Theories of Political Change and Development

Mukesh Kumar Pandey

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ALEXIS PRESS

Published by: Alexis Press, LLC, Jersey City, USA
www.alexispress.us

First Published 2023

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Theories of Political Change and Development by *Mukesh Kumar Pandey*

ISBN 979-8-89161-751-3

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CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE THIRD WORLD: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, AND IDEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS

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ABSTRACT:

This study explores the role of political parties in organizing and managing support in various contexts, particularly in the Third World. It delves into the multifaceted goals of political parties, ranging from preserving the status quo to pursuing revolutionary change, and examines their strategies for mobilizing the general public. The study also analyzes the functions of political parties in emerging nations, including providing legitimacy to governments, serving as conduits for political recruitment and social mobility, and aggregating interests to form coalitions. Additionally, it investigates the influence of political parties on political socialization, public policy, and social expenditures, particularly in addressing issues such as poverty.

The study categorizes political parties based on organizational, ideological, and functional classifications, and explores how party structures evolve and endure in different political systems. Furthermore, it examines the emergence and characteristics of single-party systems in the Third World, considering factors such as historical legacies, authoritarianism, statism, and nationalist ideologies. The study concludes that political parties play a crucial role in shaping political stability, national integration, and development in the Third World, while acknowledging the challenges and complexities inherent in their structures and functions.

KEYWORDS:

Ideological, Political, Political Parties, Public Policy, Social.

INTRODUCTION

A party may use repressive or ideological tactics to organize and manage support, but it must be controlled in order to seize power and ensure the validity of constitutional office. Parties may have many different goals, such as preserving the status quo or pursuing revolutionary change, but they all need to mobilize the general public. Parties support calls for more political involvement and assist in managing the inevitable conflict that results from such widespread political engagement via a variety of strategies, such as patronage and repression. Because they improve a society's ability to handle crises of integration, participation, and distribution, political parties both contribute to and are a result of political change.

It is difficult to define a political party, particularly in the Third World due to the wide range of views that exist. Coleman and Rosberg's definition, which reads as follows, is adequate: associations that are formally organized with the express and stated goal of obtaining and/or retaining legal control over the personnel and policies of the government of an actual or potential sovereign state, either alone or in coalition with other associations of a similar nature or through electoral competition. It is simpler to categorize Third World parties' actions than to provide a definition that would include all of their incarnations. Classification is also less complicated than explaining changes in the structure and party system—two topics to be

covered later. Political science has traditionally used three primary classifications: organizational, ideological, and functional. Combinations of these elements have also resulted in the formation of typologies.

Political parties' function

In emerging nations, political parties serve a variety of purposes. First, they may provide governments legitimacy in certain situations by offering leadership, ideas, or chances for political engagement—or a mix of all three. Through the facilitation of a peaceful transition of power within a competitive party system, they validate the legitimacy of a government established on the basis of broad involvement and representation. Parties allow a certain amount of power rotation among the various élites they support in competitive conditions.

Second, they may serve as a conduit for political recruiting while also generating chances for social mobility upward. Political parties provide the most significant civilian path into a career in politics in developing nations. Parties have a distinct sort of recruiting function within certain ideological frameworks. In an effort to augment government actions in situations of severe resource shortage, they organize individuals into community-based self-help projects. This kind of mobilization is often linked to the socialization role discussed below, when local party organizations work to disseminate the party's ideology among the general public. Thirdly, parties provide chances for powerful political interests to come together and build coalitions that support a government. This is the role of parties known as "interest aggregation," as defined by functionalists. It is particularly significant in competitive systems as the formation of legislative and electoral majorities requires the enlargement of political support. If political parties are able to garner support from areas where people have a stronger affinity than the nation-state, they may aid in the process of political unification. Regionally or ethnically based political mobilization has the potential to be so devastating in Nigeria that political parties are legally obligated to recruit members from all across the nation. This suggests that parties may, in some situations, obstruct political unification by focusing mostly on ethnic and regional concerns [1], [2].

Parties also serve as the means via which the public, if they are compelled to run for office through the voting booth, and associated groups representing particular interests like women, youth, or trade unions, exert upward pressure on them. Certain political parties have served to represent traditional oligarchies. In certain regions of West Africa, for instance, traditionalists have modified the contemporary party system to suit their own political goals. In a system of government where each individual is granted one vote, even a republic must have broad popular support. Its ability to capitalize on the customs of innately submissive civilizations within the broader framework of more equal values is one of its advantages. The demands of the professional classes—such as educators, attorneys, and lower-level officials—have served as the foundation for other parties. A related defining criterion that restricts participation and transcends economic and vocational interests is often ethnicity.

Parties also play a role in political socialization, influencing the opinions of both the general public and party members on issues like national identity, economic management, and the legitimacy of the government. Theoretically, political parties ought to have a significant impact on public policy as well, either by creating initiatives that draw a viable coalition of interests or by applying official doctrine to pressing issues. Parties have historically had little influence on public policy in Third World nations and, even less often, have effectively supervised the execution of policies. Nonetheless, there is mounting evidence that parties have an impact on policy outcomes, particularly in recently democratizing polities. Parties, for instance, are essential to plans aimed at empowering the impoverished to end poverty. Experience in a few

Indian states and some Latin American countries strongly suggests that the ability to elect pro-poor parties to office has a substantial impact on the effectiveness of public policies intended to reduce poverty, particularly if the parties are united rather than divided and have a cogent platform [3], [4].

Party system type also has a role in explaining whether or not governments would prioritize social expenditures on the underprivileged. Policies aimed at alleviating poverty are unlikely to be started by party systems that let leaders to hold power despite having a small margin of support in elections. Politicians like those in Costa Rica and Sri Lanka, which have stable party systems and few parties, aim to form wide political coalitions, including connections with non-governmental organizations that support the impoverished. Parties in fragmented democracies—like Brazil and Thailand—respond to limited interests, a lack of incentives to implement programs aimed at reducing poverty, and the vetoes of coalition partners. These conditions result in unstable support for numerous parties that prioritize individual leadership over programs. Even elected authoritarian regimes with regular elections—like those in Mexico and Indonesia, where there is essentially a one-party system—have an incentive to address the needs of the impoverished in rural areas if they face challenges from pro-poor opposition movements, declining support from the urban population, challenges to their legitimacy as a developmental regime, or calls for democratization. But rather than promoting empowerment, these programs also have a higher likelihood of serving as social control tools.

DISCUSSION

Political parties are now considered essential for maintaining political stability. Huntington's remark on this connection is the most direct. According to him, a society's capacity to accommodate the rising degree of political engagement by the new social forces brought out by modernization is what determines its stability. Especially if the parties are established before the amount of involvement becomes too high, they provide the primary institutional means of arranging such engagement in positive and legal ways. Strong party structure together with high membership rates provide protection against violent and anomic politics. Political parties that are too weak, for example, raise the possibility of military involvement. Therefore, "the strength of a modernizing political system's political parties determines that system's stability." Conversely, a party is powerful if it has institutionalized broad support.

Party doctrine

Third World parties' ideologies have inevitably come to resemble those of their First and Second World equivalents, given their appeal to specific class interests. Western philosophies have been modified to improve national cohesion and provide a shared set of values for very diverse countries. For these purposes, both socialism and communism have been used in the Third World. However, they have been modified for the specific situation in which they are meant to serve as a directive. There have been variants created, such as Tanzania's African socialism, which aims to include both European concepts of equality and indigenous community values. Chinese Marxism-Leninism evolved with unique characteristics of its own.

Political parties most obviously reflect class interests in their ideological positions when capitalism has grown over an extended period of time, as in the comparatively long post-independence histories of Latin American nations. In Argentina, Colombia, and Equador, landlord coalitions and the Catholic Church back conservative political parties. Urban business interest alliances provide support to liberal parties. They compete with socialist and communist parties for the support of laborers and peasants. At some point, Latin American politics have included representatives of the majority of European ideas. Ideological advances and the political formations that sprang from them, however, have been unique in many significant

ways across the majority of the Third World. First, rather than being primarily based on the materialistic Western ideas that were predicted to gain traction in many post-colonial cultures, Third World political parties often draw their ideological foundations from religion. The Islamic party in Libya, the Muslim party in Indonesia, and the Hindu communal groups in India are a few examples. In many Third World countries, the rise of Islamic political beliefs is becoming more and more prominent.

Second, several parties have emerged to protect the unique lifestyles of various ethnic groups, such as Malaysia's Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Rather than being a reflection of class interests, ideologies reflect the culture of these unique communities. In India, caste may serve as the basis for a political party, as seen by the Dalits Party, which advocates for the Untouchables. After winning state elections in 1993, this party joined the coalition administration in Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state in India. The party wants to advance social justice for the most marginalized and downtrodden citizens of India. Given that 40% of Indians are from lower castes, this might be a very consequential political development. However, in other places, particularly in Africa, political parties' propensity to reflect ethnicity and regional consciousness rather than national identities that bridge such divides and bring people together have been blamed for both their own weakness and the weakness of governments that rely on this kind of party rivalry.

Thirdly, populist political groups are common in the Third World. This is not a philosophy, but a leadership style. Its goal is to organize people without regard to class by downplaying the importance of class and any ideology based on class. The goal of populism is to unite diverse interests around a single national interest paradigm. It disavows the notion that conflicting interests exist amongst organizations. Political figures like Guinea's Sékou Touré asserted that despite social divisions based on profession, age, and other factors, all of their communities had a common interest that was served by a certain party and its leadership. The way society is portrayed is as "cellularized," with groups of people who share interests that are greater than their unique and often contradictory ones—be they young or elderly, men or women, producers or consumers, peasants or urbanites, bureaucrats or customers.

Therefore, populism is a means of promoting a social vision that prioritizes homogeneity above variety. Populist parties and leaders describe special interests in ways that make them eventually reconcilable in order to appeal to all societal interests. When at all feasible, issues that are contentious or linked to specific interests are avoided. It is the express purpose of leaders to keep people from becoming aware of their competing interests. The strategies include articulating conflicting policy goals incoherently and garnering support based on benefits rather than ideological commitment. Since populism aims to stop the emergence of alternative viewpoints to the current quo, it is inherently conservative [5], [6].

It is not believed that social variety prevents people from identifying a more significant shared interest. This image of the political world was somewhat supported in certain nations by the post-colonial social structures, particularly in those where economic underdevelopments had prevented classes from completely developing and the world seemed to be free of important class disparities. India's Congress has to be among the most prosperous populist parties. Support for it comes from a wide range of social groups, whose goals may not seem to mesh. It has shown the ability to forge an alliance across various socioeconomic structures, including those seen in rural and urban regions, even when these strata are topped with linguistic, ethnic, communal, and religious distinctions. The examination of Third World parties has been dominated by two themes. One has to do with how party systems evolve and endure, especially the rise of one-party regimes. The other is about the parties' ability to continue as institutions.

Party structures

Based on a mix of organizational, participatory, and ideological factors, Coleman and Rosberg created a typology of parties in response to observations made in the early 1960s on the propensity for single-party systems to arise in Africa. They were able to compare a "revolutionary-centralizing" pattern with a "pragmatic pluralist" pattern as a result. Parties that were pragmatic pluralists were those who, for the most part, accepted the continuation of conventional politics, made sporadic and only partly attempts to garner support, and integrated group interests to a limited degree. On the other hand, modernizing ideologies were promoted by revolutionary-centralizing parties, who also established monolithic and centralized structures and showed a strong commitment to popular political participation. The degree of success attained by African nations in resolving the issue of national integration both in the sense of "crossing the élite-mass gap" and in the sense of geographical integration was explained by this categorization.

Nevertheless, particularly under a one-party system of government, it was challenging to distinguish between defining political integration as a function that parties may carry out and developing a theory of effective political integration. The most Coleman and Rosberg could do was to say, "In all but a few of Africa's new states the national political party, the single or dominant party currently governing the state, is the primary structure... for coping with the myriad parochial and ethnic pressures." LaPalombara and Weiner categorize political parties in emerging nations using a similar mix of ideology and regime. They make a distinction between systems that are competitive and those that are not, followed by two dimensions that show how different parties are within each system. Large and/or ethnically divided nations like India, Nigeria, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka are linked to competitive systems. One aspect of such a system might be described as "hegemonic," in which a single party rules for an extended period of time, or as "turnover," in which the party in power changes often. The second component makes a distinction between pragmatic and ideological parties and speaks about the parties themselves as opposed to governments.

Insofar as "the particular combination of hegemony or turnover, ideology or pragmatism that a party pattern manifests may tell us something about how the parties relate to social, economic, and political development," it is hoped that this typology will have theoretical significance. If one was concerned in how well parties handled conflict, the typology was also helpful: "In competitive systems, the pragmatic–turnover or pragmatic–hegemonic systems are more able to cope with conflicts than the ideological–hegemonic and ideological–turnover systems." Another theory put out is that parties with strong ideological stances are likely to lead any push for hegemonic rule.

In a non-competitive system, party control is more likely to be hegemonic than "turnover" by definition. There are three primary kinds of single-party systems that result from the combination of the ideological variable and hegemonic party systems. Opposition is seen as a danger to revolutionary or patriotic goals under a one-party authoritarian society. Like in the case of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, the one-party pluralist system is typified by a pragmatic ideology and a pluralistic party structure. As in China, Vietnam, and North Korea, a one-party totalitarian government uses the state as a weapon of the party whose goal is social and economic transformation [5], [7].

Systems with only one party

Party systems in the Third World have sometimes mirrored those in the West, providing a certain level of electoral choice, a platform for genuine political opposition, and responsibility to the interests that backed them in the election. Others have echoed the democratic centralism

of the Eastern Bloc and the former Soviet Union. However, the Third World has created significant variations of its own, chief among which is the single-party system within the framework of parliamentary government and capitalist economy, as seen in Kenya up until 1991. Certain nations, like India, have maintained multi-party politics largely unaltered since gaining their independence. It has sometimes surfaced in other places, such as Nigeria. In the context of capitalism, one-party systems demonstrate that, rather than ensuring liberal democracy, these systems often need its denial. It was assumed that parties would emerge as the primary institutions for the political mobilization of various societal segments, bringing disparate interests together to form coalitions that could form majorities, maintain governments, and allow for the regular changing of governments as independent states with institutions rooted in Western models of governance came into being. Many people believe that this alternation is essential to a contemporary democracy. Parties rooted in nationalist movements that battled for independence had emerged as part of the political evolution of the pre- and post-colonial period. One well-known example of an organization having a lengthy pre-independence history is the Indian Congress. Especially in Africa, where nationalist groups often represented many tribal groupings, each with its own ideals about the end of colonialism, multiple nationalist movements evolved to become political parties in certain colonies. This provided more evidence in favor of the theory that multi-party forms of governance originated here.

Thus, single-party systems of governance emerged as a marked divergence from what the framers of the constitution had anticipated on the eve of independence. As such, a great deal of work has gone into finding plausible reasons for what were often thought to be anomalies in the typical developmental trajectory. First, it has been suggested that a solitary nationalist organization's "aura of nationalist legitimacy" at the time of independence a consequence of being seen as the conqueror of imperialism led to resounding electoral support. An accomplishment of this kind was seen as proof that the group could keep representing the shared interests of all societal segments. A single-party state is formed both de jure and de facto as a result of the dominant party's ability to impose laws prohibiting the existence of other parties due to popular support. While not all one-party governments exclude other parties, it has been fairly usual for them to erect barriers beyond the legal system to prevent effectively organized opposition. Taking over the media has shown to be one of the best strategies for preventing opposition parties from operating.

Second, it was said that the one-party system of governance reflected the authoritarian system that the new state inherited from both colonialism and traditional government. Multi-party democracy and pluralism are modern concepts. Instead, the prevailing feature of political history is authoritarianism. Coleman and Rosberg contended that the autocratic authority of the departing colonialists, bolstered, in the case of African societies at least, by elements inclined toward more authoritarian forms of government, had created the conditions that party leaders faced upon independence. For multi-party democracy to endure in the local political culture, customs, and history, it was an alien import. The colonial legacy—which included a centralized administrative infrastructure, paternalism, and electoral systems—combined with ideas of tradition and what was suitable for society to provide unrestricted power to a party that may not have received a majority of the votes. In situations when the legacy was distinct, there was a greater likelihood of survival for many parties [8], [9].

Thirdly, the government was seen as having exclusive authority and knowledge, contributing to the élitist political culture of the new indigenous leadership. It was hard to argue against this assertion since there were few, if any, other social or political groups that could match the expert knowledge concentration found in government. Fourth, there was a statist culture inside

the leadership. It was believed that the state was the modernizer and development agent. Multi-party democracy was often seen as an expensive luxury. Discontinuities in the pursuit of public aims were considered an indulgence due to the enormous issues that the administrations of newly formed nations were faced with. Research, however, has not produced data that consistently bolsters the argument that policy results, such social equality and economic development, are better when there is no party rivalry.

Additionally, the leadership was nationalist, seeing national unity as the most important objective and denouncing any sub-national sympathy for a tribe, religion, area, or other political hotspots as detrimental to national integration. Certainly, many separatist sentiments were encouraged by political leaders in the newly formed republics. The appeal of the single-party system stemmed from the need for political order. Certain political scientists from the West spoke positively, descriptively, and analytically about one-party regimes. Huntington observed that communist countries were more successful in establishing political order, attributing this to their emphasis on "the conscious act of political organization." Political stability might be threatened by modernizing societal forces that could be assimilated by a powerful party. Huntington was unable to locate a stable multiparty system in any nation that was modernizing. Parties in a multi-party system did not seem to be as effective as single parties in institutionalizing and regularizing political rivalry and conflict.

The fact that political office is not easily given up, especially in Third World countries, is another consideration. There must always be a temptation to manage politics in order to eliminate the organized opposition since the benefits of holding public office in an underdeveloped country are so tremendous. Even while corruption is a big issue, this goes beyond that. The issue lies in the fact that those who want to gain socially and economically from this progress must maintain control over the state, which serves as the primary driver of economic growth. It is impossible for a rising bourgeoisie to turn to alternative funding sources. All forms of business, trade, and production rely on money flowing via the government, which also manages licenses, labor laws, foreign currency availability, import licenses, and export permissions. Any party that wants to amass financial riches must take control of the state as an entity. Both political careers and political power have enormous benefits that opponents do not take lightly.

Additionally, it was thought that many parties were unnecessary in certain Third World societies due to their classlessness. For instance, there were many ethnic groups that were about balanced in Tanzanian culture, and there was little to no significant social or economic inequality. Therefore, it was considered that too much homogeneity existed for several parties to adequately represent interests. Not every newly formed state was founded with the goal of gaining independence in the style of the constitutions of Western Europe. Different preparations were made for independence in Algeria, Indo-China, Angola, and Mozambique. The philosophy of Marxist-Leninists has had an impact. Such an ideology links the party with the state and the country, maybe stemming from the mobilization for a liberation war. By definition, everything that is against the party or outside of it is almost treasonous. In the context of post-war civilian politics, an organization created with the express purpose of waging war would naturally tend to take the lead in politics.

Apparently democratic elements within certain sole parties helped to ease the acceptance of one-party rule. Some parties seemed to be able to maintain democratic decision-making inside the party to the extent necessary to make up for the absence of options. Perhaps the amount of debate about alternatives in intra-party democracy might be equal to or less than that in inter-party democracy. Tanzania is often used as an example. Tanzania's only legitimate political party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, was democratically run under its one-party rule. Delegates to

the national executive council, which chose the central committee, were chosen by the national conference. The party chose two candidates for each seat in the parliamentary elections, sometimes from a big pool of nominations (85 in one constituency in 1990, for instance). In a meticulously controlled campaign, seats were hotly fought. It was not unusual for incumbents to lose, even ministers [10], [11].

As a result, some Third World political leaders asserted not without some justification that the policy options presented by, say, Democrats and Republicans in the USA were no better than the decisions made between the candidates that those parties sponsored in parliamentary elections and within the mass organizations of single parties. Various groups within a same party may also run for public office. Ultimately, as several newly independent nations gained their independence, the political leadership said that traditional societies already had democratic decision-making mechanisms that could be modified to fit modern circumstances, negating the necessity for multiple political parties. Leaders like Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania said that equality, unity, and consensus were the foundation of traditional African decision-making; nevertheless, historical study has cast considerable doubt on these statements. There was a sense in which fundamental political democracy operated in pre-colonial African village communities. The choices would be made by the tribe elders, but they would represent the consensus. Rather than being Gesellschaft, these communities matched Tönnies Gemeinschaft. Perhaps the argument that political leaders had to break from the institutions and ideals of the colonists is a stronger justification for the nostalgia for a pre-colonial Golden Age.

When it is acknowledged that Third World countries lacked the two essential conditions political and economic that preceded liberal revolutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the West the availability of capitalist enterprise, finance, and skills, and a loyalty to the nation rather than an ethnic community the development of an alternative form of democracy to that of Western liberalism appears even more natural. Therefore, "a painful, long period of accumulation of capital and of productive skill" was to be anticipated. It is necessary to awaken a pre-political or pre-national population to political and national awareness. This emphasizes the importance of mass movements led by influential ideologies. There have been a few noteworthy exceptions to the general trend of one-party regimes. Senegal chose to go back to a two-party system in 1983 after quickly gaining independence from France and becoming a one-party state under the charismatic leadership of Leopold Senghor [12], [13]. Such reversals have been promoted more lately by democratic movements and foreign pressures. The only nation whose political leadership has recently attempted to defend a shift away from a multi-party system is Zimbabwe.

CONCLUSION

This study underscores the vital importance of political parties in the political landscape of the Third World, highlighting their diverse roles and functions in organizing support, legitimizing governments, and shaping public policy. Through a comprehensive analysis of party structures, ideologies, and historical contexts, the study elucidates the complex dynamics that underpin political party systems in emerging nations. Despite the challenges posed by single-party regimes and authoritarian tendencies, the study acknowledges instances of democratic resilience and the potential for transitions towards multi-party systems. It emphasizes the need for inclusive political processes, social mobilization, and institutional reforms to address the underlying socio-economic inequalities and promote political stability and development. Ultimately, the study underscores the centrality of political parties in navigating the complexities of governance and ensuring the effective representation of diverse societal interests in the Third World.

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CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL TURBULENCE: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS

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ABSTRACT:

This study delves into the intricate political landscape of Third World nations, with a specific focus on the pivotal role played by political parties. These parties serve as linchpins of political mobilization within the context of mass politics, marking a significant departure from historically entrenched oligarchic or hereditary elite rule. The emergence and evolution of political parties reflect a fundamental shift in governance dynamics, wherein the support or mobilization of the masses becomes instrumental in shaping the political landscape, regardless of the specific nature of the civilian regime in place. By examining the multifaceted roles and functions of political parties within Third World contexts, this study illuminates the complex interplay between societal dynamics, governmental structures, and ideological orientations. From their origins as vehicles of nationalist movements to their role in shaping post-colonial governance structures, political parties have exerted profound influence on the trajectory of political development in these nations. Moreover, this study explores the nexus between political parties, political stability, and the consolidation of democracy. It investigates how political instability, often associated with the breakdown of party politics, can precipitate military intervention and disrupt democratic processes. By analyzing the mechanisms and consequences of political instability, military involvement, and democratization efforts, this study aims to offer valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing Third World societies in their quest for sustainable governance and democratic consolidation.

KEYWORDS:

Democratic, Governance, Instability, Political, Political Parties.

INTRODUCTION

This study explores the political landscape of Third World nations, focusing particularly on the role of political parties, which stand as the cornerstone of political mobilization in the realm of mass politics. The emergence and significance of political parties underscore a profound shift in governance dynamics, signifying a departure from exclusive oligarchic or hereditary elite rule towards a system wherein the support or mobilization of the masses plays a pivotal role, irrespective of the specific nature of the civilian regime in place. This inclusive perspective encompasses regimes grounded in the principles of liberal parliamentary democracy, as well as those characterized by monopolistic forms of political leadership or interpretations of Marxism-Leninism.

Political parties, therefore, come to the forefront whenever the notion of 'participation or control of the masses' becomes integral to the concept of political power. Their emergence and evolution serve as a barometer of the evolving political landscape, reflecting the shifting power dynamics and the changing aspirations of diverse societies across the Third World. In essence, political parties act as conduits through which the aspirations, interests, and demands of the broader populace find expression within the political sphere, shaping the course of governance

and policy-making. By examining the multifaceted roles and functions of political parties within Third World contexts, this chapter seeks to illuminate the complex interplay between societal dynamics, governmental structures, and ideological orientations. From their inception as vehicles of nationalist movements to their role in shaping post-colonial governance structures, political parties have played a pivotal role in defining the trajectory of political development in these nations [1], [2].

Furthermore, the study of political parties offers insights into the mechanisms of power consolidation and distribution, as well as the strategies employed by various regimes to navigate the complexities of mass politics. Whether in the context of competitive multiparty systems or single-party rule, political parties serve as crucial instruments through which rulers seek to legitimize their authority, consolidate support, and manage dissent. Thus, by exploring the rich tapestry of political party dynamics in Third World nations, this chapter endeavors to shed light on the complexities of governance, the challenges of democratic consolidation, and the enduring quest for political stability and legitimacy amidst diverse socio-political landscapes.

The question of the durability of representative politics and the efficacy of party administration is intrinsically tied to broader discussions surrounding political stability and the consolidation of democracy. Political instability, often perceived as a pressing concern, is frequently attributed to the erosion or breakdown of party politics, particularly in its competitive manifestation. Consequently, the discourse surrounding political instability in the Third World often revolves around the phenomenon of civilian governance, founded upon a party system, being supplanted by military intervention. It is unsurprising, therefore, that much scholarly attention has been directed towards analyzing the mechanisms and consequences of political instability in Third World contexts, with a specific focus on the military's intervention in governance. Subsequent chapters will delve into the intricacies of military involvement in politics, the dynamics of political stability, and the ongoing democratization processes within these nations.

By examining the interplay between party politics, military intervention, and the broader quest for political stability and democratic governance, we can gain valuable insights into the underlying challenges and opportunities facing Third World societies. Moreover, understanding the complex relationship between these factors is essential for formulating effective strategies aimed at promoting institutional resilience, fostering democratic consolidation, and mitigating the risk of political upheaval. Through rigorous analysis and empirical investigation, we can elucidate the underlying dynamics driving political instability and delineate pathways towards sustainable democratic governance. In doing so, we contribute to the scholarly discourse on Third World politics and offer practical insights for policymakers and practitioners seeking to navigate the complexities of governance in diverse socio-political contexts.

Party government's downfall

A more concerning trend has been the complete breakdown of party and parliamentary politics in the face of political crises. Military systems have often replaced party systems. Regarding the political stability that they were able to establish, single-party and multi-party systems seem to have performed about the same poorly. It is difficult to identify any trends in the breakdown of party systems. Single-party systems may endure for a while, as in Tanzania or Kenya, or they might fall victim to military takeovers, as in Ghana. While multi-party systems have sometimes endured—most notably in India—they have not done so elsewhere. Ten of the fifteen multiparty nations in Africa have seen military involvement between 1960 and 1969.

Eleven of the 20 one-party republics have experienced coups. It is not shocking that some pundits began to dismiss party systems in general as complete failures. The prevalent denial of the political importance of Third World parties reflects this. However, party governance has endured for a very long period in several nations. Certain party systems in the Third World have lasted longer than those in Eastern Europe. There is no lack of nations with protracted party systems of governance.

There are other instances when the military has helped restore political parties, although in order to justify the military's involvement in politics. There are no clear-cut reasons why party government persists. Economic growth does not ensure the survival of party systems, despite the World Bank's 1989 observation that the most prosperous African nations were parliamentary democracies. Economic growth is thought to boost prosperity and, consequently, a sense of satisfaction with the regime.

The Gambia, which enjoyed multi-party democracy since gaining independence in 1965 despite having a GNP per capita of just US$240 and an average life expectancy of 43 years in 1989, but which was overthrown by the military in 1994, was considered as providing support for this conclusion. An alternative theory is that social structure might explain why competitive politics tend to thrive better on class stratification than on vertical divisions along racial, linguistic, or religious lines. However, there doesn't seem to be a systematic relationship between party politics and socioeconomic characteristics like class and associated stratification indicators like urbanization and literacy [3], [4].

Explaining differences across party systems is easier than explaining why a party system remains stable. The latter is explained by factors such as colonialism's legacy, the length of time it takes for parties to establish themselves, and whether independence was achieved through negotiation or war, with the former producing the "party-army" of national liberation movements like the FLN in Algeria, which struggled mightily to become a civilian political movement after the French withdrew. Some nationalist groups have been able to negotiate the end of colonialism rather than resort to armed conflict; these movements do not all have a history of guerrilla warfare. Foreign effects must be added to these aspects. Aid providers have expanded the list of requirements for international development aid to include political pluralism, "good governance," democracy, and respect for human rights. For instance, during the sixteenth Franco-African Congress in 1990, French President Mitterrand issued a warning to African leaders, saying, "France will link its contribution to efforts designed to lead to greater liberty and democracy." The British Minister for Overseas Development said in 1991 that recipient countries would have to advance pluralism, the rule of law, democracy, and respect for human rights in order to qualify for British assistance.

DISCUSSION

The demands for "good government" in exchange for help have increased thanks to the efforts of multilateral aid organizations like the World Bank. There has been considerable variation in the interpretation of "good governance" as a prerequisite for both bilateral and multilateral aid. Early in the 1990s, these pressures were compounded by the impact of the historic events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on internal political groupings calling for political changes, chief among them the overthrow of the one-party system.

As a result, some nations have seen the emergence of competitive party politics; they include Nepal, Angola, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Zambia. However, there has been a lot of opposition to multipartyism. The danger of tribal factionalism, the need of focusing on economic growth, and the populace's lack of preparation for democracy are still used to support the one-party regime.

Democratic systems and party structures

Political parties have played a crucial role in the democratic process, as shown by their enormous prominence. The establishment of structured parties and party systems of governance is necessary for democracy to succeed. Most people agree that the establishment of regular election competition between parties that can adjust to new constitutional provisions is a necessary prerequisite for the development of democracy. Parties, which mostly resembled social movements, have also been essential to the resistance against authoritarian authority. When electoral rivalry is established, these political groups must "institutionalize" themselves. Mainwaring and Scully created the notion of "institutionalization" of party systems by comparing chances for democratic consolidation in various Latin American nations using data.

The party competition rules are generally known, regularly followed, and confidently expected; The number of parties vying for office is stable. Parties have a solid social foundation, influence political choices, garner consistent electoral support, and exhibit ideological stability; Political elites acknowledge that electoral competition is a legitimate means of gaining power. Party organizations function autonomously from influential individuals, with robust national resources and well-established internal recruiting procedures for party positions. Party systems are more institutionalized the more these characteristics they share. The system is more "inchoate" the fewer the attributes. The democratization of Latin America lends credence to the idea that institutionalized systems promote compromise, coalition building, and moderation, whereas "inchoate" systems put democracy at risk from personalism, complex legislatures, unpredictable governance, and difficulties establishing legitimacy. Party organizers have a stake in maintaining party rivalry in institutionalized party systems because party discipline ensures successful governance. Parties are supported by the public instead of demagogues. Elections are used to pursue interests while policies and programs are contrasted and evaluated. It is easier to arbitrate and handle conflicts. Only democratic systems allow for political competition, and political accountability works. Consent and participation may be directed.

It would appear that the establishment of an established party system is a prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy, even if it may not be a sufficient one. However, in the "third wave" of democracy, party structures in developing nations are often rudimentary. As a result, personalism, a lack of responsibility, electoral instability, unpredictability, and most importantly for the consolidation of democracy low legitimacy assigned to parties and party structures characterize their democracies. Kuenzi and Lambright conducted research on the consequences of party system institutionalization in Africa and found that although there was considerable variance in the extent of institutionalization, most of the continent's nations were classified as "inchoate." They also discovered evidence of a positive feedback loop: institutionalized party systems are a "necessity for democratic government," but the degree of institutionalization of party systems increases with a nation's degree of democratic experience. The number of parties in the system has been the subject of another discussion about party systems and democracy, which contrasts the stability of two-party rivalry with that of a multi-party system. It is believed that multi-party systems are less stable [5], [6].

For example, Huntington projected that two-party and dominant-party systems would, over time, be more likely to generate political stability than single- or multi-party systems because they offer a form of party competition that is better at integrating new groups into the political system. Without coercion and consequent instability, single parties find it challenging to accommodate the new social and economic interests brought about by modernization. The two-party system "most effectively institutionalizes and moderates the polarization which gives rise to the development of party politics in the first place," meaning that adding more parties is the

only way to incorporate new social forces into politics in a multi-party system. On the other hand, there is a different perspective that claims that favoring a two-party system is a reflection of Anglo-American and Eurocentric biases, that governmental instability is mistaken for regime instability, and that party politics is dominated by a single Left-Right dimension, when in Third World countries, other dimensions of conflict, like ethnicity and religion, are superimposed. A variety of parties allows for the representation of various viewpoints, promoting legitimate political engagement and lowering the motivation for using violence in politics. Although a comparative study of Third World democracy revealed only "weak and fragmentary" evidence for the theory that democratic consolidation was more probable under a multi-party system than a two-party one, this topic is still unsettled. This is noteworthy given the tendency for nations that emerge from autocracy to have a wide variety of political parties. For instance, the 850,000-person tiny state of East Timor has fragmented into no less than 16 parties since gaining independence from Indonesian control, and these parties ran in the assembly's first elections for 88 seats.

Parties' ability to continue existing as groups

We have seen that the power of parties as organizations has played a role in the institutionalization of party systems of governance. Strong parties are flexible, sophisticated, self-sufficient, and logical. Stockton discovered that institutionalized party systems and powerful parties are necessary for democracy in his comparison of Korea, Taiwan, and twelve Latin American nations. As a result, parties' enduring organizational traits are now a subject of scientific inquiry. This is a very challenging undertaking since it is difficult to determine if a party's actions regarding its internal structure are essential to its long-term survival. Early in the 1960s, research on parties in French-speaking West Africa led to R. S. Morgenthau to differentiate between "patron" and "mass" celebrations. This distinction which was "less neat in fact than in definition" showed variations in terms of procedures, patterns of authority, organizational structure, membership numbers, finances, and functions. Each of these organizational characteristics demonstrated how party officials interacted with the general public. While patron parties like Niger's Union Nigerienne "usually terminated their structure simply with the adherence of influential notables or patrons," mass parties like the Democratic Parties of the Ivory Coast and Guinea and the Union Soudanaise sought the allegiance of people. Patron parties lacked discipline, were poorly run, and had low levels of direct membership engagement. To reach the local community, one may rely on local customers. "Only to the extent that he happened to be included in the franchise, provided candidates for election, and the minimal machinery for bringing the voter to the polls" was the person of interest to patron parties. In contrast, mass parties had large structures, served as a means of "social integration" via mass membership, and showed interest in all facets of its members' life, not just their political preferences. Thus, a large membership base is necessary for organizational strength. The more a party can institutionalize broad support and grow into a sophisticated organization connected to socioeconomic entities like labor unions, the more powerful it becomes.

It seems that ensuring survival calls for a complex internal mechanism to energize society and infiltrate it via widespread participation in both local and national organizations. The party will then find it simpler to establish a feeling of national legitimacy. It turns become a more effective tool for political recruiting. One theory for parties' survival is because they have strong grassroots support. Parties that have merely established lines of communication and coercion from the leadership to the people, rather than establishing a mechanism for conveying interests, views, and requirements upwards to the policy-making élite, have found it difficult to survive. Beyond organizational form, a local organization has a comprehensive strategy for

managing the economy and society in addition to political indoctrination, control, and education. Establishing and disseminating an ideology is essential to establishing credibility. A wide variety of interests must be represented in the party leadership for the organization to survive. In Zambia, for instance, the United National Independence Party was effective in elevating a diverse variety of socioeconomic elites to positions of leadership. A membership that is balanced is also required. Professional expertise in many policy sectors must be matched with activists who maintain the organization via membership drives, fundraising, candidate selection, voter mobilization, and party debates. Additionally, a balance has to be struck between party activists and nominal members as well as between collegial leadership and the readiness to fire leaders who are out of touch with the voters and members. Achieving a balance between the open membership policy that welcomes anyone who shares the party's beliefs and goals and the restricted access policy is necessary to prevent the party from being influenced by special interests that could reduce its appeal to voters and to guarantee the party's ability to act effectively in both government and opposition [7], [8].

It is also necessary for leaders to identify with the party instead of utilizing it as a vehicle to hold position elsewhere, like the government bureaucracy. In this passage, Huntington talks about the damage that occurs to political parties when talented individuals leave to join other factions. He does not dispute that political parties ought to run for office in order to represent their leaders when they run for executive, legislative, and other state offices where hiring decisions are made by ballot.

The constancy of a party's leadership succession policies, discipline, internal organizational patterns, mass mobilization techniques, and ideological stance all contribute to the organization's strength. There is also a requirement for substantial financial and personnel resources, including professional staff, as well as autonomy from the "founding personalities." Prosperity and institutional independence, which includes releasing the party from military or civil bureaucratic rule, are crucial aspects of Third World political organizations. It should be mentioned that the Indian Congress Party seems to be the exception to this rule, with significant bureaucratic penetration.

Clientelism and factionalism

The distribution of patronage, the distribution of state resources, and the distribution of jobs in the military and bureaucracy have often determined the strength of party organization in the Third World. A political party's ability to continue operating may depend on how incentives are distributed to members and customers on an individual basis. However, factionalism—a practice wherein disparate interests within parties are often expressed—may have a wide range of effects on how long political parties can last. The informal facets of party organization are referred to as factionalism. It is an unavoidable byproduct of coalitions and alliances formed by leaders and followers with no shared ideology but a goal of winning over voters. Faction leaders and their followers have relationships that are shaped by several social and economic factors, including cultural allegiances, other conventional duties, and feudalistic tenure systems. As an alternative, the factional connection might be linguistic, caste-based, or tribal.

One expression of a more fun- damental aspect of Third World politics, notably clientelism, is factionalism within political parties. Patron-client relationships are a reflection of the interdependencies that exist between those in positions of political and economic authority and others who depend on them for security and the fulfillment of their obligations in exchange for political support, gifts, personal services, loyalty, and reverence. Even though it expresses interdependency, capitalism is fundamentally an unequal form of political exchange in a world

where citizenship and equality are, at most, constitutional formalities and lower classes endure discrimination and material and political inequality, particularly at the hands of state officials. It concerns the dynamic between the strong and the weak. When parties need the backing of many ethnic, regional, and personal groups, clientelism seems to be a reasonable way for individuals to behave. Nine "core analytical characteristics" of the social interactions and exchanges involved in patron-client relations are identified by Eisenstadt and Roniger: They exhibit particularism and diffuseness [9], [10].

Resources, both political and economic, are traded; Resources are not traded independently, but rather as a "package"; The partnership is enduring and firmly unconditional; The degree of solidarity in the partnership varies; It is based on unofficial, maybe non-legal understandings; Relationships between patrons and clients are voluntary; Horizontal solidarity, particularly among customers, is undermined by the vertical character of patron-client, connections; the connection is predicated on significant power disparities and inequity. The nature of patronage has changed significantly as a result of political and economic developments, especially the growth of the state and the expansion of capitalism.

In today's world, patron-client relationships often include brokerage and mediation between clients in their interactions with the market and the government. Many Third World nations now use clientelism as a major election component. To win the political support of their constituents, political parties are forced to enlist the aid of local patrons and brokers. As a result, relationships between leaders and followers within party groups are quite individualized. These connections between special interests and political authority help them achieve their goals. Leaders of the party provide assistance and defense to those who acknowledge and endorse their guidance. Conflicting interests will be sliced through by a leader's identity, forcing faction leaders to act as a middleman between the factions that behind them. For instance, political parties in India, particularly the Congress, have had to take into account a wide range of forms of allegiance, including those based on caste, landlord-tenant relationships, language, tribe, and religion. Party politics becomes segmented as a result of factionalism. Within factions, political relationships are always transactional, instrumental, and dependent, with their internal structures being very similar [11], [12].

The benefits that come with holding political office encourage factionalism. The shared interest of patron and client supersedes class interests and conflicts. The goal of factional fighting is to acquire a larger base of supporters. However, the resolution of a disagreement does not alter the social order. A group may fracture if a leader is unable to effectively manage conflicts between divergent economic interests within it. Factional strife might result in the formation of a new party if the split lasts the whole duration of the party. Faction disputes are not motivated by ideologies. These battles are about resources, about having enough influence at pivotal points in the party and government's decision-making structure, and about having enough followers to obtain office and expand the faction's size and power via increasing patronage. In a patronage system, success fosters success.

It is common for leaders to expand their group and bring others under their sway by using their patronage privileges. Leaders may then aim for better positions, more favor, and a larger fan base. Third World parties have a unique image due to patron-client relationships and factional dynamics inside the party. Thus, centrifugal forces and elements that promote factionalism and erode party unity, like caste or communalism in India, must be dealt with by a successful party. As the example of Uruguay shows, the election system is another one of these factors. Only when parties are formed along ideological lines and mobilize political support based on horizontal rather than vertical links is clientelism likely to lose relevance. The bureaucratic distribution of public services based on entitlements also lessens the political relevance of

clientelism. Alternatives to clientelism include the emergence of a universalistic political culture and civil society structures that allow people to exercise their individual rights and entitlements.

CONCLUSION

The study of political parties in Third World nations unveils a complex tapestry of political dynamics, characterized by a delicate balance between mass mobilization, governance structures, and ideological orientations. Political parties, as agents of political mobilization, play a crucial role in shaping the political landscape, reflecting the evolving aspirations and demands of diverse societies. However, the durability of representative politics and the efficacy of party administration remain subjects of scrutiny, particularly in the context of political stability and democratic consolidation. The phenomenon of political instability, often precipitated by the erosion of party politics, poses significant challenges to governance and democracy, frequently leading to military intervention and the disruption of democratic processes. Nevertheless, amidst these challenges, there exist opportunities for fostering institutional resilience, promoting democratic consolidation, and mitigating the risk of political upheaval. By comprehensively analyzing the interplay between party politics, military intervention, and the quest for political stability and democratic governance, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities of governance in Third World societies. Policymakers and practitioners must heed the insights gleaned from this study to formulate effective strategies aimed at nurturing democratic institutions, fostering inclusive governance structures, and advancing the aspirations of diverse populations across the Third World. Only through concerted efforts to address underlying challenges and capitalize on emerging opportunities can Third World societies embark on a path towards sustainable governance and democratic prosperity.

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CHAPTER 3

BUREAUCRACY'S ROLE IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS: A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN THE THIRD WORLD CONTEXT

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ABSTRACT:

Bureaucracy is a pivotal institution in political systems worldwide, but its role and influence can vary significantly. In the context of emerging nations, bureaucracy often assumes a central position, wielding considerable power and authority beyond mere implementation. This study explores the multifaceted influence of bureaucracy on politics in Third World countries, encompassing its historical evolution, organizational structures, and impacts on democratic governance. Drawing on theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence, the study delves into the complexities of bureaucratic power dynamics, including its interactions with elected officials, control over resources, and role in policy implementation. Moreover, the study examines the challenges posed by bureaucratic dominance to democratic principles and the efforts of reformist politicians to navigate the intricate bureaucracy-politics relations. By elucidating these dynamics, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the interplay between bureaucracy and politics in emerging nations and underscores the importance of fostering transparency, accountability, and democratic governance in bureaucratic systems.

KEYWORDS:

Bureaucracy, Democratic, Economic, Governance, Political System.

INTRODUCTION

Important institutions in any political system are bureaucracies. It is not appropriate to see public servants as nothing more than impartial implementers of other people's political judgments. In some situations, the bureaucracy is now thought of as the most powerful political institution in the Third World. We've previously discussed a few aspects of the bureaucracy's negative perception. The idea of a bureaucratic oligarchy has been used in theories of the post-colonial state, meaning unequivocally that salaried state officials control the government. The amount of work in the public sector gives some idea of the importance of bureaucracy in emerging nations. Compared to affluent nations, a larger portion of the labor force is employed by the state in non-agricultural sectors. In emerging nations, public employment grew at a faster pace in the 1970s and 1980s. The pressures placed on governments to stimulate development by creating a social and economic infrastructure and becoming involved in direct production are partially to blame for the expansion of governmental bureaucracy in emerging nations.

Through planned development initiatives, state bureaucracies were seen as catalysts for social and economic transformation after independence. The state has stepped in to protect private wealth even in cases when the prevailing philosophy has been one of capitalism and free markets. The state and bureaucracy have been very interventionist in the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of South East Asia and Latin America. One of the biggest problems confronting democratic political leaders is keeping the bureaucracy under control. One of the

biggest challenges for reformist politicians is the prominence of senior public officials in Third World governments. Regardless of their popular support and democratic credentials, entering politicians will always be dependent on the bureaucracy in politics [1], [2].

Ideas on bureaucracy

The word "bureaucracy" has varied meanings to different individuals, which makes it difficult to research. These will show up when we look at how political science has included the study of bureaucracy into the examination of politics in the Third World. There are many meanings that have been applied to the phrase. It is possible to make excellent use of this conceptual uncertainty, however. We may examine the entire importance of bureaucracy as a political force in LDCs—a relevance that goes well beyond the execution of public policy—if we take the time to remind ourselves of the many connotations attached to the word.

Sometimes, the term "bureaucracy" is used to merely describe government administrative organizations that employ public officials. It is interchangeable with public administration, which consists of the institutions established by the contemporary state to implement the decisions made by policymakers. The state employs a sizable number of individuals who make it their vocation to work for the state in a professional capacity and requires specialized institutions in order to carry out public policy. Thus, the public services and the institutions that house them are referred to as the bureaucracy. It is a group of government employees and positions that are staffed in a certain manner. It no longer provides information on the operations of those organizations or the potential political influence that the bureaucracy may have over the creation of public policies or even the manner and extent to which they are carried out.

However, there is another interpretation of bureaucracy that refers to a certain kind of organizational structure where individuals are hired into positions of responsibility via a particular process. This is the traditional Weberian definition of bureaucracy. According to Weber, bureaucracy is the most sophisticated human organization that society has ever created and the most sensible way to carry out group activities, particularly those that need for extensive planning. This suggests unequivocally that not all organizations are bureaucratic. Compared to others, some could be more bureaucratic. When it comes to features, they are easily recognizable. There are distinct chains of command between each tier of the structure. A bureaucracy will only hire people based on merit, as shown by their achievement in a competitive entrance exam or acquisition of suitable credentials. Officials are reliant on their pay. The tools of administration are not theirs. They are not allowed to seize personally any portion of the taxes that they may be authorized to collect. All that officials get in exchange for their services to the state is a pay.

This strengthens the boundaries of recognized jurisdictions. A bureaucratic organization has a distinct division of labor. It is split up into many offices, each of which has distinct, regular, and well-defined jurisdiction attached to it. An organizational chart, often known as an organigram, may visually depict this as a pyramid of offices. These positions have specific authorities that are outlined in abstract regulations for the officials holding them. Those regulations will strictly specify their power. They will be working on applying broad guidelines to particular situations. This is a distinctive characteristic of government agencies, particularly those run by individuals who interact directly with the public. They interact with members of the public as claimants or those who believe they are entitled to resources that the state must provide and who fulfill the state's definition of those who are in need of and eligible for certain benefits. The bureaucrat's job is to allocate resources in an unbiased, objective, and fair manner; they must evaluate all instances equally and take into account only the variables that the rules

consider significant. Apart from what the rules deem important to make a judgment, the bureaucrat doesn't care about anything concerning the claimant. The only information the official has to know is the amount of property the applicant inhabits, for instance, if they are employed by a small farmers development program that defines entitlement in terms of size of land holding. Unless the law requires otherwise, all other characteristics of the claimant's life such as age, gender, race, tribe, caste, language, family size, and place of origin are irrelevant.

This takes us to yet another definition of bureaucracy one that the average person would most likely understand if they were to use the phrase. That translates to inaccessible administration, inflexible decision-making enmeshed in "red tape," and insensitivity to the applicant's unique requirements and circumstances as they are understood by them rather than by the bureaucracy. These are the characteristics of bureaucracy that Robert Merton described as "dysfunctional" or "pathological." Reasonable structure and protocols eventually lead to ineffectiveness. Specifically, "rigorous adherence to regulations" breeds "timidity, conservatism, and technicism" in addition to "client conflict." Bureaucracy turns into a self-serving goal unto itself. Buck-passing, red tape, inflexibility, rigidity, extreme impersonality, over secretiveness, refusal to delegate, and reluctance to use discretion become its defining characteristics. These bureaucrats are said to be indifferent to human issues and focus only on certain situations that regulations happen to deem important. Bureaucrats are stuck in a difficult situation. They will be accused of abusing their authority, exercising excessive discretion, and traveling outside of their defined jurisdiction if they do not apply the rules strictly in order to avoid coming across as unkind and inflexible; if they do, they will be accused of being bureau-pathological. The bureaucrat travels a tortuous route between the two options [3], [4].

In addition to democracy or aristocracy, the term "bureaucracy" may also refer to a kind of governance. Administration by bureaucrats, as opposed to administration by the people, a single individual, or a hereditary class, is what bureaucracy is. That is exactly the kind of administration that is in existence in many Third World cultures; it is very similar to colonial governance, which was likewise ruled by selected officials, both military and civil. Under these kinds of governments, which include military dictatorships and oligarchies, bureaucracy plays a more significant role in politics than just being a powerful political force. Government and bureaucracy are almost synonymous, and bureaucracy may also resemble both a ruling class and a governing stratum.

The influence of bureaucracy on politics

The influence of bureaucracy on politics is multifaceted and can have significant implications for democratic governance. Bureaucratic agencies, tasked with implementing policies and regulations set forth by elected representatives or political leaders, traditionally function as neutral administrative bodies. However, in certain contexts, bureaucracies can transcend their intended role and assert influence over political processes. This phenomenon may take various forms, including bureaucratic collusion with military authorities, co-option of political power, or the emergence of a bureaucratic elite wielding disproportionate influence over political and economic affairs. One way bureaucracy influences politics is through its ability to shape policy agendas and decision-making processes. Bureaucratic agencies often possess specialized expertise and information that can influence policy outcomes.

As such, bureaucrats may play a significant role in shaping the priorities of elected officials and influencing the direction of public policy. This influence can be exerted through various means, including the drafting of policy proposals, the provision of technical advice, or the implementation of policy initiatives. Furthermore, bureaucracy can exert influence through its control over resources and administrative processes. Bureaucratic agencies often control

significant budgetary allocations and have authority over the allocation of public resources. This control over resources can give bureaucracies considerable leverage in political negotiations and decision-making processes. Additionally, bureaucracies may wield influence through their control over administrative processes, such as the granting of permits or licenses, which can shape economic activities and political outcomes.

Moreover, bureaucracy can influence politics through its role in the implementation and enforcement of laws and regulations. Bureaucratic agencies are responsible for carrying out and enforcing government policies, which can have significant implications for citizens and businesses. Through their enforcement actions, bureaucracies can shape behavior, regulate economic activities, and even influence political outcomes. For example, regulatory agencies may have the power to grant or deny permits for certain activities, thereby shaping the economic landscape and influencing political dynamics. The influence of bureaucracy on politics is complex and multifaceted. While bureaucracies play a crucial role in implementing government policies and regulations, their influence can extend beyond their administrative functions and shape political agendas, decision-making processes, and even political outcomes. As such, understanding the dynamics of bureaucracy-politics relations is essential for promoting transparency, accountability, and democratic governance.

DISCUSSION

A significant theoretical question is how to understand the bureaucracy's political authority. Here, methodological and ideological decisions have proven crucial. Marxists and functionalists have both made unique observations on Third World bureaucracy. Their broader perspectives and ideas about society and the state have a significant influence on what they have chosen to emphasize and how they have understood the function of the bureaucracy. Knowledge is one source of political power. Bureaucracies in the Third World are often accused of controlling the information and skills necessary for governance. Within the bureaucracy, there is an unparalleled concentration of technical, professional, and administrative knowledge. Even in the presence of a robust parliamentary system, powerful political parties, and other political power centers, bureaucrats continue to have significant influence since their constitutional duty limits their ability to advise the political executive.

There aren't many political institutions in emerging nations that can rival bureaucracy's monopoly on professional and technical know-how. Furthermore, the vast majority of these experts have long held positions in the public sector and in public services. This restricts once further the pool of opposing forces that might provide political leaders ideas, policy recommendations, and implementation strategies different from those of public servants. As a result, development planning has typically been very centralized, technocratic, and "top down," with experts at the top deciding what the general public needs in the way of development programs, whether they are for health care, agriculture, education, or other areas of planned development. This bureaucratic trait embodies the idea of a well-chosen team established on the basis of qualifications to provide logical and effective working procedures. Bureaucratic power also results from reliance; a recruiting system that admits only those who can show the necessary degree of knowledge and competence is destined to develop organizations that lay politicians find difficult to command.

In developing nations, efficient administration is a prerequisite for planned transformation, if not a sufficient one. When it comes to implementing programs for investment, education, family planning, nutrition, sanitation, and other areas where the state has been at the forefront of preparing change in the economy and society, the success of these initiatives has depended on having a strong and capable administration. A government passing legislation on, say, land

reform, is one thing. The ensuing implementation calls for the registration of thousands of land titles, the settlement and payment of compensations, and the processing and resolution of disputes. Nothing is implemented when there is no officialdom. Administrative procedures and the plethora of development programs developed by Third World governments must cement any gains made by politicians via electoral support or the use of force.

Max Weber recognized a third element of bureaucratic influence long ago: the social standing and respect that senior officials enjoy. The public's recognition of the public service's objectivity and professional expertise, as well as the legacy of colonialism in which officials held the highest positions of authority, especially in rural areas and the post-colonial officials' adoption of the positions, benefits packages, and salary ranges of the colonial expatriates may be the origin of this. The objective of the technocratic elite becomes positions in the public service when there aren't many other options for educated individuals to find work. In many Third World nations, government service continues to provide possibilities that the private sector was unable to provide for a long time. The ambition for power and respect among bureaucrats surpasses even egalitarian ideals [5], [6].

The alluring opportunity of being seconded to an international bureaucracy like a UN agency like the FAO, UNDP, or WHO, with the World Bank, the IMF, or even a regional body like the OAS or the ECLA, is another perk of working for the national government. The dissemination of universal principles via these activities and relationships elevates bureaucrats to an elite position within their own nations. This might result in the establishment of a bureaucracy that propagates a certain ideology and understanding of the state's role in development in a hegemonic manner. This has been specifically noted in functionalist literature as aiming at national unity via the articulation of contemporary, Westernized, and universalistic principles. It has been determined that bureaucrats are what move nations forward. They affect not only the policies that governments choose to implement, but also how non-governmental actors see the state's role in development.

In the prior examination of the post-colonial state, a fourth aspect was mentioned. This represents the bureaucracy's comparative political influence with other institutions. Both Marxist and functionalist political science share this view. Riggs was the first to present the functionalist viewpoint in the most convincing way. An almost similar line of reasoning can be found in Alavi's neo-Marxist examination of Bangladesh and Pakistan. According to both schools of thinking, one colonial legacy was the delayed establishment of political institutions that might have provided a check and balance on the bureaucracy. Bureaucracies were created during colonialism at the cost of other institutions. It was more concerned with the power of officials over representative assemblies, political parties, pressure groups, and other groups that represented various societal segments. It also anticipated that these organizations would develop into institutions that could regulate the state's bureaucratic apparatus.

Colonialism created a well-oiled bureaucracy that newly elected governments were forced to fill with their own citizens, often in the face of a severe shortage of skilled native labor. Crash training programs were initiated to provide a workforce capable of replacing the foreign nationals who were sent away and supporting the functioning of the newly independent governments. As a result, new nations inherited prominent, well-run bureaucracies with a strong sense of corporate identity, along with other political institutions that lacked the same authority and credibility. This evolved when party organizations became more powerful. Stronger methods for managing the bureaucracy developed as mass parties produced leaders who were less dependent on the bureaucracy and more on popular support during elections and the longer legislative institutions had to establish themselves. The bureaucracy was held more

responsible to other policy-making groups the more non-state groups in commerce, agriculture, the labor movement, and the professions created and formed their own organizations.

However, administrative competence does not always correspond with the bureaucracy's political authority. It typically deals with incomplete data, especially statistical data. Its monopoly on policy-relevant information does not guarantee that it will have enough qualified workers to complete the duties assigned to it. Projects initiated by the previous political leadership may be resisted for political reasons. Long ago, Riggs contended that the bureaucracy's political clout correlated with its inefficiency and weakened incentives for efficient management. Additionally, he asserted that the weight of bureaucratic power varied inversely with efficiency, primarily due to the asymmetry between bureaucracies and other political institutions and the ensuing obsession of bureaucrats with advancing their bureaucratic interests rather than serving their political masters. International organizations like the World Bank, who are attempting to redefine the role of the state in economic and social development, are now concerned about the administrative capability of Third World nations. In addition, Riggs discovered historical and modern evidence to support the notion that the growth and authority of bureaucracies has detrimental effects on the evolution of democratic systems.

The "spoils" of office, who are one of the main supporters of an emerging party system, are undermined by the merit system, which is most powerfully represented by bureaucratic recruiting practices. The educating benefits of political engagement are weakened by bureaucratic centralism and local government control. Autonomous political pressure centers are weakened by the bureaucratic mobilization of interest groups. Weak parties, pressure groups, and public engagement cannot be the basis for the development of parliamentary legislative institutions. Parliaments do not manage income collection, spending, or policy initiatives; bureaucracies do. The enactment of laws but their non-implementation due to bureaucratic "formalism" progressively erodes representative institutions. The bureaucracy may utilize the legal system, which doesn't have public backing, to further its abuse of power. The development of effective politics is often hampered by the bureaucracy's excessive growth when the political system is lagging behind, according to Riggs' conclusion. If bureaucratic institutions are relatively small, however, independent political institutions are more likely to flourish [7], [8].

The establishment of organizations that can guarantee accountability and serve as substitute policy-making bodies may be positively discouraged by bureaucracy. Parties and bureaucracy are two examples of distinct political entities whose growth processes are interconnected. It has been observed that bureaucracy really creates political voids that it then fills on its own. The term "multi-functionality" was used by functionalists to describe this institutional imbalance. They claimed that political institutions in transitional cultures had not yet specialized to the same extent as they would in completely modern countries. A bureaucracy that was entirely dedicated to the application of rules was part of the functionalist concept of political modernity. According to functionalist definitions of mature societies, the people are in charge and public employees are there to provide guidance and carry out directives. Political systems in transitional societies are multipurpose rather than entirely specialized. It makes sense for bureaucratic structures to carry out all of the input and output duties of the political system and to be as interested in the function of creating rules as they are in enforcing them. Still, it was never easy to reconcile Third World bureaucrats' behavior with the functionalist taxonomy.

Marxist social theorists see bureaucratic overdevelopment from a different perspective. According to Mali research, there was a "crisis of colonialism" that led to independence before

the bureaucracy or any other feasible political system could have grown. In addition, Alavi discusses how the bureaucracy in Pakistan and Bangladesh has grown too much in comparison to other democratic institutions. Released from direct metropolitan control, this oligarchy expanded its economic dominance, took on a new role in society, multiplied public agencies and bureaucratic controls, manipulated the appearance of parliamentary government, and ultimately succeeded in overthrowing the democratic regime. Previous experiences suggested that this portrayal of the bureaucracy needed qualification. For instance, the bureaucracy of Kenya was separated into many branches and tiers. It is not always the case that managers of state-owned businesses, who are "especially exposed to the bourgeois values embodied in the technology, management practices, “efficiency” ideology, etc. of the firms they take over," have the same interests as civil officials. It was also necessary to differentiate career bureaucrats from party officials appointed to civil administrations, especially with regard to the connections between their classes.

According to some authorities, the post-colonial model is only temporary and has been abandoned in some Third World societies. This is especially the case in India, where the colonial administration was highly esteemed and overdeveloped, with a complex ideology that promoted racial superiority, paternalism, and tolerance for indigenous institutions that were thought to be in line with metropolitan interests. However, with independence, a rather well-established middle class in India began to voice its concerns more and more via the official political democratic institutions. Wood argues that post-colonial India's administrative behavior changed from being primarily bureaucratic to being more instrumental due to the rise of political parties, legislatures, and new forms of class differentiation, all of which worked to undermine the autonomy of the state administrative apparatus. Wood bases his case study of the Kosi Development Region in northeastern Bihar. Specifically, a class of capitalist farmers had come to dominate the development of agricultural policy [9], [10].

The creation of democratic institutions resulted in the bureaucracy losing its position, influence, and authority. The bureaucracy withdrew under ideologies of professionalism, instrumentalism, and impartiality as class interests attempted to thwart reforms by eroding administrative power. Another source of influence is bureaucratic stability, or the persistence of the bureaucratic élite as compared to other political élites. Although governments change and are replaced by coups, bureaucracy endures. "It seldom occurs to the men leading a coup to throw the administrators out" illustrates how other élites become reliant on it. It seems that bureaucracy has ruled Pakistan from the country's founding under "military" administration. The permanence of bureaucracy strengthens its authority in politically unstable environments. As an institution, it cannot be abolished, and it is sometimes very difficult to replace its staff with individuals who possess the ideological commitment required by the leaders of a new government or regime, particularly if the old guard has monopolized administrative knowledge.

CONCLUSION

The study illuminates the intricate and nuanced relationship between bureaucracy and politics in emerging nations, emphasizing the multifaceted nature of bureaucratic influence on political processes and democratic governance. Bureaucracy, often perceived as a neutral administrative entity, emerges as a complex and powerful political force with the capacity to shape policy agendas, decision-making processes, and political outcomes. Through its control over resources, specialized expertise, and administrative processes, bureaucracy exerts significant influence on political dynamics, sometimes transcending its intended role and becoming a dominant political institution. Despite the challenges posed by bureaucratic dominance, efforts to reform and democratize political systems must navigate the complexities of bureaucracy-politics relations, recognizing the importance of promoting transparency, accountability, and

democratic principles within bureaucratic systems. Ultimately, a deeper understanding of the dynamics between bureaucracy and politics is crucial for advancing democratic governance and ensuring that bureaucratic power serves the interests of the public and contributes to inclusive and equitable development in emerging nations.

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CHAPTER 4

BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT:

This study explores the evolving role of bureaucracy in Third World nations amidst ongoing democratization processes. It contrasts the traditional view of bureaucracy as a neutral administrative body with its potential as a wielder of autonomous power, often at odds with established democratic institutions. The study examines instances of bureaucratic assertiveness, such as collusion with military authorities or co-option of political power, and the implications for democratic governance. Furthermore, it discusses the significance of bureaucratic reform in aligning administrative institutions with democratic norms and values. Merit-based hiring practices, transparency in public policy management, and mechanisms for accountability are highlighted as essential elements for strengthening bureaucracy within democratic systems. The study also examines the challenges associated with bureaucratic reform, including political interference, lack of institutional capacity for scrutiny, and resistance from entrenched interests. It emphasizes the need for comprehensive approaches to democratic governance that address broader issues such as corruption, weak rule of law, and social inequities. Ultimately, the study underscores the importance of fostering a symbiotic relationship between bureaucracy and democracy, characterized by professionalism, accountability, and transparency, to ensure the effective functioning of democratic systems in Third World nations.

KEYWORDS:

Bureaucracy, Democratization, Democratic, Economic, Governance.

INTRODUCTION

The notion of an impartial administrative apparatus stands in stark contrast to the concept of bureaucracy as a mode of governance within Third World nations. The former presupposes that bureaucracy possesses the capability to wield power autonomously, either by supplanting other parliamentary democratic or party-driven political structures or by aligning itself with the military to form a coalition, or even by emerging as a novel class wielding economic and political dominance. This paradigm shift necessitates integration into the ongoing democratization processes observed in many Third World countries.

Traditionally, bureaucracies have been viewed as neutral administrative bodies tasked with implementing policies and regulations set forth by elected representatives or political leaders. However, in certain contexts, bureaucracies have transcended their intended role and assumed a more assertive stance, often at the expense of established democratic institutions. This phenomenon may manifest in various forms, such as bureaucratic collusion with military authorities to influence policymaking, bureaucratic co-option of political power, or the emergence of a bureaucratic elite wielding disproportionate influence over political and

economic affairs. In the context of Third World democratization, the role of bureaucracy assumes heightened significance as these nations strive to establish robust democratic governance structures. The incorporation of bureaucratic agencies into the democratic process presents both opportunities and challenges. On one hand, a competent and impartial bureaucracy can facilitate effective governance, ensure the rule of law, and promote transparency and accountability in decision-making. On the other hand, bureaucratic overreach or corruption can undermine democratic principles, stifle political pluralism, and erode public trust in governmental institutions [1], [2].

Moreover, the democratization process in Third World nations necessitates the reform and professionalization of bureaucratic institutions to align with democratic norms and values. This entails enhancing bureaucratic transparency, depoliticizing administrative appointments, strengthening institutional checks and balances, and fostering a culture of accountability within bureaucratic ranks. Additionally, efforts should be directed towards promoting citizen participation in bureaucratic decision-making processes, thereby enhancing the legitimacy and responsiveness of administrative agencies to societal needs and aspirations.

In essence, the transition towards democratic governance in Third World nations requires a nuanced approach towards the role of bureaucracy. While bureaucratic agencies can serve as crucial enablers of democratic consolidation, their unchecked power or politicization can pose significant challenges to the democratization process. Therefore, fostering a symbiotic relationship between bureaucracy and democracy, characterized by professionalism, accountability, and transparency, is essential for building resilient and inclusive democratic systems in the Third World.

In order to solidify bureaucracy's role within a democratic system, it is imperative to establish institutions that prioritize merit-based hiring practices over favoritism, nepotism, or corruption. Such institutions would ensure that individuals are appointed to bureaucratic positions based on their qualifications, expertise, and competence rather than personal connections or political affiliations. By upholding meritocracy in recruitment and promotion processes, bureaucratic agencies can cultivate a skilled and professional workforce capable of effectively executing public policies and delivering services to citizens impartially.

Furthermore, fostering transparency and openness in the management of public policy is essential to bolstering the credibility and legitimacy of bureaucratic institutions within a democratic framework. Citizens have a right to access information about government decision-making processes, budget allocations, and policy implementation outcomes. By promoting transparency and accountability in bureaucratic operations, governments can enhance public trust in administrative bodies and mitigate the risk of corruption, mismanagement, and abuse of power.

In addition to transparency measures, mechanisms for holding bureaucrats accountable for ineptitude and poor administration are indispensable components of a democratic system. This entails establishing oversight mechanisms, such as independent auditing bodies, ombudsman offices, and parliamentary committees, tasked with monitoring bureaucratic performance, investigating allegations of misconduct, and holding officials accountable for their actions. By enforcing accountability measures, governments can ensure that bureaucratic agencies remain accountable to the public and responsive to their needs, thereby strengthening the democratic governance framework.

However, despite the importance of these institutional reforms, it is crucial to recognize that legislators, judges, and civil society organizations in many developing nations often lack the capacity or independence to effectively scrutinize bureaucracy. Weak institutional checks and

balances, coupled with limited resources and political interference, can impede efforts to hold bureaucratic agencies accountable for their actions. Moreover, the influence of vested interests, including powerful elites and entrenched bureaucracies, may hinder meaningful reform efforts aimed at addressing systemic challenges within the bureaucratic apparatus.

Furthermore, while there is increasing pressure from the international development community to implement bureaucratic reforms in developing nations, it is unlikely that such reforms alone will address the underlying power imbalances in politics. Bureaucratic reform initiatives must be accompanied by broader efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, promote civic engagement, and combat corruption and impunity at all levels of government. Additionally, fostering a culture of respect for the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values is essential for building resilient and accountable governance systems capable of effectively serving the needs and interests of all citizens.

While institutional reforms aimed at enhancing the role of bureaucracy within democratic systems are necessary, they must be part of a comprehensive approach to democratic governance that addresses broader challenges such as political patronage, institutional corruption, and weak rule of law.

By promoting meritocracy, transparency, and accountability within bureaucratic institutions, governments can strengthen the foundations of democracy and ensure that bureaucratic agencies remain responsive, efficient, and accountable to the citizens they serve [3], [4].

Access and Bureaucracy

The administrative distribution of limited public resources among various groups of people to satisfy politically defined needs such as those for food, shelter, credit, healthcare, education, and other bureaucratically administered public services as well as administrative power is linked to this process. Reexamining the many interpretations of bureaucracy specifically, bureaucracy as a kind of rationality we see that rationality has a unique political relevance when it comes to the bureaucratic distribution of limited resources. High levels of need necessitate that the bureaucracy distribute limited resources in accordance with politically decided categories of need, especially among the poorest segments of society but also among other segments, including private capital. Such distributions are not left to the market; rather, they are made by government intervention. Because they lack the means to effectively generate a demand, the demands of the poor are not being addressed by the market.

The reason why the lower classes of society are seen to be in need of anything money, employment, land, healthcare, agricultural inputs, food, education, and so forth is because they are unable to get via the market the necessities of living at a certain legally defined level. If the policymakers define need, for instance, in terms of income, then actions may be made to generate employment, such as launching a public works program that will employ workers from a target group whose needs have been formally recognized and for whom the public intervention has been established. Alternatively, land may be considered a requirement so that people can sustain themselves.

The policy might therefore take the shape of a land-reform program that uses official procedures to determine eligibility in order to transfer land to the landless or to raise the size of uneconomic holdings. Shelter may be required, but it cannot be demanded in the private housing market. Similar to this, certain groups of persons who are politically classified as "needing" educational services may not be able to access the private school market. Health care belongs in the same group.

DISCUSSION

Development planners use a wide range of techniques to determine the requirements of various individuals. It may be determined that some groups of industrial or agricultural producers need inputs in order to raise productivity levels. The state offers loans at subsidized rates because a group that has the potential to be productive may find it difficult to get credit in the financial markets due to a lack of safe collateral or an inability to repay at the market interest rate. Physical inputs like equipment, seeds, and fertilizer are examples of how production must rise; they will once again be provided by the state. Development planning in many Third World countries is almost synonymous with a broad variety of governmental actions directed at certain beneficiary groups. The Weberian concept of public service should be followed by officials handling such governmental interventions in a bureaucratic manner. Specific instances will be subject to rules and regulations. Certain groups are given entitlements to public benefits. The intended beneficiaries will be able to recognize themselves as such, will be aware of their newly defined rights under a governmental program, and will be able to understand how bureaucratic organizations make judgments on specific instances, according to bureaucratic theory.

As a result, officials follow the rules that govern the decision-making process, looking for pertinent data to determine whether the requirements have been fulfilled. There might be a wide range of intricate situations. Even so, a claim may still be methodically reviewed to determine whether or not the claimant meets the qualifying requirements. Understanding how public organizations allocate resources and prepare for such expenditures and interventions is not a challenge for many individuals. Political meddling in the administrative allocation procedure might cause a departure from the bureaucratic standard. Then, allocations may not be done fairly and in accordance with the regulations. Although it's a very political process, the decision-making procedures make sense to the more educated and Westernized segments of society. However, bureaucratic methods of decision-making are hard for other segments of society in underdeveloped, rural economies that are undergoing development.

Such bureaucratization may seem quite foreign in a rural society. This isn't a result of people being too primitive, illogical, or stupid. The reason for this is that peasant rationality and bureaucratic rationality are at odds. In many rural societies around the globe, the actions of the bureaucrat, who is limited to dealing with information pertinent to the case within his purview, may seem quite peculiar. It is challenging for an individual to absorb information about their present circumstances when they are a member of a community where many facets of people's life intersect. Individuals see themselves as being in multi-stranded relationships rather than single-stranded ones with other people. One may contact a moneylender for credit rather than an agriculture extension worker, but dealing with a moneylender differs greatly from dealing with a government official. Peasant communities have complex interactions that include reciprocity, debt, kinship, tenancy, employment, political factionalism, and patronage [5], [6].

A bureaucrat using a distinctively Westernized type of logic that wealthy and educated farmers in the community would be able to recognize and cooperate with is one who treats similar situations alike and concerns himself only with officially specified parts of an individual's circumstances. However, the procedure may be tough for the underprivileged, illiterate, uneducated, and dependent people of the society, at whom the public spending programs may have been particularly and intentionally intended. It is not possible to approach a bureaucrat from many angles. The bureaucrat will designate other characteristics of a person's economic and familial circumstances—which are pervasive today—as unimportant. The officially chosen characteristics of an individual's existence will have served as the basis for defining needs. Conversely, the claimant will not want to make a case. He'll want to tell a tale that encompasses

the interconnected aspects of his whole life. Maybe bureaucrats shouldn't be shocked when they learn that their programs aren't having the desired effect on policymakers.

Officialdom's resources are often utilized to meet the beneficiaries' perceived more urgent requirements. They shouldn't be shocked either if the intended beneficiaries choose not to assert their legal claims. Participating in a government program might be dangerous if it requires renunciating communal traditions. The results might be disastrous if the bureaucratic allocation doesn't function as planned, if the individual has distanced themselves from the neighborhood and is no longer in need of the safety, support, and reciprocity of neighborhood ties. It could be preferable to be in a dependent or even exploitative situation rather than be a receiver of a governmental program. The target group may not get the resources that are supposed to be distributed; instead, they may end up somewhere else due to pressure on authorities, including corruption. To some degree, political pressure to assist local elites at the cost of target populations defined by government programs may have an impact on administrative personnel.

Success must be shown by bureaucrats. They can exercise their discretion in allocating resources to those who can demonstrate the kinds of outcomes—such as agricultural output—that can be converted into administrative performance levels that will meet the expectations of superiors. Examples of such individuals include farmers with familiarity with contemporary farming methods and business dealings. Such programs will inevitably favor the capitalistic, rationally economic, literate, and market-oriented farmer who matches the behavior model predicated on bureaucratically administered programs rather than the survival-oriented, indebted, dependent, marginal, and vulnerable poor peasant. This introduces bias into a lot of development planning, which targets certain beneficiary groups with governmental interventions.

A class that rules

Furthermore, bureaucracies have been described as being more than merely political institutions. They have evolved into a brand-new class—one that is governing. For many Third World countries, this conclusion has been made for a variety of reasons. First, a form of production known as bureaucracy has existed in some emerging nations. Through the state, the bureaucracy oversees and controls the means of production. It offers the required structure. By establishing public bodies in need of public managers, such as development companies, marketing boards, and other parastatal organizations and their subsidiaries, it promotes chances for careers in bureaucracy. It expresses a philosophy of planning and governmental ownership. By giving bureaucrats' children disproportionately good possibilities to acquire the credentials required for admission into bureaucratic employment and, therefore, the new class, it arranges the means of its own reproduction.

For instance, the post-independence bureaucracy in Mali adopted some traits of a social class by using its access to political power. It maintained its supremacy by controlling the means of repression and the economic infrastructure, especially when it came to fighting against weaker indigenous social groups like the landed aristocracy and the petty-bourgeois class of merchants. Above all, it led to the nationalization of a portion of the economy, which allowed bureaucrats to take control of it under the pretext of socialism [7], [8].

Tanzania is a further example. African socialism's concept supported government control, bureaucratic leadership, and ownership of the economy's upper echelons, at the very least. Instead of allowing it to be appropriated privately, the state retained authority over the majority of the economic surplus generated. State-run institutions were used for surplus extraction. Thus, the bureaucracy behaved similarly to a ruling class that owned property in regard to the means of production. In addition to managing the means of production via state-owned

companies, the bureaucracy also maintained price controls over the various elements of production to guarantee that direct producers produced excess that the bureaucracy subsequently amassed and used.

The bureaucracy's control over the means of production and the surplus created included taking away workers' rights to strike, imposing traditional wage ceilings, taking control of agricultural marketing, controlling the prices paid to agricultural producers, and enacting government controls over trade unions. Because of the weak socioeconomic classes, a "ruling clique" that included ministers, senior civil officials, high-ranking members of the armed forces and police, and party bureaucrats was able to grow into a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie." Following the Arusha Declaration, this "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" transitioned from being primarily political-administrative and had a regulating function in the economy to being the "dominant actors in the economy," where "political power and control over property now came to rest in the same class."

Second, in addition to land, labor, and money, another component of production is the expertise that the bureaucracy has. The organizations and the requisite administrative, scientific, and technological expertise are provided by the bureaucracy. It assumes the colonial heritage left by the bureaucracy, which ruled the developing indigenous classes. All aspects of organization that are essential for managing the economy are monopolized by the bureaucracy. It presents an ideology that lends credence to this. Any form of production needs a set of beliefs to support the ruling class's entitlement to control the surplus.

The ideology that has prevailed in Tanzania is African Socialism; nevertheless, leaders in other Third World countries have espoused other forms of socialism. For example, Mali's socialism has served as a rationale for growth that is driven by the state.

Therefore, some bureaucratic traits have been seen as indicators of the rise of a new class of governing elite. It is believed to be a legalistic fabrication that society, not the bureaucracy, has ownership. As has been stated about capitalism, control is everything. Managers, not owners of company assets, are the ones in positions of power. Furthermore, by providing more and more fresh recruits from bureaucratic families, it is possible to limit entry to the bureaucratic layer from the outside. The development of personal wealth made feasible by a career in bureaucracy helps with this. Hirschmann explains how the wealthiest people in many African republics have been able to purchase both urban and rural real estate as well as commercial endeavors because of their easy access to financing, control over permits, licenses, and tenders, and high wages.

Nonetheless, the class motivations of the state bureaucracy won't always reflect the state's class makeup. In 1970s African society was dominated by the foreign bourgeoisie. Any class interests that state employees may have had were only marginally represented in state policy. Senior bureaucrats may be able to embourgeoise themselves by taking advantage of the opportunities provided by their official positions to purchase property, siphoning off "a large part of the economic surplus that is generated in society to accumulate wealth for themselves" and even enjoying significant social mobility for themselves and their families as a result. However, this does not prove that a new class structure has emerged on its own.

Cutbacks on Bureaucracy

The concepts of economic liberalization and New Public Management are having an increasingly noticeable impact on the function of bureaucracy in emerging country politics. Certain Third World governments have been forced to implement structural adjustment programs due to conditions imposed by multilateral organizations like the World Bank, the

IMF, UNDP, and the Asian Development Bank, as well as with the help of strong bilateral donors like the US Agency for International Development. Others, including China and Thailand, have independently adopted similar changes.

One of them was the privatization of state-owned businesses, which resulted in a reduction in the size of the public sector. In line with NPM's tenets, the same international organizations have mandated and encouraged administrative improvements. These strategies have had varying effects on the place of bureaucracy in Third World governments' politics, and not all of them have been favorable to obtaining more democratic control over public servants.

On the surface, it would seem that a privatization program would surely weaken the influence of bureaucrats by giving the private sector control over the creation of products and services. That leaves bureaucrats with much less to handle. But the Third World nations were counseled to regulate as soon as they were told to privatize. The World Bank said that governments are realizing that market reforms and rapidly evolving technologies provide unique regulatory challenges, as they realize that the state must ultimately have a pivotal role in the development of their nation. States are unable to give up regulation.

States need officials to enforce laws that support free markets, preserve the environment, encourage industrial innovation, stop the abuse of monopoly power, educate consumers and workers, protect the stability of the financial system, and shield savers and borrowers from "information asymmetry." This depends on the administrative capacity of the local government. Public administrators are required to carry out regulation, and they need discretionary authority to act adaptably in the face of changing circumstances. Once again, the competence and integrity of public officials greatly influence the public interest and welfare.

One of the objectives of the NPM approach to administrative reform is to reduce the amount of bureaucracy. Making increased use of the private sector by contracting out to private companies tasks that were previously done "in-house" is a fundamental criterion of NPM. The idea behind this is that collaboration would guarantee lower costs and, hence, improved efficiency in the accomplishment of public aims. Governments would be more interested in "enabling" the provision of services rather than producing them directly [9], [10].

However, some NPM tenets suggest that public servants should have more autonomy and influence in their capacities as enablers and providers of services. It is advised that newly appointed public administrators be allowed more freedom to allocate the resources at their disposal. They may be held to more precise and quantitative performance requirements than in the past, but their responsibility to political leaders would be undermined. Moreover, private sector management strategies and practices would be preferred over the limitations of the public service ethic, especially with regard to people management. Additionally, NPM rejects the erroneous division between administration and politics, realizing that public managers would unavoidably make decisions on political importance policy matters.

The employment of better managers, a focus on results rather than budgetary inputs, the use of effective incentives within public bodies, and a greater concern for the economical use of public resources can all lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public services and functions. However, it is less obvious that these reforms will weaken the power of officials in relation to political leaders. Public personnel become to resemble politicians' equals rather than their subordinates. Because NPM recognizes officials' authority to choose what needs should be met and how to satisfy them, it actually gives them more political power by requiring them to be sensitive to the requirements of their customers. They will not react to independent customers in the same way as rival private forms do.

Public officials' activities may become more open under NPM, which would make it simpler for the general public to assess the viability of government initiatives. However, the politicians' ability to manage their bureaucrats would have been compromised. It is far from certain that NPM-inspired administrative reforms will guarantee public officials' accountability to elected representatives to the same extent as more conventional public administration techniques, particularly in Third World settings with feeble legislatures and disorganized client groups.

The new management doctrine's application in public administration has an impact on the distribution of power in civil society. Redefining a citizen as a "customer" or "client" indicates a monetary transaction and exchange rather than a public obligation to offer a service to those who are entitled to receive it. Many nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have taken this approach. When services are charged for, low-income populations find it more difficult to finance basic needs like healthcare and education. Public service "downsizing" and divestiture lower the state's ability to provide for citizens' fundamental necessities, such as housing, health care, and education—services that are vital to the impoverished's ability to maintain their level of life. Corporate elites get preferential treatment from bureaucrats due to their partnerships with the private sector, as opposed to those segments of society who rely on tax-funded public services. "The normative criteria or rationales for public policies and administrative decisions are likely to be based on market driven criteria rather than the opinions and expectations of citizens" is the result of the loss of a "democratic tradition of ethical standards" that demanded accountability, the representation of minorities and women, impartiality and responsiveness in favor of market values, productivity, competition, and profitability. It is more challenging to develop a culture of public service in the public interest because of bureaucracy's function as a facilitator, regulator, and coordinator of private sector contracts.

CONCLUSION

The study sheds light on the complex dynamics shaping the role of bureaucracy in Third World nations amid processes of democratization. It underscores the transformative potential of bureaucratic reform in enhancing democratic governance structures, while also acknowledging the formidable challenges inherent in such endeavors. The findings highlight the critical importance of meritocracy, transparency, and accountability in bureaucratic institutions to bolster their legitimacy and effectiveness within democratic systems. By prioritizing these principles, governments can cultivate a professional and responsive bureaucratic workforce capable of delivering public services impartially and efficiently. However, the study also underscores the persistent obstacles to bureaucratic reform, including political interference, institutional weaknesses, and resistance from vested interests. It emphasizes the need for concerted efforts to address these challenges through comprehensive strategies that promote civic engagement, strengthen democratic institutions, and combat corruption. The study calls for a nuanced approach to bureaucracy within democratic governance frameworks, one that recognizes both its potential as a facilitator of democratic consolidation and its capacity for undermining democratic principles if left unchecked. By fostering a culture of professionalism, accountability, and transparency within bureaucratic institutions, Third World nations can build resilient and inclusive democratic systems that serve the needs and aspirations of all citizens.

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CHAPTER 5

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT:

Since the post-war era, many Third World nations have experienced frequent military interventions in their political affairs, including coups and attempted coups. Despite expectations during the independence period that the military would serve as professional state servants, events proved otherwise, with the military often emerging as a dominant political force. This study explores the complex phenomenon of military intervention in Third World politics, examining factors contributing to such interventions and their implications for democracy and governance. It discusses various theories and explanations for military involvement, including social, economic, and political factors, and evaluates their validity through quantitative and qualitative analysis. Additionally, the study explores different types of military intervention, ranging from direct coups to more subtle forms of influence on civilian governments. By understanding the dynamics of military involvement in politics, policymakers can develop strategies to strengthen democratic institutions and mitigate the risk of military interference.

KEYWORDS:

Democratic, Economic, Government, Political, Social.

INTRODUCTION

Since the height of post-war independence, there has been a depressingly frequent incidence of direct military interference in the political affairs of Third World nations. Three-quarters of the Latin American nations, half of the Third World Asian states, and more than half of the African states all had coups between 1960 and 1980. The tendency persisted significantly until the 1980s. In some Third World country, there has been a coup or attempted coup every year. There have been coups or attempted coups in Chad, Togo, Peru, Sierra Leone, Venezuela, Haiti, Guatemala, Nigeria, Gambia, Pakistan, and Venezuela despite the wave of democracy in the 1990s.

Expectations were very different during the independence period. History had shown that military intervention in politics, including coups d'états, was nothing new. However, many national politicians and outside observers, including Western social scientists, were shocked and appalled that the military should become so frequently involved in Third World countries. These observers had previously held the opinion that the military was unlikely to pose a threat to civilian regimes. Many social scientists were rather certain in the late 1950s and early 1960s that while the military may be an issue in Latin America, it was unlikely to be so there since situations in other parts of the globe, especially Africa, were so different. It was generally accepted that the military's only constitutionally mandated involvement in politics in the newly independent republics of the globe was unlikely.

It was not necessary to worry that the military would serve as anything other than professional state servants due to the way it was organized and the conditions in those nations. However, as soon as the complacency was spoken, events would show that these sanguine predictions were unfounded. The military overthrew civilian governments in some African states, and in other Third World countries, the military's backing proved essential for the survival of the regime, even in cases where it did not seize total and direct control [1], [2].

More than just academics are interested in the question of why, in so many newly independent African and Latin American nations, the military emerged as the dominant political force and continued to do so throughout Latin America despite the region's longer histories of independence and more advanced economies. Since fragile democracies are emerging across the Third World, sometimes after protracted military rule, it is critical to comprehend the circumstances surrounding military involvement and how they jeopardize the establishment of democracy. Particular attention has been paid to coups and how easily the military may overthrow civilian governments on several occasions. This chapter addresses this issue in an attempt to determine when a new democracy may be threatened and what circumstances are required to make it more likely that the armed forces will continue to be supportive of civilian political leadership and receptive to its guidance. It doesn't address the form of governance the military may impose on a nation in the Third World after seizing power by force.

It is hardly surprising that no one theory has gained complete acceptance for such a complicated occurrence that takes place in such disparate civilizations. Many of the justifications offered for military involvement have focused more on the reasons why the previous civilian administrations were so brittle and unstable, almost presuming that the military would always take over in less developed countries when a civilian regime falls. It's not entirely incorrect to assume this in the context of underdevelopment.

The military has sometimes served as "the only effectively organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policy" in situations of political unrest. However, other interpretations have focused on the political advantages that the military has in these circumstances.

An explanation of military intervention

A large portion of the military's role in Third World politics has been studied from a macro and quantitative perspective. The literature in this case is based on statistical analysis of several nations rated according to factors indicating degrees of military involvement or instability. Subsequently, they are associated with socio-economic variables that seem to have predictive significance. Wells' 1970 study of 31 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is a noteworthy illustration of the genre. Using multivariate analysis, Wells connected social and economic factors to military coups to explain why some African nations had experienced them while others had not. Measures of "centrality," literacy, mass media availability, population size and growth rate, urbanization, GDP per capita, economic growth rate, and other pertinent indicators of social and economic conditions that might be assumed to be predicated on the possibility of military intervention were considered.

The importance of organizational traits in military intervention was determined using measures of the size of the armed forces, police, and defense spending. The amount of loans from the United States was seen as a sign of outside pressure on the country's susceptibility to the coup d'état. The findings were surprisingly equivocal. Only 56% of the difference in coup activity could be explained by combining all the independent factors. Case studies contributed more to the final explanatory model than did statistical analysis.

This is a rather common set of issues that come up when trying to forecast and explain military coups using quantitative statistical analysis. The first concern is deciding which states to include in the study. Was the colony a "state"? Had they been included, as in several analyses, among the populations at danger of military intervention? The ceteris paribus principle must be met for statistical explanations, meaning that factors other than military intervention must be equivalent in the instances being examined. It is rare for "other things" to be "equal" in nation-states. For instance, it may be argued that lumping "Black African states" together produces heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity. Combining a genuinely similar group of nations leads to issues whose fixes are not worth the time and effort required to identify them.

The second area of uncertainty surrounding this kind of study is to the extent to which the particular quantifiable variables selected accurately reflect both independent and dependent elements, such as levels of political development, social mobilization, military qualities, and international economic dependency. How effectively, for instance, do "degree of multi-partyism" and "voter turnout" represent "political development" as an independent variable? How good of a predictor of outside factors that might lead to a military coup is the total amount of loans and credit extended by the US in a given year? Many multivariate analyses have a poor conceptual basis, which may lead to conclusions being taken from the statistical data that are not supported by the evidence [3], [4].

Thirdly, temporal variation raises problems of "simultaneity bias" if measurements employed as independent and dependent variables do not cover the same time periods. For instance, is it realistic to argue that "party fractionalization" in 1975 led to coups that began fifteen years earlier, given that the military often expels political parties and thus sets the political system's degree of plurality? Fourth, when a portion of what has to be explained is included in the explicandum's definition, the quantitative analyst may run into tautological traps. For instance, "increased military expenditure" is employed as the independent variable, but the dependent variable expenditure on the military must be explained by the military's dominance over the state. The attempt to define political culture in terms of a society's lack of consensus which is supported by the inability of the civilian system to resist military replacement to explain military coups in terms of political culture in a society faces the same issue.

DISCUSSION

The widespread dissatisfaction with this mode of analysis is certainly explained, among other things, by the use of dubious indicators of the variables under consideration and the unwillingness of researchers to replicate each other’s methods in different regions. It would be incorrect, nevertheless, to be overly dismissive, either on the grounds that military intervention cannot be characterized and is therefore completely random, or on the grounds that statistical correlations and comparisons require the use of uncertainly valid indicators of political, social, and economic development. Using quantitative analysis, intriguing theories may be produced. Perhaps much of the dissatisfaction and annoyance they cause might be attributed to the fact that, thus far, they have not provided anything more definitive, leaving us in need of a compelling explanation, and that they are most likely unable to satisfy these demands.

Types of Intervention

The act of seizing political power by force and installing military leadership in place of civilian institutions to create a self-appointed junta with unchecked authority independent of all civilian political institutions has been the major subject of scholarly attention. Then, government is imposed by fiat. Political representation, public consent, and parliamentary processes are all disregarded in favor of instant dissolution of elected legislatures, suspension of elections, and abolition of political parities, all of which are constitutional niceties. If it is thought that specific

constitutional precepts, such preserving the judiciary and giving it the authority to rule on the validity of certain administrative actions, must be adhered to in order to achieve some semblance of legitimacy. However, the term "supplantment" refers to the use of armed force to replace a civilian government with a military one.

The military may play many more roles than this one. In every state, it is a significant organized interest organization or pressure group. In terms of having access to the governmental machinery, it is among the groups with the finest resources. Through a variety of consultative and executive mechanisms, including defense councils, advisory committees, and the strong working connections between senior political, bureaucratic, and military people, the military leadership is always integrated into the government apparatus. Underestimating the military's political significance is inappropriate under any form of governance. One of the most important questions regarding the military in politics is the extent to which its values go beyond judgments about the best ways to fight and defend a nation, to those that represent not only a business interest in high-tech weapons, high compensation, and favorable working conditions, but also an idea of the ideal structure for society.

Furthermore, since it is so simple for the military to envelop itself in secrecy and evade parliamentary and other kinds of inspection, it is very difficult to submit it to democratic supervision and responsibility in its regular constitutional duty. Commonly, this secrecy goes well beyond what needs to be kept hidden from current or prospective foreign aggressors; it even includes the specific funding of costly projects that the public is required to pay for.

The military's replacement of one civilian administration with another is another example of intervention. One method the military may bring about a change of administration is by refusing to serve as the government's tool against its opponents. An essential component of every revolution is army control. In Iran, this was undoubtedly the case. One important issue that determines the fate of a time of revolutionary upheaval is whether a new administration has control over the army and can employ military force against vestiges of the ancien régime. Governmental shifts brought about by the military abandoning one set of political leaders for another are possible and have happened often in modern Latin American history. The force behind the throne is often the military. There are also glaring instances of this in South East Asia, where the military has long served as the last arbitrator in political disputes in both Thailand and Indonesia. When military governments return power to civilian politicians, it is often to individuals they have personally selected and drafted a constitution for. Former military officials, including those who have plotted coups in the past, have often entered politics by starting new political parties and running for government. One example is President Chavaz of Venezuela, who led the first of two coups in 1992. In emerging nations, civilian politics often serve as a front for military might that is poised to seize total authority.

One of four groups describes the majority of military takeovers. First, there are guardian or governmental coups, such the one that occurred in Pakistan in 1999. The military plays a guardianship role in that the new government maintains the status quo economic structure, makes minimal fundamental changes to government policy, and justifies its rule by arguing that its role is to provide stability for a while before returning power to civilians. The social and political framework remains unchanged, despite changes in the government's leadership. According to Perlmutter, this kind of coup is the product of a "arbitrator army" that recognizes the status quo, doesn't establish a separate political party, and declares its intention to go back to the barracks after the conflicts among the populace are resolved or a substitute, respectable government is put in place.

When the military overthrows a civilian administration that is dedicated to extreme social and economic change at the expense of society's richer strata, it is known as a veto coup. Examples include the military overthrow of President Aristide in Haiti in 1991 and Chile in 1973. Aristide was the country's first democratically elected president and was admired by the underprivileged and despised by the wealthy and their military supporters due to his liberationist ideology and reformist policies [5], [6].

An example of a "veto" coup is an anticipatory veto, in which the military steps in before power transfers to a radical or revolutionary administration, as opposed to overthrowing an established progressive or reformist government. One may argue that Ajub Khan's 1958 coup in Pakistan was intended to thwart a left-wing party's chances of winning the election. Similar events occurred in Algeria in 1991 when the military dissolved the second round of voting, established a "High State Council," and began suppressing the fundamentalist movement after the Islamic Salvation Front, with a platform of social change, received twice as many votes as its closest competitor in the first of two rounds of voting. Burma in 1990 is a further instance. The current civilian administration may even support an anticipatory coup if it believes it is going to lose control via elections. In the event that Zanu-PF lost the 2002 national election, the ruling party in Zimbabwe said it would be open to military intervention.

Ultimately, the military attempts to overthrow the current social order and establish a new ideological basis for the state and society via a reformist coup. Within what he refers to as the ruler-type Praetorian army, Perlmutter distinguishes three subtypes: the anti-traditionalist, radical reformer; the anti-traditionalist, anti-radical reformer; and the anti-traditional, republican reformer. These subtypes reject the status quo, question its legitimacy, and establish their own political organization in order to maximize military control over the state.

This does not imply that a nation's military services' political motivations will always fit into one group. Members of the extreme Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement, which attempted a coup in 1992, were present in the Venezuelan military throughout the 1980s. It also included a more moderate group that later that year tried to conduct a coup and was worried about the incompetence and corruption of officials but did not have a radical or ideological purpose.

Military involvement and social mobility

Military involvement may be explained in part by the destabilizing consequences of social mobility. People may take advantage of the chances presented by new institutions and economic activity to alter their social standing as societies become more open and flexible. Groups who had not had such chances in previous culture now enjoy prestige due to their wealth, education, and skill set. Political mobilization comes after social mobilization when newly formed socioeconomic interests—most notably in the economy—look for efficient channels of expression inside the political system as a consequence of modernization. Post-colonial society's democratic environment and participatory ethos will foster this kind of political mobilization.

The phenomenon of social mobility that emerged with industrialization and its concomitant advancements in education, urbanization, mass communication, and commercialization of all economic domains has led to a rise in political engagement and mobilization. It has also placed an unmanageable burden of conflict resolution on civilian regimes. Political organizations such as trade associations, chambers of commerce, political parties, unions, voluntary associations, and industrial organizations are necessary to express the division of society into increasingly intricate divisions and structures. Seldom are they developed enough for the job. Unlike conventional civilizations where a privileged few controls political decision-making, political resources are distributed across a greater number of individuals in this context. Power gets

increasingly distributed in contemporary society, if not in actuality than at least in theory. It raises hopes for a more equitable distribution of power. The freedom to vote and participate in choosing political leaders is a reflection of this. Institutions are necessary for such engagement in order for it to function in a structured and organized manner. It is necessary to establish institutions and processes that will enable the effective expression of political demands and the making of choices that are accepted as binding and lawful. Governmental procedures are an example of this second kind of organization. The former is embodied by parties and pressure organizations, which people need in order to successfully safeguard and advance their interests.

The more this institutionalization takes place, the less likely it is that military action will be taken. The degrees of political participation rise in tandem with social mobilization. The populace will become devoted to their civic institutions and government if this is matched by the growth of groups that serve as a conduit for political engagement. They'll consider them to be practical ways to get access to riches and authority. The national defense sector, which is one of the main functions of the state, is controlled by a technological and professional elite; the military will not find itself in a position where it may intervene on its behalf [7], [8].

A disagreement over technology is linked. Changes in the degree of economic development led to social mobility. This not only boosts the political clout and income of several organizations that support maintaining civilian systems of governance. It also makes governance more technologically complicated and beyond the purview of the armed forces. This theory has a difficulty in that it attempts to create a framework that can cover any situation involving military involvement, which is an excessive amount of generality. Upon attempting to apply it to particular countries, a plethora of exceptions and variants emerge. Certain comparative studies have provided support for the concept that fast social change would result in political violence and military involvement, while other studies have not. Putnam, for instance, came to the conclusion that Huntington was mistaken to believe that stable civilian rule depends on strong political institutions after observing insignificant correlations between military intervention in Latin America and political participation as well as the strength of parties and pressure groups. Furthermore, he discovered that nations with comparable economic growth were less likely to resort to military intervention in the event of increased popular mobilization. A coup is more likely to occur in a country that has had more economic growth and social mobility than the other.

Using data from Africa between 1960 and 1975, Jackman conducted a similar sort of analysis but reached somewhat different conclusions: first, political participation, as measured by electoral turnout, lowers the likelihood of coups, suggesting that "political mobilization in the form of higher lev-els of mass electoral participation may reflect a higher degree of acceptance of conventional non-violent processes of élite succession." Johnson et al. also discovered that substantial defense against military intervention comes from party rivalry, particularly between mass parties with national rather than ethnic or regional support.

The armed forces and the middle class

There has sometimes been a class component to social explanations of military involvement. The political basis of citizen democracy is stronger the more advanced the native middle class is. Modernization theorists see the middle class as a stabilizing factor, but they also believe that in the beginning of their growth, it is "small, weak, ineffective, divided, and therefore politically impotent." A divided middle class has conflicting political and economic goals, which might lead to "praetorianism," or the possibility of the military taking control of the political system.

Perlmutter cited differences throughout all spheres of society, including the middle class, to explain why there are no alternatives to the military when social cohesiveness breaks down. When the middle class is unable to protect democratic civilian institutions, petty bourgeoisie takes over. However, in regions such as Latin America, where "military intervention assures the middle class of power if and when they fail to come to power by electoral means," it may also occur in larger, more cohesive communities. This is consistent with Huntington's theory that the military will be a radical force in civilizations that have not yet created a middle class and will support the middle class as a conservative force after one has emerged. Sadly, efforts to provide quantitative evidence for this have been unsuccessful, casting significant doubt on the claim that the impacts of military rule alter systematically with rising national income.

It seems to reason that a newly formed middle class would be more interested in civilian administration that serves their needs than the interests of the pre-industrial groups. Using data from Latin America, Putnam investigated this hypothesis and discovered a marginally favorable correlation between military intervention and economic progress and social mobility. But the emergence of the middle class created barriers to military action.

An alternate reading of class development's relevance is that it contributes to the instability of civilian institutions. The fact that there might be conflict amongst middle class factions, especially in situations of reliance and underdevelopment, rather than the emergence of a new middle class, is the important development. These kinds of conflicts have often come before Third World coups. The concept of a "guardian" coup itself indicates knowledge of this potential. This might be explained by the importance of political power to middle class wants and interests in less developed cultures where state capital is the primary source of capital. Should segments of the middle class see themselves as being at a disadvantage due to the functioning of the political system, they can be in favor of its overthrow by a military that shares their objectives.

Support for contemporary, democratic, civilian institutions can be brittle if the political consensus and ideological underpinnings of the system are weak, as was frequently the case in the early post-independence era when the vestiges of pre-capitalist social relations, such as forms of feudalism, remained in rural areas. In such a situation, political norms are not well-established. There's a good chance that other middle-class groups may turn to unconstitutional tactics of gaining power if one tries to establish a permanent monopoly of power and, therefore, of the few resources available for wealth creation. This is the classic Bonapartist scenario, in which the weak ideological foundation makes it impossible to maintain pure bourgeois rule through liberal democratic institutions in times of crisis, and in which managing and integrating other classes into the social order becomes more and more challenging.

In post-colonial cultures, disputes between tribes and regions, as well as interests based on pre-capitalist, capitalist, and comprador class structures, are all part of the "crisis of hegemony" that a kind of Bonapartism answers to. Military intervention is often used to manage these conflicts rather than to significantly alter society's power structure. Often times, coups do not really bring about a fundamental shift in the structure of state power and its distribution among social classes; rather, they just "speed the circulation of élites and the realignment of factions of the ruling classes."

But the history of Latin America offers many reasons why the middle class may not believe that military rule best serves its interests. If it is fractured, the military might deny newly formed bourgeoisie groups political power. Repression of the workforce has the potential to disrupt production and lower earnings from mass consumption. The military-run state may intrude into private property. Compared to a military dictatorship, the intellectual component of the

bourgeoisie could have a distinct ideological stance. Bourgeois politicians may be conditioned to present a democratic image to the outside world, and they may take offense at being forced from office [9], [10]. Because it gives the armed forces themselves the chance to advance socially and militarily, military intervention is further linked to class. Consider the coup that occurred in Uganda in 1971. According to one reading, the army's interests as a disenfranchised group under a post-independence élite—whose educational attainment was Westernized and whose primary language was English—were represented in the coup. Due to the fact that army personnel spoke Swahili, the armed forces were not granted elite status. Thus, the coup offered the illiterate lumpen militariat a chance to advance in society.

Because they were drawn from underprivileged sections of society or regions of the country that had not been a major source of political recruitment for leadership positions, the coup produced a realignment of ruling groups and an opportunity for upward mobility for groups not prominent under the previous civilian regime, all without changing the basis of political power, which was based on class. Other African examples would include the tribes of Nigeria's "middle belt" and the people living in northern Togo. For a minority community, particularly one with an ethnic identity, political power has often "flowed from the barrel of a gun."

When military leaders utilize their political influence to amass riches and property after a successful coup, embourgeoisement may become even more apparent. Through the accumulation of wealth through commissions, corruption, land acquisition and speculation, trade, and rents, members of the armed forces can rise from petty-bourgeois status, which is associated with rich peasants, technocrats, intellectuals, state bureaucracy, industrial management, and small-scale private capitalists, into the new bourgeoisie.

CONCLUSION

The study of military intervention in Third World politics reveals a multifaceted phenomenon shaped by diverse socio-economic and political factors. Despite initial expectations of civilian rule following independence, the prevalence of military coups and interventions underscored the complexities of governance in newly independent nations. Various theories have been proposed to explain military involvement, including social mobility, economic development, and the role of the middle class, yet no single theory has gained universal acceptance. Quantitative analysis has provided valuable insights into the correlates of military coups, but limitations such as the selection of indicators and temporal variation highlight the challenges of predicting such events. Moreover, the study elucidates different forms of military intervention, from direct coups to more subtle influences on civilian governments, emphasizing the need for nuanced approaches to understanding and addressing this phenomenon. Ultimately, by comprehensively examining the conditions and implications of military intervention, policymakers can devise strategies to promote democratic stability and governance in Third World nations, safeguarding against threats to civilian rule and fostering sustainable development.

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CHAPTER 6

UNDERSTANDING THE NEXUS BETWEEN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: A MULTIFACETED ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT:

This study examines the multifaceted dynamics of political instability in Third World countries, with a specific focus on the role of military intervention. While military involvement is often associated with political unrest, it is crucial to understand that instability can arise from various factors beyond direct military actions. Ethnic tensions, separatist movements, and socioeconomic disparities contribute significantly to political instability, leading to prolonged periods of unrest and conflict. Moreover, the proliferation of non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations further complicates efforts to address instability. By comprehensively analyzing the factors driving military intervention and their implications for democratic governance, policymakers and scholars can work towards promoting democratic resilience and inclusive political development.

KEYWORDS:

Democratic, Economic, Government, Political, Social.

INTRODUCTION

Many of the characteristics associated with military intervention, particularly those pertaining to social and economic factors, are also integral in understanding the political unrest that often precedes military coups. However, it's crucial to recognize that political instability can arise from a myriad of causes beyond direct military involvement. Ethnic tensions, simmering disputes, and separatist movements within a country can escalate into full-blown civil conflicts, leading to prolonged periods of instability. These conflicts may stem from historical grievances, identity politics, or disparities in resource allocation and political representation. Ethnic disputes, for instance, often arise from deep-seated historical divisions, cultural differences, or competition over resources and political power. In multi-ethnic societies, disparities in access to economic opportunities, social services, and political representation can exacerbate tensions and fuel grievances among marginalized groups. When these grievances remain unaddressed or are exploited by opportunistic leaders, they can escalate into violent conflicts, threatening the stability of the state.

Similarly, separatist movements driven by aspirations for self-determination or autonomy can pose significant challenges to political stability. These movements often emerge in regions with distinct cultural, linguistic, or historical identities seeking greater autonomy or independence from the central government. The failure of governments to accommodate diverse aspirations or address underlying grievances can lead to heightened tensions and violent confrontations, further destabilizing the political landscape. Acts of communal violence, such as sectarian clashes or religious conflicts, also contribute to political instability by undermining social cohesion and exacerbating divisions within society. These conflicts may be fueled by religious

extremism, political manipulation, or competition over scarce resources, leading to cycles of violence and retaliation that destabilize communities and undermine governance [1], [2].

Moreover, the proliferation of non-state armed groups, insurgencies, and terrorist organizations further complicates efforts to address political instability. These groups often exploit existing grievances, ethnic tensions, and socioeconomic disparities to advance their agendas through violence and intimidation, posing significant challenges to state authority and stability. While military intervention is one manifestation of political instability, it is imperative to recognize the diverse array of factors that can precipitate unrest and conflict within societies. Addressing the root causes of instability requires comprehensive approaches that encompass political, economic, social, and security dimensions, along with efforts to promote dialogue, reconciliation, and inclusive governance. Only through concerted efforts to address underlying grievances and build resilient institutions can societies mitigate the risks of political instability and conflict.

In subsequent chapters, a broader and more comprehensive view of instability will be explored. However, in this chapter, we have delved into the specific conditions that underlie military interventions in Third World politics and the extent to which they have been elucidated. Understanding military involvement is of paramount importance, particularly when it manifests in ways that undermine democratic processes, either through direct coups d'état or by refusing to reinstate democratic governance despite widespread public calls for it. Military interventions in politics often occur in contexts where democratic institutions are fragile or nascent, and where there is a perceived failure of civilian leadership to address pressing socio-economic or political challenges.

The military, viewing itself as a guardian of national stability and unity, may intervene to restore order, curb corruption, or address perceived threats to national security. However, these interventions can quickly erode democratic norms and institutions, leading to prolonged periods of authoritarian rule and political repression.

Coups d'état, in particular, represent a direct assault on democratic governance, as they involve the forcible overthrow of elected governments and the suspension of constitutional order. While coups are often justified as necessary measures to restore stability or combat perceived threats, they frequently result in the consolidation of military power and the suppression of political dissent. Moreover, coups can have long-lasting repercussions for democratic development, as they undermine public trust in democratic institutions and create a climate of fear and uncertainty. In some cases, military interventions may occur in response to popular demands for democratic reform or in the aftermath of mass protests or uprisings against authoritarian regimes. However, instead of facilitating a transition to civilian rule, the military may perpetuate its grip on power or install a new authoritarian regime, thereby thwarting the aspirations of the populace for greater political freedom and accountability.

It is therefore imperative to critically examine the factors that contribute to military interventions in Third World politics and to assess their implications for democratic governance. By understanding the dynamics of military involvement and its impact on political stability and democratic norms, policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors can work towards promoting democratic resilience and institutional safeguards against authoritarian encroachment. In subsequent chapters, we will explore alternative models of governance and strategies for building inclusive and participatory political systems that are resilient to military interference and conducive to democratic consolidation. Through comparative analysis and case studies, we will seek to identify best practices for safeguarding democracy and promoting political stability in diverse socio-political contexts. Ultimately, the goal is to advance a more

nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between military interventions and democratic governance, with the aim of fostering democratic resilience and inclusive political development in the Third World and beyond.

If empirical evidence can establish a correlation between the propensity for military intervention and various factors such as the level of political institutionalization, economic development, political participation, economic specialization, the rise of mass political parties, the state's central role in capital accumulation, the growth of a middle class, or the professional culture within the military, then such findings carry significant implications for public policies and government strategies. Firstly, understanding the relationship between military intervention and political institutionalization is crucial for assessing the resilience of democratic systems. Higher levels of political institutionalization, characterized by strong democratic norms, independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances, may serve as deterrents to military interference in politics. Governments and policymakers can prioritize efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and uphold the rule of law to mitigate the risk of military intervention [3], [4].

Similarly, the correlation between military coups and economic development underscores the importance of inclusive economic policies and equitable development strategies. Socio-economic disparities and grievances can exacerbate political instability and provide fertile ground for military intervention. By promoting inclusive growth, reducing poverty, and addressing socio-economic inequalities, governments can help mitigate the underlying causes of political unrest and reduce the likelihood of military coups. Furthermore, the role of mass political parties and civil society in shaping political dynamics highlights the significance of fostering a vibrant and participatory political culture. Governments can support the development of robust political parties, promote civic engagement, and protect freedom of expression and association to strengthen democratic governance and reduce the appeal of military intervention as a means of political change.

Additionally, the state's involvement in capital accumulation and the emergence of a middle class can influence the military's perception of its role in society. Governments can pursue policies that promote economic diversification, entrepreneurship, and social mobility to foster a thriving middle class and reduce the military's inclination to intervene in politics. Finally, understanding the professional culture within the military is essential for maintaining civilian control over the armed forces and upholding democratic governance. Governments can invest in military professionalism, promote civilian oversight mechanisms, and ensure adherence to constitutional principles to safeguard against military interference in political affairs. Identifying the factors associated with military intervention in politics has important implications for designing effective public policies and government strategies to promote democratic stability and resilience. By addressing underlying socio-economic grievances, strengthening democratic institutions, fostering political participation, and promoting civilian-military relations based on democratic principles, governments can mitigate the risk of military coups and uphold democratic governance.

Development of the economy and military action

According to an economic perspective, military intervention is encouraged by a deficiency in economic growth. Civilian administrations face the danger of being overthrown by disgruntled segments of the modernizing élite who are no longer in power if they are seen to have failed to industrialize the economy. McGowan and Johnson's analysis of military involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1956 and 1984 provides evidence in favor of this claim. They found that the frequency of military engagement in politics increased with decreasing economic

development and industrial employment levels. The authors acknowledge that causality is unlikely to follow a single path, such as coup-induced political instability impeding economic growth. The picture that remains is one of a vicious cycle in which military interventions result in economic loss and stagnation, which in turn often cause greater economic uncertainty and stagnation.

DISCUSSION

There are many ways in which economic underdevelopment might promote coups. Economic instability results from a reliance on main export items, the prices of which may vary greatly on a global scale. This is because a lack of economic diversification means that there are no substitute goods and services to counteract the price variations. This produces issues that can be attributed to governments, which is a recipe for coups. The terms of commerce have an immediate effect on a government's capacity to expand the economy and ensure the welfare of society when a significant share of tax revenues originate from the export of a single item. Attention naturally turns to the government when the nation's goods lose value on international markets. Thus, the likelihood of a successful coup is raised in a nation where the nature of its exports has led to a high degree of specialization and where the economy is heavily dependent on those export profits.

Nonetheless, there will always be elements that lessen the possibility of a coup. First, independence is getting closer. The longer a nation is autonomous, the more opportunity it has for coups to occur since governments may show they are incapable of governing. The second experience is that of military involvement, or what is often referred to as internal contagion. After one coup, another is probably on the horizon. A nation without prior experience with coups d'état is less likely to have one than a nation with a history of coups. Here, the military becomes more adept at using domestic coercion, experience in the military deters the public from supporting the government, and it becomes harder to maintain civil-ian authority in the years that follow. Third, there is a barrier due to the presence of foreign forces. If there was any possibility that they were sympathetic to military takeover, they would not have been invited in the first place with the consent of the home administration. The presence of foreign forces brought in by the civilian administration would discourage incursions by the local military, despite evidence that foreign powers actually facilitate coups rather than obstruct them. The likelihood of a coup rises when any one of these three requirements is met because it eliminates the barriers to military replacement. Exactly how recent is "recent" is a methodological challenge in this context. Nigeria had a civilian administration for five years prior to the country's first military takeover. The administration did not seem to require much time to show how ill-equipped it was to handle the tensions and disputes that arise from an impoverished economy and a divided community along ethnic line.

The culture of politics

The degree of political culture is the basis for the most persuasive political justification of military involvement. On a sliding modernity scale, Finer categorized political cultures as mature, developed, low, and minimum. Every level is connected to the military's inclination to interfere and to various forms of military action. A politically developed culture is one in which the military plays a significant part in determining defense policy, but is not given a greater role by societal norms, attitudes, or expectations. There is a general feeling of legitimacy that backs the civilian rule. On the opposite extreme of the spectrum are nations with "minimal" political cultures, in which there is almost no legitimacy for civilian administration. These nations are probably going to face the coup d'état, which is the most drastic kind of military intervention. Third World countries tend to have low levels of political culture and a poor sense

of political commitment. Here, there is a lack of faith in other groups that could rise to power as well as a lack of confidence that political demands would be acknowledged. Given that the regime's fundamental assumptions are at odds with political principles and beliefs, there may be broad public support for direct military involvement. In societies that do not believe that their current civilian government is the best that could have been created, the destruction of democracy and the emergence of authoritarianism may be acceptable.

There will be little military intervention in politics in areas where the populace has a strong allegiance to civilian institutions. If it happens at all, it will take the shape of operating behind or on top of these institutions, such as the parliament or the crown, in accordance with the prevailing political formula. In the same vein, military involvement in politics will find extensive use in areas where popular support for civilian institutions is either nonexistent or very weak. Finer's detractors have noted that this seems contradictory. Lack of unanimity is a sign of a poor political culture. By making reference to the explanation, it is meant to provide, it is defined.

The idea of political culture makes a definitionally valid claim rather than explaining why there isn't political agreement. The argument is circular in another way as military intervention is seen as proof of a weak political culture since it shows a breakdown in agreement. Therefore, circumstances that are represented by the military intervention itself are used to explain it. If the idea of political culture has any useful explanations, it is more about explaining why civilian administrations fall short than it is about the military's rightful place as the ultimate authority. Moreover, the idea fails to explain why coups happen in some governments with weak political cultures but not in others. Making intervention itself a measure of the degree of political culture is the only way to solve this issue, but doing so further tautologizes the explanation [5], [6].

Organizational elements

Understanding why the armed forces have taken control in so many nations may rely more on observations of the military than on the socioeconomic environment that Third World governments are operating in. The "environmentalists," who emphasize the impact of social and economic variables on the inclination for military action, and the proponents of a "environmental" approach have been engaged in a protracted discussion. Understanding the organizational features of the military may be essential, particularly in light of the stark differences in the experiences of military involvement between Pakistan and India despite their seemingly comparable socioeconomic situations.

Compared to other political organizations, the military seems to have several political benefits. It features a distinct chain of command and a system of superior-subordinate relationships that are closely recognized and followed. Decisions are followed without question until a consensus is achieved.

The military is prepared to launch strikes on establishments run by civilians. When the military steps in, the middle ranks of younger officers are frequently chosen to lead the coup instead of the highest ranking officers. This could be due to a number of factors, including the senior officers' too close ties to the civilian regime or the fact that the members of that particular officer corps come from an ethnic group that is worried about the use of political power. Even if the highest ranking commanders do not decide to organize a coup, those in charge of the overthrow will undoubtedly have access to an organization that will follow their orders.

It is not accurate to overstate the organizational cohesion of the Third World's military. They are often split into factions according to factors like age, education, status, religion, or tribe, which reflects differences within the larger political community. For instance, in October 2001,

General Musharraf, the military ruler of Pakistan, felt compelled to remove two of his most senior generals because they were leaders of a party that disagreed with the President's pro-American policies and were seen to be hardline Islamists. In this sense, the military should not be seen as a separate institution but rather as fully interwoven with society.

It is also noteworthy that Putnam discovered a negative correlation between the size of the military establishment and the degree of military intervention when he attempted to test the significance of variations in organizational characteristics to the propensity for intervention using data from Latin America, a challenging task given the availability of "only a few gross characteristics of the armed forces." Naturally, it is simple to reject the indicator utilized on the grounds that it is an inaccurate proxy for the variable under study as is the case with every such quantitative research. Johnson et al., on the other hand, strongly recommended "that variables specific to African military establishments must be considered in any search for the structural determinants of military intervention in African politics" after discovering from their study of politics in 35 Black African states between 1960 and 1982 that military "cohesion" and political "centrality" were positively related to military intervention.

Additionally, the military has a symbolic standing that gives them legitimacy if they decide to become involved in civilian affairs. If the military doesn't incorporate this into its corporate ideology or belief system, it could represent something important to the general public. Because of their schooling, authority structures, and technical know-how, they may be considered contemporary. Achieving achievement may also lead to symbolic prestige. The army had served in a UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo just before to the first military revolution in Nigeria in 1966. In that capacity, it had performed well, established a reputation for being efficient and well-behaved, and promoted worldwide recognition for the nation.

Some developmentalists, like Pye, contend that the military's seeming modernity is a primary factor in its appeal as a substitute for a democratic government that has shown to be ineffective. When there is "a sense of failure in the country," their logical structures—which are able to relate means to aims and are linked to fast technological growth and specialized skills—allow them to be seen as "possible saviors." The military as an organization may in part be a carrier of scientificity, while the soldiers themselves continue to carry more archaic habits. This is because, as Mazrui has argued, though the military may be a modern organization structurally, in Africa, where soldiers are often recruited from the rural and less Westernized areas, the attitudes of the soldiers toward the wider society are probably more deeply conditioned by traditionalist sympathies than by the modern characteristics of a particular profession. As a result, the military could contribute to traditionalization, at least in Africa [7], [8].

The military benefits organizationally from having a near-monopoly on the use of force thanks to its monopoly on contemporary weaponry. The use of coercion will be the decisive factor if the military does not support the civilian rule but the concept of a military government is unjustified. In this kind of political involvement, communication is also essential, especially in a big nation with several administrative hubs. The military's communications network allows them to coordinate their actions in the chaotic wake of the coup and launch simultaneous attacks on many government targets. These organizational benefits counterbalance the military's political shortcomings, which include its lack of authority and administrative experience.

There might be a connection between the military's professional culture and its political involvement. Professionalism may imply that the military's code of conduct, which recruits are inducted into and educated to follow, upholds the primacy of the civilian government. It is the responsibility of the professional soldier to follow the orders of the duly appointed civil

authority. The components of professionalism include knowledge, social responsibility, and corporate allegiance. Huntington claims that the military will be more "politically sterile and neutral" the more professional it is in this regard.

But in other cultures, military professionalism might imply entirely other things. For example, it can mean that the army believes it has a responsibility to protect the state against forces that could compromise its integrity, even if those forces happen to be civilian politicians. Therefore, Huntington's connection between professionalism and the idea of the civic power's superiority is called into question by finer. The army may prioritize defending society's fundamental values if it seems that the politicians are undermining the country and leaving it open to outside influences, both military and economic. In such case, the military serves as a tool of the country, one whose interests it is empowered to interpret, rather than as a neutral tool of the current administration. There may be adequate justification for direct military involvement in politics if the military has such views ingrained in its corpo- rate culture. This is particularly true given that there will almost likely be segments of civil society who support the military's assumption of such duty. Strong ideological underpinnings like nationalism, dirigism, morality, and "a deep distrust of organized civilian politics" may support military engagement in politics.

Outside Impact

Finally, in several cases, the military's choice to launch a coup d'état has been greatly influenced by external assistance from a foreign power. For instance, the USA helped the military of Chile topple the Allende government. There is growing evidence that the United States of America was involved in the April 2001 coup attempt against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. The Third World's national militaries are now more powerful than their civilian counterparts because to ongoing relationships with wealthy nations that have been forged via military assistance, equipment, and training. In a number of Third World coups, the impact of foreign support—via covert military, security, and intelligence organizations like the USA's CIA—has been crucial. Foreign influence has permeated Third World societies deeply through "covert operations" that involve political advice, financial support for political groups and individuals, training, economic interventions, paramilitary support for domestic groups, infiltration and co-optation of local agents and allies in corporations, political parties, trade unions, the media, and the military itself [9], [10].

As an alternative, "contagion" has been used to characterize foreign impact. At times, it seemed as if neighboring nations had shown how simple it was to carry out coups in some states and the benefits that resulted for the military forces. There is some evidence from West Africa that military leaders did "learn" about the financial benefits of assuming power and how to do so from their counterparts in other nations. These lessons were included into their decisions about when and if to interfere. But in broad terms of explanation, this reasoning can never be stretched too far since it would logically follow that military intervention would never cease as it spread from one state to another like wildfire. For South America and Africa, respectively, Putnam and Wells could not find any empirical support for the contagion theory. It is evident that there are efficient obstacles to spread. The international setting in which domestic conflict and instability arise is another example of an external effect. The size and relevance of the military forces, which were concerned with both national security and national pride, were augmented and their willingness to interfere intensified when Third World nations were at the center of regional conflicts or on the perimeter of the Cold War.

CONCLUSION

This study underscores the complex interplay between military intervention and political stability in Third World countries. While economic underdevelopment, political culture, and

external influences shape the propensity for military coups, it is essential to recognize the diverse array of factors contributing to political instability. Addressing underlying grievances, strengthening democratic institutions, and fostering inclusive governance are paramount to mitigating the risks of military intervention and promoting democratic resilience. By understanding the organizational dynamics of the military and its interaction with socioeconomic factors, policymakers can develop effective strategies to uphold democratic governance and safeguard against authoritarian encroachment. Moving forward, a nuanced understanding of the root causes of instability is crucial for advancing democratic consolidation and inclusive political development in the Third World and beyond.

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CHAPTER 7

NAVIGATING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES: CHALLENGES, PERSPECTIVES, AND STRATEGIES

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ABSTRACT:

The transition from military rule to democracy presents a fundamental challenge in establishing and maintaining civilian control over the armed forces. This study explores the complexities of civil-military relations during democratization processes, drawing insights from global experiences. Various theories are examined, including the importance of institutional reforms, fostering military professionalism, and addressing socioeconomic factors. Transparent communication and dialogue between civilian authorities and the military are emphasized as crucial for building trust and cooperation. The study highlights the necessity of multifaceted approaches to navigate civil-military relations effectively. Additionally, it discusses the role of economic crises, confrontations with revolutionary groups, and organized crime in shaping civil-military dynamics. Despite challenges, progress has been made in reshaping civil-military ties, with increased public support for democratic norms and civilian authority.

KEYWORDS:

Culture, Democracy, Democratization, Economic, Military.

INTRODUCTION

During the process of democratization, especially following the ousting of a military regime, one of the paramount challenges lies in securing and maintaining military loyalty to civilian political leadership. The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy necessitates establishing civil-military relations that are conducive to democratic governance. Drawing insights from the experiences of democratic transitions worldwide, various theories have been proposed to outline the conditions required to curtail the military's authority and foster a harmonious relationship between the military and civilian authorities. One prominent theory emphasizes the importance of institutional reforms aimed at enhancing civilian control over the military. This approach advocates for the establishment of robust civilian oversight mechanisms, such as parliamentary committees or independent defense ministries, tasked with supervising military activities and ensuring adherence to democratic principles. By enshrining civilian authority in legal frameworks and institutional structures, these reforms seek to prevent the military from intervening in political affairs and uphold the principle of civilian supremacy.

Another perspective underscores the significance of fostering a culture of professionalism within the armed forces. According to this view, promoting military professionalism, defined by adherence to ethical standards, respect for civilian authority, and commitment to constitutional principles, is essential for consolidating democratic norms. Training programs, codes of conduct, and leadership development initiatives can instill a sense of duty among military personnel to serve the interests of the nation within the framework of democratic governance. Furthermore, theories of democratic consolidation highlight the importance of socioeconomic factors in shaping civil-military relations. Addressing the material interests of the military, such as adequate salaries, benefits, and career opportunities, is crucial for aligning

military incentives with democratic values. By ensuring that the military's institutional interests are compatible with democratic norms, governments can mitigate the risk of military intervention in politics and foster a sense of loyalty to civilian leadership [1], [2].

Moreover, theories of democratic civil-military relations emphasize the need for transparent communication and dialogue between civilian authorities and the military. Building trust and mutual respect through open channels of communication can help bridge the gap between civilian policymakers and military leaders, reducing the likelihood of misunderstandings or conflicts that may undermine democratic stability. Engaging in regular consultations, joint decision-making processes, and crisis management exercises can promote a collaborative approach to governance that prioritizes national interests over institutional prerogatives. Navigating civil-military relations during the consolidation of democracy requires a multifaceted approach that addresses institutional, cultural, socioeconomic, and communicative dimensions.

By implementing institutional reforms, promoting military professionalism, addressing socioeconomic grievances, and fostering transparent dialogue, transitioning societies can foster a climate of trust, cooperation, and civilian control that is essential for the long-term stability and resilience of democratic governance.

Demobilizing the armed forces and reintegrating individuals who are no longer required by a professional army into society must come first. This is especially crucial in cases like Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and South Africa where armed insurrection has aided in the country's democratic transition.

The situation in Afghanistan, where an estimated 700,000 individuals are armed compared to the 200,000 required for a standing army, and where the majority of militias are loyal to tribal warlords rather than the government, glaringly illustrates the difficulty here.

To institutionalize civilian political authority over the armed forces, a series of organizational reforms are imperative. These reforms should encompass various facets, including but not limited to:

Enhanced Civilian Oversight

Establishing robust mechanisms for civilian oversight, ensuring that elected representatives have comprehensive insight and control over military affairs. This may involve creating specialized committees within legislatures dedicated to defense matters, with the authority to scrutinize military decisions and actions.

Strengthening Defense Ministries

Ensuring that defense ministries are firmly under civilian control, with clear delineation of responsibilities between civilian leadership and military commanders. This involves empowering civilian officials within the defense establishment to make strategic decisions and set policy directives.

Parliamentary Approval for Senior Appointments

Introducing legislation that mandates parliamentary approval for senior appointments within the military hierarchy. This ensures that key leadership positions are filled with individuals who not only possess requisite military expertise but also align with democratic values and priorities.

Regulation of Defense Spending

Granting legislatures, the authority to regulate defense spending, including approval of budgets and oversight of expenditures. This serves as a crucial check on military influence and ensures that defense resources are allocated efficiently and transparently, in accordance with national security objectives and fiscal constraints.

Professionalization of the Military Establishment

Implementing measures to fortify professionalism within the armed services, emphasizing adherence to ethical standards, respect for democratic principles, and commitment to civilian authority. This may involve reforms in recruitment, training, and promotion processes to foster a culture of accountability and loyalty to constitutional governance [3], [4].

Transparent Decision-Making Processes

Promoting transparency and accountability in military decision-making processes, ensuring that major policy decisions are subject to scrutiny and debate within appropriate civilian forums. This cultivates public trust in the military's role and enhances its legitimacy as an instrument of national defense.

Education and Awareness Programs

Conducting education and awareness programs to foster understanding and appreciation of the principles of civilian control among military personnel, civilian officials, and the general public. This includes emphasizing the importance of upholding constitutional norms and respecting the authority of elected civilian leaders in shaping defense policy. By implementing these reforms, the aim is to create a framework where the military operates within the bounds of democratic governance, with civilian authorities exercising effective control over defense policy and decision-making. This not only strengthens the democratic fabric of the state but also enhances national security by ensuring that military power is wielded responsibly and in accordance with the will of the people.

DISCUSSION

The Rule of Law must also be applied to the armed forces. The idea in Latin America that military leaders are more cohesive, well-trained, organized, and patriotic than civilian political leaders is a result of the disparity between civilian and military institutions, which has to be addressed. It is necessary to choose the appropriate incentives to persuade the military to submit to civilian rule. Reorienting military mindsets away from a protective one and toward loyalty to political leaders in the civilian world is necessary. It is necessary to reduce any overlap in the duties played by military and civilian politicians, such as by disbanding the military's involvement in domestic security.

The military leadership's involvement in defense strategy must be limited to advising duties. Political leaders must also concur that military leaders have a rightful place in the formulation of defense policy and refrain from using the armed services in dispute settlement. To maintain civilian authority over the armed forces, several critical factors come into play.

Strong Popular Support for Democracy

A robust foundation of public support for democracy and opposition to military rule is essential. This sentiment is often bolstered by collective memories of past authoritarian regimes, which serve as a powerful deterrent against military intervention in governance. For

instance, in Venezuela in 1992, public resistance to military rule was fueled by recollections of previous authoritarian regimes, contributing to the preservation of civilian authority.

Regional Coalitions in Support of Civilian Rule

Building regional coalitions that advocate for civilian political dominance can provide added leverage in preserving democratic governance. Examples such as the collaboration between South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe in 1994, which helped thwart a coup attempt in Lesotho, underscore the importance of regional solidarity in upholding civilian authority over the military [5], [6].

Timely Reform Efforts

Initiating reform efforts to strengthen civil-military relations early in the democratic transition phase is crucial. During this period, constructive dialogues between government authorities and change-oriented political leaders can lay the groundwork for institutionalizing civilian control over the armed forces.

By addressing underlying grievances and implementing structural reforms proactively, nations can mitigate the risk of military discontent and preempt potential challenges to civilian authority.

Engagement with Change-Oriented Leaders

Collaborating with progressive political leaders who advocate for democratic principles and institutional reforms is essential in driving positive changes in civil-military relations. By incorporating these leaders into discussions and decision-making processes during the democratic transition, governments can foster a sense of inclusivity and ownership among stakeholders, thereby reinforcing civilian authority over the military.

Prevention of Military Loyalty Shifts

Addressing the grievances and disaffection within the military ranks is imperative to prevent the transfer of loyalty to potential future dictatorships. By implementing measures to address the concerns of military personnel and ensuring their allegiance to democratic governance, governments can reduce the risk of disgruntled factions within the military facilitating the rise of authoritarian regimes in the future.

Maintaining civilian authority over the armed forces requires a multifaceted approach that encompasses public support for democracy, regional collaboration, timely reform efforts, engagement with progressive leaders, and proactive measures to address military grievances. By prioritizing these factors, nations can reinforce the foundations of democratic governance and safeguard against threats to civilian control from within the military establishment. Several variables influence the attainment of the prerequisites for maintaining civilian authority over the armed forces. Understanding these factors is essential for devising effective strategies to uphold democratic governance and mitigate potential challenges. Some key considerations include:

Historical Trends in Civil-Military Interactions

Examining historical patterns of civil-military relations provides valuable insights into the dynamics at play and helps anticipate potential obstacles to civilian authority. Historical precedents offer lessons on the factors that have either facilitated or undermined civilian control over the military, informing policymakers' decisions and reform initiatives.

Democracy's Impact on Military Objectives

Democracies often prioritize objectives such as transparency, accountability, and civilian oversight, which may diverge from the military's traditional goals of national security and operational effectiveness. Recognizing these differences is crucial for navigating tensions and ensuring that democratic principles do not compromise the military's ability to fulfill its core responsibilities.

Fragility of Public Support for Democracy

Public support for democracy may be fragile, particularly in contexts where democratic institutions are nascent or have been undermined by historical authoritarianism. Political parties play a crucial role in galvanizing public participation and safeguarding democratic values, serving as intermediaries between citizens and the government to mitigate disenchantment and bolster support for democratic governance.

Ethnic Composition of the Military

In diverse societies, maintaining ethnic balance within the military forces is important for fostering cohesion, inclusivity, and loyalty to the state rather than particular ethnic or sectarian interests. Ensuring equitable representation and opportunities for advancement across different ethnic groups within the military helps prevent factionalism and promotes unity in upholding civilian authority.

Considering these variables, policymakers must adopt a nuanced approach to strengthening civil-military relations and safeguarding civilian authority over the armed forces. This entails addressing historical legacies, promoting democratic participation, fostering inclusive institutions, and maintaining the professionalism and neutrality of the military. By navigating these complexities effectively, nations can bolster the foundations of democratic governance and mitigate potential threats to civilian control, ensuring the enduring stability and legitimacy of their political systems. Democratic civil-military relations are intricately linked to the restructuring of the military apparatus during transitions to democracy [7], [8]. This restructuring process can significantly influence the alignment of the military with the policy objectives of the new government, particularly in areas such as combating drug trafficking or other security challenges. Several key dynamics shape this relationship:

Military Role in Policy Objectives

The extent to which the military is involved in supporting government policy objectives, such as combating drug trafficking or maintaining internal security, can impact civil-military relations. In some cases, the military may play a central role in addressing these challenges, necessitating cooperation and coordination with civilian authorities to achieve shared goals.

Accountability of Military Leaders

Calls for accountability and transparency within the military may arise from civil society and the political establishment, especially in cases where military leaders are implicated in wrongdoing or human rights abuses. However, the next civilian government may face challenges in reconciling demands for accountability with the need to maintain stability and continuity in security efforts.

Compromises in Accountability

Achieving a balance between accountability and stability often requires compromises on the part of the civilian government. This may involve prioritizing national security imperatives or

political stability over the prosecution of military leaders for past misconduct. Such compromises can be contentious and may generate tensions between proponents of accountability and advocates for security and stability.

Long-Term Implications

The manner in which the civilian government handles demands for accountability within the military can have long-term implications for democratic governance and civil-military relations. Upholding the rule of law and ensuring accountability for abuses can strengthen democratic institutions and foster public trust in civilian authority. Conversely, failure to address grievances or impunity within the military can erode confidence in democratic governance and perpetuate cycles of impunity and authoritarianism.

Civilian Oversight Mechanisms

Strengthening civilian oversight mechanisms and institutions is crucial for promoting accountability and transparency within the military. This may involve legislative reforms, judicial investigations, or the establishment of independent oversight bodies tasked with monitoring military conduct and addressing allegations of misconduct or abuse. In navigating these complexities, the next civilian government must strike a delicate balance between promoting accountability and maintaining stability in civil-military relations. By fostering dialogue, promoting transparency, and upholding the rule of law, governments can navigate the challenges of accountability while reinforcing civilian authority over the armed forces within the framework of democratic governance.

Democratic civil-military relations are intricately linked to the restructuring of the military apparatus during transitions to democracy. This restructuring process can significantly influence the alignment of the military with the policy objectives of the new government, particularly in areas such as combating drug trafficking or other security challenges. Several key dynamics shape this relationship. The extent to which the military is involved in supporting government policy objectives, such as combating drug trafficking or maintaining internal security, can impact civil-military relations. In some cases, the military may play a central role in addressing these challenges, necessitating cooperation and coordination with civilian authorities to achieve shared goals. Calls for accountability and transparency within the military may arise from civil society and the political establishment, especially in cases where military leaders are implicated in wrongdoing or human rights abuses. However, the next civilian government may face challenges in reconciling demands for accountability with the need to maintain stability and continuity in security efforts.

Achieving a balance between accountability and stability often requires compromises on the part of the civilian government. This may involve prioritizing national security imperatives or political stability over the prosecution of military leaders for past misconduct. Such compromises can be contentious and may generate tensions between proponents of accountability and advocates for security and stability. The manner in which the civilian government handles demands for accountability within the military can have long-term implications for democratic governance and civil-military relations. Upholding the rule of law and ensuring accountability for abuses can strengthen democratic institutions and foster public trust in civilian authority. Conversely, failure to address grievances or impunity within the military can erode confidence in democratic governance and perpetuate cycles of impunity and authoritarianism [9], [10].

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There will be important political events that the new civilian administration must deal with. Factors like hyperinflation and other economic crises that erode public trust in civil-military relations are particularly significant because they divert governments' attention from the need to repair civil-military relations. Confrontations with revolutionary groups and/or organized crime may make it harder to keep the military out of civilian government duties by making it difficult to refrain from utilizing the military in police operations.

Nonetheless, there has been some progress in reshaping civil-military ties in recently democratic countries. The standards of civilian authority and military professionalism have spread and gained wider acceptance. Military commanders now understand that trying to rule has not worked well for the armed services. Politicians from the civilian world understand that a professionalized, apolitical military is in their best interests. There has been an increase in public support for ending excessive military spending, human rights violations, and military participation in commercial ventures. While coup attempts are not impossible in recently democratic nations with developed economies, they are less likely to succeed. According to Huntington, "Countries with per capita GNPs of $1,000 or more do not have successful coups; countries with per capita GNPs of $3,000 or more do not have coup attempts." He was even willing to provide the cutoff thresholds.

Armed Forces and Democratization

The role of armed forces in the process of democratization has been a subject of considerable scholarly debate. In many instances, military institutions have played a significant role in shaping the political landscape of transitioning countries, either as obstacles to democratization or as facilitators of democratic consolidation. The historical context and institutional dynamics of each country often determine the extent and nature of military involvement in the democratization process. In some cases, military dictatorships have emerged as barriers to democratization, where authoritarian regimes are propped up by the coercive power of the armed forces. These regimes often suppress political dissent, restrict civil liberties, and undermine the development of democratic institutions. Military elites may perceive democratization as a threat to their vested interests, particularly if they have enjoyed significant political and economic privileges under authoritarian rule. As such, they may resist democratic reforms and actively oppose transitions to civilian-led governance.

However, there are also instances where military intervention has paved the way for democratization, particularly in contexts where authoritarian regimes have become unsustainable or faced internal challenges. Military coups or interventions that oust autocratic leaders can create opportunities for political reform and transition to democratic rule. In some cases, military leaders themselves may initiate democratization processes, either in response to internal pressure or external demands for political liberalization. Transitioning from military rule to democracy often involves a delicate balance between civilian control of the military and the military's role in safeguarding the transition process.

The relationship between armed forces and democratization is complex and multifaceted. While military intervention can disrupt democratic processes and impede democratization

efforts, it can also serve as a catalyst for political change and transition to democracy under certain conditions. Civilian oversight mechanisms, constitutional safeguards, and efforts to professionalize the military can help mitigate the risks associated with military involvement in democratization. Ultimately, successful democratization requires a careful navigation of the role of armed forces in the political sphere, ensuring that they uphold democratic values and respect civilian authority while contributing to the stability and security of transitioning societies.

CONCLUSION

The study underscores the significance of democratic civil-military relations in the process of democratization. It emphasizes the need for institutional reforms, professionalism within the armed forces, and transparent communication to consolidate civilian control over the military. While challenges such as economic crises and confrontations with non-state actors persist, progress has been observed in promoting democratic values and civilian authority. Successful democratization requires careful management of civil-military dynamics, ensuring that the armed forces uphold democratic principles while contributing to stability and security. By navigating these complexities effectively, transitioning societies can strengthen the foundations of democratic governance and mitigate potential threats to civilian control, thereby fostering long-term stability and resilience.

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CHAPTER 8

ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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ABSTRACT:

Political movements advocating for the political self-determination of marginalized communities, often through violent conflict, are prevalent in many Third World countries. This study explores various separatist movements worldwide, ranging from Polisario in Western Sahara to the Liberation Front in Ethiopia and Ogaden. It discusses the Kurdish aspirations for a sovereign Kurdistan, the Baluchistan movement in Iran, and autonomy movements in India, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka, West Papua, Acheh, and the Philippines. The study also distinguishes between separatist movements and revolutionary movements seeking to topple national governments. It examines the challenges and motivations behind ethnic separatism, including nationalism, colonial legacies, and internal colonialism. Despite the significant obstacles faced by separatist movements, including government repression and military force, some have achieved success, such as the independence of Bangladesh, Somaliland, Eritrea, and East Timor.

KEYWORDS:

Countries, Ethnic, Nationalism, Political.

INTRODUCTION

Political movements advocating for the political self-determination of marginalized communities, sometimes via violent conflict, may be found in most Third World countries. Polisario battles to free himself from Morocco in the Western Sahara. The Liberation Front wants to bring back the Ethiopian Ogaden to Western Somalia. The Kurdish population in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria aspires to a sovereign and cohesive Kurdistan. The goal of Iran's National Resistance Council is to create an independent Baluchistan. There are movements in India for autonomy among the Tripuras, Mizos, Nagas, and Sikhs. The Chittagong tribes of Bangladesh's Shanti Bahini wants autonomy. A federal union based on self-determination for the Shan, Karen, Mon, Arakan, and Kachin peoples is part of the Federal National Democratic Front's agenda in Burma. The goal of the civil war being waged by Sri Lanka's Tamil minority is the formation of a separate state in the island's north. There are independence movements in West Papua and Acheh, Indonesia. The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines aims to grant the Muslim Moros in the southern region their independence. Since 1960, there has been a significant ethnic renaissance, and social scientists' interest has grown accordingly.

It is important to separate these groups from revolutionary movements that want to topple the current government. The goal of separatist movements is to leave their jurisdiction, not topple national governments. From the standpoint of the center, this can seem quite revolutionary; also, the movement might have revolutionary goals in addition to independence, but this is not a given. The only continent where revolutionary movements are almost completely focused on a different sort of independence is Latin America. This is the independence of an entire nation

from the oppression of an authoritarian government. The history of the nineteenth century includes a significant amount of separatism in Latin America [1].

It is improbable that separatist groups would quit up and dissolve, but it is also unlikely that they will be successful in securing complete independence for the people they represent. However, as in the cases of Nigeria, Zaire, and the Sudan, they may be destroyed by the national government's overwhelming military force. But sometimes, a separatist movement does succeed. Examples include the violent split of East Pakistan into the state of Bangladesh, the 1991 separation of Somaliland from Somalia, the 1993 separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia, and the 2002 celebration of East Timor's independence from Indonesia. The transition from integration to autonomy is often marked by military struggle, as Bangladesh's founding is an example of.

Nationalism is a common justification used by political organizations advocating for secession. Although certain groups and factions may be willing to compromise and settle for a partial split, their ultimate goal is independence. It is important to define a few words that are essential to the study before moving on to the primary goal of this chapter, which is to look at the reasons of ethnic separatism.

Breaking away

The official separation of a territory from a nation-state of which it was once an essential component is known as "secession." It's possible that the area has already seen a significant decentralization of authority. Secession, on the other hand, is total separation from the parent area such that it becomes a sovereign state in its own right, recognized as such by international law, and has its own constitution. Typically, separatist groups prefer autonomy over annexation by a neighboring nation. The 'parent' state's' political and economic ties won't necessarily end as a result of such autonomy. The likelihood of economic relationships enduring is higher, especially when they include commerce.

The parent state's central authority may make a number of concessions, such as constitutional autonomy that ends far short of secession, in an effort to quell separatist impulses. There is evidence that a degree of federalism or devolution actually lessens separatist aspirations by giving moderate nationalist leaders more clout, rather than promoting secession by enhancing the identity and resources of local minority.

The Papua New Guinean instance of Bougainville lends credence to the idea that democratic provincial devolution, predicated on efficient and responsible provincial governance, improves ties with the national government, settles disputes, and discourages rather than encourages secession.

As an alternative, the state can use repression to oppose separatism. The state's attitude toward ethnic groups, as shown in the Ethiopian constitution's imposition of "nationality," influences ethnic demands in part. Genocide, deportation, assimilation, linguistic policy, quotas in the political and bureaucratic elites, income distribution formulas, positive discrimination, cultural autonomy, and political decentralization are just a few of the responses to nationalism and separatist that have been used. Governments in South Asia have responded to separatist movements with a range of tactics, including economic subsidies, policy concessions, police limitations, constitutional barriers, election manipulation, military intervention, and, in theory, the awarding of autonomy. Brass argues that central élites make coalitions with local ethnic groups, either to support or oppose local élites, and puts state management of ethnic conflict at the center of efforts to comprehend nationalist political mobilization. According to Brass, determining how privileges are distributed among various ethnic categories, which elites within

an ethnic group state leaders tend to collaborate with, and what the implications are for ethnic group identity formation and political mobilization are all important aspects of research on ethnic groups and the state [2], [3].

Approval of a distinctive region's secession from the nation-state is uncommon among national governments, particularly when that region's uniqueness is derived in part from its possession of substantial natural or other economic resources. From the perspective of the center, demands for independence are revolutionary, and history tells us that "governmental leaders generally view attempts at secession as a threat to the authority of their regime which is so intolerable that it is worth spilling blood to prevent it." Responses to secession, for example, in South East Asia demonstrate unequivocally that "the nation-state clings above all to territory." In 1994, King Hassan of Morocco vowed to bring about another round of hostilities if the Western Saharan people supported independence in any referendum that the UN may hold.

When the East Timorese people tried to secede, they suffered greatly at the hands of the Indonesian military and local militias that supported it. As Chaliand noted, over the last three decades, formal independence from former colonial powers has been simpler to attain for a nation than it has been for a minority to secure some degree of autonomy inside a Third World state. Demands of all kinds have received an almost unanimously negative response.

Nationalist groups that are willing to accept a lesser degree of political independence may help national governments negotiate a compromise. It must be acknowledged that surveys of political attitudes, primarily in developed nations, have shown that substantial numbers, often majorities, within the ethnic groups in question are willing to accept constitutional autonomy rather than separation for their country; this conclusion is almost certainly applicable to developing nations as well. Even among those who oppose violence as a means of achieving their goals and do not support separation, surveys reveal that many people have empathy for those who use violent resistance, citing "how guerrilla struggles have been maintained for years in the face of overwhelming odds [4]."

DISCUSSION

Over time, political movements may drastically alter their objectives, replacing national independence with more modest goals like the establishment of a new federation's geographical unit, the official acknowledgment of a language, and symbolic differences. On the other hand, modest demands may become more demanding when circumstances force them to do so, as shown in East Pakistan's progression from linguistic equality to autonomy within a loose federation and ultimately to independence. The expectations of different ethnic groups differ. For instance, some have called for changes to affirmative action laws and other aspects of the current state structures in South Asia. Others have demanded changes to the government, including as decentralization and province-level autonomy. Others advocate for irredentist reform and secession as means of reorganizing the state. The establishment of a new nation-state is secessionists' ultimate objective. If there is substantial support for the secessionist cause within the afflicted territory, and if the movement is based on a feeling of nationalism within the aspiring state, decentralization is unlikely to provide a long-lasting solution.

Nationalism

In recent decades, there has been an increase in the prevalence of this style of nationalism, which may demand compromises in the shape of federalism or other forms of political decentralization. Though it may have given way to religion today, it has been stated that it was "the dominant political passion" of the second half of the twentieth century, rather than ideology based on class. Nationalism assumes that the people who live in a certain area have

some kind of unique culture. In the framework of colonialism, nationalism is a fairly simple idea; nonetheless, nationalism among minorities refers to the cultural identity and distinction that unifies a specific group and may serve as inspiration for a nationalist movement. This uniqueness is frequently reinforced by linguistic difference. A fundamental aspect of this identification and the potential desire for independence it gives rise to is the conviction that the group was once sovereign. However, political theorists have been debating the definition of a "nation," which may aspire to become a nation-state, for many years. According to one perspective, ethnic groupings only transform into countries when they come up with concepts for achieving political self-determination [5], [6].

Religion, language, institutions, mythology, folklore, culture, history, and race will all contribute to a nation's sense of identity, albeit it shouldn't be expected that these factors will all have the same influence on political behavior. But none—not even language—is enough by itself to characterize a country. In addition to cultural elements and social sensitivities, economic and political characteristics may also be seen as essential components of nationhood. National unity also stems from a shared sense of history and a place. Smith enumerates the following seven characteristics of a country, identifying "tribes" and ethnic groupings as possessing some but not all of these characteristics:

a. Cultural distinctions;

b. Geographical proximity combined with internal migration;

c. A rather big populace;

d. Outside political connections;

e. A strong sense of collective devotion and feeling;

f. Immediate enrollment with equivalent rights to citizenship;

g. Vertical economic integration centered on a shared labor market.

As stated by A. D. Smith, only the first and second characteristics apply to tribes. The first five belong to "Ethnie." Every nation has all seven. Due to the arbitrary nature of colonial borders, some post-colonial countries are collections of tribes and/or ethnic groups and as such lack at least two of the seven features: cultural distinctiveness and group emotion. Even though they often have a strong sense of cultural identification, those who support separatist movements are not always clearly separated based on ethnicity. Ethnically diverse groups may form secessionist movements. Although nationhood may be claimed, there are several issues with both subjective and objective definition that need to be addressed. The definition of "nation" used by Rejai and Enloe captures the subjectivity.

A sizable number of individuals who share one or more characteristics, such as a shared language, religion, race, history, tradition, set of traditions, or destiny, and who feel as if they belong together. It's possible that none of these characteristics are true, based on factual observation; the crucial thing is that people think they are. Subjective views that individuals form a country deserving of governmental recognition have more weight than the objective definitions provided by social scientists and historians. The assessment by Emerson regarding anti-colonial nationalism could also be applied to ethno-nationalism: "The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body who feel that they are a nation; it may be that this will be the ultimate statement when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded."

A sense of unique linkages that set one group of people apart from other groups within the nation-state gives birth to secessionist alienation. Wright states that "the sociological

characteristics of the various provincial populations are at the heart of their demands for autonomy or secession," referring to separatist movements in South Asia. All of the movements have emphasized the importance of certain identity criteria, making the people they represent minority across the country even while they are majorities locally. Religion is the main element in Kashmir and Nagaland; language is the main factor in Tamil Nadu, East Bengal, and Baluchistan.

In addition to offering a standard for nation-building, the ethnic basis of nationalism plays a crucial role in the discussion of what drives nationalism and separatism and whether ethnicity is a prerequisite for the existence of demands for political autonomy. According to the primordialist view of nationalism, countries are made up of ethnic groups that are organic and have unique homelands, languages, and customs. When these tribes want self-determination from a "polyethnic" state, nationalism results. "Ethnicity remains a powerful, explosive and often durable force," providing a strong sense of responsibility, dignity, and belonging, supports this perspective of nationalism. Its continued existence in developed industrial democracies demonstrates that modernization's pressures do not weaken it.

There are opposing theories of nationalism, such as the situationalist theory, which bases claims to nationhood on a sense of self-preservation and shared interest among people who face threats to their well-being from discrimination, "internal colonialism," and unequal economic development. When the situation justifies acting defensively, ethnic traits play a significant role in determining group identity. To articulate interests, activists are required to generate ethnic awareness. According to constructivist theory, nationalism is an ideology that the political elites use to justify their claims to power. Myths about collective genealogy, history, culture, and homeland are the foundation of nationalist ideology, which gives individuals a feeling of identity, a knowledge of current issues, and suggestions on how to resolve them. Some of the reasons put up for how political secession acts as a destabilizing factor in Third World governments are supported by these perspectives.

The extreme variety of the phenomena makes any effort to provide a straightforward causal explanation for nationalism and separatism likely destined to failure. Wide variations can be seen in the history of nationalism in the number, cohesion, and mobilization of ethnic communities, as well as in the objectives of nationalist movements, the threats that these groups pose to the stability of current states, the economic environments in which ethno-nationalism is found, and the political strategies employed by these movements. This chapter is not intended to represent a thorough survey of the literature on nationalism in the Third World. The only thing that can be done is to critically examine the theoretical stances that seem to be most helpful in explaining why a portion of a nation could desire to secede [7], [8].

Integration of politics

Ethnicity plays a major role in the political integration theory's explanation of separatist. This highlights the reality that new governments were often the capricious products of colonialism in the context of the Third World. When the European powers split their tropical dependents among themselves with little consideration for preexisting social and political borders, they created a shared administrative and economic structure and a multitude of ethnic groups linked together under colonial dominance. The portrayal of these assimilated cultures in racial and tribal categories, as well as the uneven effects of colonial educational, economic, and political experiments, further accentuated differences in caste, region, and race. Such communities were thereafter united by a nationality that was founded only on resistance to being subjugated by an outside force. The only thing that brought them together was their ambition to overthrow colonial rule. Since there was no other shared identity save anti-colonialism, the state

established by achieving independence "preceded" nationalism. Unlike when nationalism comes before the state, the nation-state was not founded on shared religious, cultural, linguistic, or racial characteristics.

According to Anderson et al., it is thus "uncontroversial" that: Afro-Asia, in particular, is dominated by newly formed nations that struggle mightily to get the complete support of their populace, something that is taken for granted in the majority of Western countries. As the new leaders seek to imbue the state with a sense of nationalism, they will be up against fierce opposition from a variety of subnational allegiances, or what we have called cultural diversity. These allegiances, which might stem from racial, ethnic, linguistic, caste, religious, or regional factors, all have the capacity to arouse in men feelings that are very similar to those labeled as nationalism. We believe that understanding the direction of change is essential. As many appear to believe, are subnational allegiances giving way to the need of nationalism? Our data indicates that this isn't the case in Asia and Africa. As modern communications and education spread and the small-scale, self-enclosed rural subsistence communities are being gone, both national identity and subnational loyalty are becoming stronger.

Over time, when cultural norms spread during the modernization process, provincial attachments should eventually be undermined. According to the diffusionist school of modernization thought, subcultures become less important as nations modernize and cultures become more unified. Loyalsties to the larger state begin to take precedence over ethnic ones. This process is influenced by four factors: mass communication, industrialization, social mobilization, and bureaucratic infiltration. When combined, these advancements result in the dissemination of culture, which could even transcend national borders. Therefore, unless a feeling of territorial identity can be developed by uniting distinct social, cultural, and political institutions, a "crisis of integration" is likely to arise after independence. When a minority is endangered by a single, politically and numerically dominant group, national integration is put in jeopardy. In countries like Nigeria and India, where there is a more "balanced" plurality of ethnic groups, self-determination may also be requested.

From this perspective, ethnic groups' demands for self-determination are seen as deviating from the road toward modernity. The "problem" facing the post-colonial state is "nation-building," or forging attachments and allegiances to the new nation-state that take precedence over the local allegiances sparked by customary norms. Following a rather stable era of unity, secession may then represent a process of disintegration or a failure to integrate at all. Similar to the modernization and development theories that give rise to this idea of integration, it obscures rather than clarifies the causes of political strife that might result in secessionist movements. The "crisis" of integration is explained by integration theory as a divergence from the normal course of political development. Secession is one kind of political "disintegration" that is described as the result of an incompatibility between old and contemporary norms, values, and behavioral patterns. Failing to properly integrate areas into the state system is seen as proof of enduring parochial attachments, often based on tribal communality, that prioritize the legitimacy of traditional communities above that of the nation-state, a contemporary form of political affiliation. Thus, it is believed that the "primordial" devotion to tradition stands in the way of progress.

All of modernization theory's teleological and ethnocentric flaws apply to the "integration" approach to the phenomena of secession. While it is true that political animosity against the injustices of contemporary nations may be seen in an appeal to historical continuity and a shared identity, this "parochialism" is not the main catalyst for political action; rather, it is a byproduct of other considerations. Understanding these additional aspects is necessary. Ignoring them as the result of disgruntled groups in society not knowing how to express their

political demands in the context of a largely made-up egalitarian and pluralistic political system is insufficient. It is a meaningless explanation of political crises to discuss national integration as if it is only a matter of minority realizing that new nation-states are the contemporary forms through which politics must be conducted. An analysis of the underlying causes of ethnic disturbance is necessary. One cannot consider ethnicity to be a primordial "given." It is influenced by a variety of political and economic factors, including regional economic rivalry, ruling elites' manipulation of ethnic identity to deflect attention from other socioeconomic conflict, and the allure of communalism in the lack of more fruitful avenues for political engagement.

Desperation at ever being able to defend one's interests via other political associations is one reason why people resort to ethnically defined activism. Additionally, there is evidence in favor of the view of post-colonial history that holds that ethnicity promotes national integration. According to Wallerstein, ethnicity in West Africa promotes national integration in at least four ways. First of all, it offers the kind of social support that is lacking from the state and extended family during times of social unrest. Second, ethnic groupings provide a variety of social and political interactions, which facilitates the process of resocialization during times of fast social change. Thirdly, ethnic groups contribute to the upkeep of a flexible stratification system by providing opportunities for social mobility, which helps to thwart the development of castes. In conclusion, they serve as a significant "channel for political strains." It is necessary to acknowledge and balance these potentialities against the inherently particularistic and separatist tendencies of ethnic emotion [9], [10].

Colonialism within

The notion of internal colonialism presents some intriguing theories as to why a minority population could feel obliged to pursue greater autonomy and perhaps secession. Hechter expanded the ideas of internal colonialism and uneven growth with application to the UK, where they were used to explain Celtic nationalism. However, the theory's genesis may be traced to perspectives on colonialism and dependency in the Third World. Regarding territorial economic and political difference in the post-colonial governments of the Third World and the ensuing calls for autonomy on the part of the groups subjected to discrimination and exploitation, it seems to have significant resonance. According to this idea, certain plural societies are split between a "core" society and one or more periphery communities, which the core principally uses for its own economic gain. Because the economies of the periphery are often more specialized than those of the core community, they are thus more susceptible to changes in global markets.

This division between the core and the periphery results from capitalism, which also causes disputes and inequities on a geographical and class level via unequal growth. During such evolution, a division of labor based on culture is developed. This cultural division of labor, a stratification structure that connects an individual's life prospects to cultural disparities and gives culture a political significance, is essential to nationalism's existence. In terms of culture, people see a common material interest. This is a prerequisite for group cohesion and cooperative activity, but it is insufficient. In order to foster solidarity with a nationalist organization, other prerequisites must be met, such as a strong reliance on the movement for advantages and "compliance with the movement's goals and procedures" being monitored by members.

The center has influence on the politics of the periphery. People from the core community hold a disproportionate number of influential positions in the state. Both the national state apparatus and its local branches in the places inhabited by minorities are affected by this. Political groups

that aim to uphold the rights of marginalized cultures may face limitations or outright prohibitions. A nationalist organization may use the state's oppressive tools selectively to suppress dissenting opinions. Racist ideologies have often been used to defend this kind of persecution.

Apart from economic discrimination, the marginalization and exclusion of an ethnic or regional minority may also manifest as cultural prejudice, which involves painting the group as inferior, dangerous, uncivilized, backward, or untrustworthy. When a disproportionately high number of members of the minority group experience unemployment, low incomes, poor health, substandard housing, illiteracy, low life expectancy, high crime rates, high suicide rates, and other social disadvantages as a result of economic and societal discrimination, such claims can easily become self-fulfilling prophecies. When minorities are prohibited from using their native tongue in the media, in schools, or in local administration, discrimination may be more obvious. Requiring that education, information, and social development be restricted to those who speak the official language is an example of an indirect approach. Discrimination may also take the form of attempts by the dominant group to downplay any ethnic differences, as is the case with Turkish attempts to demonstrate the Kurds' Turkishness or the Iranian government's assertion that the Kurds are "pure Iranians." Regimes' retaliation to nationalist organizations' agitation may very possibly include forced migration and even attempted extermination, which would increase discrimination.

CONCLUSION

The study sheds light on the complexities of ethnic separatism in the Third World, highlighting the diverse motivations and challenges faced by separatist movements. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the historical, cultural, and political contexts within which these movements arise. While many separatist movements may struggle to achieve their ultimate goal of independence, their demands often reflect deeper issues of marginalization, discrimination, and historical grievances. Governments' responses to separatist movements vary, ranging from concessions and autonomy to repression and violence. Ultimately, the study underscores the need for nuanced approaches to addressing ethnic conflicts and promoting inclusive governance to prevent the escalation of violence and instability in marginalized communities.

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CHAPTER 9

DYNAMICS OF INTERNAL COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM, AND SECESSION: A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH AND BEYOND

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ABSTRACT:

This study examines the internal colonialism concept in the context of Bangladesh's separation from West Pakistan, shedding light on the economic, political, and social disparities that fueled nationalist movements. The analysis reveals how West Pakistan's disproportionate economic advantage, political marginalization of Bengalis, and cultural identity struggles contributed to the demand for autonomy and eventual secession. The study also explores the limitations of the internal colonialism theory in explaining nationalist movements, considering cases like Biafra and Kurdistan. It concludes by emphasizing the complex interplay of economic, political, and ethnic factors in shaping nationalist sentiments and separatist movements, highlighting the need for a nuanced understanding of these dynamics. Ultimately, the study underscores the importance of adopting a holistic approach to analyzing nationalist movements, one that accounts for the intricate web of historical legacies, socio-economic disparities, and geopolitical dynamics shaping contemporary struggles for autonomy and self-determination.

KEYWORDS:

Colonialism, Cultural, Identity, Nationalism, Secession.

INTRODUCTION

The internal colonialism concept would appear to match certain separation scenarios, including Bangladesh, which was politically and economically repressed by West Pakistan while still part of East Pakistan. The majority of the entrepreneurs who went to the West at independence and were essential to the region's industrial growth gave the West wing an early economic edge. The establishment of the new country's capital in the West thereafter promoted the growth of the industrial and infrastructure sectors even more. West Pakistan benefited disproportionately from the utilization of development money, international assistance, economic and fiscal policies, foreign currency restrictions, and licensing authorities. The lack of positive discrimination that would have been required for the East to catch up further aided in the resource flow to the more developed area.

However, the transfer of East Pakistan's foreign currency gains to the West was the primary cause of the Bengalis' sense of discrimination and exploitation. Over Pakistan's post-independence history, there has been a growing disparity in per capita income between the two "wings" of the country, as well as in the relative contributions of agri-culture and industry to regional incomes, school and university enrollment, and infrastructure in general and transportation in particular.

This era's political events validate the general framework of the "internal colonialism" theory. Bengali participation in the national power elite was restricted in the early years after independence. Due to the fact that more than half of Pakistan's population resided in the East,

Bengalis held roughly 50% of the seats in the democratically elected governmental institutions. However, the proportion of Bengalis in the military élite, senior bureaucracy, and entrepreneurial elite was just 5%, 30%, and 10%, respectively. This gained special significance when the military coup of 1958 resulted in the removal of elected government and the subsequent rise to power of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. The political elite's representation of Bengalis shrank, and their feeling of alienation grew. After the government declined to acknowledge the outcomes of the 1965 and 1971 elections, the elite class in Bengal focused their energies on demanding extreme autonomy. There was a reduction in provincial authority that benefited the East more than the West. The central government's economic policies fueled aspirations for Bengali autonomy, which were sparked by administrative and political centralization [1], [2].

Despite being unique, the Bangladeshi instance raises several important questions about nationalism and secession that could apply more broadly to Third World countries. Bengalis had long been aware of their unique cultural identity and had occasionally felt compelled to express it in opposition to assimilationist policies, but they weren't forced to secede until their democratic victories were overruled by the national government. Up to that point, their agenda called for changes inside the Pakistani state. Demands for nationalism and independence were sparked more by the central government's stubbornness than by an organic expression.

The Awami League, a political organization that gained traction as Western Pakistani political forces opposed its dominance in national politics, bolstered the liberation cause. On the other side, the eventual Indian military assistance for the Bengalis and the expensive logistical challenges of governing a region divided by a thousand miles of Indian territory undermined the national cause.

It is evident that the internal colonialism thesis offers a framework for understanding secession in certain situations. But as a broad theory of nationalism and secession, it has certain flaws. The primary challenge lies in the fact that wealthy districts have called for political autonomy from the state, while many impoverished regions have not, as has been often noted in the context of industrialized nations. It might be argued that rather than being economically behind, Katanga in the Congo, Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and Biafra in Nigeria aspired to secede due to their relative prosperity, which was based on their natural mineral resources. The idea of internal colonialism is further undermined by the emergence of ethnic nationalism and secession in areas that have not yet seen significant capitalist growth, such as Eritrea, Naga, and the Kurds.

It is difficult to reconcile "uneven development," which results in overdeveloped peripheries inside developing nations, with the internal colonialism paradigm. When an area with more economic standing and de facto power wants de jure equality inside the state, a "power disparity" may arise. For instance, Kurdistan in Iraq has benefited from favorable natural circumstances and resources, particularly oil, while being among the least developed regions of Turkey and Iran. Rich natural resource wealth, however, does not protect against exploitation. Despite accounting for over 53% of state income and almost 80% of Iraq's oil output, the Kurdish regions of the country have continuously received disproportionately tiny amounts of development funding, industrial projects, and infrastructure.

Thus, it is possible to postulate that an area may become politically aggressive if it combines "ethnic potential" with a better economic position. The inability to establish successful political negotiations, particularly via national political parties, may be a contributing factor to the "faltering core." It is believed that the emergence of strong regional links between Pakistan and Nigeria has exacerbated separatist instability by centering political strife around regional

rivalry. Following independence, the struggle for political and economic dominance took on a more regional aspect. Political elites' regional orientation heightened national class divisions to the service of tribalism and regional identities and conflict.

This still begs the question of how nationalism fits into the concept of "even" development. For example, nationalism in the West Indies, East Africa, and French Saharan Africa hindered feasible federal amalgamations between more or less equally developed provinces. Another issue is how unequal growth may persist in the absence of nationalist and separatist movements; yet, developed nations may find this more puzzling than developing ones. There isn't much evidence between political or economic inequality with minority secession. There is a higher correlation between ecological stress—that is, pressure on land or other natural resources—and culturally different groups' desire for separate status [3], [4].

Horowitz made an intriguing distinction between population and geographical differences in order to explain ethnic secession and determine whether either or both are "advanced" or "backward." He makes the argument that since they were unable to compete, "backward groups" from "backward" areas have tried secession shortly after gaining independence from a colonial state. The Hausa people in northern Nigeria may have been an example if it weren't for their large population, which gave them political power. As it is, the people in southern Sudan are an example. Only in extreme cases and in response to prejudice and violence can a developed group in a developing area try to secede. One such example is Sri Lanka's Tamil population. Unless there are compelling political and economic reasons to stay in the state, an advanced group in an advanced area may want to secede if it thinks that it is undermining the rest of the nation. These differences highlight the importance of social divides that occur among minority groups and their political and economic dynamics, requiring an examination of élite and class interests.

DISCUSSION

One possible explanation for why nationalism does not always result from interethnic inequality and why dominant groups occasionally develop nationalistic tendencies is relative deprivation, which refers to aspirations for living standards that are not yet attained but to which the "deprived" group feels it is entitled. Brass criticizes this theory because it is impossible to quantify or define the relative deprivation threshold at which an ethnic group must become nationalist. The hypothesis acknowledges the statements made by the nationalists themselves as proof of relative hardship. Furthermore, "the nationalism of privileged groups, such as that of Afrikaners in South Africa, cannot be explained by deprivation theory." It is unclear, nevertheless, why objective metrics of relative deprivation should not be developed in order to compare two ethnic groups who are at odds over political autonomy, nor why the theory is inapplicable to the relative privilege cases for which it was intended. It would seem that the relative deprivation hypothesis still has some heuristic validity.

The idea of internal colonialism also fails to explain why nationalism—rather than, say, a return to pre-modern politics or revolutionary class consciousness—should be the answer to unequal growth and internal, colonial-style exploitation. Why would a marginalized community want to establish itself as a nation-state? ..The theory of uneven development then needs a more precise definition of what unevenness is than what has been offered thus far, as Orridge persuasively argued: "we need to be given some clearer idea of how much unevenness is necessary for the maintenance or growth of a sense of distinct ethnic or national feeling." It is difficult to evaluate whether the idea holds true for a given nation unless it is understood how to detect the substantial geographical variances across areas. The inequalities between UK regions that were the focus of the analysis were not derived from general statements about

internal colonialism, which means that they do not explain relationships that may need to be investigated in other countries, which further complicates the application of the Hechter model to other nations.

The collapse of the Biafran independence effort serves as an example of some of the issues with the internal colonialism concept. Conflict resulted more from rivalry for wealth, power, and patronage than from the exploitation of the Ibos or the area in which they held political dominance, despite the fact that there were clear cultural divisions and intense rivalry amongst Nigeria's major ethnic groups. In fact, dread of the opportunity that education had provided the Ibos to become dominant in many spheres of life was a major factor in other ethnic groups' animosity against them. The first military revolution of 1966 was seen by many other ethnic groups as a "Ibo coup," primarily because the majority of the young army commanders were Ibo. This was a significant event in the history of the independence effort. Among the ethnic groupings in Nigeria, the Ibos had evolved into the most "national" in many ways, seizing economic opportunities wherever they may be found. It wasn't until the community violence of 1966 started to resemble a genocide attempt that secession plans started to surface. Even even then, the whole Eastern Region of the federation, which had 5 million non-Ibo minorities out of a total population of 12 million, was included in the political entity known as "Biafra [5], [6]."

Prior to the East's oil discoveries making secession seem economically feasible, the Ibo response to local issues—such as a lack of land—had been to search for chances in other parts of Nigeria. It wasn't until they realized that, even if they survived the pogrom that started in 1966 in retaliation for what other ethnic groups, especially in the North, perceived as an Ibo coup, that Ibo members of the bureaucratic and commercial classes working in other parts of the country started to consider secession. Up until now, there had been no prejudice against the Eastern Region when it came to economic investment or income distribution. Due to the decline in cocoa prices between 1960 and 1965, the Western Region had a sharp decline in export duty earnings and lost its oil to the newly formed Mid-West Region, while the East saw a sharp increase in mining rents and royalties. Between 1958 and 1965, the East outperformed the West and the North in terms of overall revenues. Although Yorubas in the West and Ibos in the East suffered equally from this post-independence economic boom, there was worry that it was concentrated in the North. The East has seen the most rise in industrial investment up to 1964.

Ibo politics have been deeply ingrained in both national and regional politics from the early days of the independence struggle. Nmandi Azikiwe, an Ibo who went on to become Nigeria's first president, headed the National Convention of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the country's first significant political organization to function on a national level. Initially receiving support from all across Nigeria, the NCNC was later accused of Ibo chauvinism by a few leaders of the Yoruba community.

The NCNC emerged as the main political force in the East as regional politics gained importance, but it also maintained a sizable support in the North and West's non-Yoruba communities. It joined the federal government as a coalition partner after independence. Ibos dominated national politics during the military administration that replaced elected politics in 1966. Therefore, the Ibos did not seek secession in order to achieve the progress that would have been theirs in a nation where there were no regional barriers to employment and advancement. Ibo leaders did not begin to consider the idea of an independent Biafra until after hundreds of Ibo officers and troops had been killed by mutinies inside the army and until pogroms in Northern cities had raised the possibility of genocide.

There were more regions in 1966 than only the East that suggested a loose confederation for Nigeria's future. There was ambivalence across the nation over the merits of Nigerian unity. Since plans for independence from Britain started, the West had employed the threat of secession from the federation more than any other area, and the leaders of the Muslim majority in the North had also considered secession before independence. The main factor uniting the rest of the nation against Biafra was the minorities' anxieties for their futures under a divided Nigeria, which extended to all areas, including the East.

Nafziger notes that "the benefits of regional autonomy for the East increased relative to the benefits of continued membership of the federation as a result of the discovery and commercial exploitation of crude oil centering in the region in the late 1950s," supporting his claim that "the probability of secession of a regional unit from a nation-state is dependent upon the expected costs and benefits to the region from the maintenance of the national unit and those of secession from it." But independence was not prompted by oil. In the view of the Biafran leadership, it only made it a feasible tactic against the federal government. After 1959, when a new income distribution mechanism left the East with a fraction of its earlier oil profits, the proportion of oil money that accrued to the East became a significant cause of political conflict. The choice to expand the federation's membership from four to twelve states in 1967 was another significant element. By splitting the Eastern area into three states, the Ibos would only control one and would only account for one-sixth of the oil produced in the area. The Ibo core would become landlocked and cut off from the oil deposits.

The Biafra situation also raises the possibility that the development of ethnic consciousness and aspirations for self-determination may be significantly influenced by economic integration levels. Interregional commerce had little importance in Nigeria during the Biafran separation. Indigenous businesses often catered to regional markets. Almost no capital was transferred across areas. Economic integration was further impeded between 1965 and 1967 by ethnic violence. Therefore, it was believed that the costs of secession outweighed the advantages of integration, particularly after the Ibos' previous prospects for economic growth via migration were curtailed by policies of employment regionalization and pogroms [7], [8].

The importance of ethnic identity—which some would say is the primary source of nationalism—reminds us of the absence of a consistent association between nationalistic mobilization and peripheral economic position. While geographical economic inequalities may or may not be noticed by the groups they define, cultural differences are. Separatism would appear to need ethnicity as a prerequisite. However, it doesn't seem that the core community's economic exploitation is a prerequisite for nationalism, much less a sufficient one. It is necessary to look further for separatist origins than in economic ones. For people to choose independence, they must first consider themselves to be a unique country. However, ethnicity does not seem to be a necessary criterion either. The history of nationalism unequivocally demonstrates that, although empirical or subjective perceptions of inequality are necessary to support nationalism, they do not provide a sufficient explanation for it. The one thing that is definite is that every nationalist movement has always used the oppression of one group or the threat of persecution by another to justify its existence.

Not every "objective" cultural group has a strong nationalistic bent. When there is an external danger, particularly one from the state, such as assimilationist policies, discrimination, environmental harm, or the seizure of natural resources, group identification becomes crucial. Both Somaliland and Eritrea's claims to self-determination were predicated on a "consciousness of oppression." Political integration theory, which focuses on ethnicity interpretations and the competing cultural values—particularly those related to politics—of many ethnic groups, is hence appealing.

The relative strength of the advantages

The foundation of this theory is the notion that communities evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of integration and segregation. Birch has created a cost-benefit analysis of nationalism, seeing ethnicity as an independent variable that produces long-lasting identities and allegiances, mainly independent of other influences. Consequently, ethnicity need to be taken for granted and not be justified in terms of relative disadvantage, economic exploitation, or political prejudice. Although Birch bases a major portion of his argument on data from affluent nations, his addition to the nationalism debate is too reflective of Third World conditions to be ignored in the current setting.

Minority groups must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of political integration. The benefits of integrating into a larger community will fluctuate over time, and it is unlikely that this integration will be complete, defying the central thesis of the diffusionist school, which holds that social mobilization, bureaucratic intrusion, mass media, and industrialization will cause ethnic allegiances to become less important than those to the larger political unit. Ethnic communities fight against the loss of their cultural identity, even earning "psychic income" from their pride and contentment in claiming a culture that makes up for the deprivation and inferiority complex created by a dominating culture.

The small community has gained the upper hand over the large state since World War II. This is due, in part, to the fact that "changes in the international order have removed one of the main benefits to be derived from membership of a sizeable state," namely defensive and military security. The advantages of integration in a state with a costly defense capacity and a large domestic market are likewise diminished by free trade and regional defense alliances. The cost of integration may also go up if the bigger unit's economy weakens.

Second, small nations now have access to markets, financing, jobs, and investment via the growth of international organizations like the EC, OECD, and IMF, which helps to make their little economies more viable than they otherwise would be. Thirdly, there is a greater awareness of and resistance to cultural imperialism and homogeneity as a result of the mass media's influence on minority cultures and languages. Lastly, minority political activism is less expensive now than it was in the past. It is easier to assert and surrender rights. Terrorism and agitation are simpler and get immediate international attention. The security of national energy supply is increased by sabotage. As a result, there has been a decrease in the emphasis placed on the advantages of integration within the larger nation-state and in minorities' acceptance of piecemeal changes.

In light of the world's emerging areas, this theory seems quite likely. However, there are issues connected to it. First of all, it focuses more on how simple it is to make the split than on what causes certain ethnic minority to become disenchanted with the state's current geographical authority while ignoring others. It suggests that the desire for separation won't go away and will only cease when conditions are more favorable for the establishment and survival of a new, little state. However, it is evident that demand is not steady, thus it is necessary to pinpoint the causes of nationalist mobilization. When certain conditions are met, such as material inequalities, the exclusion of minority elites, the movement's organizational capacities, and geopolitical support, separation will seem like a more sensible decision than integration, providing the minority with the "maximum net advantage" and making the high risks involved worthwhile [9], [10].

Secondly, the explanation provided fails to adequately consider the organizational prerequisites for a successful independence bid as well as the fluid political environment in which it is undertaken. The ability to shape the identity of the group to be led, identification with the

community represented, leadership continuity, control over community resources, and exclusive or dominant representation of ethnic demands are organizational factors that impact a nationalist movement's chances of political success. Contextual factors, particularly the realignment of political and social forces, the willingness of elites from dominant ethnic groups to share political power, and the availability of alternative political arenas like federalism, all influence the intensity and form of nationalist politics.

Thirdly, the state's ability to use its ideological, political, and coercive machinery against separatist movements should not be undervalued. Central governments have significant capabilities when dealing with separatist areas, in addition to the more visible and dangerous tactics of using force and withholding public finances. For the sake of internal comparisons, governments may carry out a census that establishes social groupings. They are recognized internationally as having the right to engage with the separatists and the power to identify the problems and disputes that need to be politically handled. They set economic strata, manage taxes, gather data, and make capital investments. Internal migration may "alter drastically the ethnic composition of certain regions, usually diluting the indigenous populations and thus undermining possibly separatist tendencies," according to the right of governments to manage it.

In addition, central governments have the ability to use their administrative, diplomatic, and political connections to exploit differences within local communities and prevent outside funding of separatist rebels. As in the case of India's handling of the Kashmir dispute, they sometimes add foreign meddling to the list of justifications for refusing to recognize independence. Lastly, although Birch's requirements are clearly important and should guide future research, it should not be assumed that the international setting is entirely favorable to aspiring nation-states. External involvement might be in the form of tangible assistance like financial and military help, or moral support like making human rights complaints public. The provision of such assistance will be contingent upon the strategic and other foreign policy objectives of the supporting state, as well as its prior relationships with the "parent" state and the existence of ethnic kinsmen within the supporting state's borders. The latter factor may impact India's stance towards Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka, for example. The differing results of these two secession cases were largely influenced by the views of neighboring nations and global forces toward Biafra and Bangladesh.

External factors often have a significant impact on how independence battles turn out. In the brief history of the Kurdish Republic of 1946, they were definitive. Eritrea's separation was mostly driven by internal political conditions rather than outside pressure, but international cooperation is necessary for it to be viable in the long run. The United States government is currently trying to mediate a deal between the Islamic Sudanese government and the southern secessionists out of concern for oil supplies from that country. This could result in power sharing, the separation of state and religion in the south, a more equitable distribution of oil revenues, an end to discrimination against non-Muslims, and ultimately the end of one of Africa's longest civil wars. However, external help is a hard resource to get by, especially in cases when ethnic groupings cross national boundaries. For example, when ethnic minorities live in border areas in South East Asia, neighboring governments have relatively little support for ethnic secession. Boundaries that already exist have always been considered sacred. Claims, like those made by Indonesia about the province of Aceh, that independence would lead to instability and insecurity in the area may have a persuasive effect on neighboring governments. Nationalist movements must be successful in gaining foreign financial, diplomatic, and political support in addition to being adept at spreading awareness of their demands among the world's governments and non-governmental organizations.

CONCLUSION

This study underscores the multifaceted nature of nationalist movements and separatist aspirations, particularly in the context of internal colonialism. While the internal colonialism concept offers valuable insights into the dynamics of economic exploitation, political marginalization, and cultural identity, its applicability to diverse contexts remains limited. The case of Bangladesh exemplifies how historical grievances and disparities can culminate in demands for autonomy and secession, but it also highlights the complexities of nationalist movements that extend beyond economic inequality. Moreover, the study illuminates the role of external factors, such as geopolitical interests and international support, in shaping the outcomes of independence struggles. Moving forward, a more comprehensive understanding of nationalist movements necessitates considering the interplay of economic, political, ethnic, and external factors. By acknowledging the nuances of each context and the diverse motivations driving nationalist sentiments, policymakers and scholars can better address the root causes of conflicts and work towards sustainable solutions.

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CHAPTER 10

UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN DEVELOPING NATIONS: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT:

This study delves into the intricate relationship between political instability and socioeconomic factors, particularly focusing on the context of the Third World since 1945. It examines the prevalence of military takeovers, civil wars, intercommunal disputes, and their significant impacts on societies and economies. By analyzing metrics such as civil wars and armed conflicts, the study highlights the staggering toll of political instability on human lives, infrastructure, and economic development. Conceptual challenges surrounding the definition and measurement of stability are explored, considering normative biases, ideological perspectives, and the evolving focus from stable democracy to political order. The discussion extends to the role of wealth, poverty, and economic development in shaping political stability, highlighting the complex interplay between socioeconomic factors and governance. Ultimately, the study emphasizes the urgent need for nuanced approaches to understanding and addressing political instability in the Third World.

KEYWORDS:

Authoritarian, Government, Political Instability, Social.

INTRODUCTION

The Third World has seen far too many military takeovers, civil wars, intercommunal disputes, and other forms of political instability for the social sciences to pay any attention to. Since 1945, conflicts inside and between states have shifted from industrialized to developing nations; this tendency was only delayed when violence broke out in the former Soviet bloc when communist governments fell. The metrics used to gauge political instability's frequency determine how much it costs and how big of an issue it is. The analysis of civil wars, which is undoubtedly proof of the greatest degree of contention over the legitimacy of a given regime and, therefore, its stability, may provide some insight into the scope of the issue. Almost all of the armed conflicts that have occurred after World War II have been civil wars; during the latter two decades of the 20th century, there were 26 significant armed conflicts year on average. Ninety-three percent of these have occurred in underdeveloped nations. Only two of the twenty-seven were not in developing nations in 1999, and those two included disputes between states as opposed to inside them.

These disputes have huge social and financial implications. Indirectly via the loss of food supplies and medical facilities, or directly from military action, about 4 million people perished as a consequence of violent wars throughout the 1990s. During the 1980s, civil conflict claimed the lives of almost 1.5 million people in southern Africa alone. Landmines claimed the lives of 25,000 people annually around the globe in the 1990s. Over 40,000 people in Angola were physically disabled by the end of the 1990s, mostly as a consequence of landmines. Approximately 200,000 people lost their lives during the ten-year civil war in Sierra Leone, and one in five people are now refugees. The average lifespan is now just 33 years. Over 2

million people have died and over 4 million have been displaced by Sudan's civil conflict. A civil conflict has been raging in Colombia for over 40 years. In barely three months, the ethnic violence in central Africa in 1994 claimed the lives of almost 800,000 Tutsis. According to estimates, the destruction of infrastructure, natural resources, capital stock, transportation networks, and physical capital results in a loss of output that lowers GDP per capita by 2.2% annually.

There is pressure on highly trained professionals to emigrate. The effects of political unrest on the economy are seen quickly. For instance, in 2002, the instability in Madagascar only took a few months to destroy employment in the textile sector and discourage investment, costing one of the world's poorest nations £10 million a day.

The "culture of violence" that emerges as a result of civil society disintegrating, human rights being violated, government collapse, and corruption intensifying is another price. For instance, since the start of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in 1996, there have been 4,000 deaths, rising rates of poverty, suspension or arbitrary violations of civil rights by the security forces, and the pressganging of minors into becoming soldiers. In Burundi, the militias even compel children to fight. Aid organizations refer to the southern region of Sudan as a "ethics-free zone" because to the extent of the government's maltreatment of civilians. Paramilitary and vigilante organizations proliferate, sometimes operating beyond official government authority and sometimes with the implicit cooperation of the government, as in the case of Colombia, where right-wing paramilitaries and the military collaborate. Increased military spending comes at the price of economic growth and social services, which exacerbates poverty, increases insecurity, and "crowds outs" social expenditures in favor of law and order spending [1], [2].

Conceptual Challenges

Thus, it is not unexpected that a great deal of time and energy has been devoted to understanding political instability in the Third World. However, there are a number of challenges associated with the idea of "stability" that must be acknowledged in order to properly assess the causative explanations. Initially, the idea of "stability" is heavily normative. For some, instability may mean the happy removal of an abhorrent administration; for others, it could mean the opposite.

The United States of America has historically been actively involved in overthrowing governments that it opposes. What is stable for one individual may be repressive for another. Eliminating values from the examination of political stability is a challenging task. Stability is seen as deviation and a stumble on the road to development by those outside the Marxist paradigm. There has to be an explanation for this abnormality. In the Marxist paradigm, instability is seen as a necessary part of how history develops. Class conflict is an inevitable step in society's journey towards its ultimate condition. The unavoidable result of economic development's paradoxes is crisis.

As a result, some contend that handling the concept in any manner is not feasible from a scientific standpoint. An fixation with instability in analysis only suggests support for the regime that is under danger. An impartial investigation of the circumstances leading up to a specific form of political transition is necessary in order to comprehend it, particularly when such shift often involves bloodshed, fatalities, and significant economic disruption. This is difficult when political instability occurs because so many ideals are at risk. The second issue is whether stable government or stable democratic governance should be the focus of the investigation. Not all attention has been focused on the challenges facing democracy. In the 1950s and early 1960s, political science concentrated on the requirements for a stable democracy; but, in the 1960s and 1970s, this emphasis changed to a concern with

political order, whether it be in a democracy or under another kind of regime. Particularly in the US political science of the 1970s, there was a strong ideological push toward emphasizing the need of control and order above plurality and democracy.

Changes in Third World political realities, the pessimism that emerged during the first Development Decade, and perceptions of ongoing external influence over ostensibly independent nation-states and sovereign governments gave rise to concerns about the maintenance of regimes and élites, political order, and stability in policy-making. Focus was placed on the need of centralized governance, the ability of national elites to negotiate with foreign interests, and their capacity to make policy. Passive traditionalism and the competition between national and local elites were seen as barriers to successful government initiatives. Rapid economic expansion was seen as necessitating authoritarianism, with democracies seemingly exhibiting comparatively subpar growth and distribution histories. Cross-national quantitative studies, however, show that coercion, particularly when repression is partial and allows for some political mobilization by opposition parties, actually encourages rather than discourages political violence. Thus, stability cannot be ensured by authoritarianism [3], [4].

Even now, stability is sometimes seen as a goal unto itself, if not in spite of the government in question, then at least with reluctant respect for what can be accomplished with partial democracy. For instance, Diamond mentioned Malaysia's political restructuring, which has limited political competition and speech rights: "While this restructuring has brought considerable ethnic peace, political stability, and socioeconomic prosperity, it has also levelled parliamentary democracy down to semi-democratic status." It must also be acknowledged that a stable democracy might give way to a stable authoritarianism or even a stable government that would not fit certain definitions of democracy—especially those that exclude multipartyism—but that few would consider dictatorial. It is incorrect to compare the collapse of stable governance with the downfall of democracy. The extent of the failure can simply depend on how democracy is defined, as in Diamond's study of the "failure" of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, where multi-party democracy had vanished by the early 1970s in all save Botswana, the Gambia, and Mauritius.

DISCUSSION

Managing the concept of stability is challenging because it is frequently applied in a way that obscures the distinction between nations that have witnessed the overthrow of a democratic regime and the installation of a stable but authoritarian one, and nations that constantly experience civil unrest and regime change. Though the two trends are often closely connected, inclinations to "drift away" from democratic principles rather than toward instability have been a major source of worry for the health of democracy during the last 30 years. When Huntington used the phrase "going communist" to support his claims that Kerala, India, and Cuba were unstable, he was falling into a trap. The issue of coming up with a workable operational definition of "stability" comes in third. Numerous metrics have been used, including the rate of chief executive turnover, the number of violent occurrences overall, and the number of fatalities due to internal group violence per million inhabitants. Measurements of government duration, group hostility inside the political system, and the constitutionality of governmental activities have all been attempted. None of them adequately conveys the complexity of political instability. It's possible for political systems to change without necessarily creating instability.

The advantage of extending the types of events that are to be considered beyond the elite interactions that are traditionally regarded as indicators of political instability—coups, electoral violence, political assassinations, and so on—and acknowledging that what is destabilizing to one political structure may not be to another is that Ake's formulation of instability in terms of

members of society deviating from "the behavior patterns that fall within the limits imposed by political role expectations" under a constitutional democracy, for instance, a leader's reluctance to seek an election mandate can be unstable, but not under a hereditary monarchy. Certain signs of political instability seem to be of little use when they occur in tandem with the survival of regimes. The political system of governance may endure despite frequent and severe political violence, which may be linked to communal identities similar to those in India. It's possible that understanding instability is limited to hindsight.

However, this is only possible if instability is interpreted as circumstances that result in the overthrow of a government. Whether or whether they result in the overthrow of a government, indicators of political instability should be regarded as significant and expensive events whose origins and effects require to be studied. Thus, among the effects of civil war, riots, disputes between communities or religions, and other unlawful behavior is the violent transition from one type of government to another. The element of time comes in fourth. To be considered stable, a country must not only be devoid of certain things, but also have a defined length of time during which it must not experience any destabilizing influences. It is difficult to determine the exact moment of instability, particularly in light of the fact that years of intermittent political violence coexist with stable democracies, while a short-lived battle may topple one government. Despite these challenges, a lot of work has gone into explaining political instability, which is often understood to be the inability of a governmental system to endure over an extended length of time. We shall now look at these justifications.

Riches and Poor

First, it is believed that growing wealth increases the likelihood of stability, particularly in nations with democratic governments. On the other hand, extreme poverty has been identified as a primary contributor to political instability. For instance, in his writing on Asia, Brecher said that "most of the new Asian states still maintain that all-pervasive poverty undermines government of any kind" and that "people who live at the margin of subsistence are either indifferent or hostile to government." Thus, political violence is more likely to occur in poorer nations than in richer ones. Kenya is a modern illustration. Over 70% of people are unemployed, and half of the population lives below the poverty level. Banditry is widespread in the regions, and organized crime is on the rise. There has been a surge in violence; in December 2001 alone, political disputes between ethnic groupings claimed the lives of 148 Kenyans. Election-related violence is common; in the years leading up to the 1992 elections, more than 1,500 individuals lost their lives. Political instability should thus decrease as a nation's wealth and per capita income rise.

There have, nonetheless, been several undeveloped, impoverished nations with stable political structures. Rather than democratic governments, authoritarian ones are what they have in common. In fact, it seems that a dictatorship is more likely to remain stable the poorer it is. It is also possible that wealth and economic expansion might precede political stability as opposed to the other way around. Certain politically stable countries came to be before they were wealthy. In a similar vein, certain totalitarian governments have also been successful in establishing stability prior to economic growth. Due to the many obstacles that prevent the impoverished from taking meaningful political action to protect their rights and interests, poverty and political stability may coexist. Even having the ability to cast a ballot, electoral frauds of many kinds may readily undermine the authority of the voting booth. It is still easy to buy votes in underdeveloped cultures. Poverty also means that because of the social and financial costs involved, successful court appeals against the strong in the economy and their bureaucratic friends who delay the execution of government changes are unusual [5], [6].

The poor's isolation as economic actors peasants, for example who toil their own land and provide their own labor in scattered fields limits their ability to mobilize politically. Similar experiences might be had in certain industrial settings, like mining, where people are housed in secluded industrial communities and given necessities at the workplace. They may form a union, which might serve as a significant catalyst for political unrest. However, union participation could be limited to working problems rather than political ones that impact individuals in other capacities. A significant collective organization of the working class is impeded by the fragmented structure of small enterprises, which further limits the political power of numerically weak industrial workers in the Third World. Radicism may arise from awareness of the widening gaps in society, but this may be readily restrained by populist and clientelist political integration strategies, as well as governmental repression, "which facil- itate state control and regimentation." Households and manufacturing units are likewise separated in the informal sector of the urban economy. Separate producers encounter hostile social groups on their own, such as landlords, merchants, moneylenders, bureaucrats, and wholesalers, who might take advantage of them and further weaken them due to clientelist connections, in order to achieve minimum amounts of capital. It is hard to establish class awareness, or even group consciousness, as the foundation for political organization.

In addition, rather of having a shared experience that may serve as a foundation for exploitation and a shared sense of identity, the impoverished are in competition with one another. Instead of bringing people together, poverty increases competition for limited resources, such as the right to own or rent property, work, loans, access to grazing areas, water, and tools. The informal sector's participants compete with one another for inexpensive goods to exchange. People with such experiences don't become more unified. The instability of living in shantytowns and the ongoing fear of eviction further erode solidarity for individuals who have moved from rural to urban poverty.

The competition of urban life and work has fostered tribal affiliations, which have been a significant cause of violence between Africa's rural and urban poor. Ethnic groups have been one means of mutual support and security for immigrants into metropolitan areas, and competition for employment has been a particularly powerful influence in escalating ethnic hostilities.

There is limited chance to engage in political activities due to the daily grind of labor-intensive physical labor. For women in particular, this issue is really serious. In Third World civilizations, poor women cultivate, market, and work as wage laborers in addition to doing a lot of household tasks. This might include transporting heavy loads of water over great distances to service the house. It is difficult to convince individuals to walk the little distance between political meetings given the pace at which energy is expended and the insufficient dietary replenishment. Political involvement cannot be maintained by the physical strain and malnourishment that the impoverished endure.

Engaging in politics has significant dangers for the impoverished as well, particularly when it comes to upsetting those who rely on them, such as employers, landlords, moneylenders, and others with better social standing. These individuals are all involved in the local political process, and effective political agitation on the side of the impoverished might jeopardize their interests. Through systems of reciprocal duties within the traditional framework of the local community, relations of reliance provide help to the impoverished. In difficult and needful times, kinsmen will provide a hand. Because kinship networks are made up of both affluent and poor individuals, it is difficult for the impoverished to participate in political action because it may seem dangerous to their own relatives. Similarly, even while the goal of political activity is to better circumstances for members of that class, it may be seen as endangering other

members of the kinship group. Family relationships transcend class boundaries, which further lowers political awareness. Political activity carries a further danger of harsh official persecution.

Extreme parochialism, low literacy and education rates, and reverence for customs, religion, and authority all further diminish the poor's capacity for political organizing and communication. The mass media is not widely accessible. Additionally, it is hard to organize and form a union when much better organized businesses have access to huge labor reserves. Joining groups like labor unions, which are controlled by males, may make women hesitant. The need for leadership to come from the intelligentsia and from persons with knowledge and experience outside of the countryside is another barrier impeding political organization, whether it comes from workers or peasants. The Roman Catholic priesthood has been a vital source of organization, leadership, and consciousness-raising in several sections of Latin America. In conclusion, the impoverished endure cultural subjugation, which sometimes stems from colonial racism. Ideological strategies are used to establish subjugated groups—such as women in most nations, untouchables and tribal people in India, and native Americans—as subservient. One of the main goals of this kind of philosophy is to ingrain the idea that submission is inevitable and natural [7], [8].

The growth rate

An alternate theory holds that political stability depends on the pace of economic development. The harder it is to preserve stability, the faster development happens. Societal groups that experience rapid economic development often feel themselves left behind in the advancement of society. Their economic pursuits, professions, and skill sets become less significant than they once were. Previously significant groups are left out of the new economic opportunities that arise while a community is modernizing, changing its economy from subsistence or small-scale production to industrialization or the commercialization of agriculture, and adopting new technologies. Peasant owners, for instance, may become members of the rural proletariat. Losing prestige and autonomy leads to discontent. By severing the links that kept individuals in a social hierarchy, economic progress creates chances for social mobility. Individuals who would not often be expected to experience economic independence now have new opportunities for it due to the emergence of new economic vocations. These new responsibilities and beliefs weaken the ties that bind the village community, kin group, and family together.

Village elders, tribal chiefs, traditional healers, magicians, craftsmen, priests, and other individuals who are being driven from their positions of status and power by the new sets of values clash with those new roles that are acknowledged in the modern economic context but are not acknowledged in the traditional context. People whose connections to their kinship groupings, extended families, castes, and classes are becoming slacker due to industrialization and commercialism displace these groups. In the larger economy, cottage industry and subsistence farming lose importance, and the village's role as a community is diminished. Atomized people are brought together to form communities. The continuation of ties based on ethnicity may help to lessen the problems brought up by such developments. However, these individuals may then turn into rivals for the benefits offered by the new economic arrangements and a fresh hotbed of political unrest that the system might not be able to control. People move from rural to urban regions when the economy shifts from one centered on agriculture to one centered on industry.

Rapid urbanization is likely to occur in industrializing nations with strong economic growth rates and industrial capital acquired from surpluses produced in one way or another by the

commercialization of agriculture. The changes taking place in the countryside will cause disruptions to daily life, taking away people's means of subsistence and forcing rural residents to seek employment in cities. Extremism and activism are prevalent in the Third World's emerging metropolitan regions. There is a high rate of unemployment. It is the combustible forms of political expression that draw in urbanites. Urban political organizations provide marginalized populations opportunities for social mobility, prestige, and power, making political involvement even more alluring. Activating politically may have relatively low opportunity costs in urban areas populated by a large number of "marginalized" individuals. It is not surprising that the process of urbanization is thought to be a major cause of political instability in the Third World given the prevalence of poverty, unemployment, income inequality, insecurity, poor working conditions, and poor health, as well as the absence of government provision for the poor and the differences in political power that exacerbate wealth disparities.

People whose ties to the status quo are shifting will be at the forefront of mass movements demanding significant political change as a result of the rapid economic progress. The number of these déclassés rises with rapid economic expansion because these groups are less closely linked to their families, tribes, classes, and castes, and because the means of production and income distribution change. The social and political order is challenged by the nouveaux wealthy via their economic clout. The fact that the nouveaux pauvres are resentful of their poverty is especially noteworthy since economic expansion has the potential to dramatically increase the number of losers. Fast growth concentrates wealth in a small number of hands because prices rise more quickly than salaries and robots replace humans due to technical advancements. In these circumstances, welfare arrangements to make up for financial hardship are improbable, particularly in the early phases of industrialization. In addition, there will be those who, although experiencing some absolute benefits from economic expansion, discover that their relative standing has declined. This will add to their discontent and highlight the inconsistency between the distribution of political and economic power. Furthermore, fast economic expansion may result in a drop in consumption levels. It could be necessary to lower living standards in order to achieve the necessary rate of savings. Thus, "the absence of rapid economic growth or decline should be regarded as conducive to social and political tranquillity, and economic stability is what that is."

Given that many Western nations have seen faster development rates after 1945 than at any other time in their history without experiencing political instability, this compelling a priori logic has come under scrutiny. There may be other variables at play in emerging nations given the existence of European and Scandinavian nations with notable histories of both political stability and rapid economic development. Additionally, one must refrain from crude representations of "traditional" and "modern" culture. As Ake notes, role uncertainty and disorientation need not result in animosity and alienation, but rather might foster feelings of affinity and group identification. Industrialization has the potential to be integrative, laying new groundwork for social connections like class. Tension may be decreased and causes of conflict eliminated via social distinction. Instead, then creating instability, new modes of political engagement might be beneficial. Although economic modernization has the potential to cause instability, this does not always indicate that it will [9], [10].

It seems that some conditions in emerging nations, when coupled with fast economic expansion, lead to political instability. It's also feasible that a nation's high pace of economic development is facilitated by political stability. It does not follow that impoverished agricultural cultures would have political stability and rapid development at the same rates as sophisticated industrialized nations. According to Booth's study on Central America, the

working class's relative and absolute living standards were lowered by industrialization and the region's fast agricultural expansion, which led to worker uprisings against national governments. The public outcry only subsided when governments, like those in Costa Rica and Honduras, reacted with measures to lessen inequality and raise the actual worth of salaries. "Opposition mobilization and unity increased and led to a broad, rebellious challenge to regime sovereignty" in cases when the state reacted with repression.

CONCLUSION

Political instability in the Third World since 1945 has been characterized by a myriad of challenges, including military coups, civil wars, and intercommunal conflicts. The impacts of such instability on human lives, economies, and governance structures are profound and far-reaching. Despite efforts to conceptualize and measure stability, inherent complexities and normative biases persist, complicating our understanding of this phenomenon. Socioeconomic factors such as wealth, poverty, and economic development play pivotal roles in shaping political stability, yet their interplay is nuanced and multifaceted. As we navigate the complexities of political instability, it is imperative to adopt holistic approaches that address the root causes and dynamics at play. By fostering inclusive governance, socioeconomic development, and conflict resolution mechanisms, we can strive towards a more stable and equitable future for all nations, particularly those in the Third World.

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CHAPTER 11

DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY: UNDERSTANDING THE REVOLUTION OF RISING EXPECTATIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

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ABSTRACT:

This study explores the concept of a "revolution of rising expectations" in the context of economic downturns following periods of robust economic expansion. It examines how individuals, fueled by optimism from economic growth, develop heightened expectations for improvements in their quality of life, only to find those expectations unmet due to downturns. The study delves into the resulting frustration and discontent among populations, which can manifest in various forms of political action, ranging from peaceful demonstrations to violent conflict. Additionally, it analyzes the role of government responses to economic downturns in exacerbating or mitigating political instability. Drawing from psychological and historical perspectives, the study highlights the intricate relationship between economic conditions and political stability, emphasizing the importance of addressing disparities and fostering inclusive growth to mitigate risks of instability. This study underscores the importance of proactive measures to address economic inequalities, promote inclusive growth, and foster responsive governance to mitigate the risks of political instability. By addressing the underlying grievances of marginalized populations and fostering a sense of social cohesion, policymakers can work towards building more resilient and stable societies in the face of economic challenges.

KEYWORDS:

Economic, Government, Population, Political Instability.

INTRODUCTION

An economic downturn following a period of robust economic expansion can trigger what is often referred to as a "revolution of rising expectations." This phenomenon arises when individuals, buoyed by the optimism of economic growth, develop heightened expectations for improvements in their quality of life, only to find those expectations unmet due to the downturn. This dissonance between rising expectations and actual outcomes can fuel frustration and discontent among the population. When people perceive their standard of living as stagnating or declining despite initial promises of progress, they may become disillusioned with the existing political order. This disillusionment is compounded by the realization that the benefits of economic growth have not been distributed equitably or have failed to reach certain segments of society. As a result, individuals who feel left behind or marginalized may express their grievances through various forms of protest, dissent, or even rebellion. The frustration stemming from unmet expectations can manifest in diverse ways, ranging from peaceful demonstrations and advocacy to more disruptive and destabilizing forms of political action. Social unrest, civil disobedience, and even violent conflict may erupt as individuals seek to voice their grievances and demand change.

Moreover, the manner in which governments respond to economic downturns can further exacerbate political instability. Heavy-handed measures, austerity policies, and repression of dissent can deepen social divisions and erode trust in institutions. Conversely, proactive efforts to address economic inequalities, provide social safety nets, and promote inclusive growth can help mitigate the risks of instability. The "revolution of rising expectations" underscores the intricate relationship between economic conditions and political stability. As societies navigate the complexities of economic growth and downturns, policymakers must be attentive to the dynamics of public expectations and work to foster inclusive and equitable development to mitigate the risks of instability [1], [2].

The change brought about by increased expectations

An economic downturn may occur after a time of strong economic expansion. Then, there may be a "revolution of rising expectations," which would imply that individuals whose expectations are growing faster than the economy can meet would get frustrated if there was a downturn in prosperity after a time of sharply rising economic growth. Because of the probable methods in which those who are denied the rise in their quality of life that they had expected would vent their anger, this may be politically unstable. Drawing from Marx's observation that we gauge our desires and pleasures primarily through social comparison rather than the objects that satisfy them, and de Tocqueville's conclusion that "Evils that are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable once the idea of escape from them is suggested," Davies provides a largely psychological explanation of one specific type of instability, positing that "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal."

An unbearable disparity between expectations and reality arises as a result of the economic turnabout, causing worry and annoyance. "Since the revolution is sparked by an unsatisfied mental state rather than the concrete provision of "sufficient" supplies of food, equality, or liberty, political stability and instability ultimately depend on a state of mind, a mood, in a society." Some say that deprivation does not cause revolution, but rather abruptly reduces the chances of continuing to improve one's circumstances in accordance with expectations. Expectations of advances in the satisfying of wants must be under "a persistent, unrelenting threat" in order to be in a "revolutionary state of mind." The concern that "ground gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost" is the "crucial factor." A J curve may be used to illustrate the connection between the expectations and actual fulfilling of demands.

According to Davies, this thesis applies to not just the French, Russian, American, and Egyptian revolutions, but also the 1952 Egyptian revolution, which culminated in an army officer coup d'état after a string of strikes, peasant uprisings, and urban riots. He notes that hopes for better times started in 1922 when the British granted limited independence, and they persisted after World War II with the rise in manufacturing and exports. Between 1945 and 1951, the world's demand for cotton collapsed, leaving a third of the labor force unemployed, rising inflation, a humiliating loss to the newly formed state of Israel, corruption in the administration, and shortages of food and oil destroyed hopes for further advancement. When the predicted benefits of independence did not materialize, the promises made by nationalist movements added to these issues.

This concept is applicable to the present danger to Argentina's political stability. When hyperinflation was stopped, exchange restrictions were removed, state monopolies were privatized, and the peso was fixed to the US dollar, relative prosperity seemed to be assured. But all of this was abruptly jeopardized by a significant rise in the value of the dollar, which increased the cost of Argentine exports and led to deflation. The rising expense of servicing

the nation's foreign loans made this worse. The IMF advocated for a "zero deficit" strategy, which entailed slashing public employees' pay and benefits by 13% and lowering investment, which further slowed economic development.

The middle class suffered greatly as a result of the peso's depreciation when banks were stopped and companies were forced to shut. By mid-2002, the unemployment rate had risen to 25%. The impoverished faced more social hardships, with one-quarter of small children suffering from malnutrition. The percentage of people living in poverty is above 53%. Such a sudden decline in people's well-being resulted in violent protests, looting, strikes, increased crime, and a decline in trust in democracy. Environmental issues like deforestation and land degradation, which decrease economic production levels and force populations to relocate, are other modern elements contributing to views of a growing divide between actual and predicted levels of prosperity.

Outside Factors

The significance of external factors is emphasized in some theories for instability. Debt and reliance have a destabilizing effect on governments in Latin America since they negatively impact their ability to conduct their economies. Nevertheless, more explicitly political considerations either moderate or operate independently of these economic impacts. As shown in the cases of the Cuban Revolution in Latin America, military takeovers in nearby nations, and the United States' stance on dictators and democracies, international demonstration and dissemination may be significant. Aid is being used more and more as a weapon against political activities, even while it is moving toward democracy. Authoritarianism, militarism, and restrictions on civil freedoms have all been encouraged by perceived or actual external threats to national security [3], [4].

Race and ethnicity

There is another element that has garnered a lot of attention that is connected to the destabilizing influence of economic and social modernization. This is ethnicity and the issues that arise when a person's allegiance to their ethnic group supersedes their allegiance to a newly formed state. This issue is frequently referred to as the nation-building or integration dilemma, as we saw in Chapter 9. There are many who see nation-building as a moral and psychological exercise intended to refocus people's allegiances on a different political organization. However, in most Third World countries, innate bonds based on race, tribe, language, or religion have been and continue to be very strong. They have caused great division and often give rise to violent insurgencies. Ethnic aspirations, which range from secession to equal rights, increased political involvement, an end to social and economic discrimination, and the preservation of cultural traditions, are today the main cause of violent political strife in the Third World. In multiethnic societies, democratization is quite challenging.

When new governments emerged and people's major political allegiances were directed toward organizations other than their own country, the issue of national integration arose. Because the country, its political institutions, and its methods of governance did not enjoy the same degree of legitimacy as more fundamental objects of attachment, public officials found it difficult to maintain their feeling of legitimacy. Furthermore, historical hostilities, rivalry for limited resources, the disproportionate advantages of modernity experienced by certain ethnic groups, and exclusive ethnic occupational specialization and "division of labor" are all contributing factors to ethnic conflict. Ethnic hierarchies and differences in material well-being are remnants of colonial discrimination. The declaration of one language as the "official" language and the exclusive right to govern asserted by some ethnic groups have increased fears of political dominance.

DISCUSSION

The way ethnic diversity is organized and handled will determine whether or not it poses a danger to political stability. The degree of group cohesiveness, the methods and tactics of leaders, the kind of political system faced, and outside support all influence the kind and scope of ethnic conflict. When there are cross-cutting identities instead of a correlation between ethnic, religious, regional, and linguistic cleavages, ethnicity loses relevance. In addition, instability is less probable in areas with a multitude of tiny ethnic groups and more likely in areas with a few major ethnic groups whose disputes control politics; in this sense, compare Tanzania and Nigeria. Lack of agreement on political ideals has often been associated with cultural plurality, which has been seen as practically a sign of political underdevelopment. Then there's what's often considered to be a political cultural issue.

The culture of politics

This prompts an examination of a set of overtly political impacts on stability. Third World political cultures have been proposed as one factor for instability. An early 1960s attitude study conducted by Almond and Verba, the findings of which were published in The Civic Culture in 1963, marked a turning point in this field of inquiry. Interviews were conducted with samples of individuals from various civilizations who were thought to be at varying phases of political development in order to gauge the degree of adherence to a certain political system.

Political culture is often understood to be the subjective assessment of political actions and establishments. It is a set of principles, values, and ideas about how a political system ought to operate. "Political culture," with certain exceptions, refers to standards of assessment of the political game's rules. Some political scientists have restricted the idea to moral principles pertaining to political processes, such as who should choose political leaders, how they should conduct themselves, and how decisive choices should be reached. Almond and others expand on this by arguing that government involvement in some sectors of the economy and society is legitimate.

The legal limits of the state and the procedures for transferring power are examples of cultural values. The result of beliefs about where and how to create territorial borders is nationalism and secession. Political culture also includes beliefs about individual political engagement, rights to participate, and the likelihood of political action being successful in a particular political system. Attitudes regarding other participants and their roles as political actors are also covered. Not every aspect of society may be encouraged to participate and be involved in politics. Women, for instance, may not be included.

The significance of political culture as a source of agreement or disagreement is intimately tied to the notion of shared values in the context of cultural heterogeneity as a significant issue for Third World governments. It is believed that a broadly held set of beliefs and perspectives about the political system leads to stability. The idea of political culture and its application to the explanation of change have drawn criticism. First, there is a causality issue with the assumption that certain political cultures are helpful in maintaining particular kinds of political systems, and that systems will change if there is no congruence between culture and system because of a lack of legitimacy and consensus. Political culture shouldn't be seen in an overly prescriptive manner. A large body of literature assumes that the causation line points in this manner [5], [6].

The claim that instability results from the plurality of political cultures present in many Third World countries and the blending of a number of relatively distinct communities into a single nation, each with its own set of values regarding the proper functioning of government and,

more specifically, the reliability and legitimacy of other players in the system, is flawed in another way. This is because a significant portion of the political unrest that Third World nations have seen seems to align with generally held beliefs. Many political movements in the post-independence era, as well as some of the dispersed nationalist movements fighting for independence, have been driven by the belief that the only way to protect one's own interests is to obtain and maintain a monopoly of power to the complete exclusion of other groups when possible. The state has drawn the attention of political organizations looking to monopolize power rather than share it in a spirit of mutual respect with other groups because of its importance in social and economic terms. Such widely held beliefs about power have had a very unsettling effect.

Therefore, the idea that culture implies shared values as an explanation for stability is no longer valid if certain shared values promote stability and others do not. It turns into a circular argument, at the very least: stability happens when people in a society have ideals that promote stability. What those common ideals are will determine this. Saying that a society will be stable only if a sizable enough portion of its members have similar ideas on how to run political affairs is insufficient. This has nothing to do with the question of how many is enough. Political culture writers recognize that within any given society, there are likely to be several schools of thought on the correct purpose of government, how it should be run, and the political roles that various community segments should play. It remains unclear how much of society needs agree with one perspective on how the government should operate in order for there to be enough agreement to maintain a political system that reflects those common ideals. To what extent is the culture need to be homogenous and broadly shared?

Another problem emerges if we presume that there is a crisis of legitimacy when a segment of the populace disputes government regulations because they believe they are morally dubious and do not consider it unethical to alter the constitution to serve their own interests. It is difficult to foresee how far people would go from the accepted standards only by knowing that they don't think any or all of those regulations have any moral value. If people aren't willing to transgress the rules, they may feel that they don't deserve their moral approbation. This is a common political conundrum. If a system is shown to be easily abused, it may lose its moral authority. However, following the current rules as they are written may not be as harmful as acting against some of the rules because others are being bent and violated.

This poses an additional challenge to the notion that political culture determines stability. It is hard to predict how far individuals may go from moral respect for the government alone, much alone whether such deviation will occur as a result of that absence. There is a lot of election malpractice and regular rule breaking in the Third World. Is there a problem of legitimacy here? Unless instability is characterized as disobedience to the rules, it does not always result in instability. Therefore, it does not seem to be a very helpful theoretical explanation to state that political instability would occur if there is a lack of agreement.

Lastly, the idea of political culture suggests that opinions and sentiments toward politics are a reflection of well-reasoned decisions and a high degree of understanding of the implications of political systems for specific interests. The concepts of hegemony and false awareness have no place here. However, the ideals and values that people hold dear in terms of governmental institutions may come from socioeconomic groups that are determined to preserve their own dominance. Different sets of ideals would challenge that hegemony. The concept of socialization and the transmission of political ideals from one generation to the next is somewhat taken up in the literature on political culture. However, socialization—the process by which one generation imparts values to another that are at odds with their class interests—is defined as a generational phenomenon rather than an issue of class. The notion that some

political power is derived from delusions and the capacity to win support for social structures has far-reaching consequences for all fields of political science. Understanding the political awareness of certain groups in Third World cultures is crucial to comprehending why such extreme forms of deprivation, injustice, and inequality are tolerated in these societies. What has to be considered an essential aspect of political power is not truly addressed by the notion of political culture [7], [8].

Unfairness

Aristotle is credited with proposing the idea that social equality would provide peace and stability in the face of political volatility. In the Third World, where there are "deep, cumulative social inequalities," this ought to be very pertinent. Although there is no geographical pattern to the developments in inequality in the Third World, global inequality has grown over the last 30 years, mostly due to population growth in countries like China. A comparison of the percentage shares of income of the wealthiest and poorest 20% of the population in the nations with the greatest and lowest levels of inequality shows the scope of the issue in emerging nations.

It is not necessarily the case that the nations with the lowest levels of inequality are also the wealthiest in the world, and vice versa. However, none of the Third World nations have low levels of inequality. Third World countries confront significant challenges if political instability stems from inequality; but, instability may also be linked to relative equality, although mostly in nations transitioning from communism to democracy.

According to a reasonable perspective, there will be anger and dissatisfaction with a decision-making system if there are significant disparities as it is either unable to correct the imbalance or dominated by those who want to maintain the status quo. Political violence is expected to be highly predicted by economic inequality, in part because the urban poor, who have more capacity for collective mobilization, will be disproportionately affected by it. There is some evidence, such as land-holding patterns, that links political instability in developing nations to material disparity. According to studies, the least developed nations with uneven land distribution are less stable than those with land inequality who also have access to other sources of wealth and steady income levels. This pertains to the economic backwardness thesis, which holds that wealthy nations can meet all of their demands but impoverished nations cannot create enough money to meet their fundamental requirements and maintain an acceptable and secure quality of life for their citizens.

However, other studies that used land ownership as a measure of inequality and political violence as an indicator of instability found that while revolutionary violence in El Salvador and Nicaragua has been preceded by high levels of landlessness and unequal land ownership, other countries in the same region that have similar inequality have remained relatively peaceful and stable. Agrarian disparity could only be a component of total income distribution inequality rather than acting on its own. Measuring land inequality is crucial because, in Mexico, China, Cuba, and Bolivia, political victories and even revolutions were preceded by high rates of landlessness, suggesting that landlessness—rather than the distribution of land among the landed population—may be a better predictor of instability. Nevertheless, a thorough cross-national multivariate research has shown that there is no statistically significant correlation between political violence and landlessness [9], [10].

On the other hand, stable nations tend to have more equitable income distributions. However, it must be acknowledged that inequitable civilizations that have still seen a great deal of stability seem to contradict the concept. One example would be India, which is often mentioned as a stable democracy—at least in terms of the Third World. It clearly relies on the stability

measurement technique used. It seems that not all forms of inequality pose a danger to the current order. One of the most obvious examples of this is gender disparity. The distinguishing feature of gender relations in the Third World is discrimination against women in politics. There are few women who are citizens. Three-quarters of the world's population, or 43 nations, were studied, and the results showed that "in no country do women have political status equal to men's." Women are disproportionately responsible for running the family and home, which takes time away from their political engagement.

In political institutions and organizations, particularly political parties, women are glaringly underrepresented. Only in the Seychelles and the Caribbean do women hold more than 20% of Cabinet-level ministerial positions. In Asia and the Pacific, the percentage is less than 5%. Women hold at least 20% of sub-ministerial posts in the executive branch in only 11 developing nations. Women make up no more than 15% of national lawmakers on average throughout all Third World areas. Table 10.2 demonstrates that even among nations in the same development category, there are significant differences. However, in the Third World, the state is characterized by a "gendered hierarchy" that, particularly in Islamic regimes, marginalizes and excludes women via misogynistic social and religious norms that confine them to the home. Due to the advent of multi-candidate elections that permit discrimination in favor of males, women's political engagement has actually decreased in China as a result of recent economic and political changes.

Cultural patriarchy persists in barring women from entering politics, even after periods of democracy during which they had been significant players. Restoring "normalcy" often means limiting women's responsibilities, particularly in the public sector and politics. For instance, women in Latin America have been particularly vulnerable to renewed marginalization since the continent's democratic transition because male-dominated political parties have displaced the influence of their social movements and because governments there are prioritizing economic interests over the social goals that women ran on a phenomenon known as the "remasculinization" of politics. History of Latin America demonstrates that even revolutionary republics "are as resistant to the participation of women as other states."

This is not to argue that women haven't participated in movements to radically alter politics. They have formed new social groups to protest, advocate, and voice political demands. They have been essential in the campaigns for democracy, political change, and opposition to authoritarianism, particularly in Latin America, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In the 1980s and 1990s, feminist women's groups began to take shape. Two examples are the National Women's Lobby in Zambia and GABRIELA in the Philippines [11], [12].

Though maybe supported by a feminist perspective, a large portion of women's political engagement and organizing has not been focused on gender inequality. It has been committed to economic and social concerns, such as the fight for food subsidies, job protection, human rights, and health care, that are beneficial to all people and are not gender specific. The prioritization of equality has not consistently been seen in the political discourse of women. Even in instances when women have participated in revolutionary movements with women's liberation at the forefront of their agendas, their efforts have been "limited and full of contradictions." It is more reasonable to attribute post-revolutionary advancements in women's health, education, and welfare to broader improvements in the lives of the impoverished than it is to the political involvement of women. This may be partially explained by the fact that women are just as split as males in terms of class, religion, and ethnicity rather than making up a homogenous group. For instance, "women stress their class links rather than their gender identities" in Latin America.

Class rivalry

From a Marxist standpoint, class struggle provides a theoretical explanation for instability. Their interests become more incompatible as classes within the capitalist economy and society grow. The laboring class grows in number as it gets more and more impoverished, until finally revolution is unavoidable. However, if class awareness is emerging in the Third World, it is doing so in a distinctive fashion, which presents at least some challenges to this school of thinking. It has more to do with political power than it does with who owns the means of production. The people in charge of the means of production, such as salaried bureaucrats, often deal with a peasant community that has not yet developed a class consciousness based on its social status. The issue that was previously mentioned is that those that engage in instability are often the affluent segments of society. Political instability has been caused by conflicts and crises among the newly formed middle class in the Third World. Factionalism between the propertied classes and classes controlling the state machinery, sometimes along ethnic lines, has often resulted in military takeovers or unlawful political process manipulation. Using strategies that violate the law and the constitution, segments of the middle-class fight for control of the state instead of peasants rising up against their oppressors or workers rebelling against their exploiters.

CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in this study underscores the profound impact of unmet expectations following economic downturns on political stability. It illuminates how individuals' aspirations for improved living standards, when unrealized, can lead to widespread disillusionment and unrest. Moreover, the study underscores the critical role of government responses in either exacerbating or alleviating political instability during such periods of economic uncertainty. From historical examples to contemporary case studies, the study reveals a recurring pattern wherein economic downturns give rise to social discontent and political upheaval. Whether it be the "revolution of rising expectations" following the Egyptian revolution of 1952 or the more recent challenges faced by Argentina, the study demonstrates the far-reaching consequences of economic disparity on societal stability. Furthermore, the study examines the multifaceted nature of instability, considering factors such as external influences, ethnic tensions, political culture, and socioeconomic inequality. It challenges simplistic explanations and emphasizes the need for nuanced approaches to understanding and addressing the root causes of instability.

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CHAPTER 12

EXPLORING THE MULTIFACETED DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND SOCIETAL RESPONSES

ABSTRACT:

This study delves into the multifaceted nature of political instability, particularly focusing on its roots beyond rural poverty. While rural poverty and its associated challenges in effective political participation are highlighted, the analysis expands to encompass a spectrum of factors influencing societal dynamics. The study emphasizes that no single factor can fully elucidate the complexity of political instability, stressing the contextual relevance of each component within specific geographical, historical, and socioeconomic contexts. Drawing on insights from scholars like Ake, the study explores the circumstances under which factors such as economic disparity, rapid economic development, and social divergence contribute to political instability. It argues that unmet expectations of political participants regarding social, economic, and political progress can fuel instability, especially when societal perceptions undergo significant changes due to popular mobilization. Moreover, the study examines the role of state incapacity and crises of authority in fostering instability, highlighting instances where governmental institutions fail to effectively govern and provide essential services. It discusses how state coercion, often wielded by the military, can exacerbate instability when directed against civil society. Furthermore, the study explores the importance of political institutionalization in maintaining stability, noting that the pace of institutional development must match the increasing political mobilization of societies to prevent instability. It also analyzes the phenomenon of revolutions, particularly in rural societies, where various factors such as economic dependency, ideological shifts, and external leadership play crucial roles in mobilizing peasant populations. The study underscores the intricate interplay of socioeconomic, political, and institutional factors in driving political instability. It advocates for nuanced understandings of these dynamics to inform effective strategies for promoting inclusive development and fostering political resilience in diverse contexts.

KEYWORDS:

Economic, Organization, Political Instability, Social.

INTRODUCTION

The emphasis in most of this chapter has been on the rural poor, their challenges in effective political involvement, and the crises that arise, prompting severe responses against those who wield economic and political control. However, political instability is influenced by a myriad of factors beyond just rural poverty. While the direction of causation may not always be clear, these elements play significant roles in shaping societal dynamics. No single factor alone can fully explain the complexity of these phenomena. The relevance of each component varies depending on various contextual factors such as geographical location, historical background, level of economic development, and position within the global system. Thus, it becomes imperative to discern, as Ake emphasized, the circumstances under which factors like

economic disparity, rapid economic development, or social divergence are likely to contribute to political instability. One possible explanation for the relationship between these factors and political instability arises when the expectations of political participants regarding social, economic, and political progress are not met due to changes in social organization. For instance, if vast disparities exist in pre-industrial societies and yet political stability persists, contrary to analysts' expectations, this may be attributed to the absence of equality within the prevailing social structure. In essence, understanding the intricate interplay between various factors, their contextual relevance, and their impact on societal stability is crucial for devising effective strategies to address political instability. It requires a nuanced understanding of historical, economic, and social dynamics to identify root causes and implement targeted interventions that promote inclusive development and foster political resilience [1], [2].

When societal perceptions are altered as a result of widespread mobilization among the populace, disparities in wealth and opportunity become increasingly intolerable, potentially leading to political unrest. Conversely, rapid economic expansion in modern Western nations tends to be less destabilizing because such transformations are aligned with entrenched expectations shaped by prevailing worldviews. This paradigm offers a valuable framework for understanding why certain factors may appear to be causative under specific circumstances but not others. By emphasizing the significance of how dominant actors respond to changes in society and the economy, it helps elucidate why certain groups or classes, which might be expected to harbor significant discontent, may not express overt political dissent that could undermine stability. Essentially, this perspective underscores the dynamic interplay between societal expectations, economic realities, and political stability. It highlights the role of perceptions and interpretations in shaping collective responses to socioeconomic shifts, shedding light on why certain societies may weather periods of change with relative stability while others experience upheaval.

An authority problem in the state

A "crisis of authority" or collapse of the state is the focus of another argument for instability. Third World countries often lack the ability to influence society as a whole. They have been unable to rule both legally and administratively. Although bureaucracies may possess excessive political influence, their administrative efficacy may be questionable. The state is unable to provide the services that citizens think they are paying for, collect the funds from society that it needs to fund its operations, uphold law and order, and effectively police its area. This kind of reasoning seems to be supported by Uganda's situation in the 1980s. Too many regions were ruled by bandits, outlaws, and other organizations without legal power. This is an issue in several other civilizations. The northernmost provinces of Thailand are not under the authority of the government; instead, drug lords dominate them. The state and groups that want to avoid the state's jurisdiction and the application of its laws have been engaged in a virtual civil war in Colombia. In "the already fragile post-colonial state," crises, the eroding of legitimacy and security, and violent civil strife result from "new" governments' inability to extend effective political power, maintain order, and extract resources for the provision of public goods across their territories.

The causes of state incapacity are many. Colonialism undermined, dispersed, or eliminated preexisting social control mechanisms. Organizations that challenge and potentially undermine the authority of the state's executive branch have been established by state leaders. Powerful families, foreign businesses, affluent peasants, chiefs, landowners, bosses, clan leaders, castes, and "strongmen" have all shown their ability to withstand governmental rule in strong societies. This perspective on political unrest and civic unrest might conflate cause and effect. The same factors—ethnocentrism, social unrest, and foreign military intervention—that are cited as the

results of state failure can also—and perhaps more persuasively—be viewed as the causes of state incompetence and the fall of previously strong states, like Lebanon before the middle of the 1970s. This is not to argue that the social and economic factors that have pushed for the dismantling of state control won't become worse as a result of its collapse.

Furthermore, rather than those in charge of extralegal forms of coercion, such as opposition groups or criminal organizations, instability is often the product of the acts of those in charge of the state's coercive machinery. The most prominent example of this is the military. The state's coercive machinery turns against its civil masters, not because it is so weak that it cannot withstand an external challenge to the state's authority, which is why there is an authority crisis. The amount of money spent on weapons by Third World countries has strengthened the coercive machinery of the state. The political pressures that the military forces in developing nations are able to apply seem to have a greater influence on such spending than security considerations. It prevents the emergence of "strong and independent social and political institutions," tips the scales in favor of the military, and "results in state institutions and elite groups being bent to the purposes of the institutions of organized violence." Stability stems from the strong state, not the weak one [3], [4].

Zimbabwe's recent history demonstrates that governments have the same power as opposition groups to destabilize a nation. In an effort to maintain control, President Mugabe's government has weakened the judiciary's independence, imposed extensive new security measures, outlawed free speech, incited illegal farm occupations and the killing of their owners, politicized law enforcement, and incited Zanu-PF war veterans to use violence and intimidation against supporters of the opposition. These actions have resulted in political killings, kidnappings, wrongful detentions, and assaults. The military has issued a warning, stating that it would not support a president who had different policies from President Mugabe. As a consequence, certain parts of the population are now at risk of famine, there is almost 100% inflation, and the rate of unemployment is rising.

Institutionalization of politics

In emerging nations, political institutions are crucial for stability. Huntington was the first to realize the importance of institutional development. According to him, the most significant political effect of modernization in a pre-industrial society is a sharp rise in political involvement and mobilization. Such engagement requires an equal degree of institutional growth if political instability is to be avoided. In poorer nations, this had not often occurred. Conversely, "the modernizing countries have become a common place to witness institutional decay." Political institutions that have developed more slowly than the pace at which new socioeconomic groups are getting politically mobilized have resulted in violence and instability.

It is difficult for demands to be directed via legal and effective channels in the absence of functional political institutions. According to Huntington, political involvement and instability are related in the following ways:

Social dissatisfaction = Social mobilization = Economic growth

Social dissatisfaction = Political engagement Mobility prospects

Political engagement equates to political unrest and institutionalization

This explanation has a tautological aspect, which is problematic. The term "institutionalization" describes a method for handling dispute in a controlled and amicable manner. It encompasses more than simply the establishment of institutions. The institutionalization argument

essentially says that stability will occur if people and organizations are willing to engage in politics by following the rules and living with the consequences of doing so. If political institutions are unable to accommodate a rise in involvement, instability results; yet, instability is a sign that institutionalization is not yet fully matured. Stated differently, when there is no instability, there will be stability. We are left in need of an explanation for why individuals need to act in a manner that is not authorized by the constitution.

Third World Revolution

Revolution is the ultimate expression of political unrest. A revolution entails the overthrow of a political government and the establishment of a new social order. New organizational structures and ideologies are needed. Mostly along class lines, religion has a major role in mobilizing solidarity; this is shown in the instance of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria and Iran. Current political and social structures—particularly those pertaining to property relations—are criticized for being exploitative and repressive. An alternative social structure is the goal.

According to Shanin, "peasant revolt has been central to every successful self-generated revolution for over a century," taking place in a "developing society." The hunt for the prerequisites for a peasant-based revolution has dominated examination of similar occurrences. Historians and social scientists have questioned why these should happen in some civilizations but not in others that seem to have similar social and economic conditions that are a priori assumed to be prone to cause revolution. Thus, in mostly agricultural civilizations, the hunt has been for the necessary circumstances associated with revolution. Four primary features of the processes leading up to the twentieth-century revolutions are identified by Shanin: a major crisis that severely disrupted society and its daily operations; a major crisis that affected the ability of the ruling class to govern; a crystallization of classes and subclasses manifested in a sharp rise in class-based militancy, organization, and self-identification; and an effective revolutionary organization that led the political struggle.

The rationale for the crises and the increase in class activism remains unexplained despite this classification of the immediate preconditions. According to Goldstone et al., the budgetary crisis, elite conflict and alienation, and pervasive grievances that contribute to public support for change that may be organized against the government are the causes of state disintegration. The establishment of a coalition of intellectuals, students, white-collar and blue-collar workers, and professionals is necessary for the revolutionary movement to succeed. For instance, the Iranian leadership was unable to manage inflation due to the country's massive debt accumulation. The ecclesiastical elite and the merchant class were alienated by the government's corruption, persecution, and exclusion of the middle classes from positions of authority. Economic prospects were outpaced by population expansion and urbanization, which left society open to the mobilisation of nationalist Islamic doctrine. The downfall of the Shah's government was caused by an alliance of Westernized and traditional elites.

DISCUSSION

The other characteristics of the susceptible condition influence the crisis's importance. "Exclusive" nations are susceptible if they limit political power to people and dynasties, marginalize democratic processes, keep other elites out of decision-making, and provide no chances for reform. Such regimes are forced to use external support from foreign powers and repression during times of crisis, which alienates moderate political opposition and increases the attractiveness of revolutionary action in the lack of other political options. States that engage in extensive economic intervention are particularly susceptible to criticism for both their political and economic shortcomings. Every facet of society becomes politicized, and any

socioeconomic stratum might fall prey to mishandled government policies. Because of their failed interventionism and political exclusivity, pre-revolutionary Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines were all at risk. They were unable to be saved by military repression or outside assistance from the USA. In Iran and Nicaragua, moderate opposition was undermined or eliminated, which radicalized other segments of society, particularly the clergy and students. Moderate political opponents in the Philippines were able to contain the effect of revolutionary upheaval inside the political sphere and were tolerated.

The Mexican revolution of 1910, the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the Vietnamese revolution, the Algerian liberation struggles of the 1950s, and the Cuban revolution of 1958 were among the major social and political upheavals of the twentieth century that fought with peasant support that had an impact on Shanin. Despite having studied revolutions, Wolfe's analysis makes a distinction between the factors that lead to peasant uprisings and rebellions and the circumstances that turn these events into catalysts for revolution: the shift "from a movement aimed at the redress of wrongs, to the attempted overthrow of society itself." While peasants first fight to right wrongs, "the injustices they rebel against are but parochial manifestations of great social dislocations," according to the author. Rebellion therefore quickly leads to revolution and large-scale activities intended to alter society as a whole.

Agrarian revolutions have historically coincided with the rise of capitalism and the commercialization of agriculture. The delicate balance of the peasantry is endangered by the commodityization of labor, land, and riches.

The emergence of capitalism in politics leads to a new problem in the exercise of power. Groups involved in labor sales and the manufacture of commodities threaten the status quo of power. When people in positions of economic power do not yet possess political legitimacy and those who do possess it are fast losing it, a political vacuum result. A central administrative authority fills the political void by pitting the competing factions against one another in an effort to get the upper hand. The market pressures that gradually eroded traditional forms of authority in the peasant village often benefited those in positions of power [5], [6].

When the mutual assistance between peasants and landowners is rendered unnecessary by market forces operating in the economy, a fresh political crisis for the peasantry arises. Because they are unaware of or unconcerned with the situation of the disturbed population, new economic groupings are oblivious to it even if they may be receptive to market pressures. The peasants is rebellious because of these circumstances. In order to resist the intensification of exploitation through increased workloads, declining real wages, victimization of trade unionists, police harassment, loss of land, or increases in rents and taxes, the rural and urban poor may resort to extra-constitutional action, sometimes involving violence, known as "rebellion." In this case, political involvement is transient. The goal is to right a wrong. An ideology or long-term blueprint for a major shift in social and economic relations does not exist.

What makes the peasants a force for revolution? Prior to discontenting into a revolutionary movement, political action must be redirected and focused by an ideology. But it's crucial to remember that a revolution's conclusion does not always imply that its reasons were met, even when the revolution's philosophy is reflected in it. Furthermore, ideology is not always prioritized in order to avoid upsetting significant revolutionary coalition members or drawing attention from the government for repression. It's possible that tactical factors will prevail over ideological ones. Furthermore, a revolution won't always be typified by a single, cohesive philosophy; in Iran, the Philippines, or Nicaragua, for instance, no one ideology brought the whole populace together.

Second, in order to start a revolution, peasants need outside leadership. In contrast to the peasant's tendency to look to a vanished "golden age" for inspiration, a coalition of peasants, intellectuals, students, professionals, clerics, and industrial workers—whose class distinctions may be very fluid—is essential for supplying a forward-looking revolutionary consciousness. This is supported by Goodwin and Skocpol for Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua, and by White for Vietnam. Typically, revolutionary leadership manifests as a paramilitary political party or as a military force known as "intelligentsia-in-arms." It was up to the army in Algeria and Mexico to keep the new government stable. The party was responsible for restructuring the social structure and the state in China, Vietnam, and Russia.

Thirdly, a social interchange between a revolutionary organization and the peasants is necessary for a revolution to occur. Understanding the reasons for encouraging peasants to take part in revolutionary conflicts revolves upon the interaction that exists between the leaders of revolutionary organizations and the peasantry. Migdal disapproves of theories that center on "frustration with deprivation," "ideological altruism," or the idea that peasants are a passive group that yields to "the cajoling or coercion of outsiders." He emphasizes how the peasants and revolutionary groups are interdependent. With the advantages provided as inducements to engage in revolutionary activity, the peasantry attempts to find solutions to local issues. The peasantry faces numerous challenges and crises that render them vulnerable to revolutionary leadership. These arise from their heightened involvement in economic markets, which carries risks related to monopolistic merchants, corruption, and economic instability. In other words, their economic network is "full of shortcomings and injus- tices." The peasants will be more receptive to foreign revolutionary organizers the quicker their traditional social structure is disrupted.

On the other hand, revolutionaries must enlist more peasants in order to increase their influence. They must be able to demonstrate that they can provide the needs of the peasants. Given the dangers involved, not to mention the possibility of harsh reprisal by the state, this must be higher than other political groups. Providing the necessities for peasants involves providing alternatives to the socio-economic structures that the revolution will replace. According to Migdal's research, revolutionary groups provided social services like health care and education, public utilities like roads, communications, and irrigation ditches, cooperatives, harvest labor, marketing arrangements, land reform, and—most importantly—the overthrow of monopolistic merchants, corrupt officials, and landlords. Additionally, revolutionary groups like armies and parties provide chances for social mobility.

Governmental instability and social contact between revolutionary groups and prospective recruits are intertwined. When the government misses its chance to gain clout among disgruntled rural people, revolutionary groups like those in southern Vietnam and northern Thailand may be able to intervene. Fourth, there is revolutionary potential in the rural society's class structure. In an attempt to determine what conditions, lead the peasants to become revolutionary, Alavi made comparisons between the peasant movements in India and the revolutions in China and Russia. Alavi also questioned, "What roles different sections of the peasantry play in revolutionary situations," acknowledging that the peasantry is not a homogenous mass. He was especially interested in the roles of the "middle" and "poor" peasantry, as well as the circumstances that would probably cause the latter to organize for revolution. Sharecroppers without property who labor on land that is held by landowners but not farmed are known as poor peasants. Among them are agricultural laborers who work for wealthy peasants. Independent smallholders with sufficient land ownership and labor force to support themselves are known as middle peasants. Due to their enormous land holdings, wealthy peasants must exploit wage labor. So, rather than only being differentiated by riches

or poverty, these three kinds of peasants are also differentiated by their forms of production. Even if these categories overlap, Alavi's argument depends on the differentiation between the poor peasants' subordination and dependency and the middle peasants' economic independence.

When it comes to the first phases of class warfare, impoverished peasants in Russia, China, and India are the least revolutionary. Extreme economic dependence and a submissive attitude are major contributors to this. However, when middle peasantry takes anti-rich peasant or anti-landlord stances, the poor peasantry's militancy and spirit might be galvanized. Before impoverished peasants become revolutionary, they must be taught that it is possible to oppose the authority of landowners. When a revolution gains traction, the middle class peasants, who are originally the most ardent, may start to worry for their own interests [7], [8].

There were two significant differences between Alavi's results and Wolfe's conclusions. First, it was discovered that in order to oppose the authority of bosses and landlords, impoverished peasants and laborers without land needed outside assistance. It was the Yucatan Constitutionalist army in Mexico, the Red Army in China, and the return of army personnel to their communities in Russia. "The poor peasant and landless laborer are under near-complete constraint when such external power is absent; they have latitude of movement when it is present." Second, Wolfe concurs with Alavi that middle-class peasants possess the independence to oppose the authority of their masters; nevertheless, he also puts peasants in outlying regions, regardless of their socioeconomic status, within this group. In such locations the impoverished might augment their resources via temporary employment, smuggling and livestock-raising which, not being under external supervision, provide the peasants some ‘latitude of movement’. The revolutionary potential of impoverished peasants is further strengthened when they are situated in places that the state finds it difficult to govern, such as border areas. The ‘tactical mobility’ of the peasantry in such areas as Morelos in Mexico, Kabylia in Algeria and Oriente Province in Cuba was further enhanced by ethnic or linguistic identity: ‘Ethnic distinctions enhance the solidarity of the rebels; possession of a special linguistic code provides for an autonomous system of communication’.

Finally, revolution in rural countries is predicated on the danger to the peasants from the upper classes. Wolfe characterizes the middle peasants as those who adhere to the concept subsequently supplied by Barrington Moore of revolutionary potential under the effect of commercial agriculture.

The middle peasants in the countries studied by Wolfe were most vulnerable to the changes brought about by commercialization population growth, competition from other landlords, the loss of rights to grazing land and water, falling prices, interest payments and foreclosures while remaining locked into traditional social structures of mutual aid between kin and neighbours. Moore’s research contrasted countries in which revolution happened with those where it did not despite it may have been anticipated to. A variety of hypotheses proposing explanations of why peasant-based revolutions happened were examined to identify ‘what sorts of social structures and historical conditions promote peasant revolutions and which ones block or prevent them’ .

First, a number of reasonable theories were dismissed. The theory that revolution among the peasantry occurs when the situation of the peasantry deteriorates markedly under the impact of commerce and industry is dis- missed because of the case of India, where the deterioration in the economic position of the peasantry during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was as great as in China but where the political behaviour of the Indian peas- antry was very different. The proposition that ‘a large rural proletariat of landless labour is a potential source of

insurrection and revolution' also falls foul of the historical evidence from China, where the 'revolutionary upsurges of 1927 and 1949 were certainly not those of a rural proletariat working huge landed estates'.

Religion may be regarded to be the important determinant, with Hinduism accounting for the passivity of the Indian peasants. However, Moore contends that religions teaching resignation, acceptance, fatalism and the validity of the social and political system are the creation of urban and priestly elites and by no means inevitably part of peasant views. Even if heretical movements in Asia have burst out from time to time, they have not universally followed large peasant uprisings. Moore's conclusion is that such interpretations have placed too much on the acts of the peasants and not enough on the actions of the higher classes. What decided whether the peasants was revolutionary was the reaction of the upper class to the challenge of commercial agriculture. Revolution is most probable when the aristocracy hurts the interests of the peasants as a class by extracting a higher surplus from it, but leaves it intact by failing to establish a sufficiently significant economic urge in the countryside [9], [10]. When the commercial interest in rural living is sufficiently powerful to eliminate the peasants as a class, peasant-based revolution is less probable. Revolution in largely agricultural societies had happened when the landed classes by and large did not make a successful transition to the sphere of commerce and industry and did not undermine the prevalent social organization among the peasants.

CONCLUSION

This study provides a comprehensive examination of political instability, revealing its multifaceted nature and the diverse array of factors contributing to its onset. While rural poverty and its associated challenges in political involvement are significant, the analysis expands beyond this singular focus to encompass broader societal dynamics.

The study emphasizes the contextual relevance of various factors such as economic disparity, rapid economic development, and social divergence in shaping instability, underscoring the importance of understanding these dynamics within specific historical, geographical, and socioeconomic contexts. Moreover, the study sheds light on the role of state incapacity and crises of authority in fueling instability, highlighting the detrimental effects of governmental failures in governing and providing essential services. Furthermore, the study underscores the significance of political institutionalization in maintaining stability, stressing the need for institutional development to match the increasing political mobilization of societies. Additionally, the study delves into the complexities of revolutions, particularly in rural contexts, where external leadership, ideological shifts, and socioeconomic grievances converge to mobilize peasant populations. Ultimately, the study advocates for nuanced understandings of these complex dynamics to inform strategies aimed at promoting inclusive development and fostering political resilience. By addressing the root causes of instability and adopting context-specific approaches, policymakers and practitioners can work towards building more stable and resilient societies.

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CHAPTER 13

UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRATIZATION DYNAMICS: FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO PLURALIST DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT:

In the wake of global shifts away from authoritarian regimes towards pluralist democracy, there is renewed interest in understanding the prerequisites for stable democratic systems. The so-called "third wave" of democracy has seen significant transformations, with the percentage of nations having democratic governments rising from 28% in 1974 to 61% in 1998. While Latin America has experienced strong democratization, efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East have been more modest. This study delves into the complex process of democratization, examining the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and the challenges of consolidation. Definitions of democracy vary, from Western liberal ideals to practical criteria such as free and fair elections and freedom of expression. The transition to democracy is influenced by various factors, including elite power struggles, internal crises, and external pressures. Successful transitions often involve negotiations between opposition forces and incumbent authorities. However, democratization does not always lead to liberal democracy, with many newly democratic nations facing challenges such as weak institutions, poverty, and political inequality. Economic prosperity is often linked to democratic stability, with studies showing a positive correlation between socioeconomic progress and the presence of stable democracies. Despite some exceptions, the overall trend suggests that well-developed societies are more likely to support and maintain democratic systems.

KEYWORDS:

Authoritarianism, Democracy, Democratization, Economic, Political.

INTRODUCTION

Interest in determining the requirements for stable democracy has resurfaced in light of recent changes that have moved away from authoritarianism personal dictatorships, military control, one-party systems, and racial oligarchies and toward pluralist democracy. Political scientists have always been interested in determining the prerequisites for democratic regimes to survive, but this is especially important now because there are several efforts underway to develop or reestablish Western liberal democracy in numerous regions of the globe. The so-called "third wave" of democracy, which began in Portugal in 1974 and spread to much of the Third World and southern and eastern Europe, has engulfed developing nations. The Third World has seen notable transformations as a result of the most recent wave of democracy, which raised the percentage of nations having democratic governments worldwide from 28% in 1974 to 61% in 1998. Though it has fluctuated since 1980, democracy has been felt most strongly throughout Latin America. Asia has democratized significantly as well. Sub-Saharan Africa's efforts to democratize have been relatively modest, and it has fallen behind. There has been relatively little attempt at democratization in the Middle East. In the Arab world, there are few free or democratic nations among governments where the main population is Muslim, and there are no real democracies or free societies [1], [2].

The road toward democracy has not been an easy one. As more nations join the ranks of recently democratizing states, others experience setbacks in the form of coups or ethnic violence that topples governments. There were 18 countries in 2001 that experienced setbacks in terms of political rights and civil liberties, all but one of them in the Third World, including Trinidad and Tobago, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Other countries that experience gains in these areas include Taiwan, where free and fair elections are held, Peru, where media freedoms are allowed, and Oman, where women have more economic opportunities.

Political science has made a broad distinction between the transition to democracy, or a specific kind of change and its historical antecedents and causes, and consolidation, or the conditions required for democratic regimes, particularly those that follow an authoritarian period, to survive, in order to account for the process of democratization and its setbacks. A little about democracy must be spoken before looking at efforts to generalize and theorize about various stages of democratization.

Definitions of democracy

Western liberal definitions of "democracy" are used in research on Third World democratization. For instance, before a system of government is deemed democratic, Diamond et al. require it to offer significant and widespread competition between individuals and groups, extremely inclusive levels of political participation in the choice of leaders and policies, and civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure such competition and participation. However, they also acknowledge that different countries may meet these requirements to varying degrees and that rules and principles may be tainted by practice. Instead of focusing on philosophical ideals, Rueschmeyer et al. search for practical solutions, such as "modest" popular participation in government through representative parliaments, the government's accountability to parliament, free and fair elections on a regular basis, freedom of expression and association, and universal suffrage.

The diversity of regimes labeled democratic and the nature of the democratic deficit present in many of them are among the factors contributing to the difficulty of comprehending democratization. Even though parliaments have circumvented presidential decrees, the executive branch has disregarded constitutional boundaries, and non-elected entities like the military have been granted veto powers, these and other deviations from the democratic ideal can still qualify a regime as either new or restored democracies. Because of these variances, it is difficult to link democratization as a dependent variable to theories that are put up to describe the process, particularly consolidation.

The disputed nature of the idea of democracy presents another issue for the examination of democratization. Definitions often make reference to the existence of certain phenomena, such as protocols, acknowledged human rights, broad involvement, and material equality. There are two different ideas about democracy: formal and substantive. Certain individuals define democracy as "meaningful political citizenship." The investigator's perspective on democracy influences the analysis of democratization [3], [4].

The shift to democracy

Since authoritarian to democratic transitions have been so variable, it is difficult to identify trends that might help with explanation. The mechanisms by which democratic replacements are introduced and the reasons why authoritarian regimes fall apart may sometimes be confused, adding to this complexity. For instance, Potter et al. categorize the three "routes" to democracy as follows: "modernization," which emphasizes the economic requirements for democracy; "structural," which focuses on the effects of changes in class and power on

authoritarianism; and "transition," which emphasizes the negotiations between elites that negotiate the transition to democracy. It is challenging to discern between the definition of a phase, like transition, and its causes because of these misunderstandings. Moreover, there are situations in which the conceptual distinction between transition and consolidation is blurred, such as when transitional explanations are used to determine whether a democracy has solidified. Additionally, it has been challenging to discern between the factors that lead to authoritarian collapse and the shape that change is being negotiated into.

Although the word "trigger" may not be the most appropriate given that the reasons of democratization may be long-, medium-, or short-term, it is helpful to first examine what "triggers" the end of authoritarianism and a shift towards a democratic alternative. In this case, the primary argument has been between theories that highlight the significance of struggle within the authoritarian elite and those that highlight internal or external pressure to oppose authoritarianism. not or not the democratic threat originates from civil society mobilization or internal regime struggle depends on the characteristics of the authoritarian regime.

All breakdowns within authoritarian regimes have been marked by disunity as coalitions break down due to disagreements over goals, strategies, and policies without any means of resolving conflicts amicably: "the danger for authoritarian regimes is that the weak-ness of institutional procedures for resolving disputes creates significant potential for instability." Numerous democratic revolutions have been preceded by elite strife, which has made opposition forces aware of the potential for transformation. Then, a change is started from above. Rather than being toppled, authoritarian governments crumble. Only seldom does public outcry or revolutionary action put an end to authoritarianism. Above-the-ground changes have historically resulted in democracy. Authoritarian governments may be overthrown by revolutions, but democracy is seldom the result. Mass movements often face anti-democratic opposition from the entrenched élites when they attempt reform. Even that popular mobilization and mass participation might be detrimental to the development of democracy has been suggested. At least in Latin America, democratization entails the formation of "pacts" between opposition and regime officials that provide some level of protection for the parties' respective interests, including labor unions on the opposition side and the government's military on the government side.

DISCUSSION

Critics have criticized those who emphasize the value of human agency and the elites' role in navigating the shift from authoritarianism for having an overly limited understanding of democracy, minimizing the impact of mass movements, and giving insufficient consideration to structural elements like economic development levels that may be responsible for both the decline of authoritarianism and the subsequent barriers to democratic consolidation. Other academics have argued that, even when members of various political and economic élites predominate in the subsequent negotiations that design the new democratic regimes, authoritarian regimes are destabilized by pressures from the public protest and industrial and political action by trade unions. Examples of countries where transitions have been primarily sparked by mass protests in which church leaders, trade unions, professional groups, human rights activists, student and youth organizations, and traditional politicians have all been involved are Peru, Argentina, the Philippines, South Korea, and some African states.

More often than not, authoritarian governments use tightly regulated organizations such as political parties, labor unions, youth clubs, business associations, and cultural agencies to enlist the support of the populace. When political mobilization takes the form of mass movements seeking some degree of autonomy from the state, political parties, labor unions, and other

organizations become threats to the regime. These kinds of public mobilizations are often sparked by economic growth or disaster. In the fight against authoritarianism, popular involvement via social movements including women's groups, labor unions, community organizations, and indigenous associations was crucial. The examples of South Korea and a few other "Asian Tigers" demonstrate how economic prosperity may give rise to new social groupings and élites that desire greater access to resources and power.

Therefore, popular mobilization has accompanied certain successful transitions, and democratization which has happened despite political extremism and violence has not required "moderation" on the side of the working class. This might be the result of authoritarian elites realizing that, as opposed to choosing between democracy and further repression, they can choose between democratic reform and revolution. In a similar vein, the fear of extremism may unite moderate opposition leaders. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the elite's dominance in transitional talks meant that civil society or public pressure had no role in the causes of authoritarian collapse. Authoritarian governments often face opposition from the populace. Elites may control the process of negotiating and reaching agreements, but they also speak for non-élites, such as laborers, campaigners, professionals, and peasants, whose rights are unalienable and whose political activity is the focus of the negotiation process. Stressing the elites' involvement in negotiating political change also runs the risk of making the process seem arbitrary and voluntaristic, which makes developing a theory of transition very challenging: "If individual actors possess omnipotence, not only does this negate the importance of paying attention to others outside of these actors, but it also virtually eliminates the possibility of developing a theory of change."

An additional issue with explaining democratic transition through power struggles within the ruling bloc or alliance is that it does not adequately account for the way in which bureaucrats, the military, labor, representatives of the property owning classes, and other social entities form and dissolve alliances. These changes result from the unavoidable uncertainty regarding how the retreat from authoritarianism would affect various socioeconomic interests [5], [6]. Another common catalyst for the shift to democracy is an internal crisis, such as a military defeat or an economic downturn.

Authoritarian regime collapses have often been accompanied by economic crises brought on by incompetent economic management and external pressure. Reactions to the crisis via policy changes, such devaluation, then have negative effects for regime-supporting groups that have already been disadvantaged by the crisis. Consequently, the price of authoritarian authority rises as domestic legitimacy declines. On the other hand, autocratic regimes can believe that the dangers of revolution or democracy have diminished. Mainwaring uses the phrases "collapse," "transaction," and "extrication" to differentiate across different élite motivational kinds in Latin America.

An authoritarian government may fall due to external factors, such as the desire to gain international legitimacy or meet political reform demands that are made in exchange for further development support from bilateral and multilateral aid organizations. Alternately, like in Panama, a foreign power may impose democracy.

The present democratic wave is mostly a reaction to the USSR's disintegration, increased economic globalization, and the predominance of neo-liberal philosophy. worldwide forces such as trade embargoes, economic sanctions, worldwide ideological pressures, global recessions, "contagion," and, in rare cases, military action, may work in tandem with internal causes to bring down an authoritarian dictatorship. The way that local political and economic players, institutions, and structures were connected to foreign geopolitical forces has

determined how these international factors had an impact on democratizing regimes. Liberalization, which eases repression and recognizes the freedom to political association, is often used to describe the fall of authoritarian governments. Civil society is "resurrected" gradually. The parties reappear. However, the major feature of transition is the bargaining that takes place to create the new political structure between members of the opposition and the incumbent authority. As in Mexico, dominant élites may determine that democratic reform would serve their own interests and hence yield to democratic change. Alternatively, they may have to give way under pressure from the opposition, which contributed to Argentina's transition away from military administration. Negotiations to eliminate authoritarianism are then led by opposition organizations. Transition is often characterized by negotiations between opponents and representatives of the previous authority. The history of Latin America demonstrates that peaceful transitions were often negotiated by middle-class individuals on both sides who were prepared to make concessions to suit one another's interests.

Agreements and discussions have an impact on the standard of the democracy that is established. For example, the interests of individuals who seek more involvement, accountability, and equality are unlikely to prevail during the transition period when transition calls for agreements that safeguard the interests of groups and classes represented by authoritarian elites. Understanding the potential for widespread participation in transition makes it clear that many of the political figures negotiating the shift to democracy have popular support, and that their roles cannot be understood in a vacuum from the constituencies they represent and are indebted to. However, the specific role that social forces and their leaders play in the shift to democracy will vary depending on the kind of authoritarian government that has to be overthrown as well as the characteristics of the society in which it is situated. Gill's theory of transition integrates data regarding regime and non-regime elites, the latter of whom get their influence from their standing in civil society, by differentiating between various forms of political society and regime.

Regimes are either "segmentary," with various interests backing the regime in conflict, or "unitary," in the face of difficulties. Either "atomized" or "civilized" societies have autonomous structures that allow for the expression of interests and the exercise of some degree of popular control.

The chances for a political system's transition to democracy and the course that will be followed are determined by its standing with respect to these two elements. Democracy is less probable when there is a unitary system and an atomized population because the regime is better equipped to handle threats to its authority and the people is unable to mount a strong enough resistance. Comparatively, there are more chances for democratization when a segmented system and civil society are together. Violence is likely to occur when a powerful civil society faces a military dictatorship. Lastly, in an atomized society, a segmented system presents slim chances for democracy. Here, further authoritarianism is likely to emerge after the fall of the last one.

Three primary concerns must be addressed in order to negotiate the end of authoritarianism: the creation of a constitutional settlement, the deconstruction of authoritarian government entities, and the repeal of laws that are inappropriate for democratic politics. Five sets of elements determine the likelihood of successful negotiations on these institutional improvements. First, there is the kind of authoritarian government that has to be overthrown. It will be simpler to overthrow a military dictatorship that takes care of things rather than one that is radical or reformist. Depending on the degree of integration between the party, the state, and civil society, one-party governments provide challenges. Second, the capacity of opposition organizations to envision a democratic future instead of just opposing

authoritarianism will have an impact on discussions. The arrangement of institutions and political structures under authoritarianism, as well as the degree to which parties, legislatures, constitutions, and established political power have endured under such governance, include a third category of variables.

Fourthly, the course of transition is determined by the shifting views on change held by influential groups representing various facets of civil society as well as major élites such as governments, juntas, bureaucrats, military personnel, and opposition leaders. These perspectives dictate whether the process of democracy will be spearheaded by the government's elite, or whether it will be propelled by grassroots or middle-class forces. The process of resolving conflicts comes last. Relationships between procedure and results have been observed to exhibit patterns. It has been discovered that a transitional process marked by gradual rather than rapid change, moderation rather than radicalism on the part of protagonists, consensus rather than conflict over the objectives of democratization, and a balance of power between negotiating groups strengthens the viability of new democratic regimes. These patterns, however, are far from stable, and studies of their precise action in certain circumstances have only led to the generation of speculative conclusions.

After negotiations, a temporary administration is finally established while the institutions of democracy are established and the elites modify their political behavior to conform to liberal democratic norms. The point at which the transition ends and consolidation begins is inherently ambiguous, in part because varying observers interpret democracy's essential features differently and because change is not always signaled by a "focal event."

The causes of conflict inside authoritarian regimes, the ways in which authoritarian leaders have responded to calls for political reform, the pace of transition, and the actions of élites, political parties, and civil society organizations have all been very varied throughout transitions.

The transitional administration inherits a variety of structural factors, including ties between states and classes, informal interest groups, political institutions, and societal division, among others, which provide the process of consolidation with "structured contingencies."

The underlying presumptions of the notion of a "transition" to democracy have come under intense scrutiny. Assuming that a transition always leads to democracy is risky. Most "third wave" nations lack "well-functioning" democracies, have significant weaknesses in their democratic systems, and are not "clearly headed toward democracy." Adjectives such as semi, formal, façade, faux, weak, partial, illiberal, and virtual should not be used to fit these flaws into the "transition" model since the politics of these nations call into question the whole paradigm. There has been no increase in voting-related involvement or accountability. Attempts at democracy have often been made in weak nations when democratization and state development have not been compatible. The degree of protection afforded to civil and political rights varies widely. There are constant challenges to the rule of law. Given the extent of poverty, one must question if a sizable portion of the populace in recently democratic republics really enjoys full citizenship. Pro-democracy groups are weak, elections have little effect on the political system in Africa, and political and economic problems impede reform. Persistent poverty and the marginalization and exclusion of significant segments of society have undermined political equality and participatory democracy in Latin America and Africa. In Asia, democracy has not replaced authoritarianism; rather, it has "softened" it [7], [8].

Consequently, even while electoral democracy is universally accepted, it hasn't always been accompanied by "liberal" democracy, pluralism, the protection of individual and group freedoms, accountability, the rule of law, and judicial independence. In actuality, political and

civil liberties have decreased even as the number of electoral democracies has increased, leaving democracy "shallow, illiberal, and poorly institutionalized." From change, several forms of democracy may arise.

These criticisms of the transition model, which primarily aims to identify the elements that subvert authoritarianism and the political processes involved in the negotiations of a new government, may come out as harsh. However, the criticisms do highlight the fact that a significant portion of the issue with democratic consolidation is that, in many instances, the regime being consolidated lacks true democratic credentials. This is likely to remain the case as long as the government must keep political liberties from interfering with the financial interests of privileged groups.

The strengthening of democracy

Consolidating democracy involves extending democratic procedures, fortifying democratic institutions, and averting authoritarian backward movements. In order to boost public involvement and make it harder for the élites to control democratic institutions, democratic practices need to be injected into political institutions and civil society. One way to do this is by giving organizations greater authority inside civil society. Rejecting authoritarian political ideologies and neutralizing authoritarian political actors are necessary. "Perverse institutions," such as mentoring by non-democratic élites, limitations on the authority to enact laws, and methods of recruiting political candidates that give certain minority groups an outsized voice on legislative bodies, have to be eliminated.

Consolidation indicates that political behavior has become routine and institutionalized in terms of democracy. No meaningful organizations use unlawful, undemocratic, or unconstitutional methods to further their objectives. Democracy is seen by elites and the general public as the best form of government for determining political succession. There is now a democratic political culture where the prevailing political values are tolerance, trust, and compromise. Different explanations have emphasized political or socioeconomic issues, such as foreign interference. The subsequent sections address consolidation explanations in terms of these several sets of characteristics, acknowledging that it might be difficult to extrapolate consolidation forecasts from one region—Latin America—to another—Africa [9], [10].

The financial prerequisites for the strengthening of democracy

The view that economic prosperity and associated social transformation are necessary to increase the likelihood of democratic consolidation is supported by a large body of data. Lipset was the first to statistically prove this point, demonstrating that indicators of economic development and prosperity are positively correlated with the durability of democratic democracy. Measures of industrialization, such as the percentage of the population still engaged in agriculture, and measures of social development, such as literacy rates, educational enrollment, and levels of urbanization, were combined with indicators of wealth, such as per capita income, the percentage of the population owning motor cars, and the number of doctors, radios, and telephones per thousand people. Europe, the English-speaking world, and Latin America all showed correlations with democratic stability.

According to Lipset's assessment, the connections showed that wealth decreased dissatisfaction among the lower classes. He contended that his data supported the long-held belief that the majority of people could only engage in politics intelligently and learn the self-control required to resist giving in to the seductions of reckless politicians in a wealthy society where a small percentage of people actually lived in poverty.

Higher levels of education, urbanization, and industrialization were also seen in nations with more democratic systems of government. According to Lipset, economic growth produced improved educational opportunities and more economic security, which in turn allowed for "longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics." Furthermore, "by increasing the extent to which the lower strata are exposed to cross pressures which will reduce the intensity of their commitment to given ide-ologies and make them less receptive to supporting extremist ones," income and education gains also contribute to pluralism.

The middle class grows as a result of economic progress, and they have an interest in reducing conflict. They may achieve this by supporting moderate political parties and discouraging radical ones. Other classes are also impacted by economic progress. The likelihood that the upper class will deny the lower class their political rights decrease with their level of income. The richer a nation gets, the less meaningful any redistribution would be; losing political office would become less consequential, making nepotism and other non-democratic methods of retaining power obsolete. Furthermore, Lipset maintained that plenty creates chances for political engagement, outreach, and recruitment as well as opposing sources of power, all of which strengthen democracy [11], [12].

On the other hand, it was shown that the authoritarian governments and shaky democracies of Europe had advanced farther in their growth than the democracies Lipset compiled from Latin America. Lipset's approach had a flaw in that it identified correlation without correctly determining the direction of causation. It did not use multivariate analysis, which made it possible to assess the causative weight of variables by adjusting for other causation factors. Lipset's results only revealed a trend toward causation. Therefore, there are issues with Lipset's explanation, even if it seems plausible that as a society becomes wealthier, there would be less unhappy individuals and a higher consensus in favor of the status quo of democracy.

However, since Lipset's first publication, a great deal of quantitative research using cross-tabulations and multivariate analysis have been published, almost all of which have shown a positive correlation between democracy and different measures of socioeconomic progress. The conclusion that "high levels of socio-economic development are associated with not only the presence but the stability of democracy" has the most bearing on our understanding of political stability. Taking into account the many quantitative techniques, durations, and metrics used, "this has to be among the strongest and most resilient relationships in the study of comparative national development." Although there will always be some exceptions to the rule, Diamond felt it was safe to theorize that "the more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favour, achieve and maintain a democratic system" after conducting a thorough review of the literature and a fresh cross-tabulation of per capita GNP with type of regime.

CONCLUSION

The journey towards stable democracy is fraught with challenges and complexities. From understanding the diverse definitions of democracy to navigating the transition from authoritarianism, this study sheds light on the multifaceted nature of democratization. Elite power struggles, internal crises, and external pressures all play a role in shaping the path to democracy, with successful transitions often requiring negotiations and compromises between opposing forces. However, the mere presence of electoral democracy does not guarantee the establishment of liberal democratic norms. Many newly democratic nations grapple with weak institutions, socioeconomic inequality, and political instability. Despite these challenges, there is evidence to suggest that economic prosperity is correlated with democratic stability, highlighting the importance of socioeconomic development in fostering and maintaining

democratic systems. Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and scholars to continue examining the dynamics of democratization and consolidation, recognizing the diverse contexts and complexities involved in each case. Only through a nuanced understanding of these processes can we hope to build and sustain stable democracies worldwide.

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