wave historians for alleged errors, such as promoting eternal truths, constructing mythologies, and engaging in parochialism. The study argues that while the second wave has had significant influence, it faces criticism for its methodological arguments and its implications for the relevance of historical political theory to the present. This examination encourages a reevaluation of the second wave's contributions, highlighting the need for a nuanced understanding of the history of political philosophy. It calls for a careful consideration of the role of historical context, linguistic frameworks, and the enduring relevance of ideas, providing a foundation for future discussions on the methodologies and purposes of studying the history of political thought.

KEYWORDS:

Authorial Intentions, Contextualism, Parochialism, Revaluating Political, Wave's Emphasis.

INTRODUCTION

The historian might reveal the author's objectives via conventions. Thus, the importance of conventions, texts, and intents is equal. "Not only the text to be interpreted, but the prevailing conventions governing the treatment of the issues or themes with which the text is concerned," he remarks. Every speech is produced within a framework that encompasses both linguistic and broader social and intellectual traditions. This collection of customs is what Skinner refers to as the ideological background, a term he uses often. Ideology is used by Skinners as a "language of politics defined by its conventions and employed by a number of writers," according to Tully. Secondary and tertiary literature from a certain era is inevitably included into this customary setting in order to fully illustrate the norms' structure. Thus, as Skinner observes, "we can't avoid involving ourselves in extensive historical inquiries if we are interested in the process of ideological formation and change." As a result, Tully characterizes Skinner's Foundations of Modern Political Thought as "a guide to the location and the ideological and political explanation of the incremental manipulations and grand transformations of them, as well as a map of the great political ideologies of early modern Europe."

However, it seems that many of Skinner's prior methodological arguments are undermined by this one statement alone. "Grand transformations" and "incremental manipulation" fall short of arguments that demand strict contextualism and the rejection of enduring beliefs. Second wave authors also place a high value on the relationship between political ideology and political activity, as well as the types of political thinking and action that contribute to the spread of

ideological change. Political activities fluctuate along with traditions and ideological circumstances. Theories have the power to support or undermine a system of conventions. According to Tully, "Changing some of the conventions of a political ideology is to change the way in which some of that political action is represented, because a political ideology represents a political action." The political activity is recharacterized and redescribed by the modified conventions [1], [2].

This second wave's primary component is its critical analysis of alternative approaches to studying political philosophy's past. This is a critical analysis of twentieth-century political thinking histories as well as first wave ideas. It finds its forebears guilty of many grave errors, chief among them being the promotion of the notion of eternal truths. They are also charged with producing "mythologies" rather than "true history," or a "mythology of doctrines." Second, they are found guilty of encouraging a "mythology of coherence," which is the presumption that the creator of a classic work has to have a well-developed idea. So, in the event that coherence is lacking, the historian of thought will provide it. Third, there is the "mythology of prolepsis," which is the emphasis on a text's implications rather than its author's intended meaning. Fourthly, they are accused of engaging in the "mythology of parochialism," which is the practice of a historian connecting a concept from their own time teleologically with a concept they are acquainted with. Therefore, it seems that the majority of political theory's history has failed horribly throughout the 20th century.

The overall nature of this second wave has drawn a lot of criticism, which is hard to condense into a brief context. Positively, nonetheless, his approach does not originate the notion of retrieving authorial intentions. It was the strategy to which the majority of the first wave was dedicated. It was clear that Strauss, Arendt, Sabine, and Bloom intended to refute too historicist views by using this topic. In actuality, both Skinner and Strauss emphasize the importance of the author's intentions and the ordinary language environment. But according to Strauss, moral universals originate from the context and intentions themselves, whereas Skinner believes that context cannot be transcended. Thus, Skinner disputes and Strauss affirms enduring issues based on the same set of fundamental arguments. However, denying enduring difficulties gives rise to challenging situations.

The first asks, "How do we recognize a linguistic context?" Regarding the exact relationship between context and texts in the many new histories, there is a lack of consensus. So, for what length of time must something exist before it qualifies as a context? What keeps a context cohesive? How is a context known, as opposed to a collection of texts? How might one tell whether something was part of the context or alien? A context is more akin to an arbitrary composite that is named after an honorific unifying title after being compiled from several sources. Still, one may argue that secondary and tertiary literature constitutes a context. By the same revisionist logic, however, this literature need context in order to be comprehended; nonetheless, every piece of subsequent literature also requires context, thus we have a reductio ad absurdum. Denying this reasoning would be contradicting oneself. As such, the word "context" is a useful sociological construct that has no true meaning. Can any historical setting be fully described as well? How would one determine whether it was adequate or finished? If we took a minute to reflect, we would ask, "What is the current context of European or American thought?" Surely, the problem of finding a suitable setting is merely really peculiar, apart from the most impressionistic sense?

A different set of issues with the second wave has to do with the self-reference issue. Second wave writings themselves must be historically contingent by the logic of their own arguments, unless they have achieved an ahistorical sub specie aeternitatis stance, which they also claim is illogical. Therefore, before we could believe their assessments of how to make history, we

would need to rebuild the language framework and norms of their own sexualizing histories in order to understand the significance of this second wave of theory. Moreover, their own historical conclusions would not apply outside of their own language framework, no matter where that boundary is. It would be necessary to consider the following: who their target audience was, what the secondary and tertiary literature of the time was, and what language norms they were attempting to convey? It's obviously quite difficult to pinpoint the whole context of the second wave argument, so things do not seem to be looking well. If it is claimed that it is too soon to determine their context, then by their reasoning, we have no reason to trust whatever they say since we are unable to comprehend or verify it [2], [3]. Moreover, according to their own definitions, their written works were incapable of offering any understanding of the past or future. Regarding the methodology of conducting the history of political thought, we could not reasonably assume any universal truths. Every methodological essay may only be comprehended within a certain set of dependent norms.

DISCUSSION

Certain repercussions would follow if one were to invert the reflexive logic in this instance and contend that humans are capable of making philosophical judgments that pertain to eternal issues in an atemporal manner. For instance, we may discuss literature from the past, even if it was in a different setting from our own. This is done in our language, however. What other possibility is there? "Sharing" even the language context of the past is an act of commonality. We neither become the past nor converse with the dead in their vernacular. We are still in the here and now. Moreover, we seem to be able to comprehend the past while being in disagreement with it. We may thus dispute or agree with a previous notion if we are able to comprehend, understand, and explain it. We may ignore it or use it as a resource. Therefore, we may evaluate ideas or ideals from the past using our current standards. Put otherwise, we possess a timeless idea that the new wave theories consistently refute. The contextual logic of the second wave arguments, which emphasizes previous language contexts, offers an alternative to this. This implies that it is never possible to comprehend or evaluate the past. We wouldn't be able to access it linguistically by definition. In actuality, second wave theories have provided us with a strong case for why historical political theory is irrelevant to modern political theory. This served as the basis for Skinner's criticism of Sabine and Plamenatz. "I just cannot conceive of building an analysis of any issue in contemporary political theory around the affirmation or negation of anything which Locke says about political matters," said John Dunn. For this reason, John Locke's ideas about property and natural rights are out of date. Dunn has now reversed course on this matter, yet there is still evidence to back his bizarre prior opinions.

Nevertheless, Skinner's former supporters, James Tully and Richard Tuck, have also distanced themselves from him on this matter in their writings. Tuck stated in his book Philosophy and Government that "the more often they seem to resemble modern ones, the better our historical sense of what those [seventeenth century] conflicts were." A number of issues pertaining to history's role also envelop these discussions. The central question is whether political theorists could ever hope to separate themselves from the intricate histories and systems of their own political cultures, much alone be able to do so. For example, it is evident that the majority of what may be called normative political theory from the nineteenth century onwards is willing to ruthlessly appropriate ideas or ideals from earlier writings without even the least regard for methodological propriety. Nozick identified with Locke, Hayek with Adam Smith and David Hume, and John Rawls with Kant. This is an established tactic. What response may this tactic elicit from the methodologically purist historian of political theory? Typically, the argument is to argue that normative political theory and history are two distinct fields of study and should

not overlap. It's ironic that this generally concurs with the assessment of several conceptualist analytic philosophers. Denying the potential of persistent issues may come with a heavy price, however [4], [5].

But should the veracity of the material one examine worry one? Those "impurists" are worried about the truth, in a way. This seems not to be an issue that the "purist" historian of political thought is particularly concerned with. But why do purists choose certain authors or thought over others in the first place? Why should we pay particular attention to these books or thinkers? Moreover, how do our arguments now stand, including our methodological justifications? What level of truth do they possess? Once an argument is spoken or written down, it provides meat for historians. In a way, we are expressing our opinions about what is true when we judge the past and what matters from that era. But it seems that we want to deny our ancestors the possibility that their opinions could contain any truth.

The question of why one should study the history of political theory in the original Skinnerian meaning is one of the most perplexing aspects of the debates surrounding it. What knowledge is gained by studying it? The second wave would have found the older practitioners of political theory history's quick response quite disagreeable: learning about the past is a method to access ongoing discussions about universal values or as a kind of civic or national education. Nonetheless, there are very few responses to this question in the second wave. One response is that learning about the development of political philosophy might make us more well-rounded or insightful people even while it has little direct bearing on the present. Stated differently, the purpose of learning history is to enhance one's awareness of oneself in the present. However, once anything is recorded or spoken, it also becomes a historical statement that requires context. Furthermore, it's unclear why we should care about it or how studying the past in this way contributes to our current knowledge of ourselves as well-rounded individuals [6], [7].

The whole hypothesis starts to seem quite flimsy as one reaches the critical assessments of the second wave. In essence, the ideas of the second wave constructed a straw man. Many critics have noted that the procrustean image painted in the new history is just not consistent with even the most cursory study of the majority of historians of political thinking in the twentieth century. Almost all political theory historians have focused on intentions within potentially more flexible definitions of context. Additionally, as any attentive student of Skinner's work would quickly see, his own "historical works reveal. Because in order to support historical practice, he is willing to overlook many of his unfavorable judgments. His Foundations of Modern Political Thought repeatedly demonstrates this notion. His publications on substantive political philosophy expose every one of his negative myths about coherence, mythological writing, prolepsis, and parochialism, as well as his use of eternal concepts and the notion of influence.

For instance, the "process by which the modern concept of the State came to be formed" is the focus of the aforementioned two-volume study. According to this conception, the state is "the exclusive source of law and legitimate force within a territory in distinctively modern terms." This timeless, logical, and "evolving" idea serves as the foundation for his writings on political thinking. In terms of twentieth-century histories of political philosophy, this "state" argument makes Skinner seem to be both, oddly, a contemporary addition to the Staatslehre tradition and a traditionalist. In essence, he uses the idea of the state to illustrate how premodern and modern political philosophy developed. This is not inherently flawed, other than the fact that it has nothing to do with his methodological assertions.

In summary, the second wave is now in a state of weakness; in many aspects, it has already completely collapsed. What seems to be a novel approach is really merely another debatable

"philosophical argument about interpretation," as others have pointed out. This second wave continues to have a strong influence on academia due to its very significant publishing success and institutional recognition. But some adherents' self-congratulatory essays make clear the perils of this. Therefore, one senses that many people need a "wake-up" call when a political thinker historian remarks that the editors of an edited book "are committed to the view, which this series is interested to advance, that ideas can only be studied in what the series editors call "their concrete contexts" and that "this is an explicit, and now familiar rejection of those older modes of intellectual history which studied texts in terms of sources and influences." It is time for a disruptive reformation when a hotly debated philosophical method to interpretation becomes so entrenched that it yields such declarations of orthodoxy.

One further, more tangential component of the second wave is this movement, which is tangentially related to some of the wave's dimensions. This is the Begriffsgeschichte movement, which is mostly German. Rheinhardt Kosellek is the main theorist in this case. Concepts are seen by the Begriffsgeschichte approach as reflective of outside practices and events. It makes the case that language and meaning have innate qualities that influence how we enter the social environment. As such, the process entails treating notions in an incredibly complex way on both an analytical and historical level. Thus, the purpose of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriff is to map ideas throughout a certain time period. Thus far, the majority of attention has been directed on the German-speaking world in the Sattelzeit era, as designated by the Begriffsgeschichte group. Some modern popularizers of Begriffsgeschichte, like Melvin Richter, have made laudable efforts to encourage communication between German authors and second wave thinkers.

Richter's efforts and a few hesitant attempts to investigate the connections haven't really helped the discussion gain traction in Britain or North America. It seems to have had very little effect on the Anglophone academic community so far. However, according to Skinner and other authors of the second wave, ideas have no history per se rather, they are only used in contingent arguments or discourses at certain contextualized times. The prospects for productive cross-fertilization between these accounts do not appear promising given that the Schwerpunkt of the Begriffsgeschichte is rarely contextual and tends to rely on source materials, such as philosophical or theoretical texts, dictionaries, and encyclopaedias, which are regarded with suspicion by the new wave theorists [8], [9].

In summary, the twentieth century has seen the history of political philosophy fulfill a variety of purposes. While some of these are intrinsic to the discipline of history, others have to do with the discipline's standing as a whole in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The history of political theory was first seen as a component of citizen education, especially for professional citizens, who were being taught virtue and leadership skills through the great classic books and were being fed by political and cultural contexts outside of their own character growth. By the early 20th century, it was also seen as a crucial component of civic and national consciousness education. Thus, the national narrative was incorporated in the history of political philosophy.

Internally, political philosophy's history was valued for its ability to represent the core concepts of political science from the Greeks to the present. Furthermore, essential to Staatslehre's metier was this. Early in the 20th century, there was little significance in the conceptual divide between institutional state theory, classical normative political theory, and the history of political theory. Philosophical Idealist scholars also emphasized the significance of history as the history of ideas. A teleological concern with the fulfillment of specific notions, such as freedom or human self-realization, or, conversely, an illustration of the significance of the historical method of knowing in and of itself, characterized the history of thought for many of

these philosophers. As a result, theory's history had a philanthropic stamp. Political theory historians concentrated on the principles that were implied in the seemingly troubled Western liberal "tradition" throughout the 1930s and 1940s. It was believed that by using the discipline, knowledgeable individuals would be able to face the threat of totalitarianism by comprehending the fundamental concepts that underpin liberal democratic institutions. This was especially true for a large portion of the literature on political theory published during this time. The discipline entered what I have referred to as the "first wave" of worry by the 1950s. The history of political theory stressed the idea that it was focused on the pursuit of the ultimate understanding of the proper order, in part due to internal critique from empirical science and in part to concerns about a perceived crisis of confidence in the West. Thus, it was believed that modernity was causing a fall in theory history. It was necessary, in the case of Arendtians and Straussians in particular, to avoid historicism while simultaneously paying close attention to texts, settings, and authorial intents in order to uncover the timeless qualities of the classics. This meant posing long-standing issues like the one dividing the ancients and the moderns.

For a brief while, the discipline settled by the 1960s and early 1970s. But potential conflicts and divides were only visible on the surface. Throughout this time, which lasted until the end of the century, there were essentially three perspectives on its function. The first held onto concepts from past eras and saw political theory history as an ongoing canonical tradition that tackled the "big questions" and even had the ability to therapeutically identify and treat contemporary illnesses. Regarding this matter, Arendtians and Straussians have not altered their positions. A second approach was put out by analytical philosophers, who said that the development of political theory may be seen as a helpful source of verifiable theories and conceptual breakthroughs. Therefore, we might read Machiavelli or Hobbes, have a discussion with them, and assess whether their points of contention were strong. In this way, the analytical component took center stage while the historical component was largely ignored. Hobbes evolved into a precursor to rational choice theory, Machiavelli became a precursor to power realism, Kant into the father of human rights or the benevolent uncle of global ethics, and so on. This was a lineage typical of twentieth-century political theory histories that were more analytically oriented. The third perspective was essentially a reiteration of an earlier Idealist theme Marxist history through other channels. It was believed that history was connected to the whole historical endeavor via teleological significance. Thus, political theory's development was significant in relation to a larger historical trend of human liberation. labor, like C. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism by B. Macpherson served as an example of this line of reasoning [10], [11].

But the second wave emerged during the latter 1970s. The main emphasis of this was on historical technique, namely authorial intents and strict contextualism. This trend has the effect of making us more aware of the approaches we use to analyze texts and surroundings. This was the second wave's beneficial contribution. Though it is still in its early stages, some academics have also recognized this as the "real transformation" of political thought history throughout the 20th century. As previously said, the substantive work of this second wave bears close examination to the concerns of previous histories. New histories of political thought can be seen as defenses of the last holdouts of traditional approaches to the study of the history of political thought against the encroachment of social science upon the domain of historical understanding, as one scholar has observed about this movement.

CONCLUSION

This study casts a critical eye on the second wave of political philosophy history, exposing its weaknesses and questioning the veracity of its methodological claims. While acknowledging its role in bringing attention to the importance of historical techniques, authorial intents, and

contextualism, the study argues that the second wave falls short in providing a comprehensive and coherent framework for understanding the history of political thought. The critique extends to the rejection of enduring issues, the problematic nature of defining historical context, and the questionable relevance of studying political theory history. The study also highlights the ongoing influence of the second wave in academia despite its shortcomings, urging for a reevaluation of its impact and a more nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in studying the history of political thought. Ultimately, the conclusion emphasizes the need for a balanced approach that appreciates the contributions of different waves while critically assessing their methodologies and implications for our understanding of political philosophy history.

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CHAPTER 6

EXPLORING POLITICAL THEORY: DEBATES, PERSPECTIVES, AND EVOLUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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ABSTRACT:

This study critically examines the prevalent negative segregation thesis in political theory that argues ideologies are inherently illogical, cultural, and sentimental claims needing separation from legitimate normative political theory. The focus is on justifying political beliefs, delving into the challenges and presuppositions associated with the argument for justifiable reasons. The analysis extends into the diverse methods employed in twentieth-century political philosophy, addressing the limitations of the normative justification reasons viewpoint. The study contrasts this with the promising positive segregation concept, advocating for a theoretical approach to ecumenism that incorporates history, ideology, and moral justification within the realm of legitimate political philosophy. The conclusion highlights the complexity of defining a pure essence for political theory, emphasizing its synthesis from various schools of thought.

KEYWORDS:

Empirical Theory, Political Science, Political Theory.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the aforementioned reasons, it is evident that the negative segregation thesis has been the more prevalent viewpoint in political theory over the latter part of the 20th century. The main argument of the latter thesis is that possessing a cognitive ideological map or just being loyal to a cause is not enough to justify a belief in liberalism, rights, freedom, or justice, or anything else. Instead, it is something we firmly believe in for valid reasons. As a normative or analytical theory, a justification must, therefore, provide strong reasoning and convincing justifications. It goes beyond just being convinced or won over. It's not like supporting a sports club when it comes to justifying. Justification is entwined with critical thinking on our core beliefs. This means that there might be reasons that are true or incorrect, or that are good or terrible. A performative contradiction in, say, Freeden's argument would be to imply the opposite, that there can be no true or erroneous reasons or beliefs, and to declare an absolute truth. Thus, proponents of the negative segregation thesis contend that ideologies are inherently illogical, cultural, and sentimental claims that need to be distinguished from legitimate normative political theory that justifies and regulates behavior.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to define authentic political theory exactly given the breadth of the debate in Part One. Furthermore, the argument based on justification cannot also claim that reasons might be true or untrue, good or evil. The argument is that a belief cannot be justified until excellent reasons are stated; yet, what would be a "good reason" to argue that there must always be good reasons to support a belief? Put otherwise, the argument for justifiable reason is logically predicated on a dubious metaphysical presupposition. In a way, the critic is attempting to "convert" her audience to a viewpoint of "justicial reasons." What, however,

would be the independent, real basis for confirming the notion that there are legitimate and invalid explanations? It is obvious that what justifies many religious adherents or many other human behaviors is not a justification for atheists. Some people think that unthinking gibberish is better than good critical philosophy [1], [2]. In other words, the justification of reason argument lacks philosophical self-reflection due to an underlying sense of arrogance, dogmatism, and simplemindedness. Furthermore, very little to nothing is known about the precise methods used in twentieth-century political philosophy. It hasn't, in any case, been exclusively centered on the "normative justification reasons" viewpoint, not even with the Anglo-American fold. To believe otherwise is to elevate intellectual blindness to a fine art. This critical evaluation might go much farther, but it would be considerably more sensible to properly explore anything along the lines of the positive segregation concept. This is not an argument that downplays the importance of history, ideology, or moral justification. Ideology, however, is regarded as a legitimate and serious field of study on par with political philosophy. This theoretical approach to ecumenism seems to be much more promising.

This latter thesis also aligns with the much larger ecumenical argument about the nature of political theory presented in Part One, which has essentially examined, at a broad level of generality, some of the prominent conceptions of political theory throughout the twentieth century. Classical normative, institutional, historical, empirical, and ideological political philosophy were the five stances that were articulated. Some of these elements have more overt contextual ties, as noted. For instance, it is a fact that the institutional and historical state-based theory framework provided the setting for the first serious efforts to conduct political theory as a discipline. At this point, the later motif has mostly faded into the background. There are other components that are considerably more recent. However, it is crucial to emphasize once again that the categories under discussion are not isolated modes of thinking; rather, there are intricate overlaps between them. The conclusion is that political theory lacks a pure essence. Political philosophy has always been an uncomfortable synthesis of several schools of thinking.

Popular Empirical Theory

The main goals of empirical political theory are to build testable hypotheses that may be used to make predictions and to draw generalizations about political processes. It has three interconnected claims: the first is the broader one, which holds that politics is about ordinary decision-making, informal daily activities, power, and resource distribution. This implies that politics is fundamentally neither explicitly institutional nor theoretical. The second assertion is that there are similarities between the explanatory character of the natural sciences and this kind of behavior. Thirdly, these explanatory social scientific explanations are capable of assuming most, if not all, of the roles and functions that classical, historical, and institutional political theory formerly filled. It might verify or refute the assertions of such previous theories, putting them to the test. It could also provide sound suggestions for future directions for policy, based on verified and proven empirical data. Stated differently, the function of institutional and political design is supplanted by empirical theory. In fact, this surpasses normativism. When empirical political theory was at its most confident, it thought it could actually take the place of all political theory.

Therefore, the ultimate goal of political theory is empirical theory. Even if many at the time dismissed this as a "pipe dream," it's crucial to acknowledge the importance of this claim for those who support it. The relationship between empirical theory and earlier theoretical theories will be briefly discussed in this section. Second, this second word will also be clearly defined, because empirical theory evolved within the purview of "political science." The focus of the third section will concentrate on the behavioral movement, which offers the most upbeat interpretation of empirical political theory. This will also provide a brief introduction to

positivity. Fourth, in light of critical reactions and the emergence of "post-behaviouralism," the downfall of the empirical approach—or, at the very least, the decline of its imperial ambitions—will be examined. A brief study of the aftershocks of empirical theory on political theory will be provided in this context. Rational choice theory is the primary after-shock hypothesis.

Throughout the 1950s, institutional state theory, historical theory, and classical normative theory were widely rejected in favor of empirical theory, unless it could be shown that they had content that could be verified by empirical means. It was believed that the historical comparative approach and institutional theory's formal commitment to institutions constrained institutional state theory. The assignment was to think about casual behavior. Many empirical theorists also believed that the idea of the state was too nebulous and imprecise. Moreover, the majority of classical political theory was seen as a collection of dubious, unverifiable presumptions. A relatively small set of testable hypotheses was the only material that could be considered viable in classical theory. Thus, the history of this corpus of dubious presumptions was seen as harmless antiquarianism. As was previously shown, there was a strong argument that political science at this moment constituted political theory in the sense that all conventional interpretations of the word had been rendered obsolete. This was a dominant view of political thought, especially in America, until the late 1960s, when it started to draw criticism. By no means should one assume that the problems have been fixed, however. They just vanished from conversation and may very well reappeal [3], [4].

Second, it's critical to understand the evolution of the concept of "political science" itself, given the strong relationship that exists between empirical theory and political science. The word "political science" was used in three different contexts, all of which were common in the late nineteenth century. Originally used by theorists like David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Montesquieu, and Condorcet in the late eighteenth century, it was often referred to as the "science of the legislator." Here, the Scottish Enlightenment intellectuals were especially influential. As a matter of fact, political science was often understood to include other fields, such as political economics. For example, "political economy" was defined by Adam Smith as a "branch of the science of a statesman or legislator" in his Wealth of Nations. As a result, there was little to no distinction made between what are today considered to be distinct fields. Political economics, moral philosophy, political theory, and history are all integrated into one cohesive work in Smith's Wealth of Nations. Commentators in North America adopted the phrase "political science" from the Scottish Enlightenment and used it in discussions about the new Constitution and Republic.

DISCUSSION

A broader need for "social science" was also connected to political science. The Enlightenment itself provided a significant intellectual contribution to this process. Generalizing about the Enlightenment is problematic because of how differently it was interpreted in Europe and North America. On the whole, however, few Enlightenment intellectuals attempted to understand human affairs by using reason in an open manner to identify and validate causal patterns. Stated differently, there was an increased need for factual information about nature, human behavior, and society. In their quest for these patterns, theorists were often motivated by the achievements of Newtonian physics as well as the burgeoning "experimental philosophy." Thus, there were similarities between the study of nature and the science of politics, according to these many authors. For example, Hume said that "human nature remains the same, in its principles and operations, and that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages." The same causes always lead to the same outcomes: The same occurrences are caused by the same intentions. According to this, human activity is "no more inconsistent

than the body's functioning, nor can we draw conclusions from one irregularity that will not follow equally from the other." As a result, philosophers like Montesquieu, Hume, and Turgot thought that causal social rules may exist. Additionally, political science was seen as a "applied science" that may lead to social initiatives for advancement in both politics and society. It could provide insight on raising the level of happiness among state residents. Therefore, political science should be seriously considered by any government that wishes to maximize the happiness and reduce the suffering of its population, as many thinkers of the era advised. Even yet, this early understanding of political science included what are today considered to be distinct fields. Good moral principles were seen to be both factually valid and ethically required for human nature to fulfill its political purposes. As a result, political science was seen as a deft combination of factual and moral generalizations. The only field that approached what we may today consider "empirical science" more closely was political economics. This included drawing empirical generalizations that were not always connected to moral principles [5], [6].

The evolution of the concept of political studies in the late nineteenth century is reflected in the second perspective on political science. Political science was used based on the idea of the ancient Greek perspective, which defined it as the "science of the polis." Thus, political science served as a fundamental synonym for institutional theory as well as classical political theory. Though it was still viewed with skepticism, there was a rising recognition of the significance of political science as a more distinctively empirical approach. In his first lecture, Ernest Barker expressed his dissatisfaction with the name "science." I will use it, as Aristotle did, to denote a process or mode of investigation known as Political Theory, as it has been validated so thoroughly and almost solely for the precise and experimental analysis of natural events. In this context, the methodical tying together of political concepts was referred to as political theory. Barker, along with several others, believed that this was the focus of Plato and Aristotle's political works. Empirical and more abstract normative factors were combined in this research. This application of political science was also a hallmark of the European and American Staatslehre traditions until the 1920s. Thus, systematic institutional political theory was synonymous with political science. But in this latter phase, Staatslehre itself also started to be seen as questionable. As it tended to bring together ideas from the fields of law, politics, history, and philosophy, it was also negatively impacted by the early twentieth century focus on disciplinary division. Therefore, this more encompassing idea of political science as Staatslehre as strongly associated with classical political theory was generally vanishing quickly, even with Ernest Barker's nostalgic appeal.

The 1920s saw the development of political science's third application. The foundation for both the later efforts to reabsorb political theory into the imperium of empirical theory as well as the seeming division between political theory and political science can be found here. This third use also provides context for the spiritual crisis in political theory that characterized the writings of Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin in the 1950s.36 This third conception was an open attempt to imitate the techniques and accomplishments of the natural sciences, in concert with other social sciences like anthropology and sociology. It led, in some instances, to an effort to colonize the whole idea of political theory in addition to separating political science from normative and historical political theory. Thus, political theory turned into political science for some. Particularly in its rational choice mode often referred to as "positive political theory" today this latter idea still permeates certain American views of political theory [7], [8].

During the twentieth century, this third meaning of political science briefly took over as the most common use. In America's social sciences, a hazy notion of identity started to emerge in the late 1920s. There were two phases in the development of this third sense in North America.38 The 1920s–1940s saw the first stage, which has been seen as a precursor to

behavioralism. Large political science conferences were held in Chicago between 1923 and 1925 devoted to the new empirical "science of politics," which, in the words of one commentator, "virtually every leader of the profession to the behavioural persuasion." This shift in focus away from institutional and historical study toward more empirical and quantitative techniques was largely led by Charles Merriam at Chicago University. Under Merriam, Chicago went on to become a hub for this new scientific perspective on politics. Under the intellectual supervision of Leonard White and other graduate students at Merriam, Numerous individuals, including V. O. Key, Gabriel Almond, Harold Lasswell, Herbert Simon, and David Truman, committed their skills to this emerging field of empirical study. On one level, the legalism, institutionalism, and communitarianism of the preceding phase were being responded to by this earlier time. On the other hand, a more rigid perspective on non-formal behavior emerged, centered on polls of public opinion, voting trends, and socialization procedures. This still required combining concerns about the moral significance of democracy with factual political science.

Behavioral political science was the main emphasis of the second stage and had a significant influence in the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast to Britain or Europe, this had a significantly more immediate and long-term impact in America. The pursuit of increased scientific empirical rigor attracted scholars from fields such as politics, sociology, and anthropology. Behavioralism proponents argue that behaviorism and behavioralism should be distinguished. They both thought that studying people was best served by the natural sciences' methodology. David Easton, for instance, asserts that political science "has never been behavioristic." Behaviorism, according to Easton, "refers to a theory in psychology about human behavior," as shown by the studies of psychologists like J. B. Watson together with B. The creator of operant conditioning, F. Skinner. Behavioralists viewed behaviorism's version of physiological reductionism to be disagreeable. This is not how politics may be reduced to attitudes, meanings, and beliefs. However, behavioralism's political theory detractors, like Dante Germino, were fairly clear that there wasn't much to distinguish the two empiricisms and that the divide was just theoretical.

According to David Easton's retrospective article, behaviorism can be broadly categorized into seven main themes: finding detectable patterns in political behavior; testing and validating empirical generalizations; concentrating on methods for gathering and analyzing empirical data; accurately quantifying and measuring empirical data; separating values or evaluative concerns from factual data analytically; organizing the relationship between theory and research; and, finally, trying to engage as much as possible in pure science with the ultimate goal of "utilizing political knowledge in the solution of practical problems of society." Thus, the recording and quantification of political behavior became the primary concerns. The study of states was superseded by political systems with input and output functions; the study of democracy was replaced by election behavior, public opinion surveys, and polling; the study of societies was superseded by pressure or interest group behavior.

The behavioral movement of the 1950s occurred at the same time as other significant advancements. First, there was the overlap with the movement known as the end-of-ideology, which rejected both political ideology and normative political theory. This involves a certain amount of self-satisfaction with the function and practical accomplishments of liberal democracy. Thus, both normative theory and ideology had become obsolete. A generation that had seen the wars, Gulags, show trials, Nazism, Jewish pogroms, and Stalinism in the 1930s and 1940s also firmly believed in the 1950s that ideology or normative-based politics represented dangerous illusions. While ideologies could have a place in growing, immature communities, they have become purely cosmetic in industrialized, democratic society. Liberal democracies had reached a state of agreement and convergence on fundamental objectives. In

the welfare mixed economy system, the major parties in industrialized economies had accomplished most of their reformist goals. The right had acknowledged the need for the welfare state and the rights of working people, while the left had acknowledged the risks associated with overreaching governmental authority. Seymour Martin Lipset once said, "For those intellectuals who need ideologies or utopias to inspire them to political action, this very triumph of the democratic social revolution of the West ends domestic politics." After a fundamental consensus on political principles was reached, politics shifted to more incidental pragmatic adjustments, such as GNP, salaries, prices, and the need for borrowing by the public sector. Everything else was motion and foam. "The democratic struggle will continue, but it will be a fight without ideologies," Lipset said.

The "end of ideology" also ushered in the heroic age of sociology, a discipline devoid of superstition but resolute in its support of liberty and liberal democracy. In the 1950s social sciences, ideology was the most pervasive belief that needed to be disproved. Thus, a value-free rigor, skepticism, empirical verification, or falsification was required for the growth of empirical social science, untarnished by the sentimental appeals of normative or ideological political theory. Beneath all of these conclusions was a positivistic separation of values and facts. Furthermore, the "death of political philosophy" movement, consensus politics in Britain, and most frightening of all the McCarthyite anti-communist purges in North America all occurred at the same time as the end of ideology.

With the exception of a small number of behaviorist extremists, positivistic political science did not usually call for the total eradication of normative theory and ideology. Some people wanted this to be removed, or at the very least, transformed into a rigorous empirical theory of politics. Nonetheless, a large number of political scientists, like Karl Deutsch, Heinz Eulau, Robert Dahl, David Easton, and Robert Lasswell, had earlier training as more conventional political theorists. Political philosophy was not, however, seen by them as a complete waste of time. The normative and historical perspectives may provide theories for empirical investigation. This makes the sometimes-appearing sharp distinction between political scientists and theorists confusing.

John Gunnell believed that the political theory writings of the émigré generation of the 1920s and 1930s, including authors like Strauss, Arendt, Brecht, Adorno, and many others, shaped the stance of behavioural theory. These writers took a highly critical stance towards political science, linking it to social crisis, individualistic liberalism, relativism, and potential nihilism. According to Gunnell, political scientists "eventually felt constrained to make a choice" in this crucial situation. Ultimately, this discussion was more about the liberal and democratic cultures than it was about methodology. According to Gunnell, the conflict by the early 1960s extended beyond a simple dispute between Easton and Strauss. It had been handed down to a new generation of academics who were schooled in the new political theories that had been refuted by the émigrés and the leaders of the behavioral movement. These scholars had already started to lose track of the origins of the conflict between the paradigms that they had been brought up with.

The influence of what may be called a loose positivist movement in the twentieth century provided the philosophical foundation for behavioural political science. In the 1950s, Carnap, one of the foremost proponents of Viennese positivist, was a professor in Chicago. This philosophical stance became known to a fresh batch of political scientists. The concept of an authentic "empirical political theory" was well-suited to positivism. Essentially, however, positivism was a more expansive program associated with a more expansive understanding of science. In the natural sciences, theories were considered to be unified explanatory systems that included rules that could be "controlled by factual evidence." The fundamental argument

was that scientific theories might use a neutral language of observation to understand an objective world. Natural science theory did not, in fact, construct or organize reality. Theories provide us with information about reality in a somewhat detached manner.44 Natural science explanations, which employ a neutral language of observation, can be characterized as methodically connected claims about an outside world. These claims can, in some situations, be referred to as laws backed by empirical data. This kind of thought often operates within a basic framework known as positivism. In particular, political science from the 1950s emphasized this method.

But positivism is a complicated idea. It represents two major concepts. It first identifies positivists, such Auguste Comte and the Viennese logical positivism movement (albeit the latter is also referred to as neo-positivist). Comte's influence, particularly via positivist sociology, created a foundation of ideas that resonated with twentieth-century positivists. Early twentieth-century positivist theory was influenced by Comte's beliefs about the ultimate triumph of positive science over metaphysics and religion, the need to distinguish between real facts and theoretical constructs, his strong faith in scientific advancement, and his claim that moral and material progress are inextricably linked. The second sense of positivism embodies a more general adherence to certain epistemological theses, such as the unity of the sciences, the idea that the empirical sciences, logic, and mathematics are the only valid standards of knowledge we have, the reality of sense impressions, the idea of a scientific theorist as a dispassionate observer who never asserts anything that has not been empirically proven, an intense dislike and mistrust of metaphysical thought, the acceptance of the clear distinction between fact and value, and, more specifically, the belief that the natural and social sciences share a certain common method [9], [10].

This later positivist approach has seen two major expressions this century. The first has to do with the neo-Kantian division between theoretical and practical reason, which is meant to allow for moral judgment and autonomy. Throughout the 20th century, neo-Kantianism became more skeptical of Kant's moral autonomy theory. The values were progressively questioned. But the facts were known. This differentiation formed a fundamental tenet of the neo-Kantianism that underpinned Max Weber's sociological research and his differentiations between moral discourse and value-free social science. Weber was not a positivist with a narrow mentality. Although moral and religious values had significance for people, he persisted in his belief that there was a distinct difference between facts and values and that science lacked solutions for the optimal way of living. Weber posed the question, "Is there any rational basis for our basic values?" when studying under Nietzsche. Weber was anxious since he was unable to provide a response to this query. The second positivist expression that is most recognizable to us is what is known as the Anglo-Saxon "liberal social science perspective," which embraces positivism often on the basis of consequentialism. This second approach has a more Comtian and utilitarian quality than a neo-Kantian one. It still has all the anticipated positivist elements, however. In particular, the division between values and facts is fundamental. A classic positivist remark from David Easton at the time is this one: "A proposition's factual aspect refers to a part of reality; hence it can be tested by reference to the facts." We verify its veracity in this manner. However, a proposition's moral element simply conveys an individual's emotional reaction. It is useless to define a proposition's value aspect in this manner, even if we may state that its aspect relating to a fact might be true or untrue.

In conclusion, behavioralists saw the idea of political theory as objective and value-free. The overt goal was to imitate the methods used in the natural sciences, which included gathering empirical data, finding connections, making generalizations, and developing testable hypotheses that made predictions possible. George Homans, one proponent, said, "As we have

come to accept... the natural scientific standards for verifying claims, thus we should consider the natural scientific criteria for explanation more carefully [in the social sciences]. We have lagged behind in that regard. In this situation, it is hardly surprising that political behavior may adopt the seductive form of the natural world, containing observable truths that could be investigated and documented.

CONCLUSION

This study sheds light on the nuanced landscape of political theory in the latter part of the 20th century. It challenges the dominance of the negative segregation thesis by exposing the limitations and underlying assumptions of the argument for justifiable reasons. The exploration of diverse elements in twentieth-century political philosophy emphasizes the need for a more comprehensive theoretical approach, as presented in the positive segregation concept. Acknowledging the intricate overlaps between categories like classical normative, institutional, historical, empirical, and ideological political philosophy, the study concludes that political theory lacks a pure essence and remains an amalgamation of diverse schools of thinking. This comprehensive understanding is crucial for navigating the complex terrain of political thought and philosophy.

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CHAPTER 7

EVOLUTION OF EMPIRICAL POLITICAL THEORY: FROM POSITIVISM TO RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE CHALLENGES OF POST-EMPIRICISM

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ABSTRACT:

This study explores the evolution of political theory, focusing on the dominance and subsequent challenges faced by empirical political theories. Initially rooted in a belief in objective, value-free observation, empirical theories emerged as a prominent approach in political studies, drawing from fields like systems theory, behavioral psychology, and neo-classical economics. The aspirations of empirical theory were to offer a clear understanding of political processes, grounded in social change and transformation. However, the study reveals a significant shift in the late 1960s and beyond, challenging the empirical hegemony. The post-behavioral revolution of the 1970s brought skepticism toward the scientific perspective, driven by critiques of counterculture movements and the inadequacy of empirical theories to address complex normative issues. Furthermore, developments in the philosophy of science, particularly post-empiricist perspectives, questioned the assumed objectivity of empirical theories and highlighted the role of interpretation and theory in shaping reality. The discussion extends to the rise of rational choice theory, emerging in the 1950s and gaining prominence in the late 20th century. While rational choice theory claims to apply analytical methods of economics to political processes, the study points out concerns about its empirical success and the ideological foundations it may represent. In conclusion, the paper acknowledges the continued dominance of empirical political theory in North American and European political studies but underscores the persistent tension between empirical and normative approaches. The study highlights the complex interplay of philosophy, methodology, and the evolving landscape of political science.

KEYWORDS:

Empirical Political Theory, Political Science, Political Studies, Political Theory.

INTRODUCTION

Theorist's overall notion of the objective universe was that of a caring, impartial observer who completely depicts and explains everything. The role of the theorist was to explain the world by well-tested categories, not to interpret it. Empirical theory often rejected the existence of any historical, normative, philosophical, or ethical elements. Emotional reactions were seen in relation to values. It was believed that facts were pre-constituted givens, existing before theory and representation. Causal relationships are seen, explained, and generalized by empirical theories. In essence, theories arrange the actual data in a way that makes sense. The original sources of information for these empirical theories often came from fields such as systems theory, behavioral psychology, neo-classical economics, mathematical modeling, and the like. These theories provide an explanation for political behavior that is not constrained by institutional frameworks, political ideals, or ideologies. Up until the late 1960s, this trend emerged as the discipline's more popular approach; that being said, it has always had a much larger following in political studies in North America. It is imperative to underscore that the aspirations of empirical theory encompassed all that was significant in normative classical and

historical notions of political theory, namely, a clear understanding and explanation of the processes involved in politics, a clear perception of the reality of politics, and a clear set of recommendations for setting up society. Empirical theory was founded on the idea of social change and transformation [1], [2].

Science was seen as a tool for society. Therefore, in this particular setting, normative and historical theory were literally superfluous. Thus, it became evident to David Easton and many other political scientists in North America that political theory would need to become much more empirically rigorous going forward in order to even continue to exist in academia. In his well-known piece "The Decline of Political Theory," Easton saw most classical normative political theorists as nothing more than intellectual parasites who sold antiquated, meaningless knowledge about bygone eras and subsisted on outdated ideologies. Simultaneously, Herbert Simon lamented that "political philosophy will not advance if we think and write in the loose, literary, metaphysical style. The standard of rigor that is tolerated in political theory would not pass an elementary logic course." Empirical political theory has to evolve from political theory. This is the exact opposite of Ernest Barker's complaint, expressed in his inauguration address in 1928, that political science turns into an institutional and normative philosophy. According to Easton, political theory transforms from a refined historical and normative framework into an empirical one. William C. Mitchell predicted with optimism in 1969 that political theory will "become increasingly logical, deductive, and mathematical" in the future. We will use economic theory, game theory, decision theory, welfare economics, and public finance more and more in its content.

Strangely, the conclusion of Brian Barry's 1990 essay, "The Strange Death of Political Philosophy," which identifies, anachronistically, the hopeful lines of future political theory as studies of welfare economics, game theory, voting behavior, and value analysis, is not too dissimilar from Mitchell's comment. In Barry's case, however, this is more of an all-encompassing partnership with economic analysis. The peculiar thing is that the author of the later ruling is a political theorist with a normative bent who participated in some of the earlier behavioral phase. However, in Barry's case, it is more of a response to the deplorable deficiencies of the history of political theory as an approach, as well as the poor state of Oxford analytical political theory throughout the 1960s. Barry's peculiar appraisal of theoretical advancements in the future, however, is neither a proposition that makes the heart race nor one that accurately captures what really happened in the latter two decades of the 20th century.

The so-called "post-behavioural revolution" of the 1970s has increased skepticism against the "scientific" perspective. During this time, most empirical theorists started to become more cautious. The master of the previous behavioral persuasion, Easton, actually redefined himself as "post-behavioural." According to Easton, the reasons for this post-behavioral development can be traced back to the critiques of the counterculture movements of the late 1960s, the behavioral movement's complete incapacity to address the intricate normative issues arising from the Vietnam War, and the in-depth civil rights debates, all of which captured the attention of most political science majors.46 Behavioural political science was ill-equipped to address the complex social, moral, and legal debates pertaining to gender, war, race, rights, and social justice that dominated the moral and political arguments of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Political science seemed to be totally silent on these matters.

In contrast to the fundamental tenets of behavioral theory, ideology and normative theory seemed to be more successful in resolving these kinds of problems. But in the 1970s, a number of political theorists also contended that empiricism was an ontological and epistemological theory that could be contested. In actuality, the ontology's nature was made clear by the epistemology. A well-established ontology was evident in empirical political theory. It exposed

certain ingrained and unquestioned conceptions of our "political being," rather than any fundamental facts about politics. It was necessary to see empirical political theory as merely another epistemology as a result. Among other things, it was an epistemology that could be contested philosophically. This meant that the fundamental differences drawn within the epistemology of empirical theory between, say, explanation and interpretation, or facts and values were not infallibly accurate. On the other hand, these were logically dubious presumptions. Empirical political theory started to lose its privileged and hegemonic standing in this setting.

Important advancements in the philosophy of science served to emphasize the aforementioned issue even more. With the assertions of logical positivism and hypothetico-deductive approaches, reflection on the procedures of natural science continued. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the collective phenomenon known as "post-empiricist science," which was cultivated in writers like Mary Hesse, Michael Polanyi, Peter Winch, Paul Feyerabend, and Thomas Kuhn, gave rise to a number of intricate questions concerning our understanding of natural science explanation and, by extension, all empirical theories. According to this post-empiricist agenda, Western science was not the pinnacle of human knowledge or civilization; rather, it was an epistemological turning point. Therefore, a thorough and considerate examination of many cultures and unique knowledge systems may teach us a great lot. Furthermore, we must be more mindful of the self-reflexive criticism that occurs inside our own knowledge systems; in other words, seemingly objective empirical evidence is not always so readily separated from theoretical models. Interpretations are capable of constituting. Ironically, theories might be thought of as natural science's truths. The goals of verification, including law theory and hypothetical-deductive methods all prevalent in behavioural and empiricist investigations are seriously called into question by this post-empiricist perspective on science [3], [4].

While acknowledging the distinct function of natural science language, the post-empiricist program offered some remarks that coincidentally connected to concepts in both interpretative and normative theory. First, theory contributes to the formation of reality rather than being about it or an attempt to modify it. Certain theories provide meaning to and shape the world based on implicit assumptions. There are no unadulterated facts that aren't tainted by presumptions about interpretation. Therefore, reality cannot be unmediated or uninterpreted. Because valid knowledge is not the purported representation of anything external, it is more difficult to determine whether a belief is clearly true or false or to assess it against an outside empirical norm. Theories may shape reality in ways that are either very successful or convincing. The basis for truth or untruth would be different theoretical or ideological frameworks. Such plans would likewise be susceptible to historical modifications.

A lot of proponents of empirical political theory disagree deeply with this point of view. For instance, how could such illusive concepts provide any trustworthy or verifiable actual data? Moreover, interpretations cannot be quantified. This kind of constitutive theory casts doubt on the whole empirical endeavor. In political science, the conflict between political theory and empirical theory remains unresolved. Within the field of political science, various changes have occurred. The confusing range of methods brought about by the post-behavioural period is now recognized. As a result, a few more contemporary political scientists have made an effort to accept "methodological pluralism." However, some people find this diversity to be shocking and unsettling. Felix Oppenheim argued that the more traditional types of behavioralism and positivism would eventually be rejected in favor of this post-empiricist viewpoint. However, he argues that contemporary political scientists have to steer clear of both the Charybdis of naive relativism and the Scylla of traditional behavioralism. "To reject behavioralism is not to

abandon empiricism," he adds. According to Oppenheim, creating accurate and straightforward definitions and explanations for political science still bears some similarities to creating clear explanations for solid natural science. He acknowledges, however, that this would not result in fully-edged empirical covering laws in political science in the more traditional positivist sense.

DISCUSSION

Rational choice theory comes one after the shock of empiricism, which is perhaps the theory that is now bringing empirical political theory into the modern day. The roots of rational choice can be found in both utilitarian and neo-classical economics.50 As for the actual, serious development of rational choice, it emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, right at the time that behavioral theory was beginning to fade. At first, though, it was a very specialized and marginal field, somewhat out of the mainstream of economics. Mainstream economists still find it very antiquated, despite its economic foundation. Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy, and Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action are the three foundational works that provide the framework for the viewpoint. The Calculus of Consent by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, which drew a comparison between voters and customers in a market, was another significant book that had a significant influence. Still, rational choice did not publicly assert its optimism until the 1980s. However, it emerged as the fastest-growing subfield of political studies in North America during the last two decades of the 20th century. It has even been given a unique moniker, "positive political theory," which makes the rest of political theory appear somewhat negative.51 It is now accurate to say that in North America it has replaced behavioralism, institutional theory, and pluralism as the empirical paradigms. Additionally, it has steadily expanded into allied fields like international relations. "Hardly an area of political science has remained untouched by its influence," a synoptic survey concluded. As a result, some astute supporters of rational choice consider this to be a significant victory for the viewpoint.

The rational choice theory has several variations, but generally speaking, it is "the application of the analytical method and techniques of modern economics to the study of political processes" (1995). Therefore, "the economic study of non-market decision-making, or simply the application of economics to political science," is a core definition of rational choice. Political science and public choice both study the same topics: party politics, voting behavior, voting regulations, state theory, bureaucracy, and so on. However, public choice employs an economics technique. Similar to economics, the fundamental behavioral tenet of public choice is that people are rational, egoistic value maximizers. Stated differently, the focus is on politics or the government as seen by the market. As typically occurs with such theories, it has split pretty swiftly amongst multiple schools, for example, the Virginia School of Public Choice and the Chicago school , commonly referred to as the 'private interest regulation' school [5], [6].

Rational choice is predicated on certain rather strict and frugal premises. First, people are the basis of all social explanations, including group explanations. Rational choice is thus individualist in methodology. Secondly, it is considered that every person is logical. Finally, Riker states that rationality is that agents make the decision "that, within certain limits of available information...," or the "option which they believe best fulfills their purposes." Actors make decisions based on how much makes them happy. This concept of rationality is entirely instrumental and does not address the substance of choices or preferences.52 A comprehensive examination of fundamental incentives may significantly contribute to the understanding of human behavior. Fourthly, the person has self-interest. This does not mean that group action is impossible or that total egoism is required. Conversely, rational choice proponents find it offers a more theoretically sound explanation for public decision-making and group behavior.53 Fifth, the real rational choice process resembles decontextualized utility maximization. Every

agent aims to minimize their losses and increase their utility. When presented with many choices, the agent will choose the alternative that best fulfills or optimizes her goals. In essence, we are examining the integuments of the creature known as homo economicus. Additionally, rational choice presupposes consistency in possibilities and choices; preferences are prioritized based on how useful they are to us. This is a fundamental balance. The agent may thus compute a decision from any collection of preferences that will provide the highest utility reward. Many rational choice theories have been influenced by this specific line of thinking, which also gave rise to "game theory" and other types of mathematical modeling. Ultimately, every rational choice analysis demonstrates "a preference for formal deductive method, deriving 'interesting' propositions via occasionally lengthy and intricate chains of logical reasoning from a minimal set of plausible axioms." It is believed that these rational choice presumptions are universal, empirical, and oriented toward science. Its greatest valued feature, in fact, is its scientific and empirical objectives, which are still praised by some of its harshest adversaries. In many respects, rational choice perfectly fits the more upbeat self-perception found in empirical political theory. Once the aforementioned fundamental assumptions are accepted, it may fulfill all the criteria of a normative political theory while also embodying a supposedly rigorous, empirically tested, and scientifically-based research program.

The issue with the empirical front is that it is unclear how successful it has been empirically. Hence, "curiously, the stature of rational choice scholarship does not rest on a readily identifiable set of empirical successes," according to the fundamental claim of a recent synoptic study of rational choice. According to the writers, the majority of detractors fail to emphasize the empirical or operationalized aspects of the philosophy. They point out that this area of rational choice research is often "tainted by erroneously selected samples, badly executed experiments, and biased interpretations of findings." Because of this, rational choice theory has not yet lived up to its great and rising popularity within the field, hindering the advancement of the empirical study of politics [7], [8]. The authors argue that part of the issue here is that this empirical weakness stems from the effort to develop a general empirical theory of politics, which has led to rational choice being "method driven" as opposed to "problem driven."

The majority of normative critique concentrates on certain well-traveled routes. It is evident that an unquestioning empiricist metaphysics is the foundation of rational decision. Nonetheless, its detractors find that its fundamental components are neither very rational nor tenable. Generally speaking, the aforementioned set of assumptions are considered to be just inaccurate and misleading, apart from the fact that they have not truly been experimentally verified. The idea of the solitary or atomized person is dubious and has been controversial both historically and sociologically. It represents an overly limited and perhaps strange viewpoint on people. In the most basic sense, it is unable to explain the complexity and peculiarities of human beings, whether they are acting in a moral or political capacity. It does little or no justice to human nature or human activity to limit all individual action and decision to instrumental personal preference rankings, utility maximization, and self-interests. This also applies to more traditional forms of utilitarianism. That may provide us with a very limited understanding of certain collective acts, but that is all. Additionally, it makes use of a rather arbitrary and constrained definition of human reason.

Critics see less of a universal foundational empirical political theory—aside from a few more erratic and peculiar offshoots in, say, Marxist rational choice—and more of a somewhat pessimistic ideological doctrine, motivated by a narrowly focused understanding of neo-classical liberal market economics and utilitarian calculus in North America. Its significance has less to do with theoretical profundity or long-term intellectual significance and more to do with the strength and influence of North America. This model is based on many very dubious

underlying presumptions. It is basically philosophically predisposed to view all government-led efforts with pessimism, for the simple reason that they are not the result of market choice. It is profoundly pessimistic about human nature, seeing self-interest and maximizing one's own usefulness as the foundation of politics and morals. Its perspective on people is essentially quite sterile. It is closely related to a number of public policies that deal with the reduction of public spending, the market-based privatization of government, the transition from progressive to proportionate taxation regimes, and the complete integration of competitive market processes into all facets of public administration, government, and public service. It offers ideological support for concepts that have dominated public policy discussions in Britain and North America, including cost-benefit analysis, private finance initiatives, value for money policies, cost-effectiveness measurement, market testing, and introducing competition in the delivery of all public services. Rational choice theorists in the 1960s and 2000s sought to model government agencies, health care, education, and similar services on private firms, just as they had modeled the democratic voter on the market-based consumer. The rational choice theory is not the main factor behind this shift in public policy. Still, rational decision participates in a broader ideological movement.

Political theory is often seen to have some strange sociological connections with behavioralism. Similar to behavioral political theory, rational choice has mostly been popularized in North America and has established a strong foothold in the academy of modern politics. It also adheres to a fundamental positivist feism. There is a significant distinction from behavioral theory, however. In the 1950s and 60s, political theory was a relatively weak and disheartened profession compared to behavioral theory. The majority of theory was composed of linguistic philosophy and logical positivism, with the exception of the European contingent of immigrant thinkers like Hannah Arendt and Strauss. These philosophical schools had their roots in an empiricist foundationalism, which recognized empirical assertions as authentic first-order knowledge right away. As a result, behaviorism was able to temporarily overcome the resistance with relative ease. Nonetheless, rational choice emerged in the 1980s, despite its popularity in academia. This was in line with the "rediscovery" of normative political theory, Rawls' justice-based argument, Skinner's work during the early, glorious days of methodological discussions, postpositivist criticism, and many more varied viewpoints. In this regard, it ran against a broad and varied resistance from various branches of political philosophy. This has significantly reduced the extent of it [9], [10].

In conclusion, rather than being formal, institutional, historical, or normative, the primary goals of political science continue to be related to the informal and empirical. Political science continues to be the much more dominant partner within North American and European political studies, despite the fact that some of the most grandiose promises of empirical political theory to "colonize" the whole of political theory have now contracted. Despite the arguments made by post-positivists and post-empiricists, empirical political theory is nonetheless devoted to the measurable, quantifiable, and testable. Though latent, the desire for political theory to be fully assimilated into empirical theory does exist.

CONCLUSION

This examination of political theory's evolution underscores the dynamic interplay between empirical and normative approaches. Empirical political theories, rooted in objectivity and observable phenomena, initially gained prominence, challenging normative traditions. However, the study reveals a turning point in the late 1960s, marked by a post-behavioral revolution and a growing awareness of the limitations of empirical theories in addressing complex normative issues. The rise of rational choice theory represents a subsequent phase in the evolution, presenting a methodological shift but facing scrutiny for its empirical

shortcomings and perceived ideological underpinnings. The study concludes with an acknowledgment of the persistent dominance of empirical political theory in contemporary political studies, despite challenges and critiques. Ultimately, the tension between empirical and normative perspectives remains unresolved, emphasizing the ongoing complexity within the field of political science. The study prompts further reflection on the role of philosophy, methodology, and the evolving socio-political landscape in shaping the trajectory of political theory.

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CHAPTER 8

EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY

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ABSTRACT:

This study delves into the intricate relationship between political theory and ideology, exploring various perspectives from historical and contemporary political philosophers. The central argument posits that ideology, often dismissed or marginalized, is an integral and practical aspect of political theory. The analysis unfolds across two main approaches: the integration of political theory and ideology and the segregation between them. The historical evolution of the term "ideology" is traced, highlighting its increasing relevance in political discourse. The study examines how ideologies and political theories have been treated as social objects within the framework of empirical social theory. It also delves into the impact of behavioral political science on the perception of normative political theory, emphasizing a shift toward empirical political theory. The study explores the coexistence of political theory and ideology, questioning the common tendency to equate the two. Furthermore, it considers the communitarian movement's approach and varying perspectives on the relationship between political theory and ideology, ranging from unintentional conflation to deliberate differentiation. The study concludes by presenting the positive separation thesis, arguing for the acknowledgment of distinct yet equally significant contributions of political philosophy and ideology within the broader realm of political theory.

KEYWORDS:

Ideology, Philosophy Ideology, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Theory Ideology.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most contentious ideas in political philosophy is ideology. The main idea of this viewpoint is that political theory is, and has always been, a very practical form of thinking that is closely related to the field of politics. Put differently, ideology represents the reality of political theory. From this perspective, the political philosophers of the past, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke, were essentially acting as ideologists when they wrote and thought about politics. Political theory is thus really about ideology, which is a practical political engagement attempting to negotiate the political sphere, alter views, and formulate public policy. As a result, ideology only marginally highlights one crucial aspect of theory: the engaged, practical aspect. This aspect of theory might suddenly and sporadically be overlooked in the overwhelming maze of abstract thinking. Ideology, however, not only directly challenges some prevalent conceptions of normative political theory, but also aspects of historical and empirical theories, in staking out this sort of territory for itself.

The most intricate and delicate relationship is that with normative theory. Following a brief introduction to the concept of ideology, the debate over the relationship between political theory and ideology will be examined in terms of two main approaches: first, attempts to fully integrate political theory and ideology, or to make them indistinguishable; and second, attempts to completely demarcate them. Since segregation and integration both have positive and negative poles, each answer may be further divided into two subcategories [1], [2].

From the early 1800s, the term "ideology" has been used in politics; it was not widely recognized until the 1840s, and it wasn't widely used again until the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It was first used to discuss the Enlightenment concept of a "empirical science of ideas" in the works of Destutt de Tracy. There was no obvious political significance to it. By the middle of the 1800s, Marx and Engels were using it in a definitive political and critical meaning. But it wasn't until the 20th century that it became a prominent topic of conversation in popular politics. However, neither idea can really claim considerable longevity, except from a rhetorical standpoint, as political theory was also, etymologically, a relatively new word, having originated in the mid- to late nineteenth century. In many respects, it nevertheless remains the inferior and sometimes derided cousin of political theory, despite its widespread use in both academic and everyday discourse. Thus, let's start with the premise of negative integration. Marx was among the first to suggest that political theory and political ideology might coexist peacefully. But Marx paints a complicated picture, as does the Marxist tradition that followed.

Political theory and ideology are often lumped together under one heading, despite the fact that they both refer to illusions. The true foundation of social existence is found in the material circumstances of economic life. It is only via these basic circumstances and the resulting class fights that cultural and political systems can be understood. All concepts must be described in terms of their relationship to the material substrate since it is the fundamental concept. They are inexplicable on their own. They make up a society's philosophy. Marx referred to the aforementioned concept as the "leading thread" of his research in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, one of his synoptic semi-autobiographical writings. Under this interpretation, it seems sense that Engels and others would have called all ideology "false-consciousness." Its primary misconception stems from its blindness to its own class foundation. Thus, a history of class interests might include the history of ideology. In actuality, political philosophers work as professional propagandists or ideologists. Thus, the explosions of political theory and ideology must be explained by the social and economic sciences.

Thus, political theory and ideology become social objects that fit into a larger empirical social theory to be explained. Political theories were still seen by most sociologists of the 20th century both structuralism and functionalism as components of a larger science of society. Ideologies and political theories have both often been seen by social science as social objects to be studied. In actuality, sociology as a whole comprised a comprehensive social epistemology, according to Durkheim and Talcott Parsons, which offered precise solutions to all of the earlier philosophical issues pertaining to knowing. Outside of civilization, humans are without distinguishing characteristics. Political philosophy and ideology are therefore explained by a science of society.

The fundamental point mentioned above has previously been discussed in empirical political theory. The "illusory" aspect of normative political theory gained prominence with the development of empirical theory in the middle of the 20th century. The perspective of behavioral political science embodied this viewpoint. The 'end of ideology' perspective's broad framework also recognized this line of reasoning. In essence, social science provided a science of society. The growth of empirical theory necessitated a value-free rigor and transparent verification procedures that were untarnished by references to ideology or normative political theory. "Science is not and has never been part of an ideological culture," said Edward Shils. Indeed, ideology is incompatible with the spirit of science. Political theory and ideology could only survive by evolving into empirical political theory.

This was the behavioral movement's prevailing viewpoint. The history of political theory, classical normative theory, and ideologies all continued to be used with theory "that lingered

from an earlier period in the discipline's history." As James Farr pointed out, theory in behavioral research was supposed to be objective and value-free, but it was also empirical and explanatory. It was suggested that there existed a logical divide that could not be bridged between what "is" and what "ought" to be.

The easiest way to understand normative subjects like justice, freedom, or authority the cornerstones of a prescientific study of politics—was to relate them to one's subjective feelings or expressive moods. Additionally, there was a "strong dose of metaphysical discourse" in them. Behavioralists, according to Farr, "had nothing to do with science" and "endlessly reinterpreted the great books of dead men and tire-lessly disputed the meaning of the good life." In larger industrialized democratic nations, ideologies and political ideas were mostly unnecessary or ornamental. In emerging communities, however, they may play a cohesive role. Basic social and political goals had been agreed upon [3], [4].

The coexistence of political theory and political ideology in this setting shouldn't raise any red flags. Once again, however, there are many viewpoints. Many people unknowingly follow the merger of the concepts, where political theory is mistakenly synonymous with ideology. Consequently, it is common to come across casual allusions to "liberal ideology" and similar topics in conversations that seem to be centered only around the field of political philosophy.

Ironically, this unintentional use may be found in the "second wave" of historical publications on political philosophy. Given the second wave theories' conspicuous concern to language and avoidance of anachronism, this is really doubly ironic. It is, to put it mildly, peculiar to find Quentin Skinner in a number of writings referring to, for example, "History and Ideology in the English Revolution" or "The Ideological Context of Hobbes' Political Thought," given that the term "ideology" is a nineteenth-century neologism with a baggage of uses. In his explanation of Skinner's methodology, James Tully also reflects this use. According to Tully, the new approach therefore requires that we put every text in a "ideological context." According to Tully, an ideology may be defined as a political language that is defined by norms and used by many authors, as per Skinner's perspective. The broad conceptual framework of the Italian city-states throughout the Renaissance is therefore composed of scholasticism and humanism, as well as Lutheranism and Calvinism. Thus, Luther and Calvin become into radical political figures!55 "Political theory, a part of politics, and the questions it treats are the effects of political action" is made possible by placing a concept or text in its proper context—the second wave theory's holy grail. "Since a political ideology represents a political action to change some of the conventions," Tully says, altering how part of that political activity is represented is the goal of the ideology. As a result, Tully characterizes The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Skinner's comprehensive two-volume work, as "a map of the great political ideologies of early modern Europe." Ideology and political philosophy therefore merge into one. It is fruitless to look for even the slightest acknowledgment in these contextualist writings that the notion of ideology is a very problematic and relatively recent term with many unsolved conflicts.

DISCUSSION

The communitarian movement of the 1980s and 1990s offers another semi-conscious reaction to this similar challenge. The way they link theory to specific community behaviors is a defining feature of their arguments. As a result, concepts cannot be defined apart from the interpersonal interactions that make them up. Thus, communitarianism contends that moral and political values cannot be established by deductive reasoning. Every human "good" comes from a certain historical community. Nothing exists that is not connected to a social setting. Morality is assumed to already exist rather than being created or found. We "read off" an established

speech tradition. The good becomes central to the society. Again, this seems to unintentionally link political theory to ideology in general, with neither having any unique characteristics. All they are are various labels applied to the same social discourse.

However, not everyone in the historical field is as ignorant of the "use" of the term ideology. Richard Ashcraft remarks that "only an ideologically grounded approach with respect to current political problems can provide a bridge between the traditions of political philosophy and the perception of what counts as "political" phenomena," using ideology to denote both political activism and political theory in an open and explicit manner. Political philosophers are categorically considered ideological, or at least they ought to be. Ashcraft challenges the notion that philosophy is superior to ideology by posing the question, "How is it even conceivable for... presuppositions of epistemology to separate themselves from the conflict they purport to "examine" and are presumed to transcend. Ashcraft's criticism seems to be aimed at both political theory historians and analytical philosophers. He contends that "those teachers of political theory who have encapsulated the meaning of politics within the frozen worlds of "analysis" or "history" bear some of the responsibility for the divorce of traditional political theory from present concerns of political life." Ashcraft goes on to say that "the original sin" is what many political philosophers refer to as ideologists. Ideology seems to renounce all hope of universality. But Ashcraft believes it is well worth sacrificing this universality. He contends that the majority of theorists in the past were, in reality, what we now consider to be ideologists and were really concerned about societal issues. It is a contemporary kind of self-indulgence to reduce them to mere philosophers.

It's also important to remember that more modern neo-Marxism does not always see ideology negatively. It may also have a very optimistic stance about the fusion of ideology and political philosophy. Therefore, proletariat ideology was seen by Antonio Gramsci, the most renowned Marxist of the 20th century, as an efficient weapon in the political war against bourgeois ideology. Thus, the predominance of political ideas was seen to be very significant. Concepts become somewhat independent of their material foundation. In other words, as a political theory, there may exist a genuine and practical Marxist ideology. This "partial autonomy" theory is somewhat reflected in the writings of several later twentieth-century Marxists, including Gramsci. It is also the prevailing perspective in critical theory of the twentieth century.

In a broader context from the late 20th century, language in general has not always been seen as a clear means of conveying meaning, both in theory and in ideology. Languages, even the most complex ones used in political philosophy, are unable to really separate themselves from the political issue or become neutral. Political theory and ideology both emphasize language, and language emphasizes social activity. Thus, speaking may be thought of as an action process. Thus, studying political ideas and ideologies is tantamount to studying society itself. Language is a medium that is entwined with political and historical traditions. Language is thus inextricably linked to social conflict, serving as both a vehicle for its expression and its experience. Stated differently, political theory and ideology contribute to the reality rather than neutrally reflecting or representing it. Political philosophy and ideology are intertwined in intricate power dynamics. For example, discourse analysis, psychoanalysis, semiotics, variants of structuralist Marxism, and much postmodern genealogy have made it their mission to analyze this process. All of them emphasize the formative and expressive roles of language while rejecting the "neutralist" notion about ideology and theory [4], [5].

A distinctive feature of Michel Foucault's works has been his criticism of the terminology used in political theory and ideology. Foucault even advocated doing away with the ideas of political theory and ideology completely. They would be replaced with laborious genealogical

explanation, which looks into the processes leading to the development of certain discourses and truth regimes. Foucault believed that all knowledge has to do with dominance and power. According to his statement, "What one seeks then is not to know what is true or false, justified or not justified, real or illusory. One seeks to know what are the ties, what are the connections that can be marked between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge, what games of dismissal and support are developed from the one to the others, and what it is that enables some process of coercion to acquire the form and the justification proper to a rational, calculated, technically efficient, and so forth, element" (1996). Since power requires something that is close to knowledge and knowledge always adheres to constraints and norms, postmodern authors do not see political theory or ideology as representing any external, objective truth. For Foucault, genealogy applies to both political philosophy and ideology. We are always enculturated creatures that use theory or ideology to contingently convey our many community narratives. There isn't an outside world that we can depict.

A further aspect of this assault on representation theory pertains to the extensive lineage of alleged non-foundationalism from the 20th century. There are other arguments in this tradition that help to conceptually connect political theory and ideology, even if they are not specifically focused on this integration thesis. Non-foundationalists, for instance, believe that there are no absolutes or unprocessed facts in the world. A "myth" is the concept of an empirical given. Moreover, nothing exists outside of our symbolic systems. We inhabit and operate throughout several realms, each with unique and sometimes incompatible symbol systems. Furthermore, the emphasis has shifted from correspondence explanations to coherence. Thus, statements become true based on whether they make sense inside unique symbol systems rather than on references to an outside, given reality. Similarly, irony and games are seen as an attack on knowledge claims; Richard Rorty believes that artistic invention must now take the place of representations of reality. Rorty captures this drift of argument by totally equating political philosophy with ideology. He stresses the absolute uselessness of 'the difference between "ideology" and a mode of mind which avoids being "ideology". In this circumstance, there are no obvious criteria to separate them. If political philosophy still claims a particular insight into the reality, as distinguished from other types of thinking like ideology, then it is simply erroneous. For the non-foundationalist the representational approach of certain philosophers is best understood as pathology rather than philosophy.

Moving now to the negative segregation thesis: this dimension constitutes the standard reaction of most twentieth century Anglo-American political theory, although a great deal relies here on precisely how one views political theory or philosophy especially philosophy. A typical and rather popular conception of philosophy throughout the twentieth century is to regard it as a higher, more critical or purer vocation. No matter what the philosophy expressed, it is viewed as separate from ideology. The most characteristic view of ideology is that of a contaminated or debased product, which lacks the merits of political philosophy. In this understanding, political philosophy is often characterized out by a reflective openness, critical detachment, a concentration on pursuing the argument regardless, and an awareness of human experience, which transcends political fights. Ideology, on the other hand, would be considered as the reverse. It shuts reflection, launches itself into partisan fight, its concepts are devised instrumentally to control actors, close dispute, and eventually to win political power. It has no regard with truth [6], [7].

Many twentieth-century political theorists, including Germino, Arendt, Oakeshott, Voegelin, and Strauss, have held variations of this thesis. This is quite standard for Strauss. As "the knowledge of God, the world, and man," philosophy is seen as an age-old quest for wisdom and universal knowledge. On the other hand, political ideology is completely entwined with

historical events, uncritically promoting myths, and oblivious to the line separating truth from opinion. Ideology represents nihilism as well as modernity. In Strauss's view, the larger issue that underlies this idea is the conflict between the ancients and moderns that was previously mentioned. Political philosophy has, in Strauss's opinion, become orthodoxy throughout the contemporary era. In the twenty-first century, the analytic school of philosophy reflects, in fresh terms, this unfavorable verdict. Philosophy is seen as a second-order activity, for instance, in logical positivism. Unlike in natural science, it did not provide any first-order data. Concepts that fall under the broad categories of "normative" or "metaphysical" tell us about human emotional and psychological states rather than the nature of the cosmos. Thus, ideology turns into a subjective, emotive, meaningless outpouring, along with the majority of other evaluative fields of thinking. In early ordinary language philosophy, paying careful attention to how words and ideas are used in everyday situations was also seen as the duty of philosophy. That philosophy does not include prescription or justification, however, is nonetheless consistent with logical positivism as expressed in common language. The philosophy of later Wittgenstein would likewise be covered by this. Though it still belongs to the second order of thinking and is not the same as ideology, political philosophy has a more meaningful function to play.

Again, the presentation of political philosophy as distinct from political activity and ideology is a significant aspect. In this instance, ideology seemed very dubious in each of these situations. This kind of reasoning served as the majority of Anglo-American political philosophy's utterly dogmatic foundation. In a 1976 popular textbook, David Raphael thus observed that ideology is only "a prescriptive doctrine that is not supported by argument." Up until the last ten years of the twentieth century, this was a commonly accepted creed. Throughout the second part of the twentieth century, this may be considered the standard liturgy of conceptual introductions to political theory. The judgment of ideology is often just stated and never contested in the bulk of these introductory books, despite the ritualized claims to analytical rigor. Such a background faith is true even for notable modern normative philosophers like John Rawls. For instance, Rawls contended in his book Political Liberalism that when social divides were severe, philosophical abstraction was necessary. "Deep conflict sets in motion the work of abstraction in political philosophy," he observed.

Profound and protracted debates provide the groundwork for the concept of reasonable justification. Only visionaries and ideologues are immune to intense conflicts. Once again, Rawls made the claim that ideology never addresses conflict or abstraction without providing any supporting data or reasoning. Ideology can out as narrow-minded and unimaginative. Ideology is really completely abstract from start to finish, and Rawls' points of view have always been supported by "liberal ideology." In addition, the fact that Rawls's theories were often used in ideological discussions about social policy and social justice in Britain and America throughout the 1980s may cause one to stop and consider exactly where political philosophy ends and ideology starts. The above negative division between political philosophy and ideology, in spite of its proponents, is only a relic of a certain school of mid-twentieth-century political thought, not a time-honored viewpoint.

The last and most underappreciated point is about the positive separation of political philosophy and ideology, i.e., each is seen to contribute something significant, but different. There aren't many instances of this tactic. Michael Freeden has made one recent, really clever effort. It is clear that Freeden does not see ideologies as political philosophy's inferior cousin. On the other hand, they provide equally useful perspectives. They generate and reflect social and political realities, respectively. Additionally, they are significantly more prevalent and subtle than is often realized. Ideology research should not be neglected in order to "weaken our comprehension of political thought."

'Conceptual morphology' is how Freeden refers to his method of approaching ideology. Focusing on the issue, "What are the implications and insights of a particular set of political views, in terms of the conceptual connections it forms?" the morphological method is semantically based. This method captures what Freeden refers to as "internal ideational arrangements." Interpretive frameworks are always necessary to determine meaning. Therefore, it is believed that an ideology is a human "thought-behavior" expressed in written and spoken language. Ideologies are thus defined as "those systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintentional, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they, or those with whom they preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that understanding." These are conceptual maps that include central, auxiliary, and ancillary ideas for navigating the political sphere. Although it is not the same as the conclusions and hypotheses of political philosophers, Freeden believed that this "thought-behavior invariably includes" them.

So how do political philosophy and ideology relate to one other? Political philosophy and ideology are seen by Freeden as subcategories within the larger concept of political theory. Essentially, he's attempting to reaffirm the significance of ideological analysis in political philosophy. Thus, he distinguishes between the political theory, political philosophy, and ideological histories. Putting Freeden's assessment of the benefits of morphological analysis of ideology into words is the simplest approach to understand the relationship between these concepts. It blends the use of synchronic and diachronic approaches. By superimposing a "multiple synchrony on the examination of a single system and a dia-chronic on synchronic analysis," morphology balances the two aspects. This gives one a sense on his perspective on political philosophy and political theory's historical development. In contrast to the diachronic nature of political theory's history, political philosophy has a tendency to place an undue emphasis on the synchronic component. Both dimensions are balanced, among other reasons, by ideology [8], [9].

A significant issue for Freeden is that, over the 20th century, Anglo-American political philosophy has undoubtedly attempted to distance itself from political ideology. This is the issue of negative segregation that was previously addressed. In contrast to ideology, which is mocked as being unrefined, illogical, and crass, philosophy is defined as fully synchronic, reflective, and self-critical. According to Freeden, the main purposes of political philosophy are to evaluate ethical recommendations, defend political ideas, and make clear the coherence, truth, and logicality of such views. Nonetheless, this function must not be carried out at the expense of ideological research. Ideology and political philosophy do not conflict with one another. Political conceptions and their interactions with one another affect both types of political thought. However, they should be positively separated as they are not interchangeable. For Freeden, the assertion that the only purpose of political theory is accurate or true conceptual application, as synchronic analysis, is just misguided. Additionally, he is eager to emphasize the historical and social contexts in which political concepts are developed. However, he also departs from the method of the great thinker. Except in few cases, the actual world of political activity and "thought behavior" is seldom very similar to the canon of great thinkers. Freeden makes a persuasive case for theoretical ecumenism overall. No field of political philosophy should be in the lead. Both "mutual fertilization" and tolerance are necessary.

According to Freeden, ideologies do sometimes exhibit awe-inspiring logic together with a peculiar blend of passion and reason. But even the most rationalistic political philosophical systems include non- or un-rationalized elements, he continues. Ideology is not the only issue here. Furthermore, if synchronic abstracted reason and logic are overemphasized, it may result in an academic vocabulary that is almost entirely professional and semi-private and has nothing

to do with politics as understood and practiced by the majority of everyday people. Furthermore, ideologies are neither wholly true nor wholly untrue. For example, how would socialism or liberalism be true? It is clear from this conclusion that some relativism results, which Freeden believes is unavoidable. The recognition that the more traditional political theory abstractions and model-building cannot adequately satiate the critical investigation of tangible idea-phenomena has coincided with the loss of the significance of "truth" in the social sciences, he continues. The more political philosophers go into their perfectionist endeavor, the more detached their conclusions become from the realm of politics. throughout conclusion, it is important to recognize that analytical philosophy, even with its predominant Anglo-American role, has been polysemic and contentious throughout the twentieth century. This further complicates the relationship with ideology.

Thus, in general, Freeden concludes that although political philosophy and ideology are not "entirely discrete categories," they are also not identical. Everybody has specific responsibilities. That being said, political philosophy needs to include more than merely meaning clarification. Political philosophy is not perfect, but ideology is not either. Ideology must be included into political theory as a legitimate process on par with political philosophy, thereby calling for a new ecumenical approach [10], [11].

CONCLUSION

This study navigates the complex terrain of political theory and ideology, unraveling the historical, philosophical, and sociological dimensions that shape their interaction. The historical roots of the term "ideology" are explored, leading to an examination of its evolving significance in political thought. The study scrutinizes different perspectives on the relationship between political theory and ideology, ranging from Marxist interpretations to contemporary approaches like conceptual morphology. It challenges the prevalent negative segregation thesis that positions ideology as a lesser counterpart to political philosophy. The positive separation thesis is presented as a call for recognizing the unique roles and contributions of both political philosophy and ideology within the broader field of political theory. By advocating for an ecumenical approach, the study encourages a more inclusive understanding that embraces the dynamic interplay between these two essential components of political thought.

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CHAPTER 9

RETHINKING POLITICAL THEORY: UNRAVELLING FOUNDATIONS, LOGICAL POSITIVISM, AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN

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ABSTRACT:

This study explores the transformative shifts in political theory from the 1930s to the 1970s, with a focus on logical positivism, conceptual analysis, and linguistic philosophy. The chapter "Foundations Shaken but Not Stirred" delves into the challenges faced by political theory, ranging from weak foundational theories to the emergence of logical positivism. It discusses the growth of conceptual analysis, philosophy of language, and the influence of Wittgenstein's ideas, leading into the changes of the 1970s triggered by John Rawls' Theory of Justice. The analysis asserts three crucial clarifications. First, despite the shaky foundations, there was unwavering acceptance of philosophical techniques' fundamental significance. Second, new theoretical advancements of the 1970s, particularly Rawls' work, stirred confidence in political theory, creating an industry of commentary. Third, while universal foundations faced criticism, they were never fully stirred, forming the basis for evaluating theory in this context. The focus then shifts to logical positivism, marking significant shifts in the 1930s and 1940s. Analyzing its tenets, the study emphasizes its opposition to metaphysics, verification principle, and categorization of propositions. The logical positivist movement's impact on analytical political philosophy, empirical political theory, and its contribution to the behavioral political science landscape are discussed. The study delves into the influence of early Wittgenstein on logical positivism, highlighting the "picture theory" and its implications for language. It explores Wittgenstein's departure from logical positivism and its consequences for political theory, especially in enhancing the credibility of behavioral assertions and empirical political theory. The discussion then turns to common language philosophy, drawing parallels with logical positivism. It discusses the integration of ordinary language philosophy, emphasizing language as an essential concern for philosophers. The study reflects on the multifaceted impacts of logical positivism and common language philosophy on political theory, shedding light on their contributions, criticisms, and the evolving landscape of philosophical thought.

KEYWORDS:

Logical Positivism, Political Philosophy, Political Science, Political Theory.

INTRODUCTION

The current chapter is headed "Foundations Shaken but Not Stirred" because there was a fundamental basis kept in all of the conceptions of the theories that will be covered, even if they were sometimes shockingly weak. At times, the foundations were so flimsy that there was so much serious inquiry in certain areas that it seemed like political theory as a whole had run its course. Thus, the introduction of logical positivism, the growth of conceptual analysis, the philosophy of language, and the influence of Wittgenstein's ideas—especially with regard to the notion of "essential contestability"—will all be covered in this chapter. Part Two's second chapter focuses on the changes that occurred in the 1970s that were initially related to John Rawls' Theory of Justice.

But there are three crucial clarifications that need to be addressed in this regard. The first is that during all of these advancements, there was never any question about the fundamental significance of certain philosophical techniques or the applicability of such techniques to problems like politics or morality. Therefore, even if philosophical frameworks in the early stages thinned down the vision of political theory, philosophical theory was still universally accepted, and there was little to no first self-doubt about its own methodology. One might even argue that it suffered from intellectual hubris, an almost overwhelming conviction of its own suitability and rightness as the one philosophical method that was relevant to all situations. The second qualification is that many of the ways in which this idea of theory was formulated also worked well sometimes fortuitously with other ideas of theory that were previously covered in Part One. This applied especially to empirical political theory. Thus, there was a foundational merging of interests here, since some of these more recent theories seemed to provide philosophical and foundational backing for the empirical endeavor. The final qualification has to do with the novel theoretical advancements of the 1970s. This all began with the release of Rawls' Theory of Justice in 1971, which sparked an entire industry of commentary and brought newfound confidence to the field of political theory as a whole. Some analysts have even suggested that this is when political theory first emerged. At first look, this seemed to represent either a continuation of the previous theoretical developments or, for some, a return to a grander, more established tradition of normative theory. Both of these conclusions make some sense, but the focus of this discussion will be on the way that particular philosophical or theoretical issues are consistent and how the Rawlsian framework allows for the observation of internal sequence. This point—that universal foundations were disturbed by criticism but never fully stirred—underlies the entire judgment of theory in this setting [1], [2].

Logical Positivity

The English-speaking world's intellectual landscape saw significant shifts in the 1930s and 1940s. At first, the rise of logical positivism, the emphasis on conceptual analysis, and the broader interest in linguistic philosophy with Wittgensteinian influences were the most significant of these. There was a broad atmosphere of political thought analysis and clarification. Philosophy was seen more and more as a "second order activity" that dealt with "tidying up" the political discourse's logic and meaning. This overall approach might be loosely described as "analytic philosophy." Analytical philosophy emerged primarily as a response to previous philosophical movements, most notably philosophical idealism, which had dominated intellectual discourse from the 1870s until the 1920s. Idealism and analytical philosophy differed greatly in several aspects. It was a much more condensed and minimalist style of philosophical thought that gave extreme attention to the pragmatics, semantics, logic, and grammatical structure of ideas as well as speech. It was less outwardly ambitious because of this intimate, finely tuned attention to themes. Indeed, some would argue that it became clearly conservative. Single notions might and have been the subject of treatises. Philosophical frameworks, expansive metaphysical theorizing, or original connections between disparate facets of human experience were all out of the question. The whole endeavor of philosophical investigation has undoubtedly gotten much more focused or concentrated.

Nonetheless, the hostility of idealism was a component of a broader hostility toward any import of foreign philosophy. Asylum seekers or philosophical refugees received severe treatment. This became most noticeable during World War I and the early post-war period. Ironically, Germany and Austria in particular provided the main push for both linguistic philosophy and logical positivism. However, many would also point out that these movements nevertheless made it possible to resurrect a dormant British empiricist tradition that dates back to Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill. This anti-immigrant sentiment typified the prevailing mindset in

American and British thinking, at least until the late 1980s. At first, throughout the 1930s, idealism and Hegelianism specifically was seen negatively. For many years, the lingering effects of this unfavorable response to Hegel persisted. Subsequently, the negativity subtly evolved into a dissatisfaction with the assertions of existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism, and Freudalism in the 1950s and 1960s. From the 1950s through the 1980s, Martin Heidegger was the main figure in analytical philosophy to be routinely maligned; a prominent undertone of this criticism was the meticulousness with which it investigated Heidegger's relationship to Nazism. But by the 1980s and 90s, postmodernism and poststructuralism had emerged as analytical philosophy's new bête-noir, surpassing the others in certain situations to the point that the names Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault were almost vilified. Hence, the main contribution of analytical philosophy has been its opposition to rather than its production of ideas.

Between the 1940s and the beginning of the 1980s, this trend in analytical political philosophy was at its height. Analytical theory was mostly a carryover of the empiricist movement. In a little more basic form, some of the fundamental differences between, say, logical or analytical and empirical assertions may be found, among other places, in the works of David Hume. Analytical political theory, which often coexisted in an uncomfortable collegiality with the history of political thought, was generally considered the most significant component of political theory for those trained in it during this time in the English-speaking world. Analytical theorists approached the history of political theory in a similar way to behaviouralists, believing that the canon may provide intriguing arguments and notions that could be critically examined rather than necessarily testable predictions. At first, the development of this analytical viewpoint was closely linked to the victorious emergence of behavioral political science, empirical political theory, and the conclusion of the 1950s and 1960s ideological battles. Their relationship was not coincidental. Someone was massaging the other person. Analytical political philosophy may serve as a "second order" handmaid, explaining speech and logic and serving as the philosophical gatekeeper for true social science, while empirical political science could present itself as the "first order" source of authentic empirical political knowledge.

Logical positivism was the first and loudest manifestation of this newly discovered analytical philosophy's confidence. It was the most defining statement of this first phase. The first iterations of logical positivism emerged in Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s among a group of scientists, philosophers, and mathematicians. Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Friedrich Waismann, Otto von Neurath, Herbert Feigl, and Victor Kraft were among its most notable philosophers. Alfred Ayer was the most well-known proponent in Britain. A large number of the original Viennese group, including Carnap and Feigl, emigrated to North America in the 1930s and had some influence on the developing behavioral perspective.2 The movement's fundamental tenets were that logic and mathematics were independent of direct experience and that there was a strong emphasis on empiricism, or the idea that all knowledge was based on testable experience. Their understanding of mathematics was heavily influenced by the writings of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein. Metaphysics was completely disapproved of, since it was seen as apart from experience and logical reality. Philosophical idealism, which was devoted to metaphysics, was therefore rejected on the grounds of logical positivism [3], [4].

The goal of logical positivism was to create a single scientific endeavor. Only scientific knowledge was considered legitimate. As a result, it was possible to make just two kinds of significant pro-positions about the globe. The first were those that were primarily incorporated in the fields of mathematics, logic, or lexicography; as such, they were minor, if significant. They were often referred to as "analytic" propositions. The content of the empirical sciences

included the second kind of statement. These stances have been referred to as "empirical" or "synthetic" pro-positions. The latter statements were important because it was possible to verify their veracity via empirical means. Actually, this was the primary motivation for the sciences as a whole. The "verification principle" was the name used to describe this empirical confirmation procedure. assertions that could be objectively verified by rigorous scientific methods were considered meaningful universal empirical or factual assertions. These kinds of claims really made "sense." Verification made it possible to distinguish clearly between claims or hypotheses that were true and those that weren't. It offered a precise standard for meaningful conversation. Nonetheless, a third category of declarations included the whole of the humanities and several social sciences. These were assertions that first appeared in political philosophy, aesthetics, metaphysics, ethics, and religion, among other fields. Metaphysics was the biggest offender for logical positivists. Essentially, the verification principle served as a means of eliminating metaphysics. There was no significant proposition in any explanation of metaphysics. Neither tautologous nor experimentally verifiable were metaphysical claims. They were practically nonsensical if they did not match them. "Produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which only a sentence can be literally significant," is how the metaphysician puts it. Like ethicists, aestheticians, or theologians, metaphysicians claimed to have knowledge of the world, but their claims could not be independently verified. The theory of emotivism, which held that morality lacked any descriptive or logical meaning, was one consequence of this in moral philosophy. It was only the outward manifestation of celebratory feelings.

In conclusion, analytic propositions were a priori assertions that could be found in lexical, logical, and mathematical statements according to logical positivism. Propositions that could be experimentally verified that were typical of the sciences were known as synthetic empirical propositions. It was believed that philosophy was a universal "second order" activity. It gave the world no first-order knowledge or contributed any to it. The sciences were the sphere of first order knowledge. As a result, the philosopher's universe was assumed to exist, which he investigated and used as the basis for his arguments. This was a fairly accepting view of the place of philosophical theory in the field of behavioral political science.

DISCUSSION

The logical positivists are said to have been inspired by the early Wittgenstein. The Vienna group undoubtedly studied and respected his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus.3 The group found great interest in the Tractatus' core ideas. At this stage, Wittgenstein's arguments were similar to Bertrand Russell's logical atomism theory.4 The central idea of Wittgenstein's writings is often referred to as the "picture theory," which holds that language paints an image of the world. The truths or representations of things that words stand for are represented by them. As stated by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus' opening paragraphs, "The world is the totality of facts" and "The world is everything that is the case." In Russell's case, logical atoms, the actuality of facts, must match meaningful words. In addition, Wittgenstein proposed that sentences correspond to ultimate irreducible basic truths or states of events in the world. Simple statements provide a picture of these atoms. Simple propositions or phrases are made up of element names ordered to reflect the facts' structure. Wittgenstein observes, "We make pictures of facts to ourselves." This is what determines whether a phrase is true or false.5 Language is therefore made up of words put together in sentences that reflect certain facts. It is believed that complex statements or propositions are "truth functional" composites of simpler phrases or propositions.

For the early Wittgenstein, logic is nothing more than a system of principles for creating pro-positions from fact-picturing statements. Every assertion that makes reference to propositional

logic's rules is a tautology. Once again, logic and mathematics are tautologous. They have no conception of the outside world. Tautologies by definition are accurate. If not Russell himself, then the logical positivists held this notion in high regard. Additionally, there is an implicit commitment to the verificationist principle. According to Wittgenstein, statements that cannot be verified are meaningless. Wittgenstein, in contrast to the logical positivists, was not ready to write them off as pure emotionalism or gibberish. Wittgenstein saw concepts like ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics as more mystical than nonsense, even if we are unable to articulate them. Though he rejected the epistemic function of metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics, Wittgenstein was obviously drawn to these fields, in contrast to the logical positivists, although almost no one in the Vienna group shared this impulse. Not even the friend and admirer of Wittgenstein, F. P. Ramsay, seeing this need in him, responded rebukingly, with the famous observation that certain things cannot be whistled or shouted. However, the Tractatus arguments' standing was called into question in the final analysis since they were likewise neither tautologous nor verifiable. In this sense, Wittgenstein describes his own philosophy as a ladder that may be abandoned as no longer relevant or helpful once one has climbed it and understood what has been said. Put another way, philosophy has come to an end.

However, there were certain ramifications for political theory from this whole logical positivist viewpoint. Firstly, it greatly enhanced the credibility of behavioral assertions and empirical political theory. In the 1950s, verification gained significance as a concept in political science and empirical political theory. The second significant consequence was that political theory was assigned a far more limited second order position by logical positivism. Thirdly, it cast severe doubt on notions of theory that are normative, historical, and ideological. It may be argued that it rendered them entirely bankrupt in a single reading [5], [6].

Common Language

There is one more advancement that closely resembles logical positivism in many respects: ordinary language philosophy. It is not realistic to think that logical positivism was easily replaced by common language philosophy. On the other hand, there was a kind of integration, especially among political theory authors such as T. D. Weldon. Up until the 1970s, a large portion of the conventional material in political theory textbooks was composed of this peculiar conglomeration of concepts.

In the twentieth century, language became a fundamental concern for philosophers. It was the subject of discussions by Heidegger, Ryle, Austin, Foucault, Derrida, Wittgenstein, and Rorty. This book will touch on several of these approaches to language. Political theory may be used to distinguish between two major Anglophone approaches to language in the early phase, which took place in the 1940s and 1950s: first, there was a push to clean up and rectify sloppy and misleading everyday language. The second method takes a more descriptive stance toward everyday language, acknowledging that conceptual use is distinct and often chaotic. The first one still supports some ordinary language theory, but it falls more within the purview of logical positivism. In essence, it used the verification principle to try to fix language. The latter works of Wittgenstein and Austin are most intimately linked to the second dimension. The publication of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is what led to his subsequent influence. To give the later book its complete effect, we shall temporarily pause our consideration of it.

A variety of philosophical issues with logical positivism were observed in the second reading, not the least of which was the challenge of developing a convincing case for the verification principle.6 Furthermore, it was felt that ordinary speech was not well served by the strict logical positivist division between analytical and empirical statements. On the other hand, it was thought that the goal of philosophy was to pay special attention to how words and ideas are

used in everyday situations. "Ordinary language" started to evoke certain feelings. It seemed as if the analyst was explaining and neutrally describing topics. Semantics and tactics were considered to be combined in philosophical difficulties. Ordinary language philosophy saw meaning in terms of normal linguistic use, in contrast to logical positivism, which regarded meaning as depending upon the strict categories of the analytic and synthetic—combined with verification. The concept of verification alone could not be used to dismiss the wide range of word use variations. As a result, the focus moved from giving words their exact, meaningful definitions to explaining ideas in all of their many, rich applications.

The idea presented above is based on a certain understanding of language. People see language as an activity. Words are instruments and acts. The speech act hypothesis of J. L. Austin is representative of this methodology. Austin defined speech actions as "per-formatives." As a result, when we talk in many of our daily interactions, we are acting. For instance, the performative "I promise" does not describe or report on the act of making promises. Instead, it is itself evoking the custom of making promises. Saying is what it is doing.7. People use words to do actions in everyday language all the time, yet various acts may be performed with the same word sequence. One word sequence's whole meaning might have many meanings depending on the traditional context. Conventions even apply to nonverbal behaviors. The speaking act is therefore heavily reliant on use standards in everyday language.8 When listeners are completely aware of the standards that govern word use, a speech act is considered successful. Austin's main points are that meaning is related to customary usage in everyday language and that we are, first and foremost, always immersed in language. Third, there is a vast range of interpretations found in common use. As a result, the philosophical focus shifts from defining and organizing ideas to the difficult problem of explaining word use standards in specific language settings. For Austin, this did not imply that there were no other options available to him in plain terms. Ordinary language is not the last word; in theory, it may always be augmented, enhanced, and surpassed, as Austin pointed out. Just keep in mind that it is the first word.

The contrast between logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy should not be overstated, nevertheless. Ordinary language theory shared logical positivism's rejection of the notion that philosophy could provide any kind of resolution to normative problems of this kind, even while it acknowledged that normative concerns about justice were acceptable to raise. The common language was still in line with logical positivism, which held that philosophy lacked any means of prescription or justification. Austin's only suggestion could have been to examine the norms in order to get an understanding of justice. Political ideas could not be advised in and of themselves. Political theory remained outside from explicit normative assertions, a second-order activity. As a result, both philosophical traditions recognized the difference between "second" and "first-order." Philosophy produced no new knowledge. Both schools of thought also had misgivings about metaphysics.9. The idea of the nuanced norms present in ordinary language was virtually proprietorially conservative in ordinary language theory. Positive logic was just antagonistic. Although some analytic philosophers, like as Strawson, attempted to change the metaphysical paradigm in the 1970s, the underlying hostility still exists today [7], [8].

T. D. Welldon is one of the most often quoted political theory expositors of this era, especially for his essay "Political Principles" and book The Vocabulary of Politics. Weldon provides a unique, self-contained synthesis of common language philosophy and logical positivism.10 There is the need to purge some uses of language and clean up others, as well as the observation of meaning in usage.

Weldon believes that normative political philosophy is based entirely on an error. It is a linguistic error. It is the responsibility of political philosophers to elucidate the intrinsic and essential meanings of words, particularly those that are commonly used in political discourse. As Weldon points out, errors stem from "carelessness over the implication of language... from the primitive and generally unquestioned belief that words have." Finding "word essences" is "a wild goose chase." Over time, words may stay reasonably constant within a community, but only because the circumstances and things they are used to dealing with also remain steady. However, they do not express or recognize anything that exists outside of or behind institutions. Essential justice and rights do not exist. According to Weldon, words have purposes rather than essences, much like Austin and Wittgenstein. Regretfully, a great deal of the historical political intellectuals had been looking for stable essences in vain. "It is not the job of philosophy to provide new information about politics or any other matters of fact," Weldon said, echoing the adage that philosophy does not provide any first-order knowledge. Second-order concerns are wholly unrelated to philosophical issues. In other words, they are problems that arise from the language used by people whose job it is to create and defend theories that are scientific, historical, or of other kinds to explain and characterize facts. We have the plain language emphasis, unfiltered, in this conclusion [5], [9].

Weldon does have a logical positivist side, however. Though the exact function is yet unknown, he reassures his audience that generations of learned political philosophers were playing a part. It seems to be a mix of the advice of rather clear biases that have no cognit-ive status and empirical descriptions of such prejudices. However, personal biases don't have to be erroneous or misguided. Weldon acknowledges that he essentially adopted J. S. Mill's views. On the other hand, no finally rational bases are to be established. He goes on to say that much political theory seems to be insane under these conditions. This is especially true when it comes to normative arguments. These arguments lack both logic and empirical support. On the other hand, they display intense feelings and provide us with information on the personal mental states of certain theorists rather than the outside world. This is the traditional theory of emotionalism. This is how the great majority of normative political theory and political ideology descends straight into the obfuscating world of passionate ejaculations and subjective laudatory "hurrahs." It is evident from Weldon's observation that normative political theory has raised concerns that cannot be satisfactorily answered by empirical research, hence rendering them absurd.

CONCLUSION

This study navigates the intricate landscape of political theory from foundational challenges to transformative movements. Examining the era's philosophical shifts, the chapter "Foundations Shaken but Not Stirred" underscores the resilience of certain theoretical underpinnings amid fluctuations. The introduction of logical positivism, conceptual analysis, and linguistic philosophy serves as a backdrop for the subsequent changes in the 1970s triggered by Rawls' Theory of Justice. Despite the precarious foundations, the study clarifies the unwavering acknowledgment of philosophical techniques' significance. The 1970s witnessed a surge in theoretical advancements, particularly Rawls' work, instigating renewed confidence in political theory. The underlying theme of universal foundations being disturbed but not fully stirred remains pivotal in evaluating the trajectory of political theory. Logical positivism emerges as a defining force in the 1930s and 1940s, with its emphasis on empiricism, opposition to metaphysics, and the verification principle. Its impact on analytical political philosophy and empirical political theory, along with its alignment with behavioral political science, reflects a significant phase in political thought evolution. The study explores the influence of early Wittgenstein on logical positivism, emphasizing the "picture theory" and its subsequent divergence. Wittgenstein's departure contributes to the enhanced credibility of behavioral

assertions and empirical political theory, reshaping the philosophical landscape. This study unravels the intricate threads of political theory's evolution, showcasing the dynamic interplay between foundational challenges, transformative movements, and the enduring impact of philosophical paradigms. The exploration of logical positivism, early Wittgenstein's influence, and common language philosophy provides valuable insights into the multifaceted nature of political thought during this critical period.

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CHAPTER 10

EVOLUTION AND CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE 'DEATH OF POLITICAL THEORY': A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION

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ABSTRACT:

This study delves into the historical narrative of the perceived "death of political theory" by examining the perspectives of key theorists such as Peter Laslett, Leo Strauss, and Brian Barry. It traces the roots of the decline of political philosophy to logical positivism, exploring its impact on the discipline during the mid-20th century. The paper scrutinizes the behavioral movement's rejection of political theory and its alignment with logical positivism, emphasizing the subsequent struggles of political theory against this backdrop.

The study highlights the debates surrounding the timing of political theory's demise, challenges the notion of a dormant period, and evaluates the role of normative dimensions in the resurgence of interest in political theory during the 1960s. It critically engages with the arguments for and against essentialism in conceptual use, drawing on Wittgensteinian philosophy to underscore the contestability and complexity of political ideas. The conclusion emphasizes the need for a nuanced understanding of the evolution of political theory and challenges the myopic perceptions that have shaped the discourse on its supposed demise. Ultimately, the study prompts a reconsideration of the sweeping narrative of political theory's demise, emphasizing its resilience and continued relevance in the ever-evolving landscape of political thought.

KEYWORDS:

Logical Positivism, Political Philosophy, Political Science, Political Theory.

INTRODUCTION

The author would like to take a little break from this argument to consider a specific instance in political theory that relates to Weldon's points of view. This is the "death of political theory," as is often said. Many believe that Peter Laslett is the one who uncovered the corpse of political philosophy. Famously, Laslett said, "It is one of the assumptions of intellectual life that there should be amongst us men whom we think of as political philosophers," in the introduction to the first book of the Philosophy Politics and Society series in 1956. Philosophers themselves should be concerned with political and social ties at the broadest possible degree of generality, and they should be attentive to philosophical development. There have been such men writing in English for three centuries, from Hobbes to Bosanquet, from the early 17th century to the 20th century. It seems like we don't have them anymore these days. The custom has been violated, and our presumption is incorrect. In any case, political philosophy is extinct right now.

The way that logical positivism questioned "the logical status of all ethical statements, and set up rigorous criteria of intelligibility which at one time threatened to reduce the traditional systems to assemblages of nonsense" was a major contributing factor to the divide that existed between political philosophers of the 1950s and thinkers like Bosanquet. Thus, Laslett blamed the logical positivists for the downfall of political philosophy, even though he included some

really odd people like Ryle, Russell, and Wittgenstein under this category. Beyond observing, on a second order level, that moral and political speech does exist, ordinary language philosophy did not really advance the case it was not the role of political philosophers to advocate for it.

However, the feeling of mortification was more pervasive, and not everyone attributed it to logical positivism. Leo Strauss, in a late 1950s jeremiad, smelled advanced putrefaction, whereas Laslett judged the body rather fresh. In actuality, political philosophy had died a long death during the course of modernity's three waves. However, political philosophy had already faded away long before the 20th century. But in the twentieth century, modernism had uttered the final words. Political science and political philosophy were hopelessly separated. The concept that "science" is the ultimate kind of knowing was adopted by Strauss, and it was subsequently adopted by Habermas and Gadamer. According to Strauss, "political philosophy is in a state of decay and perhaps putrefaction, if it has not vanished altogether," thus this is not unexpected. These days, political philosophy serves solely as a supplement to political science. Under the pretense of political theory history, it is a kind of archaic performance bear that lumbers through well-worn patterns. All of this decay, according to Strauss, occurs against the dramatic background of the cosmic collision between the ancients and the moderns. Therefore, the combination of modernism's emergence, positivism's primacy in natural science, the division of academic fields like political science and political philosophy, and nihilistic skepticism about the significance of values in human existence was the cause of death. For Strauss, sociology, psychology, and economics are only a few of the many other disciplines that have already departed political philosophy. Even political theory had spoken a heartfelt "et tu" to history [1], [2].

The earlier political theory was doomed, as prophesied by the contemporary behavioral movement, about which Strauss lamented. They did, however, see this favorably. Political theory needed to become more empirically rigorous in the future to survive, as many people understood. Thus, classic political theorists were considered academic parasites by David Easton. In this scenario, logical positivism is more indirectly linked to the reason of political theory's downfall. As Gunnell points out, "One of the ironies is that the behaviouralists, in recognising and rejecting political theory, finally identified with another corpus of [European] émigré literature the philosophy of logical positivism and empiricism" in their quest for a coherent and convincing theoretical identity and science. During the same time frame, the "end of ideology" movement another related movement clearly supported the "death thesis." Again, the "end of ideology" was a passing phase, but it's important to remember that many people who consider themselves to be true political scientists would still support the movement's "underlying premises" today.

It would have seemed that the notion of the "death of political theory" would have slowly seeped into the political studies community's collective consciousness, yet theorists continued to feel compelled to reflect on it far into the 1990s. The phrase "death of political theory" was first used by Laslett and others, and Brian Barry acknowledges that they were likely correct when he writes, "If this was the best work that could be found in 1956, then political philosophy was perhaps not dead but at the least moribund," in the retrospective introduction to the second edition of his well-known Political Argument. What political philosophy is Barry using in this situation is the main question that emerges. Apart from his own Political Argument, which was published in 1965, Barry undoubtedly believes that nothing significant in political philosophy occurs until the publication of Rawls' Theory of Justice, a work that essentially destroyed for Barry the whole logical positivist and common language approach.

For observers of late, the question of the death's timing is equally bizarre. For Barry, the discipline was obviously dormant from the turn of the 20th century until 1971. In the early 1960s, the spoke of having to "make the stuff up as one went along" when writing his PhD thesis. It should be remembered that Bosanquet passed away in 1928 and Laski in 1950, as mentioned by Laslett in 1950 when he observed that no one was writing political philosophy. Therefore, Laslett could only have meant that political philosophy had perished for a maximum of ten years. The fact that he saw Bosanquet as a political philosopher comparable to Hobbes is equally intriguing. But one of the editors, Philip Pettit, notes in a subsequent edition of the Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy that "political philosophy ceased to be an area of active exploration from late in the [nineteenth] century to about the 1950s." Many studies have been conducted on the topic's history, but little to nothing noteworthy has been written on political philosophy itself (see 1993: 8). This pinpoints the death between the 1870s and the 1950s. The same Companion volume's piece by Richard Tuck offers an even closer date. According to Tuck, the years 1870–1870 were particularly peculiar in the anglo–american world's political thought history. There are many methods to describe its weirdness in different ways. One is to draw attention to the dearth of significant political philosophy books. Another is to keep in mind that thoughtful observers in the 1950s could have thought that "political philosophy is dead for the time being." The vague notion of the "return of grand theory" during the 1970s is also somewhat reflective of this overall shift in thinking. Thus, Rawls' Theory of Justice publication date emerges once again as the deciding factor for Tuck and Barry [3], [4].

These broad observations which are by no means scholarly assertions in the field of theory are still quite puzzling. It is ludicrous and strange to describe the 1920s to 1950s as a time without political philosophy. The work of J. P. Sartre, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Simone Weil, Simone de Beauvoir, Bertrand Russell, Hans Kelsen, Bertrand de Jouvenal, Yves Simon, Dante Germino, Giovanni Gentile, Benedetto Croce, L. T. Hobhouse, G. D. H. Cole, Leon Duguit, Herbert Laski, John Dewey, R. G. Collingwood, Jacques Maritain, Antonio Gramsci, Georg Lukacs, Karl Popper, Herbert Marcuse, Theodore Adorno, Michael Oakeshott, Eric Voegelin, and Friedrich Hayek are just a few of the authors whose works are covered during this time. But it would be absurd to think of the larger time frame, spanning from 1870 to the 1970s, as theoretically devoid. The much longer view, which dates back to the 1870s, also includes various utilitarian ideologies, the widespread adoption of neo-Kantianism throughout Europe, the remarkable ascent and domination of neo-Hegelian idealism, the enormous influence of theories influenced by biology and evolution, legal and ethical pluralism, and so on.

One might continue with the list. On the other hand, during the same time period, a vast amount of writing was produced about syndicalism and anarcho-syndicalism, nationalism, early feminism, fascism, Marxism, Leninism, reformist and pluralistic socialisms, conservative and corporatist theories, various forms of anarchy, syndicalism, and anarcho-syndicalism, as well as liberalism and conservatism. Of particular note is the vast amount of writing that was produced about state theory in Europe and America between 1870 and 1930. It is important to remember that this seemingly inert era encompasses the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, two World Wars, the emergence of fascism and communism, decolonization, the establishment of the United Nations and human rights records, as well as significant shifts in ideas about statehood, citizenship, sovereignty, and other related topics. However, it seems that until Rawls's 1971 publication of his Theory of Justice, nothing significant occurred in political philosophy over the whole of the twentieth century, according to astute thinkers like Brian Barry, Philip Pettit, and Richard Tuck. Regarding the aforementioned Companion book, one may empathize with John Gray's decisions in this situation, even if Brian Barry's opinions are also relevant. According to Gray, it "belongs to a sub-genre in fantastic literature," evoking the

Thön fantasy realm created by Jorge Luis Borges. He also observes that there is not a single word on nationalism, fascism, monarchy, or theism. Moreover, it seems that the significance of events occurring in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and the majority of other cultures around the globe at the time of its publication was not recognized. He observes that the editing process seems to provide political actuality primarily to hypotheses that are relevant to a certain segment of intellectual debate, mostly in North America. Therefore, rather than reflecting the environment in which we live, the Companion should be seen as a "mirror of the subject as we find it today." Being a mirror that distorts reality, it represents the predominance of a liberal philosophy that is both unhistorical and culturally narrow, hindering comprehension when faced with the most potent political forces of our day. It is possible to finish reading the book and know nothing about "every world-historical transformation of our age."

Putting aside Gray's critique, the first unsettling aspect of the aforementioned reflections on the "death of political theory" is the degree of ignorance and myopia in the different remarks; nonetheless, the same nebulous, false statements continue to be made till the end of the century. The easiest explanation for this type of extreme strangeness is that there are still people who think that their very narrow-minded and historically biased conception of philosophy is the only legitimate way to comprehend the field. This has all of Weldon's arrogance all over again, without a few of the cultural justifications that make us laugh at his strange behavior. Second, positivism grounded in social science and analytic philosophy are the main sources of the ideas that sparked the discussion about the demise of theory. The field of political philosophy still employs this way of thinking. Therefore, even if they are partially hidden, the roots of this form of judgment are still very much there.

Nonetheless, it is evident that by the 1960s, a number of theorists in the generic analytic-based ordinary language domain believed that something had gone awry. "Political theory is a modish activity heavily populated at its center by a relatively unrefeexive corpus, a rump which is apparently happy to wriggle from one set of priorities to another," observes Condren, "despite earlier rumours of death." However, some publications supported the wriggler and suggested that political theory could still be relevant. "Does Political Theory Still Exist?" by Isaiah Berlin is among the most often referenced of these. However, outside of its historical context of writing, the underlying premise is scarcely shocking. The main idea of the essay is that, in addition to the typical logical positivist fare of analytical and empirical premises, there is a third kind that logical positivism had, of course, consigned to the realm of emotion or absurdity. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that this third sphere has distinct significance of its own. It addresses concerns of philosophy that are normative or actually practical. Therefore, we are analyzing what is "normative" in ideas like the state, liberty, and authority when we discuss them. Moreover, there is often minimal consensus over the definition of these ideas. That so, this is neither shocking nor very concerning. Human self-perceptions and interpretations are evoked by these questions. According to Berlin, "men's conception of themselves and others as human beings is part of their beliefs in a sphere of conduct." Charles Taylor has often emphasized that humans are self-interpreting beings. Examining the "manner" and "form" in which we attempt to construct ourselves is necessary. Berlin remarks, "To suppose that there have been or could be ages without political philosophy, is like supposing that as there are ages of faith, so there could be ages of total disbelief," in response to the previous rejection of normative ideas [5], [6]. Thus, normative themes reappearance in the latter half of the 1960s, but with a cautious analytical endorsement.

DISCUSSION

The analytic style's renewed interest in normative argumentation is the result of a complicated web of variables that are only lightly brushed over. First, this growth required the social and

political conditions of the 1960s and early 1970s. During this time, there was a spike in counterculture groups, widespread social radicalism, and a great deal of concern for civil rights legislation on problems of race, gender, sexual orientation, poverty, and access to reproductive healthcare. During this time, a large amount of legislation that granted more liberties and rights on things like abortion, homosexuality, educational rights, and other things was started. Furthermore, the Vietnam War served as a background for a generation of young Australians and Americans who were radicalized at home. This greatly impacted a sizable portion of the younger population. For a generation, issues like the just war theory, imperialism, colonialism, individual rights, moral and civic responsibilities, rights to freedom, justice, and similar topics took on a very personal significance. Together with this, behavioralism was starting to wane in the field of academic politics. Its rejection of moral speech was by now well established, and it lacked the means to confront the profound moral and social problems of the day. Its typical cupboard was empty and unwelcoming. A number of political theorists from the then-newer generation, including Peter Winch, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair MacIntyre, were also outspoken opponents of positivist social science. Berlin's signal about the moral and normative component was vigorously embraced by these theorists, despite their continued strong roots in the analytical and ordinary language tradition. This return of the normative dimension has two theoretical facets. The first fits in more cleanly with the custom of common language that has been covered so far. This is the result of the "fundamental contestability argument" and later Wittgenstein. The second is the arguments made by Rawlsian contractarians in the 1970s.

Wittgenstein, especially his later work the Philosophical Investigations, was a pivotal figure in the shift from ordinary language philosophy to the appreciation of normativism. Numerous philosophical stances were significantly impacted by this and other works. For the time being, the influence on ordinary language philosophy—in particular, the concept of essential contestability—will be the major emphasis.

Once again, language is the main focus. It is believed that language carries human civilization. Learning a language means assimilating into a culture. The only thing that allows us to have meaning is language, and with it, a culture. Meaning does not reside in ideas or conceptions, nor does it attempt to depict the reality. Meaning is a part of language; it is not separate from it. Words are seen in various linguistic situations to have an abundant profusion of meanings. Philosophical issues can stem from the great diversity and idiosyncrasies of language itself. But as Austin and others pointed out, words are not fundamental; rather, they may be utilized in a variety of ways. Nothing more than the usage of a notion is implied by its use. The use of it, or what speakers really do with it in various circumstances, is where the meaning is found. Therefore, concepts don't always relate to tangible objects in the real world. Nothing exists outside of words. In the world, words are inherent in things. One may argue that this is a kind of linguistic idealism, but it's unlikely Wittgenstein would have approved of the classification [7], [8].

Language has a social component to the extent that it serves a purpose. We do not create words for only private purposes; else, communication would not exist. Wittgenstein argues against the existence of private languages, a point that is hotly contested. The existence of public guidelines guiding the use of ideas allows us to recognize their meaning when they are used. In Austin, public regulations operate similarly to conventions. Words have meanings because they are connected to common use conventions. Wittgenstein once describes these guidelines as being comparable to a deep grammar, which captures the range of potential applications for a term, as opposed to a surface grammar. These guidelines are ingrained in what he terms "forms of life" or "language games." Simply said, language games are methods of navigating the outside world. Any common or shared meanings need established norms, games of

language, and rules. Language games, however, are very varied and cannot be boiled down to just one kind of game. No superior form of life exists. Meaning is defined by a word's "distribution" in language and the "linguistic environment" in which it appears, according to one writer. Several language games will often cover the same idea. Here, Wittgenstein is certain that words have no fundamental nature. However, there could be "family resemblances" between the many usages of the term.

For instance, the term "game" may refer to both board games and Olympic sports. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues that rather than just saying, "There must be something similar, otherwise they would not be called "games," we should investigate if there is any commonality at all. According to Wittgenstein, "you will not see something that is common at all, but similarities, relationships" if you look.

Language games are generally taken for granted. Though not secretive, they may be disregarded due in part to their familiarity. However, understanding any linguistic game or aspect of life is always the same as being able to comprehend the intricate strategies and regulations of the game. Being able to carry out the necessary activities entails knowing the strategies and regulations of a game. According to Wittgenstein, language is really closely related to every human activity.

It is not the same as a habit or behavior to obey a rule. Rules must be intended to be followed. Therefore, adhering to rules is, by definition, deliberate or purposeful. Therefore, deliberate behavior is inextricably linked to meaning as it is expressed in rules. Discourse, or language, and action are hence closely related. This is the basis for the idea of "speech acts" as put out by Austin and Searle, albeit the latter two scholars provide a much more nuanced and sophisticated classification of action kinds. Actions take the shape of words. The rules and intents ingrained in language games or other kinds of existence give birth to what we mean when we say anything. It is believed that language is essential to all we do in the world. Wittgenstein thus has a philosophy of action that is closely related to the philosophy of mind, in addition to a sophisticated epistemology and philosophy of mind. Both have their roots in conventionalism in language. This serves as the foundation for both Peter Winch's famous research, The Idea of Social Science, and his main points of differentiation between social science and natural science.

In this way, philosophy plays a mostly analytical and descriptive function, much like other philosophers who use everyday language. One may characterize it as language idealism or, conversely, as linguistic phenomenology. It does not, in and of itself, resolve philosophical issues; rather, it may resolve philosophical issues by paying close attention to the language that is used. According to Weldon, a lot of problems with ideas occur because the speaker often tries to fixate on a single use as if it were essential. Wittgensteinian analysis serves as a helpful reminder for speakers in this situation. Some philosophers will continue to strive for more lucidity and will therefore focus on a single application of a notion. But as Wittgenstein observed, language has a tendency to "go on holiday" in this situation. By highlighting the variety of applications, philosophy serves what Wittgenstein terms as a healing purpose. It aids in freeing people from conceptual muddles brought about by a failure to recognize the variety contained in language and how it is used in human affairs. In this way, it serves as a reminder of what we already know rather than a recommendation [9], [10].

Now when we are explicitly talking about political concepts, analysis serves the same purpose as ordinary language theory: it analyzes and makes sense of the intricate internal workings of ideas like justice, rights, duties, and so on. Similar to Hegelian idealism, descriptive phenomenology, Verstehen-based hermeneutics, and the Oakeshottian philosophy of

philosophy, the only thing that can be done is analyze what is already true, that is, comprehend the conceptual frameworks that are in place and put together reminders of the truth. Political theory takes normative reasoning seriously, but it cannot enter the realm of direct normative advice.

In light of the aforementioned, essentialism in conceptual use is specifically rejected by ordinary language theory, in the tradition of Wittgenstein and Austin. The purpose of political theory ought to be to document and clarify the many applications of political ideas. Thus, essentialism is directly opposed by the phrase "essential contestability." In its most basic form, essentialism is a notion that is related to, say, Plato's philosophy of ideas. According to this theory, political philosophy's role is to try to determine what an idea like justice's "essential" meaning is. What is the fundamental component of justice, therefore, is the central philosophical issue for essentialism.

The essence may be utilized to clarify and make corrections about the nature of justice in general after it has been identified and defined. By definition, every discussion of justice must focus on its core principles. This reasoning applies to all political ideas. We ought to be able to define its essential elements if it makes sense. A term has some degree of actuality if it makes sense and can be defined. Nonetheless, in rejecting the existence of essences in ideas and words, fundamental contestability explicitly takes up the Wittgensteinian banner.

The phrase "essential contestability," which was first used by W. B. Gallie in a 1956 speech, suggested that many conceptual disagreements are unsolvable. Despite the fact that the same notion is at stake, there are divergent applications and application criteria for the concept that directly contradict one another. This is strongly related to Wittgenstein since any specific application is a component of a linguistic game or way of living. Thus, certain notions have "no clearly definable general use which can be set up as a correct or standard use," according to Gallie. Standards of quality are embodied in several criteria for conceptions, although they are varied and subject to disagreement. When a discussion over, say, art, democracy, or a religious concept occurs, each side will assert, with justifiable reasoning, that their use is proper.

He claims that neither profound psychological issues nor what he refers to as "metaphysical afflictions" are the root of this never-ending debate. At the core, there is something more. Put differently, there are legitimate disagreements regarding ideas with solid justifications and supporting data on both sides. "Endless disputes about their proper uses" are involved in the correct use itself. An other poignant phrase used by a subsequent thinker is "cluster concepts [11], [12]."

Gallie proposes four primary basic features for these kinds of notions. First, the achievement "must be of an internally complex character." Secondly, they must be appraising "in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement." Thirdly, it follows that any description of the concept, of necessity, involves a number of rival accounts. Fourth, parties who are interested in the concept must recognize that it can be modified. Stated differently, the notion's "open" nature is acknowledged. Gallie hypothesizes more elements in addition to these four "more important" features to fundamentally disputed ideas. Consequently, he argues, fifth, that each party "understands that its own use of it is contested by those of other parties." The idea may be used both offensively and defensively to counter other usage. Additionally, he argues that there has to be an original "examplar" or prototype, whose legitimacy is acknowledged in some manner by each competitor. Consequently, "to emulate someone is to work hard to bring back its manner of doing things." He continues, "However, there's no way to determine who genuinely has the most accurate revival." Put otherwise, there is no way to

achieve a "best use" in absolute terms. Lastly, he argues that "the kind of continuous competition" is the only way the idea and its accomplishments could have grown in the manner that they have.

CONCLUSION

This study has undertaken a comprehensive exploration of the "death of political theory" narrative, unraveling the intricate historical and philosophical threads that contribute to this discourse. The examination of influential voices such as Laslett, Strauss, and Barry has shed light on divergent perspectives, exposing the multifaceted nature of the challenges faced by political philosophy. The study interrogated the role of logical positivism, the behavioral movement, and the broader socio-political context in shaping the trajectory of political theory. The paper critically engaged with the timing debate, challenging the perception of a dormant period in political philosophy and highlighting the rich intellectual landscape that persisted even during seemingly quiet times. The resurgence of normative dimensions in the 1960s, influenced by Wittgensteinian philosophy and the rejection of essentialism, was presented as a pivotal moment in the revitalization of political theory. In essence, the study advocates for a nuanced understanding of the historical shifts within political philosophy, urging scholars to move beyond simplistic narratives of decline. It calls for a continued exploration of normative dimensions, acknowledging the contestability inherent in political ideas. As the discourse on the "death of political theory" persists, this study encourages a more expansive and inclusive approach that considers the diverse philosophical landscapes that have shaped the discipline over time.

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CHAPTER 11

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ESSENTIAL CONTESTABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON POLITICAL THEORY

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ABSTRACT:

This study delves into the concept of fundamental contestability and its implications, examining the arguments surrounding its application to reason, especially in areas like religion, politics, and art. The discourse unfolds as a response to Gallie's defense of intrinsic testability, addressing the connection between historical context and logical application. It distinguishes fundamental contestability from basic contestability, highlighting its nuances in history and sociology. The exploration extends into political theory, emphasizing its link to moral pluralism, epistemological pluralism, and liberalism. The study critically evaluates essential contestability's impact on political philosophy, recognizing its connections to postmodernism and its reception in the second half of the 20th century. The narrative explores responses to Wittgenstein's legacy, scrutinizing the arguments for and against the profound relativism and incommensurability associated with fundamental contestability. As theorists grapple with the enduring questions raised by fundamental contestability, the study invites further exploration into its evolving role in shaping philosophical and political thought.

KEYWORDS:

Contestability, Logical Positivism, Political Philosophy, Political Theory.

INTRODUCTION

Some opponents contend that intrinsic testability seems to contradict the "universal assent" that reason needs. "It fails completely as a description of those elements of reason that make possible discussions of religious, political, and artistic problems," responds Gallie, "but it may be necessary in the natural sciences." This is by no means an argument on irrationality. Furthermore, Gallie's adversary may counter that he is conflating the concept's historical context with its logical application now. According to him, there is always a connection between the two. "Not simply consideration of different uses as we use it to-day, but consideration of such instances as display its growth and development" is a need for any idea assessment. Gallie believes that although if this is a "form" of historicism, it is an essential part of understanding any notion and is not false.

It is crucial to remember that fundamental contestability has different connotations from basic contestability in terms of history and sociology. Gallie's argument, thus, is not only about historicism, social relativism, or meaning variance and change, as he puts it above. It also differs from the thesis in that although the protagonists acknowledge that a resolution is not impossible nor desirable and that reaching a consensus would be a significant step forward, they do not argue that the standards for applying a concept may be contested. A stronger philosophical viewpoint, known as essential contestability, maintains that disagreements over certain ideas are in fact never-ending. There are always going to be valid arguments for disagreement, and there is never a conclusive method to settle these conflicts. This raises serious doubts and a strong incommensurability argument. It seems most true to its Wittgensteinian origins in this way [1], [2].

With varying degrees of success, some theorists have used essential contestability as their preferred approach to political theory. During the second half of the 20th century, it persisted as an undercurrent in many courses on Anglophone conceptual political theory. It also has strong connections to the theories of moral pluralism, epistemological pluralism and particularism, and, coincidentally, a Millian version of liberalism, or what John Gray refers to as "the chronic character of normative and epistemic dissensus." Additionally, it backs "a conception of political philosophy," as Gray puts it. In fact, in addition to being dedicated to a pluralist liberal perspective, Gray makes the notable move of defining fundamental contestability as a "definitive metaphysical" stance. It's interesting that the philosophical aspects of this vision are seldom discussed; this is perhaps partly because of the twentieth-century allergy to metaphysics in general.

A Reckoning With Essential Ability To Compete

There have been many critiques and efforts at adjustment, some more successful than others, even if Wittgenstein and the basic contestability thesis have played a significant role in supporting the overall educational approach to political theory. Different paths have been taken by Wittgenstein's legacy. This intellectual hagiography will undoubtedly keep publishers busy for a very long time. Orthodox serious philosophical study on the "master" has continued despite this. Four responses to Wittgenstein and the fundamental contestability thesis are examined in this account; some of them will be revisited later in the book since they continue to be important topics in the debate of difference theory and postmodernism today. The core contestability arguments' components are the subject of several critiques, both favorable and unfavorable. It is evident that the Wittgensteinian argument is quite flexible.13

The basic contestability argument's potentially profound and, to some, incapacitating relativism and incommensurability are two major points of contention. Two answers may be used to approximate the favorable opinion of this. The first response to this argument and to Wittgenstein's subsequent ideas might be referred to as the deconstructive reception. This interpretation falls short of pushing the core contestability argument to its fullest. Gallie's prospective historicism is the subject of the second answer, which also highlights how essential contestability should logically flow into more conceptually oriented historical writing. The unfavorable reaction has two sides as well. The first responds sharply to the disintegration of consensus definitions of ideas and calls for their rebuilding so that they are again clearly operational in political discourse. A differentiation between a strong and weak essential contestability thesis is made in order to sidestep the second negative reaction, which again centers on the crippling relativism.

After William Connolly's The Terms of Political Discourse was published in 1974, the first favorable reaction can nearly be seen developing across the book's several editions as he transitions from the more traditional late Wittgensteinian viewpoint via Foucault into a genealogical position. This is not at all an uncommon procedure. Wittgensteinianism has an inherent contestability that is obviously amenable to postmodern and poststructural analysis, as well as an imminent threat of severe Pyrrhonism. It may, of course, for some, just stay as pointless scepticism. Essential contestability essentially lets the genii of linguistic and ontological plurality out the philosophical bottle. It confuses even the kindest person since it does not depict a single path out of the friendship bottle, but rather many. There are many constructed worlds that may be imagined thanks to linguistic idealism, ontological incommensurability, and various language games. We may therefore discuss the possibility of numerous realities if language is our exclusive means of accessing reality. There is nothing that can be used as an appeal to answer questions, to adopt the non-foundational but somewhat more cutting-edge approach. A tidy way to describe trying to force a monoglot response is as

linguistic terrorism, as identified by Jean François Lyotard. There's nothing to settle between language games [3], [4]. Nothing is above, outside, or above. We have to give up any hope of master vocabulary, as both Lyotard and Richard Rorty (who both cite Wittgenstein as a philosophical tutor) contend. Consequently, metanarratives do not exist. Since Rorty believes that language games overlap and may dispute, Lyotard and Rorty are engaged in an edge struggle here. Still, the main thrust of their Wittgensteinianism follows a similar postmodern path. This reasoning may be used in the field of social plurality, for example. Long-lasting discussions on topics like difference have been sparked by the more popularized postcolonial, multicultural, and difference theories in recent years. In order to support postcolonial and indigenous assertions about constitutionality, law, and justice, James Tully very deliberately employs Wittgensteinian reasoning in his book Strange Multiplicity.

DISCUSSION

The historical component of the core argument for testability is picked up in the second positive reading. As a result, Terence Ball criticizes essential contestability for what he sees as an analytical tendency to adopt an ahistorical attitude.16 He also believes that analytical philosophy is noteworthy for its glaring lack of recognition of the historical dimension of concepts, which is peculiar given its linguistic emphasis. He makes the case that "critical conceptual history" must replace conceptual analysis. In his first piece, Gallie makes passing references to this possibility; nevertheless, he never explores it. Ball always views politics as a theoretically constructed activity. Our political discourses have the power to both modify and restrict us, therefore the language we choose is never neutral. For Ball, "as we speak, so we are" follows. Our universe consists on words. We are dependent on language. It is our essence and identity. The conceptual, argumentative, and rhetorical resources of human language severely constrain how we categorize and behave. It is possible to argue that the boundaries of my moral and political universe are marked by the boundaries of my moral and political vocabulary. We adapt to the changing notions that make up our speech. Though they are sometimes invisible to those who use a discourse, concepts and their meanings are constantly connected to the situations in which people find themselves.

The crucial thing to remember is that the ideas that make up our political existence are subject to debate and have changed historically. Thus, language games have histories that are quite pertinent to their use today. Every notion is the archive of past connections and usage, as noted by Ball. 'Clouds of etymology' follow them. Memory and shared experiences are also transmitted via language. "To remember our language...," Ball remarks. may allow us to get a certain level of important insight into the present. In the same way, of course, language helps to set us apart from the past by helping us see the profound contrasts between the conceptual practices of the past and our own. It takes expanding our own conceptions and categories to approach them and try to comprehend them in all their weirdness. Nonetheless, discourse is not independent of speakers. The intentionality of the notions we use cannot be divorced from practical action. In a way, they have us, even if we don't have talks. However, Ball is quick to point out to his readers that it is possible to get entangled in false analogies here. For example, Ball views the notion that language talks to us as a misleading "caricature."

According to Ball, these intricate conceptual shifts are mapped out by the critical conceptual historian. Here, he is explicitly referencing the historians of Begriffsgeschichte. He attempts to transform their concepts into conceptual history (1989) by highlighting the historical aspect of inherent contestability. Ball really appropriates one of the major ideas of the Begriffsgeschichte group, namely from Rheinhart Koselleck's works, which holds that conceptions are capable of going through a dramatic Sattelzeit era. We are living in a period of unparalleled intellectual transformation. Koselleck's research era was 1750–1850. One notable development during this

time was the emergence of the main political ideology-based "isms," which, according to Ball, "actually reconstituted that very space by supplying speakers with a new means of locating themselves in social and political space." Political disagreement therefore becoming explicitly ideological. Ball thought the last decades of the 20th century would belong to a different, significant Sattelzeit epoch. As such, Ball finds that a fundamental contestability argument that is grounded in history serves a crucial purpose. The reconstructive thesis of Felix Oppenheim contains the first negative interpretation of essential contestability. Oppenheim has a very specific perspective on language in general. While common language exists, specific technical languages also exist.

The terminology used in the past was much too abrasive and primitive. Although it incorporates a variety of sometimes contradicting use, linguistic correction is encouraged. According to Oppenheim, "it is necessary to construct language as free of the imperfections of ordinary usage as possible." Stated differently, in order to prevent ambiguity and misunderstanding, theorists must "reconstruct basic concepts." However, essential contestability languishes in everyday misunderstanding. It promotes "vagueness, open-endedness and ambiguity," as noted by Oppenheim. These are challenges to be addressed rather than resources to be developed by political theory. According to real political theory, there is a clear opportunity for "tidying up" when common conceptions are confused. Reconstruction prioritizes explicative definitions above the "reportive" and "stipulative" approaches to basic contestability, saying that these definitions "can be appraised as good and bad in terms of their suitability for scientific communication."

In terms of correctness, simplicity, and productivity, developing such explicative explanations is similar to developing sound scientific theories for Oppenheim. Generalizations are made easier and the internal structure of ideas is shown by a strong explicative description. Even if this seems like a qualified return to positivism, Oppenheim is adamant about his rejection of behavioralism and positivism in their more traditional forms. Rejecting conventional positivism does not, however, mean giving up on empirical theory. Oppenheim, meanwhile, is in favor of keeping the domains of values and facts distinct. Description is not the same as justification. Moral convictions are not descriptive. This is not to argue that political theory is value free; rather, it is to say that theorists must recognize values as separate entities that are not susceptible to assertions of truth or falsehood [5], [6].

Thus, Oppenheim views a commitment to cognitivism and an endless conceptual analysis of everyday language in all of its general confusion and vagueness as a false and harmful path.17 He also attempts to reroute the entire discussion back to a much more positivistically inclined theory that actually views language as something to control, tidy up, and use with greater technical precision. Rather of embracing relativism, objectivity should be pursued. However, there is a nagging feeling in Oppenheim's work that there ought to be a neutral metatheory—a kind of nuanced technocratic ideal—imposed on political language. This is where all or most of the long-standing issues with behavioralism and logical positivism resurface.

The last negative interpretation, akin to Oppenheim's, regards fundamental contestability as excessively predisposed to extreme relativism and incommensurability. Instead of value non-cognitivism, however, rigorous value cognitivism is the preferred option in this instance, bringing the conversation back to the ostensibly more traditional goals of normative classical political theory. Here, the argument alters what is fundamentally contestable. John Gray, for instance, briefly attempted to modify basic contestability over his varied theoretical career to set it apart from "sceptical, relativist, historicist, and conventionalist traditions." This would make "conclusive rational resolution" to conceptual conflicts in political theory more likely in the future. Although certain notions were hotly debated, essential contestability allowed for the

prospect that there may still be "good reasons" and a rational way to resolve philosophical issues. This impairs the whole traditional Wittgensteinian basic contestability explanation. But it does raise the possibility of "perennial political problems" once again, as Gray is eager to point out. "The revised essential contestability thesis endorses a classical conception of political philosophy as an intellectual activity capable of yielding determinate results, and, thus, of assisting regenerative agents in their search for a good society," his statement reads. This enables theorists like Gray to support a predominant explanation of ideas like justice and liberty and then apply a large portion of the analytical philosophical component to their work. Additionally, the independence of the political theory field is being maintained.

Which of these perspectives—the logical positivist, the common language, and the essential contestability—was ultimately more successful? The second half of the 20th century saw political theory primarily adopt a "conceptualist focus," which was one of the main repercussions. A phenomenological description of every political concept was the general requirement.18 This created what one astute commentator has aptly termed a 'issue orthodoxy,' that is, 'a general belief that politics can be defensible in terms of a finite range of distinct universal or "basic" issues, encapsulated by such terms as power, justice, obligation, state'.

Furthermore, there wasn't much curiosity in these notions' historical context. It was more significant to judge excellent theory by moral seriousness and argumentative rigor. Previous theory books were included only insofar as they were crucial to the phenomenology of the concept.19 Concepts were not thought to change much over time, despite being contentious and having varying meanings. Thus, there was complete synchronization of interests. It seems that there was no worry expressed about the possibility that we were not working with the same idea or that our mental landscape was different from that of the past. However, many observers find it strange that intellectuals who were sensitive to language had little or no understanding of the historical predicament. The naive synchronic premise of conceptualism appeared to be that Plato would respond in English if we yelled loud enough.

Furthermore, this conceptual approach, or issue orthodoxy, gave rise to other works on political ideas, including the early Macmillan publications, which started in the 1960s and gained traction again in the 1980s. Though not everyone followed the same path when it came to the conceptual analysis issue, the enterprise's main idea was evident. Outside of the field of political theory history, conceptual theory and issue orthodoxy were accepted as standard technical or professional political theory for a number of generations of political theory or political philosophy professors and postgraduates. Theorists gained intellectual growth by studying and instructing within the framework of the orthodoxy conceptual approach. Presumably the intention was that the reader was receiving unsullied "pristine political theory," but in reality, all they were receiving was a narrowly focused and sometimes quite specialized perspective on theory. The work itself has never been properly addressed, which is not to diminish it in the slightest; it was and is often insightful and very helpful pedagogically. It seems that theorists prefer closed-minded perspectives that are intellectual and historical. Even while this problem orthodoxy business is still very much in its established shape, the momentum behind it seems to fade a little in the last ten years of the century.

Furthermore, many basic works in political theory, especially those published in the 1950s, were based on this "issue orthodoxy" approach. This movement began with Stanley Benn and Richard Peters' Social Principles and the Democratic State and continued until the end of the century. Whether conceptions should be subjected to a critical clean up or a neutral phenomenological description is the central conundrum for such publications, which have often been ahistorical alphabetic lists of "key" concepts. This is how ordinary language theory and logical positivism used to differ. Most texts combine the two incoherently. For example, in The

Problems of Political Philosophy, a widely used textbook that has been used to teach political theory to many generations of students, David Raphael observed that the subject was inevitably centered on making ideas clear. Three components were included in this: idea analysis, concept synthesis, and concept improvement. First two were your typical everyday language stuff. The latter included "suggesting a definition or application that will support coherence or clarity." It also included treating things that were previously included in the theory category with selectiveness and dismissal. For example, as Raphael observed, "There is a lot of boring-looking discussion in the history of political philosophy since the sixteenth century. Much of it is indeed tedious." Here again is the arrogance of the Weldonian and logical positivists shown [7], [8].

Raphael knew that many intellectuals who spoke in everyday language held the opinion that any normative advancement in political philosophy was to be rejected. A philosopher may believe that his job is just to map out the old and new meanings, but he made the observation, "It seems to me that the process of clarication must often inevitably carry with it a sharpening and so a slight change of the meaning of the concept." Nonetheless, Raphael sees a benefit to the ahistorical examination of ideas. "Concept clarification is like cleaning the house," he remarks. Not much of your labor is visible once you have cleaned the home. Although you have thrown away some items that are unnecessary and merely a bother, you haven't added any new belongings to your collection. Upon completion, you will have a more organized home with more ease of mobility. Every generation must do this task on a recurring basis since it cannot be completed once and for all. The political theory perspective of "mental lumber" removal, often known as conceptual cleaning or garbage clearing, is reminiscent of the work of Weldon et al. It is still not true that political theory develops or provides any definitive normative responses to Raphael's tentative claim that conceptions may be refined or improved. Clearly thinking through the key concepts that make up the issue orthodoxy a kind of ongoing intellectual hand-washing is what political theory is all about, not normative argumentation [9], [10]. The idea that the theorist is still working on a widely recognized, socially responsible, and academically respectable project is strengthened by this.

CONCLUSION

The study provides a comprehensive analysis of essential contestability and its impact on political theory. It highlights the multifaceted nature of the debate, incorporating historical, linguistic, and philosophical dimensions. The examination of various perspectives, from those advocating for deconstruction to those emphasizing historical context, offers a nuanced understanding of essential contestability. The paper underscores the ongoing relevance of Wittgensteinian ideas and the contestability thesis in shaping discussions on political concepts. As the study reckons with essential contestability's ability to compete in the realm of political theory, it acknowledges the critiques and adjustments made by theorists over time. The intellectual journey from intrinsic testability to fundamental contestability reflects the complex interplay between language, history, and philosophy in understanding political ideas.

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CHAPTER 12

EVOLUTION AND MODIFICATION: ANALYZING THE TRANSFORMATIVE PATH OF POLITICAL THEORY FROM LOGICAL POSITIVISM TO NORMATIVE JUSTICE

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ABSTRACT:

This study explores the influence of the basic contestability thesis, ordinary language philosophy, and logical positivism on political theory. Despite shifts in focus over time, essential contestability remains embedded in political studies as a background language for political science students. The rejection of metaphysics by these systems did not diminish the emphasis on the philosophical method, particularly in conceptual and analytical political theory. The critical and skeptical approach to political thought persisted, with a historical shift in the 1950s and early 1960s influenced by empirical social science and rigorous conceptual analysis. However, challenges, especially related to essential contestability, prompted a modified analytical focus, paving the way for normative political theory. The study underscores the enduring importance of justice as a central idea in political theory, recognizing its multifaceted nature and the diverse theories that have shaped its discourse.

KEYWORDS:

Justice, Logical Positivism, Philosophy, Political Theory.

INTRODUCTION

The basic contestability thesis, ordinary language philosophy, and logical positivism all had a big impact on political theory. While many aspects of this overall strategy have been dropped, others have remained. For instance, essential contestability has become part of political studies' unconscious rather than firmly rejected or repudiated. These days, it only "crops up" as a somewhat background language that political science students are supposed to be familiar with. Second, although all of the aforementioned systems rejected metaphysics, they nonetheless saw the philosophical method implicit in both conceptual and analytical political theory as fundamental and all-encompassing. There was little creativity or uncertainty over its validity, despite skepticism surrounding the majority of other concerns. The bases were solid yet thin. As a result, the critical and skeptical approach to political thought held firm.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, political theory was underpinned by two main areas of knowledge: first, the "first-order" knowledge of empirical social science, or political theory in empirical practice; and second, the safe "second-order" activity of rigorous and ethically serious conceptual analysis. The historical underpinnings of political philosophy as well as conventional or classical normative norms were upended. Political philosophy endured and blossomed in a different form. It had twisted and twisted, writhing violently. This "twin pillar" strategy was firmly based on logical positivism, but it felt uneasy around common terminology and fundamental contestability theory. The fact that ordinary language theory maintained its underlying foundationalist and empiricist stance, however, helped to ease the uneasiness. Additionally, it rejected comprehensive metaphysics, which was still seen as poisonous conjecture or completely harmless. If one looked closely, the empirical social science viewpoint might coexist peacefully with both common language and essential contestability theory [1], [2].

Nonetheless, the core contestability theory has significant flaws. Chapter Three's discussion of responses to essential contestability often centered on the more troubling problem of the potentially profound relativism and incommensurabil- ility implied in such an argument. Later, some postmodern thinkers considered this relativism to be completely agreeable, while others attempted to reconcile it with historical contexts, and yet others desired to give it up completely. But such movements of ideas could not be ignored by a generation of political theorists schooled in everyday language, conceptual analysis, and analytical theory. A modified analytical focus, or moderated essential contestability, was required to fully reclaim what Berlin and others called the normative and justifiable domain. What exactly would such a recovery involve is the question.

Two minor steps were taken in the direction of normativity. First, it was indicated that normative conceptions were important for humans to have as self-interpreting animals and that political theorists might assess, refine, and enhance these conceptions. Additionally, there were a few tangential links between this and the notion of "tidying up." This route has been identified in both common language and fundamental contestability theory. Even a few timid attempts to "improve" political notions had been made. Here, "better," "clarifying," and "sharpening" were the productive terms. It is important to note that they were not the same as an explicit justification theory, which aims to explain why we should follow a certain set of norms or values instead of a different one. That last point, however, was the second nuanced move. It was a very short step to modify or adjust the essential contestability argument if the theorist could demonstrate that the original form is hopelessly caught in a relativist loop and that it did not adequately account for the way normative arguments were deployed. This modification implied that, in part, in-depth conceptual research was necessary since political notions often represented profound internal differences that needed to be clarified. After the investigation was finished, however, one element of the idea could be shown to be more consistent with our common sense than the other kinds.

This feature more closely matched an "essential use" made by humans. The basic framework of the profound intuitive values that all people have may then be revealed to us at a highly abstract, sophisticated, and systematic level by a normative theory. It is possible to demonstrate how one part of the idea approximates this deep structure. Thus, a normative political theory revealed the fundamental, real human values reduced to their most basic form. This served as the foundation for a rational normative and justificatory theory, which ultimately offered an essential answer for the fundamentally debatable ideas. Thus, essential contestability served as the appetizer to the concept's main entrée, which, despite internal controversy at first, could be settled within the framework of a normative theory. So, the traditional normative theory reappeared, smeared with analytical grease. Others saw nothing come back, while on the other hand, a new political theory emerged that had some recognizable similarities to an earlier framework. The development of normative theory, with a special emphasis on justice, throughout the 1970s and 1980s may be seen in this broad context.

The Justice Concept

Though the movement started to wane in the 1990s, normative-based justice theory was one of the primary concerns of the last three decades of the 20th century. The seminal book was Rawls's 1971 original Theory of Justice. Justice was chosen for normative theory because it was seen as the fundamental or most important idea in politics, very literally. It evolved into an archetype. Some saw it as the primary focus of political theory's historical development from the Greeks to the present. It replaced the idea of the state, qua Staatslehre, which served the same linking purpose earlier in the 20th century. To put it another way, post-1970s normative theory saw some minimal sense of justice as the logical presupposition to politics,

just as earlier in the century theorists saw the state as the crucial supposition for politics. The claim was that society could not function without a notion of justice. Even so, not everyone agreed with this statement, which was controversial in and of itself. Justice was merely one virtue among many for some people. It was also obviously not a single item. There were other competing interpretations. The emphasis on justice was due to another significant factor. Reason and justice were seen to be equivalent in a formal sense. Simply put, realizing the need for justice was what it meant to be fair. This was a very significant argument that sheds light on how people thought about justice toward the end of the 20th century. However, there are a few things to consider in this analysis.

If someone were to inquire, what exactly does justice mean? the first response would be that similar to equality, the formal and substantive meanings of the term must be distinguished. This concept stems from Aristotle, who contrasts with the several substantive species of justice and the general notion of justice as proportion and balance. According to Aristotle, the foundation of both justice and ethics is the idea of balance. It is believed that justice is the ultimate virtue and injustice is the ultimate evil. The center of all virtues is a mean or standard that is called justice. The mean is defined as the proper ratio or measurement between two extremes. Justice is the foundation of all virtues since they are all examples of this harmony between opposites. It is the soul's ideal temperament in its most complete form. Justice is also a matter of proportion and balance for Plato between the soul and the state. When a person's role in society and the arrangement of their talents are precisely balanced, justice and perfect reason are realized. This is Plato's Republic's soul-state comparison [3], [4].

Thus, proper proportion and weighing in judgment are concerns of the formal or general meaning of both justice and reason. To put it another way, treating equal instances similarly and unequal cases unequally is what reason and justice are all about. This means that treating similar circumstances similarly is the definition of both justice and reason, and it is comparable to the universalizability rule. Formal justice and reason are therefore philosophically coordinated. The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument by Chaim Perelman offers a compelling interpretation of this concept. According to Perelman, the fundamental tenet of formal logic and the commandment that "like cases should be treated as alike" constitute the essence of justice. "A principle of action following which beings of the same category must be treated in the same way" is what formal justice is defined as. Therefore, treating such situations differently when they are similar in relevant ways would be nonsensical. This might be seen as a logical impartiality guideline in practice. Impartiality is crucial to our understanding of the world cognitively. We cannot re-explain, re-identify, or behave in a self-consistent manner without it. According to Perelman, "the rule of justice," which denotes treating similar persons and circumstances equally, is the basic norm that controls theory and practice and respect for which shows the reasonableness of both his intellect and his behavior.

DISCUSSION

All things considered, the formal component of all rational behavior is the same as the essence of justice. Additionally, closely related to equality is this formal factor. Treating similar instances alike, often known as equality of treatment or equal consideration of interest, is the rule of justice. Formal justice and equality, however, are different from substantive forms of justice and equality. H. likewise echoes this formal substantive difference explicitly. Justice is often seen as upholding or restoring a balance or proportion, and its guiding principle is sometimes stated as "Treat like cases alike"; however, we also need to add, "and treat different cases differently," according to L. A. Hart's Concept of Law. Additionally, Rawls' original difference between the "conception of justice" and "concepts" or principles of justice implies it. According to Rawls, "We may still say that they each have a conception of justice even

though men disagree about which principles of justice should define the fundamental terms of their association." According to Rawls, "Societies will differ from one another not in having or failing to have this notion but in the range of cases which they apply it to and in the emphasis which they give to it." Everyone "may be supposed" to have this conception of justice.

The contrast between conceptions and concepts also refers to the previously discussed modified essential contestability thesis. Even though there is a great deal of debate over justice, Rawls contends that a crucial component of the idea may still be identified and developed since it is consistent with our gut feelings. The relationship between "reason" and "justice" is strengthened by this idea. Though it shifts imperceptibly between the formal and substantive explanations, it effectively claims to answer the justice dilemma. Abstract conclusions from universally accepted premises are the focus of reason. One may notice the same thing, for instance, in the work of Brian Barry. According to Barry, "reason as universalizability" is comparable to the idea of equality, which is captured by principles of justice. Thus, he remarks, "The reasonable acceptability of principles criterion both departs from and gives substance to the idea of fundamental equality." You might call this a vicious cycle, but that's not what it is. "Expressions of the same moral idea" is what they both are. Preciseness, universalizability, and justice are synonymous with equality and reason [5], [6].

Concepts Of Right and Wrong

Nonetheless, in discussions from the 20th century, this broader notion of justice and reason is often split between different kinds of justice. The work of Rawls is a single, significant feature on a much bigger canvas. Originally, Aristotle made a distinction between distributive, commutative, and remedial justice. Except for a few modern neo-Aristotelians, the majority of twentieth-century justice discourse is uninterested in Aristotle's theory of the relationship between just situations of affairs and a balanced human character. Nevertheless, all of these forms of justice are dependent on balance and proportion in rewards and penalties as well as product exchanges. Their treatment of "equals equally and unequals unequally, but in proportion to their relevant differences" is in line with the equality principle. While retributive justice is still a legal undertone in certain justice discussions, distributive and procedural justice are the most significant types of justice to emerge in twentieth-century literature. Contrasting patterned and unpatterned distribution is another way to put it. There are many domains in which distributive or patterned concepts may coexist with procedural or unpatterned concepts. For heuristic reasons, they will be maintained separately in this instance.

It is crucial to list some of the broad presumptions that underlie ideas of justice. In summary, theories of justice assume that human actors concerning their political, social, and economic structures are under consideration. Human actors are the primary location of value, both in terms of the value itself and the valuation process. Second, people are generally believed to be reasonable, reasonably self-interested beings. Even with various forms of socialization, humans still have a limited capacity for compassion or care for others.8 The concept of reason in this context is a little hazy. Here, the most important concerns are how to cope with limited resources and competition among populations of mostly self-interested individuals. In this case, how may one achieve a reasonable level of fairness? Third, a lack of resources suggests some kind of individual competitiveness, which calls for regulation. This second assumption can mean a substantially larger transfer of resources or very few background regulations. These presumptions may be distilled down to three main points: competition for limited resources, the need for moderate self-interest, and the significance of human action.

To understand the many ways that the notion is used in reality, it is necessary to further break down each of the two main subfields of justice theory proceduralism and distributive justice

that were previously discussed. The varieties of proceduralism that will be briefly explored are Nozick's little more awkwardly positioned entitlement theory and Friedrich Hayek's commutative explanation of justice. Subsumed under the heading of distributive or social justice, the matter becomes much more intricate. Discussing distributive justice in the 20th century has mostly focused on the somewhat more abstract distributive concept of "to each according to his or her due," or, to put it another way, the equitable distribution of advantages and disadvantages in society.

The interpretation of the more substantive premise that establishes due process leads to the fine-tuning of this concept. There are many different kinds of these principles. To everyone according to his or her rights, deserts, needs, services, effort, moral worth, talent, skill, position, and so on, is one method to phrase each premise, however, there are variations. If we further split these various principles into distributive principles that are oriented toward the desert and those that are not, we may better understand their diversity. Another minor aspect to note is that various aspirations or conceptions of a desirable society may often align with different principles.

According to desert theory, someone should get compensation for an action or attribute if they have shown merit or have a desirable attribute. With a few notable exceptions in recent years, non-desert-oriented ideas have received the majority of attention in the previous several decades in the literature. For the most part, justice theories have mostly ignored desert. Most modern theories of justice are based on non-desert concepts. The formal claim of non-desert theories, which are typically predicated on an initial rejection of the desert argument, is that the basis for allocating burdens and benefits is a broad consensus or agreement on a rational process, empirical premise, moral principle, or a pluralistic combination of these. Diverse non-desert principles exist. Differentiating between the rationalist and more empiricist assertions, two types of non-desert-oriented distribution principles are a handy approach to typology them. The goal of the latter is to provide an undisputed empirical foundation for distribution, which is typical of welfare state minimums. In the former, ideal rational conditions are examined, whereby people, under certain rational circumstances, reach a coherent choice regarding the distribution of resources in society. Over the last thirty years, the latter issue in particular has dominated justice-based fiction.

The contractarian claims have often been further split between the arguments known as "justice as mutual advantage" and "justice as impartiality," which Brian Barry has helpfully typologies. Justice is seen in the previous conception as the result of persons in a starting position engaging in mutual bargaining. This theory is essentially an advanced version of the rational choice argument. In the latter case, limits are imposed on the kind and context of reasoning that may be used, and justice is seen as the result of a reasonable agreement between distinct persons in a hypothetical circumstance or original position. Particularly in Rawls, the contract device seeks to depict a scenario in which people have to make a decision and demonstrates why people have solid reasons to accept justice as fairness. Unlike in Gauthier, it is not seen as a negotiating stance in and of itself. An additional aspect included in the literature is the endeavor to formulate a multifaceted understanding of justice, grounded on a range of principles that may be used in many situational settings [6], [7].

Advanced Theories

According to procedural conceptions of justice, justice is primarily concerned with people adhering to or maintaining rules. Though there are again many variants on this topic, the concept that justice is respecting the "rule of law" is the most defining version of this. Strong anti-constructivist sentiments may be found within proceduralist perspectives. Desert is

rejected by Hayek and Nozick because they believe it to be interventionist and may result in a reduction of liberty. According to Hayek, justice is determined by the formal consistency of a system of social norms. As a result, he distinguished between catallactic and teleocratic regimes. A catallactic order is spontaneous and results from the many actions of people, whereas a teleocratic order is focused on achieving a certain goal. Justice is about giving people as much freedom as possible to pursue their interests or goals. In this sense, justice is about upholding the procedural laws that provide the framework for personal autonomy. Fair results are not important to it. As such, distributive fairness and this directly conflict. On the other hand, deliberate acts of constraint, interference, or coercion are what injustice is all about. Since the results of a market order are not the product of deliberate activities, they are neither right nor unjust. As Hayek points out, it must be acknowledged that, in many cases, how the benefits and costs are distributed by the market process may be seen as very unfair if it were the consequence of a purposeful allocation to specific individuals. However, this is untrue. These shares are the result of a procedure that was not intended nor anticipated to have an impact on specific individuals. It is ridiculous to expect justice from such a process, and it is also unfair to pick out certain members of such a society as being entitled to a certain portion [8], [9].

The Hayekian framework suggests opinions about the value of individualism, individual liberty and rights, the relevance of the free market economy, and a more constrained view of the constitutional state. According to Hayek, the guiding principles of distributive justice frameworks are ethically arbitrary and primarily represent the private objectives and interests of those who create them. A society "whose productivity rests on individuals being free to use their knowledge and abilities for their purposes" would not allow the application of even the most profound ideas. Distribution suggests a strategy and organizers who will try to force their beliefs on other people. Because of their inherent arbitrariness, such procedures always result in injustices, which is incompatible with a plural society. The Road to Serfdom by Hayek has this as its central topic. Therefore, distributive justice tends to push nations toward dictatorship while masquerading as social justice. On the other hand, an equitable society ought to provide people the greatest amount of autonomy to follow their interests free from hindrance. It would also be inefficient for the market order for people to obtain benefits or obligations based just on their merits or needs. Nonetheless, Hayek concedes that the government may play a part in reducing severe hardship. Proceduralists, like Hayek, reject all types of contractual theory save from the way justice is administered; nonetheless, the conclusion and subsequent explanation of the proceduralist perspective have a striking resemblance to the "justice by mutual advantage" argument.

Nozick's conception of justice is based on a historical entitlement theory that embodies the rules governing the rightful acquisition and transfer of commodities. In essence, his thesis demonstrates how anarchistic ideals may coexist with a small government. People are seen to have certain fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property under anarchy state and utopia. He just takes it for granted that there are such disenfranchised people. As a result, the whole debate seems to be a complex fiction game. In actuality, the book begins with the clear claim that "people have rights and are things no person or group may do to them." These rights serve as detrimental side restrictions on every person and are unassailable. They serve as procedural tools as well, existing before any concept of the good. Other than those that are willingly agreed upon, rights do not impose responsibilities. As Nozick sees it, permission is essential throughout the whole political process and at every point in the debate. Thus, the rights are fundamental in and of themselves. Nozick refers to the non-interference with rights as the Kantian principle of inviolability. Respect is owed to individuals as ends in and of themselves. It is also evident to Nozick that there is no value in anything outside of people. There is no social entity with a good that makes certain sacrifices for its benefit, as Nozick observes. There

are only individuals—various individuals with unique lives of their own. Every person develops the meaning and worth of their own life according to their interests.

The foundation of Nozick's conception of justice is the aforementioned idea. The main goal of his thesis is to prove that everyone has their rights upheld or safeguarded. Nozick makes a distinction between historical principles and end-state principles. The latter is more in line with justice. This contrasts with another he draws between principles that are patterned and those that are not. The majority of distributive and social justice theories rely on a distribution that is designed according to needs and similar concepts. On the other hand, Nozick argues that unpatterned distribution implies upholding the inviolability of each person's rights, especially those to life, liberty, and property. Every individual is the owner of their own body and all of its labor. The person has a full right to the property if it was obtained by labor, lawful acquisition, or simple transfer. When everyone is entitled to what they are due, justice is served. This means that both forced redistribution and meddling with private property are impossible. Ultimately, justice is only a question of how a distribution is made. Once again, Nozick does not provide any theory of the good here [10], [11]. A society that has a centralized legal system and a powerful protective agency will solely care about upholding procedural justice. In this way, many of the core ideas of proceduralism in the tradition of Hayek are essentially similar to Nozick's view of unpatterned distributive fairness.

CONCLUSION

This study has explored the lasting impact of philosophical influences on political theory, tracing the trajectory from logical positivism to ordinary language theory and essential contestability. The persistence of essential contestability, albeit in a modified form, reflects the complex relationship between empirical social science, conceptual analysis, and normative political theory. The study underscores the flaws in core contestability theory, prompting a nuanced approach that incorporates in-depth conceptual research. The evolution towards normative political theory, with justice at its forefront, is highlighted as a response to the challenges posed by essential contestability. The conclusion emphasizes the need for a rational and justificatory theory to navigate the fundamentally debatable ideas, ultimately contributing to the development of political theory in the late 20th century.

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CHAPTER 13

EXPLORING DESERT THEORIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON DISTRIBUTIVE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 20TH-CENTURY PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT:

This study delves into the distributive justice aspect, focusing on desert theories prevalent in the 20th century. It explores two distinct applications of the "moral worth" principle, revealing disparate societal visions. The first emphasizes inherent worth in human beings, promoting widespread distribution to fulfill prerequisites for personhood. The second, rooted in self-determination, links personhood to individual goals, suggesting a nuanced approach to distribution. Despite the dominance of anti-desert theories in the 20th century, this work critically examines desert-oriented and non-desert principles, categorizing them into rationalist and empiricist claims. The empiricist assertion emphasizes human needs as the foundation for distribution, challenging desert-based and market-driven approaches. The study critically evaluates the concept of human need and its role in welfare state literature, acknowledging unresolved issues and differing perspectives on needs. The study also analyzes the rationalist perspective, exemplified by David Gauthier's justice as mutual advantage. Gauthier's work, rooted in methodological individualism and economic rationality, presents justice as a tool for egoists to coexist, emphasizing voluntary compliance for mutual benefit. The study explores the implications of Gauthier's approach in the context of the prisoner's dilemma and the concept of minimax relative concession. Additionally, it discusses the limitations and criticisms of Gauthier's rationalist stance. Furthermore, the study examines utilitarianism as a related theory of rational choice and mutual gain, emphasizing utility maximization for societal welfare. It scrutinizes the challenges associated with defining utility and the evolution of utilitarian concerns from individual morality to public policy. The critique addresses the inadequacies of utilitarianism in capturing the complexity and rootedness of human beings, emphasizing its impersonal and calculating nature. The study concludes by questioning the meaningfulness of utility and its limitations in providing a substantive account of justice or rights.

KEYWORDS:

Economic, Justice, Philosophy, Political.

INTRODUCTION

Regarding the distributive or social justice aspect, desert theories are, as previously said, less prevalent in the 20th century. The substance and methodology of desert arguments also differ substantially. The characteristics of merit, value, services, and labor vary greatly across civilizations. Furthermore, none of these notions of the desert give birth to any distinct social or political structure. Given a desert-based interpretation of the "moral worth" principle, one may therefore quickly discern two distinct applications of the argument, both with radically different societal visions. The first dispute would go like this: The only things that have inherent worth are human beings; everything else only has value when it comes to giving value to or enhancing human personality. Thus, the only topics deserving of respect and value are humans or agents. A certain degree of well-being is necessary to qualify as a human. Stated differently, there are certain prerequisites for the existence of an individual. Respecting others means that

we must rationally fulfill the requirements for personhood. Consequently, we pledge to ensure that everyone meets these prerequisites. It may be essential to implement widespread social and economic distribution to meet these prerequisites. Therefore, the distribution of commodities would be predicated on the equal moral value of people, with each person morally worthy of the distribution of things required for the realization of personhood. This application of moral value can suggest a drastically redistributive understanding of the state.

A second version of the argument, on the other hand, begins with the same premise that only people have inherent worth and deserve respect but leads to very different policy conclusions. A certain degree of well-being is necessary to qualify as a human. But what makes a person a person? A person's ability to retain themselves and their will might be one explanation since they have the capability for self-determination. However, the ability to make decisions for oneself depends on the objectives the agent chooses to pursue. Someone's temperament, environment, and circumstances will all reflect whether they have rich or well-rounded goals. Stated differently, it is possible to determine, at least in part, if a person has the qualities of personhood by looking at their surroundings that is, their social, economic, and personal situations. Conditions and circumstances are so often the result of human individuals; hence, human acts produce circumstances, and all actions are organized by will, which depends upon the depth and breadth of one's intentions. To alter circumstances is to alter people's intentions and goals. However, a person's nature must be evaluated to alter the situation. Giving some individuals, for instance, financial resources wouldn't solve their problems—which are moral and psychological. They may have very narrow goals or objectives. While the whole of this argument may seem quite abstract, in the late nineteenth century it served as a key pillar supporting allegations against state voluntary charity. Personhood is the foundation of moral value, but the character of purpose defines or measures personhood. The ability to make decisions for oneself would dictate distribution. As a result, some people are seen to be more "deserving" than others. Stated differently, some deserve it and others don't. The worthy individual needs support. The worthy have only experienced unforeseen events and need to get assistance. Unworthy people don't. This suggests a very new social perspective for society [1], [2].

Nonetheless, the majority of justice theories developed in the 20th century were based on anti-desert reasoning. The formal assertion of non-desert theories is that the foundation for allocating costs and benefits is a broad consensus or agreement on a logical procedure, empirical assumption, or any multiple mix of these. As was previously established, non-desert principles differing greatly. Differentiating between the two prevalent types of distributive principles that are not desert-oriented rationalist and empiricist claims is a practical method of categorizing them. The latter seeks to provide an undisputed empirical foundation for distribution, which is typical of welfare governments' social needs-based minimums. In the former, people make decisions on how to distribute resources in society under idealized rational conditions, based on certain logical circumstances. Throughout the latter thirty years of the twentieth century, theoretical justice literature has been dominated by these concerns, especially the latter.

In essence, the empiricist assertion makes the case that the distribution of responsibilities and benefits must take into account human needs. Consequently, it does not qualify as a desert, according to some of its supporters. Reactions are necessary for needs. They are not worthy of agents. The moment a need is identified, a duty follows naturally. Consequently, the welfare state has neither a dubious or unclear moral foundation nor a desert foundation. It is not necessary to know the agent's moral or psychological position to identify a need. Needs exist regardless of what others say. Whether you say it or not, if you need something, then you need

it. Independent actors can experimentally identify needs. As a result, they may be attributed to individuals regardless of their awareness of them. They go beyond simple desires or pursuits. Furthermore, they are not just representative of personal preferences, interests, or psychological states. To put it more simply, needs are physiological, whereas desires are more psychological. For proponents of the need, this is a crucial argument, in part because market activity is focused on gratifying consumers' desires, needs, and psychological preferences. However, welfare, in the context of distributive justice, addresses the physiological requirements of all people. This divergence ultimately means that the welfare state cannot, by definition, be susceptible to market pressures or market tests if it is associated with distributive justice and centered on an empirical needs basis. Thus, in contrast to moral deserts or interests, needs are seen by their proponents as distinct, definite, and objective realities. They become inherently more authoritative as a result.

The idea of human need has dominated welfare state literature throughout history, whether overtly or covertly. Such demands are thought to be satisfied by social services and social minimums. There are a lot of unresolved issues for those who disagree with need-based claims. For instance, are there any basic human needs? When needs are specified, they always seem to be influenced by a variety of different factors, including social, regional, historical, and many more. Needs come in a variety of forms. For example, in his early works, Karl Marx distinguished between several human wants that communism would satisfy. Consequently, there are three types of needs: mental, physical, and social. Consequently, a contrast between absolute and relative demands is implied here. It is harder to distinguish clearly between needs and desires or preferences if the difference between relative and absolute needs is acknowledged. It gets harder to walk the line between them. The question of whether needs are solely empirical also presents a challenge. As an example, X often requires Y for some Z. When you don't understand why something is required, the need loses its meaning. Thus, gasoline is necessary for an automobile to run. But if one explains why it's necessary, Z turns into a justification mechanism that must be evaluated. Therefore, needs don't generate duties on their own. On the other hand, needs are related to particular Zs, or end-states. As a result, the need shifts from the empirical to the normative domain, which naturally calls into question the empirical argument's central claim. The demands-based distributive argument has lost some of its strength as a result of these and other objections.

Mutual Advantage And Justice

The rationalist attitude is the second aspect of the anti-desert stance. As shown, the literature has mostly focused on two versions of this contractarian argument. These are justice as impartiality and justice as mutual benefit. Both reject the other's conception of justice.

As previously established, David Gauthier's work is a classic example of how justice is defined as mutual advantage a sophisticated kind of rational choice reasoning. The main objective of Gauthier's Morals by Agreement is to extract moral and just principles from the more scientifically based, non-moral assumption of the rational self-interested individual. Hence, although taking a very specific empirical, economic, and very instrumental perspective of reason, the aforementioned work may be seen as an effort to defend Western liberal market society by "representing its ideal nature about reason." It is not logic in and of itself. Subjective preferences and interests are prioritized. Conventions are the result of people attempting to maximize their interests via negotiating, and they exist. Here, there is a strong—if very dubious—assumption that everyone has about equal negotiating strength. Accordingly, Gauthier views his theory of justice as being "midway between the implicit collectivism of John Rawls and the simple individualism of Robert Nozick [3], [4]."

His approach is predicated on the idea of solitary rational beings, each with the ability to reason practically. Gauthier freely acknowledges that a fundamental metaphysics of the self serves as the basis for his work, Moral by Agreement. This perspective is mostly based on neo-classical economic theory, and it is effectively a type of methodological and moral individualism. As a result, everyone aims to maximize the fulfillment of their interests. "At the heart of economic theory, and generalized in decision theory and game theory," is this maximizing approach" We order our desires, about decision and action, so that we may choose to maximize our expectation of desire-fulfillment," says Gauthier in his commentary on rationality. And by doing this, we demonstrate that we are logical actors. I won't challenge this maximization viewpoint. accepting the view of economists and others that practical reason can exist nowhere else. Hence, morality and reason are all contingent upon "economic man," whom Gauthier refers to as "the natural man of our time." In a market society, everyone is seen as "a Robinson Crusoe." This is Adam Smith's "invisible hand" argument: markets and morality have the same non-coercive potential for "reconciliation of individual interests with mutual benefit." The need for "indefinite appropriation, seeking to subdue more and more of the world to his power" is innate to all human beings. According to Gauthier, this truth "runs deeper than our disavowals." However, the key to using "the efforts of the individual working for his good, in the cause of ever-increasing benefit" has been found by Western civic societies.

Thus, Gauthier's conception of justice is simply a theoretical explanation of the social compact that is predicated on methodological individualism and instrumental economic rationality. Justice offers tools that help egoists coexist. Justice-related principles emerge from instrumentally reasonable self-control. In essence, justice and instrumental reason work together to pursue individual goals while interacting cooperatively. In actuality, voluntary compliance reduces the need and expenses associated with social institutions. Individual self-interested actors essentially consent to collaborate since it benefits them both. Every person is seen as the maximizing of their interests. Here, Gauthier is seen as having a pure starting point for negotiation. The notion is based on the prisoner's dilemma, which states that while individuals might choose to collaborate or defect, it is preferable for everyone if everyone cooperates. Gauthier observes that "in Dilemma-structured situations, each maximizer will confront the uncomfortable truth that, given where it leaves the others, the outcome of her and every other person's seemingly rational, maximizing behavior leaves her and indeed every other person worse off than need be." As a result, people are forced to promote results that benefit both parties. The self-interested, logical actor recognizes the power of moral arguments to get beyond the prisoner's dilemma issues. But when people negotiate, Gauthier refers to them as "non-tuists." Being non-tourist implies having no regard for the people they communicate and share ideas. Tuism suggests a care for or interest in other people. "The demand for justice is before any particular tuistic concerns," according to Gauthier. Motivation is always entirely egocentric and personal.

However, only agreements that come from a reasonably equitable starting point—according to Gauthier's concept of "minimax relative concession"—will be welcomed by every agent. Minimax relative concession has an impact on the negotiation process itself. The general goal of rational egoists is to make as few compromises as possible with other negotiators. If both actors are equally reasonable, then making equal concessions makes sense. Therefore, minimax relative concession serves as a neutral restraint on each person's behavior as well as a foundation for reasonable individual negotiation. The just person is inclined to engage with those of his fellows whom he judges to be similarly oriented following the requirements of the principle of minimax relative concession, as Gauthier observes. The reason a just person benefits society is because they have absorbed the concept of mutual benefit. Individual efforts to maximize their interests will thus inherently be limited forms of maximizing. Gauthier's

solution to the prisoner's dilemma is limited maximization, which is a limitation that is inherent to will and reasoned decision-making, in contrast to Hobbes' fear of the sovereign. Gauthier's main goal is to adapt Hobbes to the vocabulary of twentieth-century game theory. However, Gauthier does not believe that the rationality argument is a covert moral presumption.

<div align="center">**DISCUSSION**</div>

An additional restriction on rational choice, according to Gauthier, is a clause that forbids improving one's standing at the expense of hurting another's. In essence, the proviso states, "enough and as good for others." According to Gauthier, "every person should accept a certain limitation on natural relationship... to be willingly accepted by his peers as a participant in cooperative and commercial agreements. In summary, "the real concern each of us has in maintaining the conditions in which society can be a co-operative venture" is expressed by morality by agreement.

Arguments for justice as mutual gain often result in a fundamental rule of law structure and social vision that are quite similar to those of proceduralists. A more minimalist view of the constitutional state, the value of the free market economy, the significance of individualism, and the negative liberty and rights of people are among the fundamental views that both sets of arguments' proponents have in common. Aside from the process by which justice is established (proceduralists like Hayek, for instance, reject the contractual notion), the result and the ensuing explanation of the extent of justice would often be very similar, in both cases due to mutual benefit proceduralist arguments.

Utilities And Justice

Before delving into impartialist reasoning, it is necessary to examine utilitarianism, a related theory of rational choice and mutual gain that has never really shown a clear conceptual relationship with justice or rights. The appeals of utilitarianism are evident on the surface. It exclusively cares about the welfare and equal happiness of all sentient life, sometimes even all life. Its fundamental query is always: Does the outcome of a policy X, or an activity, result in a rise in welfare or pleasure for

In this way, it seems to be a theory that can easily resolve ethical or political issues at the most fundamental level. On the other hand, utilitarians would never wish to question what a right act is in and of itself. The only thing to determine is if its "consequence" results in increased well-being or happiness. However, this is something that has to be emphasized right away with utilitarianism in all of its manifestations. In contrast, a situation—which some might consider to be a case of justice—is morally and politically acceptable, in utility terms, if and only if it can be shown to have the consequence of maximizing interests, preferences, welfare, or happiness. Utilitarian arguments do not typically attempt to argue for a substantive account or concept of justice. Additionally, it implies that justice only has significance or value when it aligns with what "I" or "we" would "want." Thus, to conceive of utilitarianism as providing a theory of justice would be inaccurate, unless one is talking about an indirect one. This hypothesis is entirely second-order. It does not provide any first-order substantive justice or rights concepts. Thus, it lacks a deep or meaningful moral message. It operates on the fundamentally straightforward concept of utility maximization and asserts that the principle is effective as long as positive or negative effects from activities can be measured or calculated in an unbiased and neutral manner. However, all of this second-order reasoning is predicated on the idea that "utility" may have a broadly accepted definition.

Although utilitarianism is a second-order principle that makes sense intuitively, there is one very important issue with it: there is no consensus over the definition of utility. Utilitarians

have never really agreed on the concept of usefulness itself. It often refers, if obliquely, to welfare, well-being, or quality of life. However, since it relies on what an individual or community wants, desires, or likes, the actual content of this fundamental well-being varies greatly. In its earliest form, it is associated with pleasure or the ratio of pleasure to suffering. But by now, no utilitarian would rely only on the hedonic or pleasure criteria. It just raises too many complex issues. For instance, is it possible to compute interpersonal comparisons using a vague "state of mind" like pleasure? Due to this flaw, preferences—or the maximizing of "preference satisfaction"—became the standard word, especially among utilitarians who lean toward economics. Preferences relate to genuine preferences and experiences as well as a state of mind. It is still unclear, nevertheless, if it is possible to draw accurate interpersonal comparisons between genuine preferences or experiences [5], [6].

Nonetheless, the strong connections between utilitarianism and logical decision-making are evident here. Both ideologies provide a narrowly focused overview of a very tiny portion of human cognition and behavior. Both often overlook people's complexity to aggregate preferences or preference satisfaction. Both attempts to use an impartial process for making decisions on social, moral, and public issues. They use a "reason" that is primarily instrumental. The logical computation of utility, in this situation, resolves all moral and political quandaries. It has been observed by some utilitarians that conscious preferences cannot always provide a complete picture of an agent's interests. Thus, they have once again shifted the utility goalposts to concepts like "rational preferences" or, more importantly, "interests." In this context, interests often relate to assets that will be beneficial to the agent's long-term well-being but may not be readily expressed as conscious preferences. The second point is somewhat related to the earlier distinction, which J. first and tragically proposed. S. Mill: superior and inferior pleasures. The main idea is that some "resources," "utilities," or "actions" have value independent of whether or not they align with our conscious interests, preferences, or current wants. All utilitarians, however, find this view to be very problematic since it rejects the consequentialist position's reasoning and instead talks of things as being "intrinsically good." Although some dare to refer to this as "ideal utilitarianism," it is debatable if it is utilitarian in the slightest.

The relationship between these different utility senses is still problematic and unsettled. It is possible to overstate the discrepancies among some of these measurements, however. Therefore, even if welfare or interest-based utilitarian theories are skeptical of preference readings and preference utilitarians reject arguments based on pleasure, all of these viewpoints conceptually overlap. In the final analysis, welfare or interests presuppose that agents would favor or get some satisfaction from such policies. Therefore, welfarist or preference utilitarianisms still have many of the same issues that plague hedonic accounts.

When it comes to utility, utilitarians have also disagreed over what should be included in any utility calculus. This brings up another important contrast between rule and act utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism argues that to determine the maximum utility, we should compute following specific rules or standards. According to act utilitarianism, the most important thing to consider is whatever action results in the most utility. Therefore, the important thing is to do the deed, not only to observe the rule. To put it another way, act utilitarians often believe that obeying rules will sometimes prevent people from getting the most out of them. Act maximization is seen to be more adaptable when establishing policies. On the other hand, there might be a very wide variety of options. Even the most diligent policymaker could find it difficult to implement act utilitarianism in the absence of norms upon which to base calculations. In this regard, some people find that rule-based utility calculus is simpler to use and implement in a bureaucratic setting.

It is also important to note that utilitarian concerns have evolved slightly from their original focus on utility as a means of discussing moral behavior on an individual basis to a concern with utility as a more public philosophy, that is, as a means of managing or reforming public policy as a group.15 Many contemporary utilitarians are willing to acknowledge that utility is intuitively compelling when it comes to morality on an individual level, but they still view utility as much more defensible when it comes to public policy, as a type of government house utilitarianism.

Nevertheless, several utilitarian detractors contend that utility misses the intricacy and community rootedness of human beings. Utility standards tend to speak in an impersonal, universal, unbiased, and calculating manner, attempting to avoid any ethical or political implications. Utilitarianism therefore has some resemblance to the early Rawlsian and neo-Kantian demands that principles be universally basic, impartial, and independent of social or historical issues. Critics counter that most moral or political circumstances do not resemble this instrumentally logical interpretation of values. Nevertheless, modern utilitarians are rather persuaded that utility calculation is most likely required and even desirable in contexts like public policy and economic decision-making, despite their philosophical discomfort with its strict application to individual morality. In this latter category, interpersonal utility computation is proven to be extremely doable. Some even contend that it serves as the foundation for all rational public policy decisions.

The argument that public policy seeks to combine people's interests may, in fact, partially address the objection leveled against the utility, which is often made against it by neo-Kantians at this stage, who claim that it compromises people's sense of separateness. Numerous facets of the "distinctiveness of persons" will unavoidably be lost in the process of policy aggregation. But by definition, for any policy goal to be accomplished, something almost always has to take place. However, ideally, each person's interests will still have been given equal weight. Utilitarianism can be interpreted as the best approach to thinking about justice issues because it is impartial and universal, allowing it to focus on the much more manageable task of determining whether a practical outcome will maximize welfare rather than on the content of justice or the intrinsic good at stake. Thus, it makes clear, definitive policies possible. What is feasible is always constrained by a broad variety of factors in the public domain, and usefulness offers a useful and logical "road map" across these many restrictions. In discussions about justice, utilitarian reasoning would therefore be quite important [7], [8].

Still, the aforementioned does not solve all of the important issues. The results of dominant public policy might be quite autocratic. Utility in the final analysis is essentially what most agents "want," or what fulfills them. A qualitative evaluation of preferences, needs, or desires is not possible. Desires are empty of meaning. Moreover, it's unclear why a desire's very existence implies that it should be maximized. However, some utilitarians have attempted to sneak in selected qualitative criteria out of concern of what this quantitative approach may entail—that is, everything that the majority desire becomes a good to be maximized, such assaults on minority of asylum seekers. Then, we see concepts being used in arguments, such as "rational interests," "rational preferences," "long-term welfare," or "ideal higher utilities." However, all of the quantitative versions of the argument's impartiality, impersonality, and calculative benefits are undermined by the latter. Fearing the ramifications of qualitative evaluation, a lot of utilitarians often retreat right away to the quantitative perspective, which is unconcerned with moral goals and substance. But even here, as said, there is nothing to stop a sizable majority from being ecstatic about egregious injustices or disparities.

A very promiscuous second order doctrine is utilitarianism. It has literally arisen in a wide range of ideological formulations and has no required connection to concepts of social justice,

welfare state policies, or caring for the impoverished. In late nineteenth-century Britain, a number of radical anti-statists and anti-welfare liberal thinkers, including Herbert Spencer, used a version of utilitarianism to support their extreme libertarian viewpoint. Recalling the earlier discussion of utilitarianism's complete lack of any theory of justice or rights, we shouldn't be too shocked to discover second-order utilitarian arguments popping up almost everywhere. It may completely upend or preserve social fairness. Above everything, utility comes first. A principle, ideology, or policy is deemed acceptable if it can be shown to maximize the preferences, desires, and interests of the largest possible number of people. This is politically and ethically unsound even while it may be handy for government house utilitarianism and simple-minded, instant public policy-making on one hand. One might easily justify an effective public policy program for racial pogrom using consequentialist utilitarian calculation. Utilitarianism fails to acknowledge the crucial fact that desires and moral judgments do not exist in a vacuum in politics or morality. What matters most is the situation that gives rise to a utility claim.

When these important considerations are combined, it becomes difficult to see what political philosophy utilitarianism can provide beyond persistent conceptual poverty and ambiguity. Regarding what utility is, nobody can agree. Substantial utilitarian theories of justice and rights do not exist. Once a theorist accepts the illogical underlying utility assumption without question, utility may be used to defend any policy or ideological ideology. Despite their need to narrow and maneuver within the qualitative realm, utilitarians are ultimately undone by their own consequentialist reasoning. The idea that unexplained interests or preferences might be combined or contrasted is never addressed, with the exception of ad hominem arguments based on what could "appear to be" occurring in real public policy. However, this allegation is not supported by any conclusive evidence. Therefore, achieving maximal pleasure or wellbeing is still an ethereal, mystical, or metaphysical concept. It is a fiction that appeases utilitarians but serves no purpose for the majority of people [9], [10]e. Ultimately, it is unclear how having a preference, interest, or want relates to having something one "ought" to pursue. Therefore, it is unclear why "I ought to prefer it" follows from having a preference. In conclusion, utility is mostly meaningless, with the exception of extremely basic bureaucratic functions, despite its ominous presence in many discussions about justice and rights.

CONCLUSION

This study navigates the intricate landscape of distributive justice theories, contrasting desert-oriented and non-desert principles. It sheds light on the diverse applications of the "moral worth" principle, highlighting the tension between personhood prerequisites and self-determination in distribution. The examination of rationalist perspectives, exemplified by Gauthier's justice as mutual advantage, offers insights into the challenges and limitations of methodological individualism. The critique of utilitarianism reveals its conceptual ambiguities and lack of substantive accounts of justice or rights. The study prompts reflection on the practicality and meaningfulness of utility in capturing the intricacies of human desires, interests, and preferences. Overall, this exploration contributes to the ongoing discourse on distributive justice, emphasizing the need for nuanced approaches that consider both empirical needs and rational cooperation in shaping societal structures.

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